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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. October 1909.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(9532.)

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9491.]

219

April to June 1909.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9491.]

[12425]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence received from the Government of India relative to the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, March 31, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

Bushire, January 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Political Agent at Koweit, describing a recent interview with Sheikh Mubarak, at which the latter asked for a loan of 2 lakhs of rupees before the 22nd March, 1909.

2. Major Knox recommends that the loan may be granted, and suggests that in connection with it the questions of quarantine at Koweit and the rent of the Agency may be considered.

3. I agree with Major Knox in recommending the loan, and may add that there would be no difficulty in finding the money from the Treasury balance with the Imperial Bank of Persia.

4. I understand that Major Cox will still be at Calcutta when this letter reaches, and will be able personally to make his recommendations on the subject to the Government of India.

5. I beg that this letter may be read in conjunction with my letters of to-day's date, with which I have the honour to forward copies of the letters to which Major Knox refers in the last paragraph of his letter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, January 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarak paid me a visit this morning welcoming me on my return to Koweit.

2. The honour was unusual and rather unexpected, as it was the morrow of the "Eed," and it would have rather been my place to have paid Sheikh Mubarak the usual

visit, congratulating him on the auspicious occasion, and I should have done so had the Sheikh not anticipated me.

3. After a long and particularly friendly conversation, the Sheikh approached me on the main object of his visit. He explained that he had been making large purchases of land, notably Fadhagiya, of which the acquisition has already been reported in this Agency diary for the week ending the 30th December, and also the purchase of Umm-al-Garab from Sheikh Sadun of the Muntafich.

4. The latter purchase was interrupted by the late Wali of Bussorah, and I am not aware that Sheikh Mubarak was again in treaty for this piece of land. The point, however, does not appear to be of any great importance for the purposes of this Report, as Sheikh Mubarak declares in short that he has recently spent, or has to meet before the end of Rabi-al-Awwal of this year (about the 20th April) a sum of £T. 92,000, approximately equivalent to 11½ lakhs of rupees.

5. He explained to me that he had plenty of money, but that it was out in merchandize, large sums had been advanced to pearl merchants, who could not at once be pressed for repayment; that his brother, Sheikh Khasal, had asked to be excused, in consequence of his expenses in regard to Hawaiza, the payment of this year's instalment of a large loan due to Sheikh Mubarak, and that the Sheikh looked to the liberality of Government to help him with a loan free of interest of 2 lakhs of rupees before the 1st of Rabi-ul-Awwal (22nd March, 1909), which would be repaid in two yearly instalments. He asked that the money might be advanced in Koweit, and that repayment would be effected in Bombay through his agent as usual.

6. Our experience of the prompt repayment of the last loan made to Sheikh Mubarak leads me to recommend with great confidence that the loan should be advanced to him. The only question that remains for consideration is whether or no any conditions should be attached to the grant. The only pending questions that can be touched with any hope of success are: (1) the rent of the present Agency; and (2) the quarantine question. In fact, the only other present question likely to cause difficulties is that of arms trade, and I fear that no concession or promise in this respect obtained in connection with the loan would be of the slightest value.

7. On each of the two questions noted above I propose to do myself the honour of addressing you separately, and would ask that my letters may be read in connection with this despatch.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Sir, *At Sea, February* 5, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Bushire Residency letter dated the 24th January, 1909, and inclosure, in which the Political Agent, Koweit, reports the Sheikh's request for the favour of a loan of 2 lakhs of rupees free of interest, under the circumstances explained.

Major Knox's recommendation has my full support, and I trust that the Government of India will see their way to accord a favourable reply to the Sheikh's request.

2. As my First Assistant observes in his covering letter, supposing that Government are pleased to grant the loan, the cash could be made available from the Treasury balance at Bushire. In case this course is decided upon I solicit early telegraphic intimation of the fact, as the Imperial Bank would require as much notice as possible of our intention to transfer the money.

3. The question of the attachment or non-attachment of conditions to the grant of the loan is being dealt with separately; but my recommendation is that the loan be granted if possible independently of any political advantage that we may be able to take of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. Z. COX, *Major,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 9, 1909.

LOAN for Sheikh of Koweit.

Please see Trevor's letters of the 24th ultimo.

We shall be glad to receive your views on Knox's proposals as early as possible.

[12427] No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th February, relative to irrigation in Mesopotamia.

India Office, March 31, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Government of India.

Sir, *Bagdad, January* 27, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sir William Willcocks has kindly allowed me to see, and take notes of, his report, dated the 1st January, 1909, to the Minister for Public Works.

I inclose, for the information of the Government of India, a brief translation of such portions of the Report as are likely to be of interest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Abstract of Report dated January 1, 1909, *submitted by Sir W. Willcocks to the Minister of Public Works, Constantinople.*

(Translation.)

THE object of the survey operations is to facilitate the preparations of the following projects:—

(1.) To restore irrigation near Babylon and Hilla by sending water down the old bed of the Euphrates. This can be done by the completion of the works at the Hindiya barrage.

(2.) To insure navigation between Bussorah and Bagdad.

(3.) To restore the ancient irrigation round Bagdad, Ctesiphon, and Seleucia by means of the Saklawie, Abu Gharaib, and Nahrwan Canals; and the protection of this irrigation against floods.

(4.) To restore the ancient irrigation round Bussorah.

(5.) To restore the ancient irrigation on the Hai Canal by means of a dam across the Tigris at Kut.

The respective levels of the water in the Tigris and Euphrates are such that all these works can be conveniently carried out.

2. Twelve engineers have been employed, of whom five are Englishmen, each of whom gets 30*l.* a-month: which is far less than was expected. All the men are well trained, and have only accepted such small pay because the work is interesting, and offers the possibility of a good career. All these engineers are working in the fields.

3. On arrival at Bagdad early in December it appeared desirable to divide the

engineers into three brigades of four each, but the Resident and British Consul-General kindly gave me a copy of a map of the Tigris between Bagdad and Bussorah, and he also lent me the "Comet" on condition that I paid for the cost of fuel. I was thus able to make a minute inspection of the river, and to start at work six brigades of two engineers each. All the engineers began to work between the 6th and 15th December, and the weather has been very favourable: consequently by the 15th January I shall have a plan of the Tigris from Bagdad to the sea, showing sections, levels, discharge, and all the details necessary for preparing project No. 2 mentioned in paragraph 1. Owing to the plan of the river given me by Colonel Ramsay, six engineers have accomplished in one month work which, without the plan, would have required twelve engineers working for three months. A great deal of work has thus been done. The three other brigades of engineers have fixed benchmarks on the Euphrates at Feluja, at the intake of the Saklawie Canal, at the Hindiya barrage, and at Hilla. A benchmark has also been fixed on the Nahrwan, near Ctesiphon.

4. Tents have been locally made.

5. A house has been rented at Bagdad.

6. By means of the information furnished to me weekly by the various parties of engineers I am able to direct the operations in the field by telegraph without losing a day of this extraordinarily good weather.

The schemes, in addition to that of improving the navigation of the Tigris already mentioned, which we hope to prepare this winter, are:—

(1.) A complete project for the Hindiya Canal.
(2.) A project for the navigation of the Tigris.
(3.) A project for a dam at Feluja and the Saklawie-Nahrwan Canal, with a navigable canal between the Euphrates and Bagdad on the Tigris.
(4.) A project to restore the ancient irrigation at Bussorah.
(5.) A project for a dam across the Tigris at Kut.

7. The Hindiya barrage has been twice examined, and the Minister of Public Works has sanctioned £T. 30,000 for repairing it. M. Cugnin has been put in charge of this work. The barrage is almost a ruin, and 240 kilom. of the Euphrates entirely owe their existence to it. We hope to make satisfactory repairs and to close the opening in the dam, which for twenty years has been the evil genius of the river.

8. Acknowledges assistance of Turkish officials.

[12424] No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th ultimo, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, March 31, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Captain Trevor to the Government of India.

Bushire, January 26, 1909.

IN continuation of correspondence ending with this Office letter dated the 10th January, 1909, regarding the French flag question at Muscat, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted letter which I have received from the Political Agent, Muscat, on the subject.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Mr. Holland to Major Cox.

Muscat, January 9, 1909.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 6th January, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of letter dated the 7th January, 1909, and its inclosure, received by me from His Highness the Sultan of Muscat.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

The Sultan of Muscat to Mr. Holland.

Dilhijar 14, 1326 (January 7, 1909).

RECEIVED your letter dated the 4th Dilhijar, 1326 (28th December, 1908), informing me of the settlement between the two Governments of the flag question by The Hague Conference. I am very thankful to your Government and then to you too.

I have received the copies of the Proclamation sent by you. Those intended for Sur have been sent through Bedr-bin-Seif. After reading it in Durbar (at Sur) the different copies were distributed among the people.

I am forwarding their letter (the people's) to you for your information.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Said-bin-Sultan, Muhammad-bin-Mubarak, Salim-bin-Musallam, Hamed-bin-Muhammad, Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, Nasir-bin-Muhammad, and the Residents of Sur to the Sultan of Muscat.

Sur, Dilhijar 13, 1326 (January 6, 1909).

RECEIVED your letter which you had sent through Saiyid Bedr. Saiyid Bedr requested that the four clans of the tribe of Jennebeh be called to be present, and they came in his presence. The Proclamation was read to them, and they accepted your orders. What is right in your consideration they accept it, and consider themselves under your orders.

[12785] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 220.)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 27, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Consul-General at Beyrout respecting Moslem students of the Syrian Protestant College, inclosing copy of a letter from the Faculty reporting their decision in question of compulsory attendance at religious services and classes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Beyrout, March 10, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 4th ultimo, on the subject of the refusal on the part of the Moslem students of the Syrian Protestant College to attend the religious services and classes, I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter addressed by the Faculty to the parents and guardians of the students setting forth their final decision on this question which has been arrived at after many long and serious deliberations.

It is practically a concession on the part of the Faculty as to attendance at the religious services, but a maintenance of the compulsory attendance at the religious

classes. Though the measure is stated to be provisional it is probable that it will be made permanent.

It now remains for the students to accept this compromise, and efforts are being made to bring pressure to bear upon them, on the part of the leading Moslems in the town, to give in, and though the letter fixes the 13th as the date on which the arrangement was to take effect the time has been prolonged for a week in order to enable the parents and friends to prevail upon the students to submit if they decide upon intervening in that sense.

If they do not give in they will be expelled, in which case it is possible that some, if not all, will resist and cause trouble.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

The Syrian Protestant College to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

Sir, *Beyrout, Syria, March* 12, 1909.

I AM happy to state that after consideration the Faculty of the college have agreed to the following plan for the rest of the college year with reference to those students who have been involved in the recent difficulty.

The Faculty, desiring to act generously and not in accordance with the usual strict regulations, agrees to excuse these students from attendance upon morning and evening prayers and Sunday worship for the rest of the college year. They agree to establish a course in the science of religion that the students may study other religions as well as Christianity. They agree to consider the whole subject of the regulations relating to compulsory attendance upon worship although the final decision rests with the trustees in America. On the other hand, they expect these students to show their abhorrence of defiance of college authority by continuing to maintain a high standard of character and by agreeing to submit to a higher standard of conduct for the rest of the year as a proof of their sincerity. They expect the students to attend all the exercises of the college course except morning and evening prayers and the religious services on Sunday. In place of these religious services some exercises not religious will be arranged, which they are expected to attend. We believe that this is a fair and generous solution of a difficult situation, and we hope that it will meet your approval. The arrangement goes into effect on Monday. In case the parents of any student prefer to have their son withdraw from the college, the proper financial adjustment will be made.

[12790] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 225. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, March* 30, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 80 of the 22nd instant.

The programme of public works contemplated by the Minister of that Department, and printed for circulation to Parliament, was duly transmitted to the Board of Trade by Mr. Waugh, His Majesty's Consul.

The scheme is a very comprehensive one, and indeed includes all, and more than all, the work that is likely to be undertaken by the Government for many years to come. I cannot ascertain that any of the schemes are likely to be carried out in the near future. What the feeling of the Chamber may eventually be as regards kilometric guarantees remains to be seen, but in the present financial condition of the Empire no proposal involving such liability is likely to meet with favour; but on p. 70 of the Report there appears a passage to the following effect: "Malheureusement, il n'existe que peu de lignes en Turquie dont on puisse donner la Concession sans garantie ou subvention d'État."

The scheme regarding which you make special inquiry is a line from Rayak (Syria) to El Arish. Length 955 kilom.—broad gauge passing through Merj Ayoun, crossing Haifa Railway and via Gaza to El Arish. The Minister hopes, as you will see by

reference to p. 10 of the Report, to be able to build this line without guarantee, which would seem very doubtful. Count Vitalis and his engineer, Kipp, have examined the line and estimate cost at 70,300,000 fr., which should require about 7,525 fr. per kilometre as annuity at 4 per cent. with redemption in eighty-nine years. The estimated receipts when the German line reaches Aleppo are 10,000 fr. to 12,000 fr. per kilometre, and the estimate of cost of construction of Count Vitalis would seem to be rather high: 5,000*l.* per kilometre should be sufficient. The capital would then be 48,125,000 fr.

Leaving aside the economic aspects, the question arises whether, when the Germans have their line completed to Aleppo, they will not amalgamate with, or acquire, the French Aleppo–Rayak line and this new projected line, if they do not even construct it with the Germans and their system is then linked with the Egyptian and Cape railways if they can get the section El Arish–Ismailyet constructed.

Presumably, it is not a line that His Majesty's Government would favour, but if it is inevitable that it should be built, and if it were possible to obtain a guarantee from Government of 4 per cent. or 5 per cent. on the construction cost with a share for Government of 40 per cent. in receipts after payment of interest, the project might be worthy of the attention of British capitalists.

The line from Constantinople to El Arish would be—

	Kilometres.	
Constantinople–Eregli	910	German constructed.
Eregli–Aleppo	509	German constructed in four or five years.
Aleppo–Rayak	333	French. To be acquired by Germans [?].
Rayak–El Arish	955	To be acquired by Germans.
Total	2,167	

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[12793] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 228.)

Sir, *Pera, March* 31, 1909.

I REGRET to report that there has been a considerable recrudescence of disorder on the lower waters of the Tigris as well as at Bussorah.

At the latter place a serious outbreak occurred at the beginning of February, the account of which reached me from His Majesty's Consul some ten days ago. On receiving his telegraphic report of these occurrences, I at once made representations to the Grand Vizier, and on the 24th February his Highness informed me that the gang referred to by Mr. Crow had been broken up and its leader killed. The Vali, Muhurrem Bey, also was changed and replaced by Arif Bey, and I have suggested to the Grand Vizier that he should be provided with more extensive powers, as suggested by Mr. Crow, in order to be able to deal more effectively with the prevailing disorder.

Despite these assurances from Hilmi Pasha, at the end of February Mr. Crow reported telegraphically further attacks on native houses, and fresh breaches of public order at Hamdan, Chibasi, and Temma. On my again representing these matters to Hilmi Pasha, his Highness asseverated that the only incident was a case of robbery at Abu Hassib, and that the Vali reported the capture of three of the delinquents.

But further telegrams informed me that attacks were made by a gang of robbers, said to number over sixty members, on houses in Abu Hassib on the 11th and 15th March, attended by the death of three persons, fourteen others being wounded.

With regard to the state of affairs on the river, I have the honour to report that intelligence of a renewal of attacks upon steamers first reached me on the 25th March from Mr. Crow, but in an indefinite form, as he only was in possession of general news, and without details. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad was at the time proceeding to Bussorah, in accordance with permission I had given him, on board the

"Kalifa." It appears that this ship was fired on four times between Kila Saleh and Majar Sogheir by different parties of Arabs, within the limits of the Albu Mohammed tribe. Twenty-five bullets struck the ship and the barge accompanying it, but there were no casualties.

The "Kalifa" was escorted from Amara by the Turkish boats "Hamidieh" and "Aloos" with a guard, whilst a guard of twenty-five soldiers was put on the steamer "Mejidieh," which left Bagdad on the 23rd March. The disturbance extended to Ali Gharbi.

The Turkish steamer "Bagdad," with 130 Redifs on board, of whom, however, only thirty had rifles, was subject to a severe fire in the same region apparently on the 20th March. The firing lasted for forty minutes, and the vessel was much damaged, being struck in no less than 500 places. Three men were killed and seven wounded. The vessel is reported to have been travelling at the rate of 15 knots. An attempt was made to utilize a 3-pr. gun which was on board, but after firing six rounds it was silenced. The Arabs are reported to have been numerous and well covered, and their fire to have been steady and accurate. Captain Denne, who was in command of the ship, estimates their losses at twenty.

The telegraph wires on both sides of Amara were cut on the 27th March, and there are no signallers acquainted with the use of heliographs in the VIth Army Corps, who might otherwise be utilized for the purpose of maintaining communications.

I have the honour to invite your attention to Major Ramsay's despatches Nos. 503 and 543 of the 9th and 25th June, 1908, and to Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 394 of the 16th of the following month.

Major Ramsay now makes certain suggestions by telegraph; he states that it is impossible to follow these Arabs of the marshes with regular troops, and recommends action from the river, demolishing the forts and filling in the small canals, whilst erecting and holding forts at the mouth of the large canals.

It appears to be the intention of the authorities to take action against the Albu Mohammed and the Beni Lam; and I am bringing the various suggestions in this connection, which Major Ramsay has telegraphed to me, to the notice of the Turkish Government. He is of opinion that there should be no great difficulty in dealing with the situation if the Turks will merely seize the command of the river banks and the mouths of the canals.

Major Ramsay states that the military authorities appear to be taking all reasonable precautions for the protection of the steamer traffic, a weekly convoy being provided both up and down stream, and this is confirmed by the fact of the convoy being sent to escort the "Kalifa" from Amara, as reported above. He considers that it would be inviting a catastrophe to take the "Comet" in her present condition down the river, but he is taking steps to have her prepared for use, by means of iron plates, &c., in case it should be necessary for him to proceed on her to the disturbed area, or to send her to escort British ships, but he will not thus use her without previously consulting me.

In reply to further representations made by me yesterday to the Grand Vizier on this serious state of affairs, his Highness stated that the disturbances arose in connection with the collection of the tithes, and are due to rivalry between Ghadba and Seyhud. He is inviting the Minister of War to take steps to increase the effectives of the VIth Army Corps battalions, and Marshal Abdullah Pasha, Governor-General of the Yemen, has been appointed to the command of that army corps, with a view to its reorganization, and thus to secure a necessary military force to deal with the refractory tribes, especially the Albu Mohammed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Bussorah, February* 13, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 10 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to me by members of the British colony, who are seriously alarmed at the disturbed state of Bussorah and the absence of any strong

action on the part of the Vali to stamp out the elements of ruffianism, which have been running riot since his arrival. The outrage in question was of a very daring description. It occurred in the afternoon, and the murdered man's house is on the main road to Bussorah, next door to the Consular Doctor, and a house occupied by retainers of Seyyed Talib Bey is beyond it. Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie's staff and Mr. Blunsum and his family all live in the same block. The gang, which must have been a large one, held up the traffic on the road and shut off the portion opposite the house they were attacking, firing indiscriminately in every direction for about a quarter of an hour. The arsenal is quite close—within five minutes' walk—and a guard-house only three minutes' walk from the scene of the attack. The soldiers and guards who were present in these places made no attempt to interfere with the gang's proceedings beyond keeping back passengers at either end from approaching the house. People were even shot in their bellems in the creek. Mr. Muggeddítch, who was partner and Traffic Manager of the Carriage Company, was killed in his house, his servant wounded, and his women-folk beaten. Two men on the road were also killed, and two gendarmes at the guard station close to the house were wounded.

I was absent from Bussorah at the time and on duty at Koweit. My dragoman saw the Vali with Mr. Blunsum, and a patrol was established. The Vali has since written to say that the regular troops are being employed to protect the town. The bazaars were, however, closed the day after the outrage, and a demonstration made at the barracks by the shopkeepers, who demanded protection.

The measures taken no doubt serve to reassure people's minds, but they will do little towards stamping out the ruffianly element now rife in the town. The Vali is wholly incompetent to deal with the situation, and we need a strong Governor, such as we had in Fakhri Pasha in 1904, who will preserve order at all cost, and will not be too particular as to his methods.

The state of the district is infinitely worse than it was before the Constitution was proclaimed, and I see no likelihood of any improvement under the very inefficient administration of the present Vali.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

British Merchants and Residents at Bussorah to Consul Crow.

Sir, *Bussorah, February* 6, 1909.

WE, the Undersigned, merchants and residents of Bussorah, respectfully beg to express our anxiety at the present insecurity of life and property in the town and districts owing to bands of armed ruffians robbing and murdering citizens with the greatest impunity. A most glaring instance of this took place yesterday in daylight, just before sunset, when a gang of men, estimated to number fifty, broke into the house of Mr. Muckerdich Garibian, murdering him and looting his house. The robbers held up the whole of the Bussorah creek road for at least a quarter of an hour, and no attempt was made by the police or the soldiers to assist the victims and those in the neighbourhood or to catch the robbers until after they (the robbers) had left, although the barracks are within five minutes' walk from the spot.

In three houses in the same block of buildings as that broken into reside British subjects, and at the time of the firing bullets entered their houses, and the few who had the misfortune to be at home at the time were entirely at the mercy of the robbers.

The local authorities do not seem to recognize the seriousness of the position, as similar outrages have been of frequent occurrence during the past few months, the culprits having apparently got away unmolested with their plunder, and it is quite evident that the police force in Bussorah is not adequate to prevent the continuance of such disgraceful outrages.

There is no reason, as far as we can see, under existing circumstances, why gangs of armed robbers should not attack and enter the house of British subjects, which is what actually occurred at Maughil in 1906, when Mr. Glanville was murdered.

We have therefore the honour to request that you will be good enough to represent the matter to the authorities here and in Constantinople in order that strong

measures may be taken to prevent these robberies continuing; and, further, we would ask that a proper police patrol be established in the town and districts.

We have, &c.
(For Lynch Brothers),
(Signed) SAML. DODS.
(For the Bussorah Trading Company (Limited)),
R. D. MARSHAL, *Manager.*
HAROLD SPIERS.
WILLIAM R. MOIR.
W. WILSON.
D. HART.
A. V. COWLEY.
REGINALD H. SHORT.
(*Per pro.* Gray, Mackenzie, and Co.),
CH. WILLS.
(For Frank S. Strick and Co. (Limited)),
J. E. MACKIE.
A. W. BANCE.
A. TOMLINSON.
E. B. BLUNSUM.
ERNEST L. B. JONAS.
C. MACPHERSON.
MAURICE D. PRICE.

[13008] No. 7.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, April 5, 1909.*

POSTAL communication between Bussorah and this town has been cut off completely as a result of disturbances among the Arab tribes.

[10066] No. 8.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, forwarding copies of correspondence as to the attitude of the Turkish authorities towards the Sheikh of Koweit, who is endeavouring to effect the purchase of certain gardens on the Turkish Bank.

This action appears to Sir E. Grey to be opposed to the maintenance of the *status quo* which the Turkish Government undertook to respect in 1901. The policy then agreed upon between the two Governments is one which His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in modifying at the present time, especially in view of the attitude which it appears from the inclosed despatch that the Sublime Porte proposes to adopt in regard to the Bagdad Railway Concession.*

If the Secretary of State for India concurs, Sir E. Grey is disposed to point this out to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and to give his Excellency discretion as to making it clear that His Majesty's Government have not in any way modified their attitude in regard to the Sheikh's status, since the occurrence of the recent constitutional changes in Turkey.

It would be pointed out at the same time to Sir G. Lowther that the Sheikh must be supported in his pretensions, though it must be left to his Excellency to decide whether the present moment is propitious or not for taking action.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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* See Confidential Paper No. 9491, No. 55.

[13086] No. 9.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

3, *Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, April 5, 1909.*

Sir,

WITH further reference to the disturbances on the River Tigris, I have the honour to communicate for your information the following telegrams received from our Bagdad and Bussorah agents:—

From Bagdad, dated the 4th April, 3·30 P.M.:

"In concurrence with His Majesty's Resident have postponed departure of 'Blosse Lynch.' We consider risk is too great to run until more reassuring information. The Hamidieh Company's steamer 'Bagdad' has not arrived at Ali Gharbi, and our own packet steamer 'Khalifah' has not arrived Bussorah. Rumours alarming."

From Bussorah, dated the 4th April, 7·10 P.M.:

"Acting upon instructions from Bagdad, we are instructing our packet steamer 'Mejidieh' to return from Gurnah to Bussorah. There is no definite news here."

Our packet steamer "Khalifah" left Bagdad for Bussorah on the 30th ultimo, and should in ordinary course have arrived at Bussorah on the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[13184] No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th February, relative to interruptions in the telegraph service between Bussorah and Bagdad.

India Office, April 6, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bagdad, January 25, 1909.*

I AM in continuation of the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 16th July, 1908, regarding interruptions in the telegraph service between Bussorah and Bagdad, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my letter No. 1, Commercial, dated the 25th January, 1909, to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with a copy of its inclosure, in which I suggest that British firms should address the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs at Constantinople with proposals for an installation of wireless telegraphy.

2. Putting aside international requirements, reliable telegraphic communication between Bagdad and Bussorah is urgently required by the commercial community. I understand that a British bank would be ready to open business at Bagdad at once if telegraphic communication in India was more certain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 1. Commercial.)

Bagdad, January 25, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a letter, dated the 25th January, 1909, to the address of the Board of Trade regarding an opening for wireless telegraphy stations in Mesopotamia. I shall be obliged if the letter can be forwarded. It is sent through the Foreign Office, as the establishment of wireless telegraphy stations may be considered as of some political importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Board of Trade.

Bagdad, January 25, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that great inconvenience is caused to trade by continual interruptions in telegraphic communication between Bagdad and Bussorah; these interruptions are sometimes caused by floods and storms, but more commonly they are caused by the Arab tribes who wish to cause inconvenience to the Turkish Government. The breakages nearly always occur between Amarah and Bussorah.

Mr. Akers has informed me that he had a wireless installation put up between Zanzibar and Pemba which cost, when erected, about 1,200*l.*, and which was guaranteed for 200 miles. I have mentioned these facts to the local telegraph officials, and they tell me that if a wireless installation can be put up between Bagdad and Bussorah for anything approaching the same sum, it will prove a most profitable investment by reason of the amount that the Turkish Government now loses, owing to telegrams from India not being able to pass over its lines. I am getting the local officials, civil, military, and telegraph, to write on the subject to Constantinople, and I suggest that British firms interested in wireless telegraphy should communicate with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, giving information on the following points:—

(*a.*) Cost of materials for one station, c.i.f., Bussorah.

(1.) If communication guaranteed up to 250 miles; this is more than the distance from Amarah to Bussorah, or from Bushire to Bussorah.

(2.) If communication guaranteed up to 300 miles; this is just over the distance from Bussorah to Bagdad.

(3.) If communication is guaranteed up to 550 miles; this is more than the distance from Bushire to Bagdad.

(*b.*) A sketch and Memorandum of the instaliation at site, so that the local cost of erection can be estimated.

(*c.*) A Memorandum of the cost of working and up-keep of each station.

With this information before it the Turkish Government would be able to form some reasonably sound idea as to what stations would best suit their purpose.

2. I inclose a plan showing the respective position of the places I have named,* and I hope the following information will be sufficient to enable an estimate to be framed.

The country is quite flat and free from trees, except a few palm trees, which do not exceed about 80 feet in height.

In winter the thermometer may go down to 20 degrees Fahrenheit, and in summer it may go up to about 125 degrees in the shade; the sun temperature is not recorded, but it may be taken to be about the same as in Upper Scinde or the Punjab. As a

* Not printed.

rule the air is very dry near Bagdad, but between Bushire and Bussorah it is often laden with moisture.

Thunderstorms are rare, but sometimes severe.

Very high winds are not unusual.

3. Firms wishing to obtain this business would probably be wise to have a representative at Constantinople. His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General there would no doubt suggest a suitable agent having experience of getting such matters arranged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[13196] No. 11.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

3, Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, April 6, 1909.

Sir,

IN continuation of our letter of the 5th instant, on the subject of the disturbances on the River Tigris, I have the honour to communicate the following telegram received from our agent at Bussorah, dated the 5th instant, I.e.s.:—

"Have just received the following message from our P.S. 'Khalifah,' Amarah: Five steamers, including the Hamidieh steamer 'Baghdad' now at Amarah awaiting arrangements local authorities. Severely attacked by Arabs Aligharbi to Amarah, but all safe."

Our agents add that they trust that pressure is being brought to bear in Constantinople to hasten operations to insure the safety of these steamers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[13197] No. 12.

Ottoman (Smyrna-Aidin) Railway Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

Winchester House, April 6, 1909.

Dear Sir,

I HAVE the honour, as President of the Ottoman (Smyrna-Aidin) Railway Company, to submit to you the inclosed extract from a letter dated the 29th March last and written by the General Manager of the Company at Smyrna to our Secretary in London, and to beg that His Majesty's Government will kindly give us all possible assistance in overcoming the vexatious difficulties which, as appears from this inclosure, are being placed in the way of the legitimate development of our enterprise upon our Egerdir extension.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RATHMORE.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Ottoman Railway (Smyrna-Aidin) Company to the Ottoman Company in London.

(Extract.) *March* 29, 1909.

I DO not know what is the object of the Ministry of Public Works in giving us so much difficulty, but it is a fact that both they and the Commissaire are very obstructive. We have now reached the season of the year when the work should go on rapidly, we have about 1,200 men at work and more come forward every day in want of employment owing to the failure of the harvests last year. We cannot, I think, find more work for them and shall have to reduce the number now employed unless the Commissaire puts us in possession of a good deal more land, which he is threatening not to do. The drawings of the second section were sent from here on the 3rd August,

1908, and returned on the 2nd ultimo, during the whole of which time they were at the Ministry of Public Works and were then returned demanding modifications to which evidently no real consideration had been given and which would considerably increase the cost of the work without any appreciable improvement of the line; in the judgment of both Mr. Hutchison and myself they are not proper modifications to make. I think it would be well for representations to be made by the Foreign Office as to the difficulties we are encountering.

[13329] No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd April, relative to the proposed presentation of guns and ammunition to the Sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, April 7, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April 2, 1909.*

KOWEIT. See your telegram of the 3rd ultimo. Proposal to give Sheikh two guns with blank ammunition for saluting purposes, and to tell him, on the lines suggested, that question of shell must be deferred, is approved by His Majesty's Government.

[13515] No. 14.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, April 8, 1909.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 29th ultimo, with its inclosure from the India Office, in which Lord Morley suggests that the Imperial Exchequer should share with India the liability for any loss arising from a proposed loan of 13,333*l.* to the Sheikh of Koweit.

It appears that the liability in respect of a previous loan to the Sheikh, in 1904, was entirely undertaken by India, and my Lords understand that in the present instance the money would be similarly advanced from Indian funds.

Their Lordships are, however, asked to share the liability of loss (which is said to be improbable) in the present instance on the security of the rent of 4,000*l.* a-year which is paid by India to the Sheikh for the lease of certain foreshore; one-half of such rent being repayable to India by the Imperial Government, in the annual adjustment under sub-head L. of the Diplomatic and Consular Vote, in accordance with the arrangement approved by Treasury letter of the 21st September, 1907.

They direct me to state, for the information of Sir E. Grey, that, in the event of the Indian Government being compelled to withhold payment of the above rent in default of repayment of the loan, they have no objection to the continuance of the payment of the Imperial share of the rent to the Indian Government by way of adjustment, provided that satisfactory evidence of payment by deduction from sums owing can be produced for audit purposes; but they do not feel disposed to extend their liability beyond such continuance, which they hope will sufficiently meet the wishes of the Secretary of State for India and Sir E. Grey. They think that any question of interest might remain the concern of the Indian Government, which advances the money.

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

[12232] No. 15.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo respecting the arrangements made by the Resident in the Persian Gulf for supplying Messrs. Strick with a sample shipment of 400 tons of red oxide.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for India to instruct the Government of India to approve the action taken by Major Cox on the assumption that the sample shipment which is being supplied to Mr. Strick consists of freshly-mined oxide, and is not taken from any stock of oxide either in the mines or on the beach which can be claimed by Messrs. Wönckhaus.

In the circumstances described no communication to the German Government seems necessary.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[13642] No. 16.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Tehran, March 19, 1909.*

IN my telegram No. 407 of the 30th November, 1908, I stated my intention of presenting to the Persian Government a claim on behalf of a Bahreini as soon as I had obtained from the Persian Government the substitution of an amended communication for the objectionable note respecting Bahrein addressed to this Legation by Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the 24th April, 1908, and in my despatch No. 10 of the 22nd January. I reported that the desired substitution had been effected.

I ought now to inform you that on a reconsideration of the matter I have refrained from presenting the Bahreini claim as originally intended. The claim was in respect of the seizure and confiscation by the Customs authorities of the Persian Gulf of a Bahrein dhow for breach of the Customs Regulations, and on discussing the matter with M. Mornard, I found that there could be no doubt that the confiscation of the dhow, though a harsh punishment for the offence committed, was technically justified. M. Mornard, moreover, promised to consider whether he could not, as an act of grace, give orders for the return to the owner of the dhow of a portion of the price realized by the dhow, and orders have now been given for the return of 200 tomans to the owner. Assuming that it is not desired by His Majesty's Government to raise the general question of the sovereignty of Bahrein at this moment, when it would be inopportune to take the steps which would be necessary to press it to an issue, I have, in view of the considerations that the case is far from strong and that a partial remission of the penalty has been ordered by M. Mornard, abstained from representing the case officially to the Persian Government.

The Persian Government can be in no doubt as to there being any question of the departure of His Majesty's Government from the attitude with regard to Bahrein as explained in Mr. Marling's note of the 30th March, 1908, but as soon as I learn that the terms of the amended note substituted for that of Mushir-ed-Dowleh of the 9th April, 1908, is acceptable to His Majesty's Government, I shall, when informing the Minister for Foreign Affairs that this is the case, make a further statement in the sense of the last paragraph of your despatch No. 17 of the 16th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13680] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 240.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 228 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting

the dismissal of the Vali and the cessation of disturbances. Mr. Crow points out that these two events are probably closely allied.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)
Sir,

Bussorah, March 10, 1909.

TELEGRAMS were received here on the 3rd instant from Constantinople stating that the Vali of Bussorah had been superseded and Seyyed Arif Bey appointed in his stead.

The disturbances reported in my telegrams of the 13th, 25th, and 26th February and the 2nd March ceased on the receipt of this news. The connection is interesting and instructive and, in view of the Grand Vizier's replies to your Excellency of the 24th February and the 1st March, which seem to me disingenuous and are certainly misleading, I think it is as well to place on record the probable cause of these sporadic outbreaks, which occur here at stated intervals, whenever the Vali of Bussorah is unfortunate or tactless enough to annoy his influential neighbours and incur their resentment.

However much the Arabs in these districts fight between themselves there is always sufficient solidarity among them to join in harassing their common enemy, the Turk, if necessity arises and the opportunity is favourable. We have too many instances of this to admit of denial, but it may be sufficient to note that some years ago, before Mubarek murdered his brothers and seized Koweit, and Khazal of Mohammerah did the same, it was a well-established custom for the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah and the Nakib of Bussorah to combine in organizing armed attacks on the inhabitants of the Shatt-ul-Arab and the neighbourhood, or in undertaking piratical emprises at the bar or in the river. Eye-witnesses still relate that it was no uncommon sight to see as many as thirty boatloads of armed men leave Mohammerah after the time of evening prayer to carry out the hostile designs of this powerful triumvirate, who employed their own servants and retainers for the purpose and shared the spoil among them. I think we should be incorrect in presuming that this custom has entirely died out. For the past six years while I have been here crime has been very frequent in Bussorah, while disturbances, similar to those which occur in the districts administered by Turkey, are unknown in Mohammerah and Koweit. It is not necessary to recapitulate events; those of unusual gravity have been reported as they occurred to His Majesty's Embassy, and are on record already. I have always understood that the present Sheikh of Koweit is no longer a party to the system. He indulges in Arab forays and "razzias" instead, and has perhaps a wider field of activity, and his position, moreover, has no doubt been modified by recent circumstances. But, as regards the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Nakib of Bussorah, who are still surrounded by followers of the most ruffianly description, I believe this not to be the case. It is at least noticeable that on each occasion when disturbances break out in the neighbourhood of Bussorah they have been invariably preceded by some quarrel or disagreement between the Vali of Bussorah and his powerful neighbours on points closely affecting the interests of the latter. And, when arguments have failed, the Turkish districts are harried by armed gangs, who plunder, murder, and commit all manner of excesses with impunity until the object of the injured party is achieved and the unpopular Governor discredited and removed.

The attitude adopted by the ex-Vali in regard to the registration of land transfer has affected the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit very closely. The former owns a great deal of land and house property in Bussorah and draws considerable revenue therefrom. The Vali, I am informed, raised the same objection to his acquiring new property as he did to the registration of Fedaghia and the land purchased from Sheikh Sadun, of Montifik, in the name of the Sheikh of Koweit. It is a well-established fact that some, if not all, of the band who committed the outrage reported in my telegram No. 10 of the 13th February last came from and returned to Mohammerah.

The same thing occurred in 1906, in the Maghil case. Several of the culprits were traced to Mohammerah; and when pressure was ultimately brought to bear on the Sheikh to hand them over, we had reason to doubt whether the persons delivered were

those concerned in the murder of Mr. Glanville. There were others, of course, caught on Turkish territory, but, as regards those known to be at Mohammerah, the Sheikh's attitude was evasive and unsatisfactory.

It is to be hoped that the new Vali will prove himself to be a stronger man than his predecessor. We had remarkable proof of what a strong Governor could do when Fakhri Pasha was sent here in 1904, after disturbances had reached a climax in the time of Mustafa Nouri Pasha, Vali of Bussorah. If extended powers were given to the new Vali, much can, no doubt, be done to mitigate the evil. But, as long as action is confined to mere perfunctory police inquiries, and reference is made to a so-called Criminal Court, where no justice is obtainable, while local authorities are allowed to throw dust in our eyes by arresting innocent persons and sentencing them to expiate the offences of guilty defaulters, the lawless condition of Bussorah will not improve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW

[13684] No. 18.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 214.)
Sir,

Constantinople, April 5, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, reporting on Bedouin attacks on the Hedjaz Railway in the neighbourhood of Medina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)
Sir,

Damascus, March 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the activity of Bedouin tribes near Medina has been recently increasing again as during last winter, and even more markedly, so that they wage incessant attacks against the line and its guards, and almost every day there is some bloodshed on one side or the other. The insurgents propose to destroy the line as far as Hadiyen Station, about 200 kilom. from Medina, and quite lately they removed 1 kilom.'s length of the rails and sleepers and carried them away, but the damaged part was at once put into repair and communication restored. This aggressiveness is far worse than before, and continuing, and likely to continue.

Their reasons for this discontent are alleged to be their great losses by the construction of the line, seeing that the Yambo road is almost entirely abandoned, and Medina visitors take Haifa or Damascus road, and reach Medina by train.

The chief tribes making the trouble are Wild-Mohammed, Jehena, Hawazim, Ahamideh, and Beni-Ali. The Sherif of Mecca, in concurrence with Behri Pasha of Medina, is trying to make conciliation and settle matters, but apparently without success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

P.S.—A Memorandum accompanies, intended for the Trade Report, now being completed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Memorandum respecting the Hejaz Railway.

THE Hejaz Railway was completed as far as Medina and declared open, amid much enthusiasm, September 1908, a distance of 1,300 kilom. It was hoped that great prosperity in trade would be realized from this line, but it has been noticed since the 1st September that difficulties exist in the way of utilizing it to its utmost resources and advantages. Among the chief obstacles to prompt and safe communi-

cation is the fact of numerous Bedouin tribes living alongside the railway from Deraa to Medina, who beset the employés and impede traffic for the slightest cause of offence or annoyance. A careful observer calculated at Haifa, the Hejaz Railway port, that during the year 1908 the Bedouins made 128 aggressions on the line, breaking the telegraph wires or displacing the rails, or damaging stations, or robbing passengers and wagons. After each case the Government is satisfied with repairing the damaged part, and does not take the trouble to punish the mischief-makers, who flee into the desert where they cannot be reached. It is a pity that such ignorant folk cannot be brought to realize that the existence of the railway alleviates the misery of their existence and their actual chance of periodical starvation by one hundredfold. More display of tact and sympathy on the part of the railway employés, together with generosity in bestowing water, letting poor tribesmen fill their waterskins liberally, would go far to conciliate the tribes. Hitherto two systems of policy alternate, either the Government flatter and cajole and send presents of money, or else an armed force in considerable number, to be quickly withdrawn. Fighting around Medina was frequent all through last winter.

Trade prospects for the present are, of course, nugatory; there is no large town and scarcely any important village for trade on the whole length of the line. Medina has only some 50,000 inhabitants, and the Hejaz produces nothing. Nejd people are still busy fighting among themselves, and little disposed to profit from the railway.

However, the line is very useful for the pilgrims during their season, and certainly a great profit will accrue to Damascus Province. As to the Hejaz traffic, in the year 1908 more than 10,000 pilgrims passed through Damascus on their way back from the Holy Places, and their presence here, with the purchase they made, brought considerable sums into Damascus market. As soon as the line reaches Mecca, not less than 50,000 pilgrims will be expected yearly in Damascus, if the hope be not too sanguine, while in such case the linking up of Mecca and Jeddah with Damascus would increase trade.

[13685] No. 19.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 245.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 6, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an extract of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah respecting affairs in the Hedjaz during the last six months under the constitutional régime.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12. Confidential.)

Sir, *Jeddah, March 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some remarks as to how the Hedjaz has fared during the six months, including a pilgrimage, which have now been passed under constitutional government.

Through the change of the Vali and the Grand Shereef the pilgrims have been relieved of much extortion. Pilgrimage expenses in the Hedjaz have been, on paper at least, not much more than half what they have been in former years, and the combine of northward-bound pilgrim ships, called the "pool," got freights at only half the rate fixed in former years, which reduction is partly, though not entirely, due to the suppression of the Vali's interest.

The Hedjaz has, so far as I know, gained nothing but some wooden boxes put up for the reception of dirt in some streets of Jeddah and the publication of two Mecca newspapers. A press is now being set up for a new newspaper here in Jeddah. Of the first Mecca newspaper, the weekly Turkish and Arabic "Hedjaz," I have already written on several occasions. It publishes articles in praise of Islam and freedom, and in one of its earlier numbers a seemingly rather fanciful incubration about the Prophet and the Arab race being the originators of Parliaments. Of the second, the "Shems-ul-Hakika" ("Sun of Truth"), which says that it will soon become a daily, four

weekly numbers in Turkish have appeared, and separate weekly numbers (I think, less than four), in Arabic. The Turkish numbers contain lively, personal attacks on the Grand Shereef whom they accuse—

1. Of spending his large revenues on banquets which require four or five male cooks, instead of judiciously spending money to keep the Bedouins quiet and enlist their services on the pilgrim routes;

2. Of treating with indifference the recent regrettable incident (see my despatch No. 8 of the 20th February, 1909) of a Bedouin wounding a soldier who was at rifle practice near Jeddah, and has since died of the wound, the Grand Shereef being, to some extent, responsible for the conduct of Bedouins; and—

3. (This is a covert charge)—Of contriving, or trying to contrive a hole-and-corner election as Member for Mecca of someone not mentioned, though known to the newspapers, in place of the already elected Member, who, for some unknown reason, never went to Parliament, but sent his resignation from Egypt and is returning to Mecca.

The Arabic numbers contain nothing of these attacks on the Grand Shereef, in consideration, I suppose, of the feelings of the less-educated Arabs. The "Sun of Truth" denounces the ex-Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, as a slanderer for imputing to the Committee of Union and Progress a design to dethrone the Sultan, and says that statesmen entirely untainted by service under the old régime are now required. The newspaper publishes a long letter of platitudes from the Member for Jeddah against the proposed Newspaper Press Law, and calls for municipal improvement in Jeddah and Mecca, and especially a water supply in Jeddah. There is so little crime in the town that the police seem hardly needed, except perhaps a water police to control the boatmen who swarm on to the pilgrim ships and pilfer from the cargo in lighters. The pilgrims camped in the streets and spaces of the town behave so well that no need is felt for encamping when outside the town walls, which is done only with some Africans. The constant howling by day and night, or, at least, till late at night, of pilgrim beggars does not affect the nerves of any native of Jeddah, and is not, I think gratuitously lugubrious. Enough money is brought by pilgrims to afford the natives the pleasure which they appreciate of repose and what Doughty calls fiddle babble.

The new Kaimakam of Jeddah, the Syrian Abdul Ghani Pasha, formerly Kaimakam of Kuneitreh, near Damascus, is corrupt, but he failed to get anything this year from the "pool" (see above); though their arch-corrupter, the Syrian Greek Christian Ilmi Bey, of Alexandria, pilgrim-traffic manager of the Khedivial Company, was inclined to pay him.* The Jeddah custom-house is as corrupt as ever, and I hear the same of Mecca officialdom, the Vali, Khazim Pasha, who, however, seems rather negligent, being always excepted. The Slave Trade is flourishing in Mecca, and far from being extinct in Jeddah. The general immobility of Mecca is, I understand, as that of Jeddah. The railway, it would seem, cannot be pushed beyond Medina without a serious guerilla war with Bedouins. The latter are armed with fairly good rifles, which they freely smuggle along the coast, though the three Turkish gun-boats which have lately arrived may perhaps put some stop to this, and indeed 352 Gras rifles and 12,000 cartridges, which were being smuggled in a boat south of Jeddah, are reported to have been already captured.

I would venture the opinion that the barbarism of this part of the Turkish Empire will not be appreciably mitigated by the Parliamentary régime.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. MONAHAN.

[13887] No. 20.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 13, 1909.*

I HAVE received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah a telegram stating that the troubles on the Tigris are undoubtedly spreading, and that the Arabs are massing a large force on both sides of the river; Mr. Crow states that lawlessness is increasing

* After a conversation with a leading merchant I now (March 15) think this statement about the custom-house perhaps too strong. At any rate, the present acting Nazir (Director) does not, according to this informant, appear to be corrupt.

in the district and that the large Turkish force now up the river is unable to suppress the Arabs promptly; he therefore thinks it desirable that we should send a war-ship to Bussorah to remain there some weeks and, in case of necessity, to afford protection to British subjects ashore.

I think it improbable that the local authorities will be able to deal satisfactorily with disorders, although they are probably doing their best with the forces of w they dispose. . . .

[13887] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 13, 1909.

IN view of the information contained in your telegram No. 106 of the 13th instant, the Admiralty have been requested to send instructions for a ship to proceed at once to Koweit. On receipt of a request from His Majesty's Consul, the ship will proceed to Bussorah.

No men will be landed unless it is absolutely necessary, as the sole purpose for which the ship is being sent is the protection of the lives of British subjects. This should be made clear to the Turkish Government.

[13887] No. 22.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 13, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,* from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, respecting the disturbed situation on the Tigris and at Bussorah.

In view of the state of affairs disclosed in this telegram, I am to express Sir E. Grey's earnest hope that their Lordships will be able to make arrangements forthwith for the dispatch of one of His Majesty's ships to Koweit, there to remain at the requisition of His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, who is being informed by telegraph that this Department is in communication with the Admiralty on the subject.

In Sir E. Grey's opinion, men should only be landed in the event of there being imminent danger to the lives of Europeans.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[13976] No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 4th ultimo, relative to the Fao properties of the Sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, April 13, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, February* 11, 1909.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your indorsement, dated the 7th December, 1908, regarding the Fao properties of the Sheikh of Koweit, I have the

* No. 20.

honour to forward copies of documents reporting the rebuilding of Sheikh Mubarak's embankment.

2. I am asking the Political Agent, Koweit, to furnish further particulars, and to state whether the question can now be considered, settled, or merely in abeyance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, February* 1, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your office indorsement, dated the 19th December, 1908, on the subject of Sheikh Mubarak's embankment to the north of the Turkish fort at Fao, I have the honour to report that, when Sheikh Mubarak came on the 31st January to visit His Britannic Majesty's Consul at the Koweit Agency, the Sheikh informed us that the work on the embankment had been commenced afresh, and was duly completed on Saturday, the 30th January, 1909.

2. The Sheikh further stated that the fort Commandant stood by during the construction and encouraged the workmen—directing them to build the embankment well.

Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

Assistant Superintendent, British Telegraph Station, Fao, to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Fao, February* 5, 1909.

TWO bugla loads of bricks were taken to Bussorah from Turkish fort yesterday; there are more to go. The wall near fort which Turks demolished on the 25th December, 1907, has been rebuilt by Sheikh Mubarak's agent, Abdurrehim, about five days ago.

Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

Captain Trevor to Assistant Superintendent, British Telegraph Station, Fao.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, February* 11, 1909.

YOUR 45/5. (*a.*) Do you know if rebuilding was done with cognizance of fort Commandant? (*b.*) Do not quite understand what they are doing with bricks—are they taking them from fort walls or buildings?

Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

Assistant Superintendent, British Telegraph Station, Fao, to Captain Trevor.

(Telegraphic.) *Fao, February* 11, 1909.

39/11. (*a.*) I hear Commandant consented to the rebuilding. (*b.*) I hear bricks are heaped up in the fort.

[13887] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1909.

TIGRIS disturbances.

You should repeat this telegram to His Majesty's Consuls at Bussorah, Koweit, and Bagdad:—

We propose to instruct His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," which is at present at Bushire, to proceed to Bussorah direct. Do you see any objection to this action?

[14183] No. 25.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 15, 1909.*

I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mersina reporting that disorders have broken out at Adana in which a number of persons have been killed. British subjects are in no danger. So far the Armenian quarter, which is armed, has not been attacked. Major Doughty Wylie thinks that the trouble is spreading, and the situation at Mersina and Tarsus appears to him anxious.

I am assured by the Porte that they are doing all that is possible.

[14198] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 15, 1909.*

BUSSORAH disturbances.

His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah points out that means of communicating with Koweit is very uncertain, and it is 130 miles away. I concur with him in the opinion that the war-ship should be at Bussorah itself.

(Reference to your telegram No. 236 of the 14th instant.)

[14183] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 241.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 15, 1909.*

IN view of the reports of disorders in Asia Minor, reported in your telegram No. 116 of the 15th February, a request has been sent to the Admiralty for ships to be held in readiness to proceed to any port where it is anticipated that disturbances will probably take place.

Unless, however, you send me word that they are needed at any particular place they will not have orders to sail.

[13197] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 112.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 15, 1909.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter from Lord Rathmore,* inclosing an extract from a communication from the General Manager of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, respecting the difficulties put in the way of the development of the enterprise by the Turkish authorities.

I have to request your Excellency to use every endeavour to overcome the opposition to the prosecution of the works in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[14317] No. 29.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 16, 1909.*

MASSACRE at Adana.

With reference to your telegram No. 241 of the 15th instant, it is desirable that a war-ship should be sent to Mersina. The situation at Adana has not improved. It would likewise seem desirable that a vessel should be present at Piræus to await orders, owing to the disorders anticipated at Beirout.

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* No. 12.

[14237] No. 28 A.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 15, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated to-day, from His Majesty's ship "Fox," at Bushire, and telegram from commander-in-chief, East Indies, at Bombay.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28 A.

Senior Officer, His Majesty's Ship "Sphinx," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *H.M.S. "Fox," at Bushire, April 15, 1909.*

I HAVE dispatched "Sphinx" to Koweit. She left last night.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28 A.

Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Bombay, April 15, 1909.*

THE orders given to the senior officer on the Persian Gulf were misinterpreted, "Sphinx" being dispatched by him to Koweit with orders to proceed to Fao if Bussorah could not be communicated with. Telegraphic directions have been sent by me to recall "Sphinx" if possible; if this cannot be done she will, pending further directions, stay at Fao.

[14294] No. 28 B.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 16th April from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 28 B.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Malta, April 16, 1909.*

REFERRING to your telegram No. 96, the following ships are held in readiness here: "Triumph," "Swiftsure," "Canopus"; the cruiser "Minerva" and three destroyers—"Stag," "Angler," "Ardent"—together with His Majesty's ship "Ocean," in which I am hoisting my flag. "Diana" has been diverted by me to Beirout.

[14461] No. 32*.

Sir E. Garst to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, April 17, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in reply to the inquiry contained in your telegram No. 17 of the 15th April as to Sir W. Willcocks's whereabouts, that his family have telegraphed to ask him about his future movements. Recent events at Constantinople and troubles on the Tigris have caused him to modify his plans, which were to leave Bagdad for Constantinople and Cairo on the 20th April. He is now on the Tigris.

[14198] No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 248.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES on the Tigris.

Please inform Bagdad, Koweit, and Bussorah that I have requested the Admiralty to send His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" at once to the last named place.

The ship is for the protection of the lives and property of foreigners only, and, if Mr. Crow thinks it desirable, he should make this fact publicly known.

(Reference is to your telegram No. 119 of the 15th April.)

[13680] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.*

PLEASE inform His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah that, at the request of His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, where serious disturbances have broken out, a man-of-war is being sent to ensure that the lives and property of foreigners may be protected. There is, of course, no intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to proceed to any act of intervention. You should tell the Consul at Mohammerah that the Sheikh of Mohammerah has, according to Crow, some influence at Bussorah, where he could prevent and restrain disturbances.

If he thinks it advisable, His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah should inform the Sheikh that His Majesty's Government have been obliged to send a man-of-war for the protection of His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, as they are much concerned at the attitude of the Arabs.

[14198] No. 32.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which his Excellency expresses the opinion that a ship of war should be sent to Bussorah.

I am to express Sir E. Grey's hope that their Lordships will cause instructions to be issued to the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx," now on the way to Koweit, to proceed forthwith to Bussorah for the purposes mentioned in my letter of the 13th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14540] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah, reporting on the attacks of Bedouin Arabs upon the Hejaz Railway and various robberies on the Mecca road.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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* No. 26.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Jeddah, March 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that attacks by Bedouins on the railway in the Hejaz, to the north of Medina, were going on until about a fortnight ago, and are probably still going on. I hear that the important Beni Salem tribe, who have hitherto been in favour of the Government, have now turned against the Government and the railway. The railway appears to have been frequently broken by Bedouins of late, but always quickly repaired. The telegraph line has been from time to time broken, but this occurred as often before the time of railway. On one occasion a few weeks ago, of soldiers repairing the line near Medina, seven are reported to have been killed and seven or eight wounded.

A caravan robbery by Bedouins occurred two days ago about 10 miles from Jeddah, on the Mecca road. Twenty camels were taken by the Bedouins, but some appear to have been afterwards recovered by soldiers.

The report (see my despatch No. 12 of the 12th instant) that the soldier who, being at rifle practice, was wounded by a shot from a Bedouin has died is contradicted.

Rumours are afloat in Jeddah about a Mehdi, otherwise called a Hadi, who is said to be invulnerable by bullets, having appeared in Assir.

It is understood that he claims not to be in rebellion against the Government, but to be propagating the "Shari Law." Nothing appears to have been heard here of steps having been taken by the Government against him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN.

[14543] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 263. Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, April 13, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 19th last, respecting the right of of His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad to navigate the Tigris in the "Comet" above Bagdad, I have the honour to report that Colonel Ramsay recently endeavoured to renew the practice of the free navigation by His Majesty's vessels of the rivers of Mesopotamia, other than the Bagdad–Bussorah section of the Tigris, under the following circumstances:—

On the 18th February I received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad asking for authorization to take Sir William Willcocks in the "Comet" up the Euphrates and Atyeh as far as the Hindieh barrage, if navigation proved possible, and proposing to return to the Tigris by way of the Hai Canal. The cost of engineering works on the Euphrates will depend largely on the possibility of water-carriage on that river, about which information is lacking, and Colonel Ramsay considered that this afforded an excellent opportunity of resuming the practice of the free navigation of the waters of Mesopotamia by the Government vessel in his service. I replied that, if it could be arranged locally and in a friendly manner with the Vali, I saw no objection to the proposed journey, but that it was not at that time advisable to raise the question here nor to make any official demand at Bagdad involving a claim of a right to navigate these rivers, which would have the effect of bringing the question up at Constantinople at an inconvenient moment.

I now have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of His Majesty's Consul-General's report of the negotiations carried on by him in accordance with my instructions as described above, with a view to proceeding in the "Comet" up to the Hindieh barrage without the possibility of official objections being raised by the Turks. You will observe that Colonel Ramsay contrived that the proposal was made to the Vali by Sir William Willcocks as coming from himself, but that the former was instructed by the Grand Vizier, in reply to a telegraphic recommendation of the plan, that "there might be objections" to Sir William Willcocks going in the "Comet," and that he had better hire some other steamer for the journey. It is perhaps to be regretted that the

negotiations proved abortive, but it is satisfactory to note that Colonel Ramsay was able by his discretion to prevent the question of his own right to take the "Comet" up the Euphrates from being involved in the case laid before the Turkish authorities. On the other hand, it may also be fortunate that the "Comet," with His Majesty's Consul-General and Sir William Willcocks, is not engaged in attempting the navigation of the Hai Canal now that some of the tribes to the east on the Tigris are in open revolt, though the canal does not pass through the disturbed district.

Before attempting to take the "Comet" up to the Hindieh barrage, Colonel Ramsay now proposes to accustom the authorities of the Bussorah Vilayet at Kurna to her passage for short distances up the Euphrates on sporting expeditions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bagdad, March 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Excellency's information a report on my negotiations to get the "Comet" up to the Hindieh barrage on the Euphrates, without the possibility of raising objections on the part of the Turks.

2. Sir William Willcocks first represented to the Vali of Bagdad that it was necessary for him to see the whole of the Euphrates below the Hindieh barrage, and that it was desirable to know the suitability of the river for navigation by steamers, so that an estimate could be made of the cost of transporting materials for barrages at Hindieh and at Feluja. Sir William said that he had reason to think that I would be willing to assist the Turkish Government by taking him in the "Comet," and he asked the Vali's opinion on the proposal. The Vali saw no objection.

I then went to see the Vali, who quite approved of the proposal, provided I did not hold him responsible for the conduct of the Arabs in the Bussorah Vilayet. I said that I had nothing to fear from the Arabs, but that I should like it if he could arrange matters so that the Vali of Bussorah should not be obstructive, or send alarmist telegrams to Constantinople, and as an example of what I meant I read to his Excellency a telegram which had been reproduced in the "Times," stating that the British had been occupying strategical positions on the Shat-el-Arab. Najm-ud-Din Bey seemed a little doubtful about the Vali of Bussorah, so he suggested that he should telegraph in cypher to the Grand Vizier saying that it would save time and money (to the Turkish Government) if I could take Sir William, and suggesting that instructions should be sent to the Vali of Bussorah to give any assistance that might be needed. We decided that if the Grand Vizier agreed to the proposal the Vali should inform me, but if the Grand Vizier objected the Vali was to tell Sir William that he had better not ask me to take him in the "Comet." The Grand Vizier was informed that I proposed to start early on the 2nd March. When no answer came on the 1st March, I again saw the Vali, and he agreed to my starting, and gave me a zaptieh in case any Turkish officials might make objections. Unfortunately, I was not able to get off on the early morning of the 2nd March, and at about mid-day a telegram came from the Grand Vizier saying that "there might be objections" to Sir William going in the "Comet," and that it would be better if he were to hire another steamer. When this message came I gave up all idea of taking the "Comet" up the Euphrates. I regret that the negotiations should have failed, but we have lost nothing, for the conversations between me and the Vali as well as the Vali's telegram show clearly that the question under discussion was not whether I could take the "Comet" up the Euphrates, but whether the Turkish Government would like its Engineer to ask me to take him up in the "Comet."

3. The next time I am at Bussorah I propose to take the "Comet" a short way up the Euphrates, nominally in search of good shooting, but really to get the Bussorah Vilayet officials accustomed to seeing the ship pass Gurna on the Euphrates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[14484] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1909.

THE Admiralty have given orders for the "Sphinx" to proceed to Bussorah, and she has already left for that port.

[14751] No. 36.

Djévad Bey to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 19 *avril,* 1909.

Mon cher Mr. Mallet,

JE vous envoie ci-inclus un télégramme que je viens de recevoir de Rifaat Pacha au sujet des malheureux événements d'Adana.

Je me permettrai de passer chez vous cet après-midi entre 4 heures et demie et 5 heures pour voir si vous avez, de votre côté, quelques meilleures nouvelles à me donner.

Bien sincèrement à vous,
(Signé) DJÉVAD.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Rifaat Pasha to Djévad Bey.

(Télégraphique.)

UN Arménien d'Adana ayant pour une affaire de femme blessé deux Musulmans, dont l'un a succombé à sa blessure, des troubles ont éclaté en cette ville et des rixes sont survenues entre Musulmans et Arméniens. Il y a eu des morts et des blessés des deux côtés. L'incendie qui s'est déclaré dans la ville n'a pu être éteint jusqu'ici. Des Arméniens armés ont cerné les villages musulmans, qui, n'étant pas en état de résister, implorent l'assistance des autorités. Celles-ci ont pris les mesures nécessaires pour le rétablissement de l'ordre. Des forces militaires sont envoyées de Beyrouth et Dedeagatch. Nous faisons une enquête sévère pour punir les fonctionnaires coupables, s'il y en a.

Les dernières nouvelles sont heureusement assez rassurantes et nous espérons que l'ordre et la sécurité ne tarderont pas à être rétablis.

[14723] No. 37.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Admiralty, April 19, 1909.

WITH reference to Admiralty telegram to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to disturbances in the Turkish Empire, copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office on the 17th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a summary of various telegrams from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station, showing the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Summary of Telegrams showing the movements of His Majesty's Ships in the Mediterranean, as reported up to April 19, 1909.

"*Diana.*"—Arrived Beirout the 18th instant (A.M.). Later the same day was ordered by Commander-in-chief, at urgent request of His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, to Alexandretta, where she will remain until arrival of "Triumph," after which "Diana" will return to Beirout.

[14764] No. 39*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 20.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of to-day's date, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day, which has been sent in cypher to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 39*.

Admiralty to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April* 19, 1909.

IN accordance with request from Foreign Office, arrange to dispatch three vessels to Lemnos to await orders, in addition to the ships already ordered, the names of the ships sent being communicated. You may make arrangements direct with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople as to the movements of His Majesty's ships "Swiftsure," "Triumph," and "Diana" wherever required, informing the Admiralty as necessary.

His Majesty the King is to be kept informed of all movements of Mediterranean ships, and you are to convey to His Majesty an expression of their Lordships' extreme regret that, in view of the situation in the Levant, it will not now be possible for existing arrangements for his reception at Malta by the fleet to be adhered to.

"*Swiftsure*" *and* "*Triumph*."—Left Malta the 18th instant (A.M.), bound—"Swiftsure" for Mersina, "Triumph" for Piræus. "Swiftsure" is proceeding to Mersina. "Triumph," at urgent request of His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, has been diverted, and is now proceeding direct to Alexandretta, where she will relieve "Diana."

[13515] No. 38.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which he caused to be addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury,* recommending to the favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners the proposal contained in your letter of the 10th ultimo for a loan of two lakhs (13,333*l.*) to the Sheikh of Koweit, together with copy of the reply to that communication which has now been received,† setting forth the conditions on which their Lordships are prepared to accept that suggestion.

I am to inquire whether Viscount Morley is disposed to agree to the conditions laid down by the Lords Commissioners.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14723] No. 39.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the dispatch of ships of war to Turkish waters, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that he has received further telegrams from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who considers that, in view of the situation in Macedonia, some ships of war should proceed immediately to Lemnos, whence they may be available for dispatch to any point where their presence may become necessary. Sir E. Grey hopes that their Lordships may see fit to order three ships to proceed to Lemnos immediately in accordance with Sir G. Lowther's suggestion.

With reference to your letter of to-day's date regarding the movement of His Majesty's ships "Triumph," "Swiftsure," and "Diana" to Mersina and Alexandretta, Sir G. Lowther has inquired whether, in view of the seriousness of the situation, he may have authority to move these ships as occasion may demand. Sir E. Grey considers that Sir G. Lowther should express his wishes as regards the movements of these vessels during the present crisis direct to the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and proposes to instruct him accordingly. He trusts that the Commander-in-chief may be authorized to meet Sir G. Lowther's wishes in this matter so far as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14923] No. 40.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 21.)

THE Secretary of the Admiralty presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to state, with reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 19th instant, that the battle-ships "Ocean" and "Canopus," the cruiser "Minerva," and the destroyers "Angler," "Ardent," and "Boxer," left Malta this evening for Lemnos.

Admiralty, April 20, 1909.

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* See No. 72 of previous Volume. † No. 11

[14924] No. 41.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Washington, April 20, 1909.*

TWO swift cruisers—the "Montana" and "North Carolina"—have just been ordered by the United States Government to proceed at once to Alexandretta. They will call for instructions at Gibraltar. This has been done, the Secretary of State informs me, not so much in the belief that American protection is needed as with a view to satisfying popular sentiment, which is anxious about the safety of the American missionaries in Asia Minor. The United States Government realise that the British and foreign war-ships are ready to do their utmost to protect American citizens. No other action or interference, except for the protection of their nationals, is contemplated by the United States Government.

15013] No. 42.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 21, 1909.*

I LEARN from Acting Consul at Aleppo that disturbances are rumoured to have begun at Birejik, and it is to be feared that they may be extended over other Armenian districts. He reports that Armenians were plundered and massacred in Antioch yesterday. The Vali declared himself not able to restore tranquillity, but has sent instructions for the protection of British subjects, who are collected in the Vice-Consulate.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam's influence alone is likely to avail. I proposed two days ago that he should attempt to exercise it with the Muftis of the Vilayets of Diarbekir and Aleppo, and that similar action should be taken by the Armenian Patriarch.

[15155] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 270 of yesterday's date, the Armenian Patriarch and Sheikh-ul-Islam sent instructions to the religious authorities of Konia, where there are fears of disorders, and repeated their previous orders to the Vilayets of Diarbekir and Aleppo.

[15154] No. 44.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, April 22, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES in Turkey.

Baron d'Aehrenthal has informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Government will not hesitate to send vessels without loss of time if disturbances arise which threaten Austro-Hungarian interests. They will not, however, send a man-of-war to Mersina at present, for, as far as he knows, there are no Austro-Hungarian subjects there.

[15038] No. 40c.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 21, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated to-day, from His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" at Mersina.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 40c.

Captain Thursby to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *"Swiftsure," at Mersina, April 21, 1909.*

ON arrival I find town full of refugees from Adana, but quiet. One French one German war-ship here.

The vice-consul, Adana, has been informed of state of affairs.

[15024] No. 42c.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 21, 1909.*

FOLLOWING from Alexandretta:—

"Diana" landed. Fifty sailors protecting lives of British subjects and consulate.

[15285] No. 47*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 23, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated to-day, from His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" at Mersina.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 47*.

Captain Thursby to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) "*Swiftsure*," *at Mersina, April* 23, 1909.

FOOD and medical assistance has been sent to Adana. All quiet at that town and at Tarsus and Mersina.

[15171] No. 45.

Mr. Wyndham to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, April* 22, 1909.

CRISIS in Turkey.

The "Piemonte" has been ordered to leave Brindisi for Suda, there to await orders.

The cruiser "Ferruccio" is due at Mersina to-day.

The squadron is still kept at Taranto in readiness.

[15152] No. 46.

Djévad Bey to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 22.)

Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
Mon cher Mr. Mallet, *le* 22 *avril*, 1909.

JE vous envoie ci-joint un télégramme que j'ai reçu hier soir de Rifaat Pacha sur l'envoi des troupes aux localités troublées en Asie Mineure.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien en faire part à Sir Edward Grey et à Sir Charles Hardinge.

Je me propose de venir vous serrer la main cet après-midi. Peut-être auriez-vous quelques minutes à me donner.

Bien sincèrement à vous,
(Signé) DJEVAD.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Rifaat Pasha to Djévad Bey.

(Télégraphique.)

DEPUIS quatre jours l'ordre est rétabli à Adana et les boutiques y ont été réouvertes. Aucun nouvel incident ne s'est produit à Itch-Eli, à Mersine (districts d'Adana). Le calme règne actuellement à Tarsous. Les troubles continuent à Djebéli Béréket (district dans lequel se trouve Antioche). Huit bataillons de réservistes de Konia sont déjà partis, trois bataillons de ligne du IIe Corps d'Armée embarqués à bord du bateau "Hodéida," et deux bataillons de Smyrne se rendent en chemin de fer à destination du Vilayet d'Adana. Des ordres ont été donnés pour que toutes les troupes disponibles du Ve Corps d'Armée soient également dépêchées sur le théâtre des troubles.

[15288] No. 47.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 23.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 22, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 5th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs generally in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to address His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the status of Koweit, and to leave it to his Excellency's discretion to take a suitable opportunity to make it clear to the Turkish Government that this attitude has not been modified since the occurrence of the recent constitutional changes in Turkey.

With regard, however, to the incident reported in the inclosure in my letter of the 15th ultimo, Lord Morley is disposed to think that it would be preferable, before basing any representation to the Porte upon it, to await an official report from the Government of India, which will no doubt be forthcoming should the developments of the matter require it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[15354] No. 48.

Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)

Sir, *Cairo, April 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 52 and 57 of the 3rd and 8th instant, respecting railway construction in Syria and the possibility of connecting El Arish and Ismailia, I venture to observe that at present there is but slight prospect of the latter work being undertaken by the Egyptian Government. It would be contrary to their policy to intrust the construction of such a railway to a private Company, and, from an economic point of view, the project is not one that presses. Moreover, serious strategic considerations, which would necessitate discussions in Cairo and London, would be raised by any proposal to connect the Egyptian and Turkish Railway systems.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELDON GORST.

[15384] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 23, 1909.*

FROM reports furnished by His Majesty's Consul and others, I learn that the state of things in and around Adana has caused great misery: several thousand orphans are left without support, the factories, &c., are destroyed, and no fewer than 15,000 individuals are rendered completely destitute. At least 100*l.* a-day is urgently necessary merely to keep the people from starving, as, the mills being damaged, there is no flour to be had. In consequence of my representations, the Turkish Government is sending money and military tents, but owing to the present situation in Constantinople little attention can be spared for difficulties remote from the capital.

Could not an appeal be made through the press and other channels to the various charitable Societies, such as the "Friends of Armenia," that interest themselves in this district? The funds would be distributed without respect to the creed of the sufferers.

[15398] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 24, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES at Adana.

The visit of the Captains of the French, German, and English men-of-war to the Vali has produced a good effect.

It now remains to rescue the American and English missionaries, who are in a most precarious position at Hadjin. An Englishman expressed his readiness to go out as peacemaker, but the Vali did not avail himself of his services, as he was unwilling to take the responsibility.

A deputation of Armenian and Turkish Delegates have now gone to Hadjin to make peace. The missionary has been advised telegraphically by the Consul to persuade the Armenians to give themselves up, under guarantee of safety, to the troops.

[15478] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 165.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 25, 1909.*

ADANA massacres.

The number of persons in need of relief is increasing, and it is estimated that 200*l.* a-day is required. Major Doughty Wylie has been proposed as President of the Relief Committee.

The killed in the town number 2,200, of whom 600 are Moslems and 1,600 Christians.

[15565] No. 52.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 268.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 212 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, reporting on the progress of the punitive expedition against the Zereneek tribe in the Yemen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9 E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, March 19, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch to your Excellency, No. 6 of the 2nd instant, I have now the honour to report that General (Mir-Liwa) Yussuf Pasha arrived here on the 15th instant from Sana'a to command the punitive operations against the Zereneek tribe.

Three battalions of infantry from the capital, viz., the third battalions of the 52nd, 62nd, and 37th Regiments respectively, with a collective strength of about 1,500 men, 25 troopers (cavalry), 100 mounted gendarmes, and 4 guns accompanied the above-mentioned officer, and proceeded directly to Marawar, where the reinforcements were concentrated.

A few days later, two companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 64th Regiment, comprising 143 foot soldiers, arrived from Hujjur, to join the expeditionary force.

On the 7th instant Yussuf Pasha who had come to Hodeidah to make arrangements about transport and supplies for the force about to operate under him, left for Marawar with the two companies of infantry that had arrived from Hujjur.

News reached Hodiedah on the same day that Major Mahomed Riza Bey had been attacked by the tribesmen in force at Husseinia, where he was securely entrenched in the enemy's stronghold that he had previously captured. He succeeded in beating off the rebels, inflicting severe losses on them. It is reported that about eighty Arabs were killed and many more wounded.

The strength of Yussuf Pasha's force that started from Marawar on the 8th instant, may be said to consist of 1,500 infantry, 125 cavalry, regular and irregular, and four mountain guns.

At the above place, five Sheikhs of the Absi tribe with some followers met him and accompanied the troops to Shujaini, where they were joined by the Sheikhs of El Rumah, who escorted them as far as Mahwat, that is situated on the eastern outskirts of the Zereneek country.

On the 9th instant Yussuf Pasha received a letter from the tribesmen inhabiting the north-eastern Zereneek districts asking for terms. The matter was referred to the vilayet that sent strict injunctions to the General that the submission of the tribesmen could only be accepted on their carrying out the following conditions:—

1. Payment of all old standing arrears of taxes (tithes, vergo, &c.) due by the tribesmen to the Ottoman Government;

2. Restitution of the loot taken from Zebeed and Hodeidah merchants during the past five years, amounting to from 5,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* (This was taken from camel caravans passing through their country);

3. Surrender of all arms and ammunition in possession of the tribe;

4. Destruction of the thick high brushwood and forests in the Zereneek territory utilized by the tribesmen for taking shelter in and fortifying themselves when hunted down by the Turks. Raids are also made on caravans from these bushes in which the Arabs lie concealed; and

5. The surrender of fifty-seven sureties, representing various sections of the tribe and comprising merchants at Monsouria and Dureimi, to be retained as a guarantee for the future good behaviour of the tribe.

The Zereneek Sheikhs and Arabs were ready to accept the first two conditions, but could not entertain the three latter Turkish proposals.

On the 10th instant Yussuf Pasha, who was still at Mahwat, attacked several villages in the vicinity, and after punishing the Arabs returned to his camp at the above place.

On the 13th his force, after several hours' severe fighting, reached Beit-el-Fakih, and took up a strong position outside the town. Here he (Yussuf Pasha) was joined by the troops under the Mutessarif of Hodeidah, that had been there for nearly a month being obliged to fortify themselves since the reverse of the 23rd February last, and to wait reinforcements. The expeditionary force was thus strengthened by some 700 more infantry and two maxims.

News reached the acting Mutessarif here from Beit-el-Fakih this afternoon to the effect that Yussuf Pasha had on the previous morning marched out against the tribesmen that were encamped in great strength at the villages of Hattabieh, Kokar, and Abassi, in the vicinity, and after eight hours' fighting compelled them to abandon their position and flee. It was estimated that the losses on the Arab side exceeded 100 men killed and a similar number wounded. A big quantity of sheep and cattle were captured by the troops and taken to Beit-el-Fakih. The Turkish losses are not known, but they were not great from all accounts.

On the same day Major Riza Bey, commanding the southern operating force, attacked the rebels in the vicinity of Husseinia, and punished them severely.

I am informed that Yussuf Pasha has now reported to head-quarters that it has been ascertained that the neighbouring clans are making common cause with the Zereneek tribesmen against the Turks, and that the strength of his force is inadequate to bring about their utter subjugation.

In addition to the troops under Yussuf Pasha at Beit-el-Fakih, there are four and a-half battalions of infantry (1,500 to 1,600 men in all) and two guns (mountain battery), under Riza Bey at Husseinia, that is just north of Zebeed, and situated about midway between the latter place and Beit-el-Fakih.

It has not been possible to ascertain the numbers of and the regiments to which the above battalions belong. These were moved to Zebeed from Reima and the Taiz district. I believe that one of them is the 14th Nishanjee Battalion, attached to the Yemen Army Corps.

The Turkish gun-boats "Tash-Kubri" and "Nau-Shahr" have shown great activity lately in patrolling the Zereneek littoral, with a view to preventing the entry of arms into the country, destined for the use of the rebel tribe.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON.

[15567] No. 53.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April 26.*)

(No. 270.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 15, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a Memorandum from the British Consulate-General at Bagdad dealing with the questions of the German doctor at Bagdad, His Majesty's Consul-General's visit to the Euphrates, the Sanniyeh steamers, and Nishat Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Memorandum.

(No. 18. Confidential.)

1. *German Doctor at Bagdad.*—Dr. Grothe, who visited Bagdad about two years ago for the purpose of studying commercial and political openings in this part of Turkey, wrote to the German press suggesting that a German hospital at Bagdad would do much to increase German influence. Some months ago a Dr. Haerle arrived here and set up in practice, saying that he was hoping to start a private hospital. I now hear on fairly good authority that Dr. Haerle receives 100*l.* a-year from the German Government, nominally as medical adviser to the Germans employed on the excavations at

Babylon. Babylon is about 50 miles from Bagdad, and I imagine that Dr. Haerle was sent as a German pioneer. At present he works in a humble way for small fees.

2. *Resident's Visit to Euphrates.*—It is very many years since the British Representative has visited the Lower Euphrates. I had hoped to do this in the "Comet," but the negotiations fell through. I am now going to join Sir William Willcocks at the Hindya Barrage and go with him from there to Gurna. Dr. van Ess, of the American Mission at Bussorah, is with him, and I think that the journey made with two experts ought to be very interesting. Dr. van Ess has spent many months among the Muntefik Arabs and will make the best possible guide, and as Sir William wishes to interest the Sheikhs in his irrigation schemes, we shall probably have occasion to meet most of the leading men along the river. We shall sail down the Euphrates and get a tug up from Bussorah to meet us, camping at nights on the banks.

3. *Sanniyeh Steamers.*—I understand that Captain Penne, who commanded the Turkish steamer "Burhaniya" for three years, has now again joined the Turkish service as commander of one of the new large steamers. He has made no contract with the Sanniyah Administration, but has been verbally promised, and is going to get it in writing, that he will be at liberty to subscribe to the pension fund, as he is not engaged for a limited period. I also hear that the Turks are trying to get another Englishman, Captain Braine, to command the other of the new steamers, the "Basra." Captain Braine was at one time in Lynch's service.

4. *Nishat Pasha.*—Nishat Pasha was until recently Chief of the Staff of the VIth Army Corps. He has now left Bagdad for Constantinople. He has the reputation, both among the Young Turks and among the Reactionaries, of being a peculiarly untrustworthy man. On his way down the river he was saying that the irrigation works could be done much more economically than was proposed by Sir W. Willcocks, and that it was the intention of Sir William to import large numbers of Indian labourers, which would be very undesirable from many points of view. As far as I am aware, Sir William will employ local labour whenever it is available. I merely mention this matter in case Nishat Pasha may pose as an authority having local knowledge when he returns to the capital. I hear that he has a book full of notes about the Hindya, but I have not heard of his placing his information at the disposal of Sir William Willcocks or of the Turkish Government.

(For the Political Resident and Consul-General, Bagdad),

(Signed) J. McPHERSON, M.A., M.B., *Captain I.M.S.*,
Acting Residency Surgeon.

[15568] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April 26.*)

(No. 271.)

Sir, *Pera, April 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 106 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that I had no reason to suppose that the Turkish Government, in requesting the reprieve or pardon of the Moslems of Magossa who had been condemned to death, were in any way seeking to assert a pretension that the Sultan possesses the prerogative of pardon over Cypriote Mahommedans.

The Grand Vizier forwarded to the Embassy, through his Secretary-Interpreter, the original telegram which he had received from Cyprus, together with a verbal message, and did not desire to attach too much importance to the matter.

Mr. Fitzmaurice, in informing the Secretary that it had been impossible to accede to the request of his Highness, took the opportunity to point out that it was illogical to object to the application of the principle of the Sheri Law in Cyprus at the very moment when, by the very same principle, the population of Constantinople were clamouring for the death of the murderer of Hassan Fehmi.

The cogency of this argument was admitted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[14795] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 272.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 15, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copy of a despatch which I have just received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, giving an account of the relations between the Arab tribes in the Shatt-el-Arab, which appear to be the root of the troubles reported in my despatch No. 228 of the 31st ultimo, the upshot being that they are due to the enmity between the Sheikh of the Mohammerah and Ghadban. From the inclosed despatch, and from telegrams which I have received recently from Mr. Crow, I gather that, while the Turks wish to eject Ghadban from Kumeit, which is the present centre of the dispute, and lease the land either to Fahad, who is a Chief of the Beni Lam tribes, hostile to Ghadban and lessee of the lands between Sheikh Saad and Ali "Sherghi," or else to the highest bidder, the Sheikh of the Mohammerah, who finds he has been dishonestly treated by Ghadban, and is anxious to punish him for the assistance he has given to the Howeyza tribes, who properly are subject to the Sheikh, is reported to be throwing all his influence on the side of Fahad, and has instructed certain friends of his at Bussorah to guarantee the rent if necessary.

The telegraphic accounts I have received are, however, insufficient to enable me to unravel these tribal complications with any clearness.

Meanwhile the Turkish steamer "Baghdad" left Bussorah on the 28th March, carrying on board the mail and Sir William Willcocks, and, as the telegraph lines were on hand and the postal communications interrupted, no news was received of her till the 5th April, when she was reported to have reached Amara, where she met the Lynch boat "Kalifa." The latter had encountered heavy fighting on the way down from Baghdad, but had sustained no casualties on board, though four men had been killed and nine wounded on other ships.

The other Lynch boat did not leave Bussorah, and the Turkish ships "Kilidbahr" and "Mejidieh" made merely useless journeys up to Karna and back. The Redif and Ihtigal of the Bussorah Vilayet were at the same time called out. No movements of troops were contemplated from Bussorah, but a force of ten battalions of the IVth Army Corps were apparently ordered to proceed to Amara from Baghdad.

There the preparations comprised negotiations between the Vali and His Majesty's Consul-General for the loan of the "Bloss Lynch" for the transport of troops and ammunition: Major Ramsay, while expressing his readiness to obtain the loan of the steamer gratis, stipulated, as recorded in your despatch No. 108 of the 8th instant, that the Turkish authorities should give a guarantee in case of the loss of or damage to the boat, but this the Vali refused to give.

On the 6th April the passenger steamers both from Bussorah and Baghdad (the Lynch "Khalifa" and the Turkish "Hamidieh" and "Basra") were lying at Amara with Sir William Willcocks and a party of British Indian pilgrims, as well as 2,013 foreign subjects, where were some 1,700 soldiers, others having moved to the south, where they were engaged in battle with the tribes, Ghadban having moved to Ibtara which had become the rallying point of the canal Arabs.

Major Ramsay considered that Amara was safe at all events for the time, and he thought it undesirable to send away the "Bloss Lynch" as she was the last steamer remaining at Baghdad, and further, if she is employed against the Arabs, we should lose our position of neutrality, and he suggested endeavouring to secure from the tribes a safe conduct for himself on board the "Comet" with a view to bringing away the British subjects.

This course appeared to me to incur an undue risk, and, in fact, not to be practicable, and I therefore asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he could not induce the Government to grant the guarantee, but am still without reply, and I can hardly hope to obtain one in the present agitated condition of the capital.

I also had previously made representations to the Grand Vizier Hussein Hilmi on the subject of these reports, and His Highness stated that according to his information there was no danger to the passengers on the steamers at Amara, and that the rebels were dispersing.

Major Ramsay, however, could obtain no news of this nature, and reported the further dispatch of four guns and about 600 men from Baghdad on the 7th April, and Mr. Crow learnt that the total of the Turkish force on the river on the 12th April

amounted to 2,550 men and 16 guns. He added that, according to an official report, they had been defeated with loss on the 8th April by a force of 8,000 Arabs and had retired in steamers to Amara. On the other hand, Major Ramsay telegraphed on the 13th instant that it was reported that the troops had taken Kumait and Amara, which is difficult to understand unless it means that the Turks had been repulsed northwards and had taken up positions at these two places.

On the same day news arrived that the "Baghdad" had passed Kutonlis up stream journey, and yesterday I heard from Mr. Crow that the "Khalifa" had been escorted by a Turkish gunboat as far as Ezra's Tomb, and had reached Bussorah without incident on the 13th April. He further expressed the belief that the Arabs had moved northwards to meet the Bagdad force, and this statement coincides with the theory that the Turks, whether through insuccess or strategy, are falling back towards their base.

Mr. Crow also telegraphs that lawlessness at Bussorah is increasing and that the troubles are undoubtedly spreading, whilst the Arabs are gathering in large force on both sides of the river, and he recommends the dispatch of a British man-of-war.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Beyrout reports that the Turkish gun-boat "Marmaris" has been dispatched from that port to the Persian Gulf.

It appears that the "Neyshehr" and the "Tash Kiupru" whose departure for the Gulf was reported in my despatch No. 880 of the 22nd December last have remained in the Red Sea where they are occupied in chasing, not unsuccessfully, the dhows which are engaged in importing arms for the recalcitrant Zeranik tribe in the Yemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER

Inclosure in No. 55.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Bussorah, March 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 22 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to report that the authorities are reletting the lands near Amara, where leases have expired, and propose to try to recover arrears of money due by the Multezims to the Government.

The passenger steamer "Khalifa," which arrived here on the 18th instant, reports that she was fired on by Arabs on the 17th instant at night while passing Kumeid, and that the Turkish steamer which passed down three hours before was not fired on. Kumeid is six hours' steaming above Amara and is leased to Ghadban, whose influence extends to Kilo Salih, twenty-four hours' steaming above Amara.

It appears that the Turks want to eject Ghadban from Kumeid and lease the land to Fahad, who is also a Beni Lam, but independent and hostile to Ghadban.

Captain Cowley, master of the "Khalifa," who was in charge of the "Bloss Lynch" when that vessel was attacked in the spring of 1908, reports that Mohamed Pasha is said at Bagdad to have received 1,000*l.* from Ghadban to exaggerate the latter's strength and to have advized the necessity of sending a force of 20,000 men if the Government intend to crush him. For this Mohamed Pasha is said to have been dismissed. Captain Cowley learns from Amara that Ghadban is weak at present and reports that Areybi Pasha, a relation of the late Seyhool and a Sheikh of the district, told him he could crush Ghadban with his own force if he had 500 regular soldiers to help him. Captain Cowley also hears up river that both the Vali of Bussorah and the Mutessarif of Amara are in Ghadban's pay.

Some troops, 320 men of the 11th Nishanji, were sent from Bussorah to Amara on the 14th March, and the "Alus" is patrolling above Kurna.

Though I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the reports given by Captain Cowley, it is evident that we may anticipate fresh disturbances, and the attitude previously adopted by Ghadban on these occasions leads me to think that they are not at all improbable. They serve at least to explain our position, and this fresh attack on the Khalifa shows that Ghadban proposes now, as he did before, to force the hands of the Turks by firing on British steamers.

The Vali, in reply to my representations, says that the "Alus" has been placed at the disposal of the Mutessarif of Amara for the protection of the river, and that he

is instructing the Mutessarif to let her escort the "Khalifa," if necessary. His Excellency will also place six gendarmes and an officer on board the vessel, which, I think, is all he can spare in the present disturbed state of Bussorah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[15570] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 274.)
Sir, *Pera, April 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 220 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the compulsory attendance at religious services and classes, &c., of the Moslem students of the Syrian Protestant College at Beirout, I have the honour to report that I have received a further despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at that place, stating that he has received a letter from the President of the College, from which it appears that the question has been satisfactorily settled, at least for the present. Most of the students, the President writes, are falling in with the rules of the College, and those who cannot do so are quietly leaving.

Mr. Cumberbatch added his assistance towards bringing about this result, and induced the Mufti, Cadi, and other leading Moslems of Beirout not to encourage the Moslem students in their abstention from the Bible classes after the College had given way as regards their attendance at daily prayers and Sunday services, but to advise those who did not wish to resume their class work to leave the College quietly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[15573] No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 278.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the general situation in that vilayet, which during the past three months has been fairly quiet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, April 5, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following observations on the state of affairs in this vilayet during the past three months.

The first point to which I would venture to draw attention is the remarkable freedom from disorder enjoyed by the province during the period in question. This is the more satisfactory as, owing to the considerable curtailment of the powers of the police since the proclamation of the Constitution, the maintenance of public order has been largely due to the good sense and self-control of the people themselves. The great majority of the Mussulmans, indeed, as was only to be expected from their own efforts in the cause of reform under the old régime, have from the first shown every indication of being determined that the new system shall have a fair trial, while their experience of the consequences of the lawlessness into which they allowed themselves to drift in the autumn of 1907 has taught them that this object cannot be obtained, should the former mistake of confusing liberty with licence be repeated. On their part, the Armenians have contributed their fair share towards the maintenance of order and, as a population, have shown a commendable desire to avoid offending the susceptibilities and prejudices of their Mussulman fellow-subjects, with the result that the good relations between the two inaugurated by the celebrations of August and September of last year have been satisfactorily maintained. I should, in fact, regard the situation

as affording a fairly encouraging outlook for the future, were it not that an unfavourable impression is being produced among the Mussulmans by the fact that for some time past an importation of arms has been going on from across the frontier into Armenian villages. The extent to which this is being done may possibly be exaggerated, and I have been assured by certain leading members of the local Tashnak organization with whom I have spoken on the matter that in no case is a systematic arming of the population being attempted, nor does it form part of their programme. Even admitting, however, the truth of their assertion in this latter respect, it may be questioned whether the importation of arms at all is not of more than doubtful expediency, in view of the use which may be made of it for their own purposes by the enemies of the new régime, and of the fact that it tends in any case—as a leading member of the local Committee of Union and Progress has more than once pointed out to me—to form an obstacle to the attainment of the complete understanding between the two nationalities which is so desirable at the present juncture. The only explanation which, as far as I can discover, has been put forward for this importation of arms seems to be that, in case a reaction should take place, the outlying Armenian villages ought not to be left entirely defenceless in the disorder which, it is presumed, would ensue. But although an argument of this kind may not be without a certain force in vilayets such as Van and Bitlis, where the Armenians have good reasons for not placing too much confidence in their Kurdish neighbours, it has no application to the major part of this province, where the attitude of the Mussulmans towards the Christians has been consistently friendly, and certainly not such as to give any present reason to suppose that, even if troubles were to break out, it is the Armenians who would be made the special sufferers.

A further source of misunderstanding is to be found in the indiscrete utterances as to a forward policy to be adopted by the Armenians, indulged in from time to time by the younger members of the Tashnak organization, and I have on more than one occasion received complaints from prominent Turks as to the bad effect these utterances have had on the general body of Mussulmans, and the difficulty they have had in persuading the latter that they need not be taken too seriously. Such utterances are the more to be regretted as, in the conversations which I have had with leading local Armenians, I have invariably found that the latter strongly deprecate anything approaching an adventurous policy, their view being that their condition as a nation has vastly improved as compared with what it was only a year ago, and that their best chance of making full use of the opportunity now afforded them for recuperation is to remain quiet and to prove to the Turks that the interests of the two peoples are not antagonistic. The matter was well put to me by one of their number, and I give his observation in his own words: "In case of trouble the army would be for us or against us. In the former event we have nothing to fear, while in the latter contingency such arms as we could import would be entirely useless." While in this connection I should not omit to refer to the valuable services rendered by the present Gregorian Bishop of Erzeroum, Mgr. Sempad, such influence as he possessed over his flock having been uniformly exerted in the interest of order and tranquillity.

With regard to the situation from an administrative point of view, it may be said that, on the whole, matters have progressed satisfactorily. None of the projects which, it is understood here, have been sanctioned by the Turkish Parliament for the development of the resources of the vilayet have, it is true, been put into active execution, for the sufficient reason that the most important of these—such as, for instance, the improvement of the means of communication—cannot be taken in hand until the winter is over. On the other hand, the establishment of the Constitution has made itself felt in the fact that complaints, whether on the part of Mussulmans or Christians, are accorded a much more attentive hearing than was formerly the case, while a wholesome conviction appears to be gaining ground in the minds of officials generally that abuses can no longer be perpetrated with the same impunity as before. His Excellency Tahir Pasha, the present Governor-General, has already made an example in one or two cases of incompetency and corrupt practices which have been brought to his notice, and has informed me that he would do more except for the difficulty of finding efficient substitutes and for the fact that, as he himself has pointed out, certain limitations have very rightly been imposed upon him by the Constitution. In this, however, as in other matters, his Excellency is being well seconded by the local Club of Union and Progress, which appears to act as an advisory Committee in all affairs affecting the general welfare of the population. The dangers inherent in a condominium of this sort are obvious, and it speaks well for the prudence and moderation shown by

both his Excellency and the club in question that it has worked so well as it has done, with the result that a somewhat critical period has so far been successfully tided over.

Of the economic condition of the province during the past winter I am unfortunately unable to give your Excellency an equally favourable account. Last year's harvest, though not a failure, was still some 20 or 25 per cent. below the average, and, as this was preceded by a deficiency in the harvest of the year before, the outlook for the winter was not without anxiety. Owing, however, to the measures taken by the Governor-General, in conjunction with a Committee of the leading Notables, to insure a supply of flour from Kars and to the prohibition placed upon the export of grain from the province, there has at no time been a danger of a state of famine. But though this is so, there has been none the less a large amount of distress among the poorer classes of the population, due not so much to the price of bread, which, thanks to the measures above referred to, has been little, if at all, above the average; as to the lack of employment, and to the fact that where employment has been obtainable, the wage given can hardly, even for this country, be called a living one. The pressure from this latter cause may be expected to be considerably lightened with the advancing spring, but in the meantime there can be doubt that the distress is being very severely felt, and, though local effort has done much to alleviate it, the appeals which, I understand, are being made for additional assistance from outside are not unwarranted by the facts. As to the chances of this year's harvest, on which so much depends, it is of course too soon to form an opinion. The conditions, however, I am told, are not unfavourable for sowing operations, while the Government has done its share by coming to the assistance of the villagers in advancing some 30,000 Turkish liras for purchases of seed in addition to the usual supplies furnished by the Agricultural Bank. There is, I am informed, a certain stringency in the local money market, which is having an adverse effect on the purchase of sheep and cattle for export, but, with this exception, the prospects for this year are not altogether discouraging.

Before concluding my Report, I would beg to refer to one incident which took place in the early part of the year, viz., the seizure by the Turkish frontier authorities at Kentok of dynamite in the possession of an Armenian, Armenak by name. The affair is somewhat obscure, as it is understood that Armenak himself maintains that the dynamite was not intended for Turkey, but for Persia. Considerable reticence has been maintained by the judicial authorities with regard to the inquiry, which has not yet terminated; but I shall, I trust, shortly be in a position to report further on the matter to your Excellency. The Armenak in question, who is a native of Bitlis, was arrested in the year 1901 on information lodged by Armenians themselves, from whom he had endeavoured to extort money for revolutionary purposes, and was subsequently condemned on the latter charge to imprisonment for life, being released along with others in the amnesty granted last year. He does not appear to have ever been held in much esteem by the Armenian community, by whom his latest exploit has been universally condemned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY

[15576] No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 281.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 20, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 272 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reporting on the recent attacks by Arabs on the Tigris steamers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Bussorah, March 27, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the "Khalifa," with Colonel Ramsay on board, was attacked in four places

between Kalat Salih or Shattrat-el-Amara and Mejer Saghir. The Albu Mohammed, from whom the authorities are trying to collect arrears of money, fired twenty-three shots which hit the vessel, but no casualties occurred. Heavy rain seems to have prevented them continuing. The "Khalifa" took on five soldiers on the way in addition to the seven embarked here.

The Turkish steamer "Bagdad" which arrived on the 24th encountered heavy firing below Amara, also from the Albu Mohammed and was hit in 560 places, not counting the shots which struck the hull and exterior of the vessel. Their 3-pounder gun was put out of action after the sixth shot, the gunner was wounded before he could fire at all and the clerk of the ship worked the gun. The Arab fire was returned from the ship which had 130 men on board, and 160 rounds were fired. Three persons were killed on board and seven wounded. Captain Denne, who is on leave of absence from the British India Company was in command of the ship, and immense credit is due to him for the courage and determination with which he brought her through the fire.

The "Mejidieh" came down shortly after, but was unmolested, the Arabs having retired temporarily.

Colonel Ramsay informs me he saw large gatherings of the Beni Lam at Kumeyl and 'Iptera above Amara on the right bank. They were evidently prepared to fight, but sent word to say the "Khalifa" could pass. They were probably waiting to see whether the Turkish authorities still meant to put Faisal into Kumeyl, and will regulate their conduct accordingly. If the Turks insist on doing so there will undoubtedly be further trouble. In fact the Arabs all along the right bank are now out on the war path.

Messrs. Lynch have decided not to send back the "Mejidieh" to Bagdad pending further news of a more reassuring nature. The resources of the Turks seem wholly inadequate to meet the situation. The gunboats "Alus" and "Bagdadi" are slow and cannot well escort steamers which travel much faster than they do. Captain Denne told me he went 15 knots through the fire for forty minutes. It would be fatal to delay the ships to keep pace with the escorting gunboats. The Defterdar told me that with local friendly Arabs he could count on about 1,000 men in this district for the protection of the river. This is of course not enough. If the Turks propose to take the matter seriously in hand they will require a considerable force, and it will mean a campaign. For many years they have tried half measures, and matters have now been brought to a head. Before we can navigate the river in safety the Albu Mohammed should be severely punished. As for the Beni Lam and Gadban it will depend very much on what line the Turks take with regard to their leases. If they do as the Arabs want, which is perhaps weak, but safer for the present in view of the difficulties of campaigning in the high river season, there will probably be no trouble with the Beni Lam. Steps against the Albu Mohammed are certainly a necessity, and an urgent necessity, if navigation is to be secured.

Colonel Ramsay suggests arming the new Hamidieh steamers "Bagdad" and "Bussorah." They are fast but unprotected, and require armour plating and quick firing machine guns, and steady gunners to work them. Each vessel has a small armour-plated room on the bridge, which might contain six men. They could, however, be converted into useful ships for offensive purposes. Operations would have to be undertaken on land as well, and forts built and manned with guns and men. I am quite of Colonel Ramsay's opinion that the Arabs have been goaded into their present state of exasperation by the rapacity and dishonesty of Turkish officials. Gadban seems to dispose of great wealth, and the officials at Bussorah and Amara have hitherto been bought. If Turkey will change this system and take the matter seriously in hand, the measures to be adopted are within their power. But with the large numbers of armed men at the disposal of the Beni Lam and the Albu Mohammed, it would be useless, and perhaps worse than useless, to begin operations without an adequate force to repress them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[15577] No. 59.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 813 of the 1st December, 1908, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah reporting on the present state of affairs in the Hedjaz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Jeddah, April 5, 1909.*

WITH reference to my below-mentioned despatches, I have the honour to submit the following supplementary information:

In my despatch No. 53 of the 5th November, 1908, I reported that two ringleaders of the successful disorderly demonstration against a long-established municipal tax in Jeddah were to be tried. There has been and is to be no trial in connection with that affair. The two ringleaders were released after a short inquiry.

In my despatch No. 60 of the 18th November, 1908, I reported the serious disturbance in Mecca on the 12th November which was raised against municipal taxation, the Committee of Union and Progress and the new régime in general, and which cost eleven lives. The Government appears to have done nothing in the matter until the end of January or early in February, when some twenty-one persons were put under arrest. The Grand Sherif's old privileges seem, by the way, to be about to be restored, as I hear that these persons were kept, for at any rate some days, in the Grand Sherif's prison, a time-honoured but somewhat irregular institution which was abolished last August (see Acting Consul Husnin's despatch No. 39 of the 25th August, 1908). The Grand Sherif was and is still supposed to have some undefined jurisdiction over Bedouins, but used to extend it over other persons. Of the twenty-one, four were, according to my latest information, discharged, the rest remaining in the regular Government prison of Mecca, a Commission to inquire into the affair, consisting, so far as I know, of a Juge d'Instruction and a Public Prosecutor, who are probably being reinforced by Mecca officials, having a fortnight ago arrived from Syria. It would seem that the Government found strength and leisure to deal with the affair after the pilgrimage, that is, after January.

The Committee of Union and Progress seems to have ceased for the last month or two to work in Mecca or Jeddah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN.

[15578] No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 283. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul General at Smyrna reporting that, in the course of his recent visit to Mitylene, he found evidence that Greek Nationalist propaganda is being sedulously promoted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 32. Confidential.)
Sir, *Smyrna, April 16, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that during my visit to Mitylene I learnt that some Greeks of Polierito and Plomari, towns on the island coast, had been arrested for sedition and brought to Mitylene for trial. Mr. Hadkinson had not been able to ascertain particulars, but will report to me as soon as possible.

I, however, found during the few days I spent in Mitylene ample evidence that Greek Nationalist propaganda is being studiously promoted all over the island by agents of the "Ethniki Hetairia" (National League).

I visited the district of Kallonia and was the guest of the Bishop. Two young doctors, graduates of the University of Athens, called upon me and made vague complaints against the Turkish authorities. These were probably of the same type as the men who have been arrested. One of them had been municipal doctor at Kallonia, but had been dismissed for using disloyal language. They begged me to stay in the island and see what the people suffer. By personal observation and general report I am convinced that there is no more flourishing or peaceful spot in Turkey than this island, and I told them so.

Mitylene is indeed singularly favoured by nature. Thanks to a vast olive cultivation, which has led to an extensive soap and oil industry, there are many very rich men in the island and very few poor.

The Bishop was an Albanian and naturally had no special enthusiasm for Greek politics, but he admitted freely the aspirations of the Greeks for union to Greece, dwelling upon the fact that those in the island outnumber the Turks five to one.

In other places also I heard of the activity of these agents from Greece. They collect much money from the people, money given freely and spontaneously, and those who are so ready to give for Greece are of course unwilling to pay taxes to Turkey.

In two places I heard of gymnastic clubs where young men were drilled with guns by officers who have served in the Greek army.

I cannot but suppose that the same propaganda is carried on in other islands of the archipelago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[15583] No. 61.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, furnishing a General Report on the affairs of the vilayet for the quarter ending the 31st ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Damascus, April 3, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a General Report for the last quarter.

Rifaat Bey, who was Mektoubjie here nine years, was transferred to Beirout and replaced by Ahmed Bey, Mektoubjie of Beirout: an alleged improvement.

It was not till January that the people of Kerak Sanjak agreed to elect Tewfik Mejali as their representative in Parliament. This Deputy is a simple peasant of no education.

Emir Emin Arslan, Kaimakam of Salt, was promoted to the Mutessarifilik of Effendi Durazzo, in Scutari, and replaced by Ata Bey Ayoubi, Kaimakam of Tyre: both predecessor and successor are worthy functionaries.

Shakir Bey, Kaïmakam of Bab, near Aleppo, was transferred to Kuneitra, in this vilayet, and Fuad Bey of Hamidiyeh, in the Sanjak of Hamah, transferred to Tafileh, in Kerak, and replaced by Abdul-Kader Bey Adu, who is a new Kaïmakam.

Javid Bey, Kaïmakam of Homs for a few weeks only, was promoted to the Mutessariflik of Hokkari, and Hashim Bey of Ajloun, to that of Jebel Barakat, in Adana Vilayet.

Nicola Effendi Adami, Directeur Politique, was dismissed and replaced by Fakhrud-Din Bey, dragoman of Salonica Vilayet.

The Vali remained absent from Damascus on a Mission in Jerusalem from the 4th February to the 6th March.

New elections for the municipality were held during this quarter, and the three sections system created four years ago was abolished and made one Department, presided over by Arif Effendi Kudsi. Numerous reforms are awaited from the new body, but owing to want of money very few things would be realized.

The Medjliss Umumi of the vilayet, created with the Constitution, met for the first time on the 15th ultimo under the presidency of the Vali. It is composed of sixteen members, four from each sanjak, half of them are Moslems and half non-Moslems, elected in the same way as the Idara and Court members are elected, and they meet forty days a year to discuss local reforms and decide on measures for the prosperity of the vilayet in industry and agriculture and education. In the sessions so far held the Medjliss discussed certain reforms in the municipalities towards increasing the revenues and forestalling encroachments by the Imperial Government: construction of carriage roads in the kazas where there are none; amelioration of the educational system, especially in the primary sections, so as to generalize its rudiments; establishing Chambers of Agriculture in the kazas for improving the methods as yet employed; trying to find a better way for imposing and collecting the tithes in which many abuses are ever committed; advising as to public security; and studying other ways of reforms in the vilayet, as irrigation systems, sanitary precaution.

Early in January a dispute took place between Moslems and Christians of Yabroud in Nebk Kaza where the former cut trees and destroyed gardens of the latter, but order has been preserved. Some contentions also arose between the Druses of Rasbaiya as to nomination of their spiritual Sheikh, but these were settled for the time being. Numerous robberies occurred in and around the Kaza of Baalbek where Shiaa brigands of that district recently went off to attack Blondan village in Zahlari Kaza and killed one man and caused great panic among the natives.

The Oldiunat tribe made a raid against the Rouela, lost three killed and killed two of the Rouela.

The security of the vilayet was during the quarter much as usual, and the rumour circulated in January that the Government intend to send an expedition of ten battalions to the Hauran contributing to calming turbulent Druses and Bedouins and establishing order to some extent in that country, although the usual raids continue among Bedouins as before.

The Union and Progress Committee in Damascus has not been active, as it was apprehended that their action might provoke other parties to unite and increase animosity and dispute.

The Mahommadan Association in Constantinople spread to Damascus and till now several thousand have signed the declaration of joining the Association, their intention is to demand the application of Sheri laws.

The Hejaz pilgrims returned in due course after spending five rather uncomfortable days' quarantine in Tebouk, happily with no illness whatever. The Mahmal was conducted here by the brother and son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, for the Muhafiz of Haj, Abdurrahman Bey, returned by sea owing to a dispute with the Sherif. The number of pilgrims who passed through Damascus on their way back to homes was about 8,000 men.

The Adliyeh members were elected and nominated as usual on the 14th March for a term of two years, but informations from the Ministry of Justice declare that steps are being taken to have the posts of judicial membership filled up by competent officials appointed direct by the Ministry, abolishing the elective system so far adopted. On receiving this news the Anjumen of Adliyeh here made certain propositions to the Ministry recommending the nomination to the Criminal Court of an able functionary, Abdu Aaiz, Effendi of the Commercial Court, who is well known for ability and integrity.

The butchers of Damascus struck on the 16th ultimo, demanding a decrease in the slaughter tax, which is presently 9 piastres on each sheep. Their strike lasted six days,

during which the municipality killed sheep and supplied the city meat. The strikers' demand was not complied with.

Very little rain fell during the quarter, and the future crops will probably be very bad, and in some places the peasants despaired of their grain-sown fields, and ploughed them for summer vegetable crops. Consequently the prices of grain rose considerably, especially that of wheat, which is now 50 piastres a jift, (6*s.* a bushel).

Hamoud-ibn-Sobhan, uncle and guardian of the minor Ibn Rashid, died in Hail, and his cousin, Zamil-ibn-Sobhan, succeeded him in the guardianship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[15584] No. 62.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April 26.*)

(No. 289.)
Sir,

Constantinople, April 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van describing the course of events in that vilayet during the past quarter.

I have the honour to request that the part of this report dealing with Persian affairs be treated as confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4.)
Sir,

Van, March 31, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a quarterly report on the affairs of this vilayet.

Elections. The original election, owing to "mainpement" in the Arjish Caza, resulted in the election of two Turks. The Armenians protested vigorously against this, however, and the matter was taken up by the Stamboul Committee of Union and Progress. On their action the Arjish election was annulled, and a second one ordered. On this occasion Colonel Tahir Bey, the President of the Local Committee of Union and Progress, himself visited Arjish, and by his influence the Armenian managers secured the election of their candidate, Varkhay Papazian (otherwise called "the Doctor"), the late Chief of a Tashnakist band.

Persian Affairs.—In my No. 2 of the 24th February, I informed your Excellency of the departure of Nadji Bey and his band of volunteers for Salmas to aid the Persian Constitutionalists. I now learn that the real Chief of this band is a certain Halil Bey, from Saloniki; Nadji Bey is more of a propagandist than a fighter.

It appears that early in February last the Maku Kurds attacked Khoi and drove the local Constitutionalists into the walled town, with a loss of 122 killed. In this fight the Kurds also suffered severely. A few days later Khalil and his band arrived with reinforcement from Salmas and drove off the Kurds (Said Effendi being killed in the fight) as far as some hills about two hours north of the town, which they still occupy. Nadji Bey returned to Bashkala to collect men and supplies, particularly of cartridges, and several Persian and Armenian emissaries are now in Van gathering volunteers.

After the first fight the Turkish Consul at Khoi had requested that his guard of ten soldiers might be increased, on the ground that they were insufficient for the security of himself and other foreigners at Khoi. The Ferik here then ordered thirty men of the company of Turkish infantry at Chairay, near Salmas, to proceed to Khoi, while a detachment from Bashkala was directed to fill their place at Chairay. The Persian Government apparently complained to the Porte of the presence of Ottoman troops in Persian territory, and said that the account of affairs sent by the Turkish Consul at Khoi was exaggerated. On this the local Government ordered Jevdet Bey, Kaïmakam of Serai, to go to Khoi and make an inquiry. He went, and has now

returned to Van, and confirms the Turkish account. The Turkish troops named are ow in Khoi.

The Revolutionists now present in the districts of Khoi and Salmas are thus of four separate types:

1. The native Persians of the district, who are about 1,000 strong, but are of little use, as they are badly armed, have no good leaders, no combination, and are poor fighters.

2. Caucasian bands. These are about 100 strong, and are Moslem "mujtchids" from the Caucasus, under one Ani Ogli; they are well armed, and are good fighters, but have no organization, and are simply brigands, who blackmail the Persians. They are sent by some Committee in the Caucasus, and are at present in command of the situation at Khoi.

3. Halil Bey's band (see my No. 2 of the 24th February). These men are being gradually reinforced from Turkish territory, and funds are supplied to them by the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika.

4. Armenian Tashnak bands. These confine themselves to the protection of the Armenian villages in Salmas.

Each of these bands is governed by a separate Committee of its own, and Halil Bey is now trying to amalgamate the first three of them into one force, and to introduce some sort of organization, order, and discipline. With this end in view, he has been joined by one or two intelligent "Young Turks" from Constantinople.

They have good hope apparently that Simco Agha, the notorious Kurd, who is the backbone of the Maku Khan, will come over to Halil's party. This would be a great blow to the forces of the Shah, as Simco can command some 250 Aldui Kurds, who are the best fighters in the country, and well armed, besides about 100 Kotur Kurds.

Simco has received orders from Van that he is not to act against the Persian Revolutionaries, but Halil Bey has warned him that even if he fights on their side, he can look for no plunder except the arms and horses of actual combatants, and it is doubtful if the prospect will have sufficient charms for him.

So far as I can make out, Halil's attempt is a sort of "ballon d'essai" on the part of the Salonika Committee of Union and Progress. If it be successful, their larger affairs will be undertaken; at present, however, it is not certain what view the Caucasian Revolutionaries will take, and those being at present at the head of affairs, may not be supposed to surrender their lead to the Turks.

Disarmament of Hamidieh.—This is being accomplished successfully, and without difficulty. 2,000 rifles have now been collected out of a total of 2,200.

Imprisonment of the Kurd Chiefs.—As mentioned in my No. 2, efforts are being made to get the Aghas amnestied, but up to the present nothing definite has been decided.

Suspension of Government Officials.—The Mutesrif of Bashkala: This official has been relieved of his post, owing to a demonstration made against him by the inhabitants of Bashkala; they accuse him of incapacity, drunkenness, and corruption, most of which charges appear to have been judged true, by a Committee which inquired into his case.

The Mektubji has been recalled by order from Constantinople as a reactionary, and a former spy of Izzat Pasha.

The Defterdar has been suspended, owing to a deficiency of £T. 400 in his accounts, which he could only explain as a sum that he had borrowed for the time being.

The Armenian Question.—Since the election, the Armenians in general and the Tashnakists in particular, have been more subdued than previously, though their relations with the native Turks have never been really warm, as I have often informed your Excellency. The native Moslems at Van are reactionary at heart, detest the Armenians, and resent seeing them in enjoyment of the liberty given by the new régime.

Their animosity is easily excited, and several of the most influential among them, unfortunately, seem to take every opportunity of estranging the two peoples.

This animosity is directed principally against the Tashnakists and their Russian leaders, Vramian, Aram, and Ishkhan, as it is they who are striving to procure the punishment of Kurdish and other Moslem malefactors, for past offences. Fortunately, they are ours at heart, and would not dare to take any action without the consent of the Government; the military have little sympathy with them, and therein lies our safeguard. The following two events that have occurred recently, will explain the situation to your Excellency.

At one of the numerous public meetings that Armenians delight to hold, some Tashnakists spoke, advocating Atheism. The population was furious, and a small riot ensued, while the Armenist and Huntchakist sections, jealous of the prestige of their Tashnakist rivals, fanned the excitement of the people, and there was for a time real danger of a serious faction fight in the Armenian quarter. This was averted, mainly by the efforts of Vramian, the Tashnak leader, who is now more or less looked on here as the "King" of Armenia. The difficulty passed away, and to show that there is no ill-feeling, Aram, the Tashnakist, is now taking a class of girls in the Sunday-school!

This *émeute* and its cause served as pretext to increase the hate of the local Moslems for the Armenians, and above all, for the Tashnakists; and they have been invited by their leaders, such as our Oghli Omar, Kiamil Effendi, Haji Hasni Effendi, to acts of violence. All of these men were among the instigators of the massacre of March 1908, for which they went unscathed; and of late they have been posting Proclamations in the Moslem quarters, denouncing Tashnakists and Armenians as Atheists and advising their extermination, as a work ordered by the Koran.

While excitement was thus brewing among the Moslems, a most unfortunate incident occurred.

A certain Jaffar Aghan, a Kurd Chief of Karchigan, had swindled numerous residents in Van (myself among the number), over contracts for firewood, and had, at my request, been brought in to Van by the Vali, to answer for his defalcations. He was by no means popular with the local Moslems, as besides having swindled many of them, he had been a sympathiser with the Armenian fedai, under the old régime, and had even hidden them in his villages. Among other crimes, he had murdered a certain Armenian of his neighbourhood, and had abducted his wife and daughter. The brother of this murdered Armenian, by name Kazar, had fled to Russia, where he came a fedai soldier until last October, after which date he returned to Van, severing his connection with the fedai. This man took the opportunity given by the presence of Jaffar at Van to assassinate him, with one of his servants, just as he was leaving this Consulate. This happened on the 17th March. The murder, of course, increased the excitement of the Moslems greatly, and all sorts of wild stories began to circulate, the fact that the assassin had been at one time a fedai being of course used to accuse the Tashnak Committee of having ordered the "execution" of Jaffar, as an act of terrorism; it was asserted, for instance, that various Moslem agitators had also been condemned by the Tashnakists, and marked for future assassination. Uneasiness was increased by the known fact that the Armenians have been receiving revolvers by the hundred through the post, and on the 19th March, when a rumour was bruited in the bazaar (a false one fortunately), that a certain prominent Bashi-bazouk, Haji Bekr Oghlu Mahomed, had been murdered by Armenians, a panic spread in the city, the bazaar was closed, and the Armenians all fled to their own quarter.

I mention this to show to your Excellency the state of feeling in Van, though I personally do not anticipate anything serious. The local Committee of Union and Progress has little influence for good, as the members have no backbone; in fact all the leading reactionaries are members of it. The military, as mentioned above, are the real safeguard.

Removal of the Firek.—Mahmoud Pasha, Firek of the 8th Division, stationed at Van, has received three months' leave, and has handed over the command to Yaver Pasha, who was recently in command at Tergawar, in the disputed district on the Persian frontier. Mahmoud Pasha left Van on the 24th March, *en route* for Constantinople, where he hopes to obtain a post in Macedonia, as he does not intend to return to Van.

He is an honest and honourable man, with liberal ideas, and I have no hesitation in saying that it was owing to him that a serious massacre of Armenians was averted, in March 1908. If such a massacre had taken place, there would have been an Armenian revolution, which might have forced the hand of young Turks, and had a disastrous effect on their later revolution at Salonica.

Yaviar Pasha, who is taking over the command, is a strong man who will stand no nonsense, and I have great confidence in his power to keep both Armenians and Bashi-bazouks in order.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.E.A.

[15508] No. 63.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 24, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated to-day, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) F. *April 24, 1909.*

OWING to disturbances at Antioch, I have, at the request of the Ambassador, ordered His Majesty's ship "Triumph" to Antioch Bay.

No. 63*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 285.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 27, 1909.*

DEPOSITION of the Sultan, if it takes place, will apparently endanger no one in Constantinople; but it may lead to retaliatory measures in Asia Minor, and the nearer our ships could then be to places within their reach the better. If all goes well, might not ships leave Lemnos in a day or two? What are your views? Would Rhodes, or some other port, be a more suitable place for them?

[14543] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 27, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 203 of the 13th instant, inclosing copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, in which he reports the endeavours he has made to renew the practice of free navigation of the Euphrates.

I approve Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay's action, as reported in his despatch to you of the 8th ultimo, and also the line of conduct which he proposes to adopt, as described in paragraph 3 of that despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[15974] No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

Sir, *India Office, April 27, 1909.*

I AM directed by Viscount Morley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 19th instant, inclosing copy of correspondence with the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury as to the proposed loan of two lakhs, free of interest, to the Sheikh of Koweit, to be repaid in two yearly instalments.

Lord Morley regrets that the Lords Commissioners have not accepted the conditions formulated in my letter of the 19th ultimo. He is of opinion, in view of the political position at Koweit, that any charges, whether on account of interest or of repayment of money lent, should be equally divided between the British and Indian Exchequers; and he must make the acceptance of this principle of equal division a condition of sanctioning the proposed advance of two lakhs.

Lord Morley trusts that the Lords Commissioners will prove willing to reconsider

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[15509] No. 63*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 26, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a decypher of a telegram No. 177, dated the 25th April, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Lemnos.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 63*.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Lemnos, April 25, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's ship "Diana" at Beirout telegraphs as follows:—

Enquiry has been made by consul-general whether "Diana" may be allowed, if the consuls at Damascus and Aleppo ask for assistance, to send a party to these places (which are respectively nine and twenty hours' rail journey distant from Beirout), subject to the Turkish authorities offering no objection.

I have replied as follows:—

"'Diana' will not be allowed except actually for the safety of life. As your complement is not large enough to be of real use from such a distance excepting as a guard for the consulate, you should, however, ask His Majesty's ships 'Swiftsure' and 'Triumph' for assistance. The responsibility should rest with Turkish authorities."

Submitted that if permission be granted to me to leave Lemnos, I am ready to proceed to the assistance of Damascus and Aleppo.

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their decision, and to accept a charge against British revenues of a moiety of the loss, if any, that may hereafter prove to have been occasioned by the transaction. As pointed out in my letter of the 19th ultimo, the rent due to the Sheikh under the foreshore lease provides security both for the capital of the proposed loan, and interest thereon, should it be found necessary to claim it.

I am to inclose copy of a telegram from the Viceroy asking for an early decision, and to ask that the Lords Commissioners may be requested to reconsider the matter with the least possible delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 24, 1909.

PLEASE refer to our telegram dated the 13th March as to loan to Sheikh of Koweit. We should be glad to know when instructions may be expected, as telegram dated the 21st instant from Resident, Persian Gulf, states that Sheikh is very anxious to get a definite answer one way or the other.

[15509] No. 66.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 28, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, inclosing copy of a telegram from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean station, on the question of landing men from His Majesty's ship "Diana" at Beirout, and I am to state that Sir Edward Grey approves the terms of the reply which the Commander-in-chief has sent to the Officer Commanding His Majesty's ship "Diana."

With reference to the last sentence in the Commander-in-chief's telegram, I am to forward to you copy of a telegram which Sir Edward Grey has sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the movement of ships in Turkish waters.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[16304] No. 67.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 28, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my letter of the 12th February, 1908, as to the judicial powers of the Political Agent in Bahrein, I am directed to transmit herewith the draft of a despatch on the subject which Viscount Morley proposes, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to address to the Government of India.†

The draft despatch, it will be seen, follows the conclusions arrived at in the recent discussion of questions relating to the Persian Gulf and Bagdad Railway.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

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* No. 68*

† Not printed

[16275] No. 68.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April 30.*)

India Office, April 28, 1909.

Sir,

I AM directed by Viscount Morley to inclose copy of a secret letter from the Government of India recommending an increase of the salute of five guns at present accorded to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein. The proposal is to raise the salute of the two first-named Sheiks to twelve guns and that of the Sheikh of Bahrein to eleven guns, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present Chiefs. It is further proposed that the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit should receive a salute of five guns, and the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein one of three guns, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' Representatives.

Lord Morley is disposed to think that the recommendations of the Government of India should be approved, and would be glad to learn if Sir E. Grey concurs in this view. In that event, this Department would propose to make the necessary communication to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject.

Attention is called to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the letter of the Government of India.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)

Fort William, March 18, 1909.

My Lord,

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's consideration, a copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf relative to a proposal to increase the salute of five guns which is at present accorded under the authority of Lord George Hamilton's despatch No. 66, dated the 12th July, 1901, to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein.

2. The claims of these Chiefs to an increase of the salute which is at present assigned to them, have been fully discussed in the accompanying correspondence, and we need only express our entire concurrence with the opinion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf that, in consideration of the enhanced importance and prestige which these three Chiefs, especially the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, enjoy owing to recent political developments in the Persian Gulf, a salute of five guns is no longer adequate.

3. We have carefully considered the question of the precise number of guns to which the salute may in each case be raised, and we are disposed to agree with Major Cox that a salute of twelve guns may appropriately be accorded to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit and one of eleven guns to the Sheikh of Bahrein. The two former Chiefs will thus receive a salute slightly in excess of that which is accorded to the Political Officers accredited to them, but less than that to which his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf are ordinarily entitled, while Sheikh Esa, who is relatively of much less political importance than Sheikh Mubarak, will receive a salute equal to that accorded to the Political Officer at Bahrein.

4. If these proposals are accepted, we would recommend, as suggested by Major Cox, that the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit should receive a salute of five guns, and the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein one of three guns on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' Representatives.

5. We are of opinion that the increased salutes should in each case be personal to the present Chiefs, and that it should be explained to them that it is within the discretion of the Government of India to continue it, or not, to their successors.

6. As regards the Sheikh of Mohammerah, His Majesty's Government will no doubt desire to consult Sir George Barclay on the point raised in paragraph 4 of Major Cox's letter, dated the 3rd August, 1908, as to how far the proposal to increase his salute is affected by his position as a Persian subject. Our records do not show whether the Persian Government was consulted or not when the Sheikh's salute was originally fixed.

7. We trust that these recommendations will meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government, and we would suggest that, should our proposals be sanctioned, it should be left to the discretion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in consultation, if necessary, with His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to decide when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the Sheikhs concerned.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
C. H. SCOTT.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram dated the 19th April, 1908, on the subject of the salute to be accorded to the Sheikh of Koweit, and incidentally of those assigned to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Bahrein.

2. The political developments of the past few years point to the desirability of increasing the scheduled salute of each of these Arab potentates, and I attach separate Reports from the three British Representatives concerned, in which each officer enters fully into the case of the Sheikh to whom he is accredited. Their Reports leave me little to add regarding the claims of the Sheikhs, and I need merely record my own ideas as to the number of guns which, in view of their representations, seem appropriate in each instance.

3. From our point of view it would seem advisable to place the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah on the same footing, and I think that the choice lies between twelve guns and thirteen guns in their case. The grant of a salute of thirteen guns would place them on a level with the Resident in the Persian Gulf and with his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, when Rear-Admiral, which rank he has generally held in the past. Sir George Warrender, as Commodore, only receives eleven guns, but it is possible that his is a special case, and that the rank of the post has not been permanently reduced.

As visitors of the same rank as their host, the Naval Commander-in-chief and the Resident would have to make the first call when visiting Koweit. This position is of no consequence as far as the Resident is concerned, as both Sheikhs have reasonable grounds for hesitating to pay frequent visits on board ships, and the dispatch of business, for which purpose the Resident generally visits their ports, makes it more convenient for him to proceed on shore and get in touch with the Sheikh as soon as possible.

The case of the Naval Commander-in-chief, however, is different. He is only an occasional visitor, and during his tours in the Gulf it is politically advantageous to endow him with as much dignity and importance as possible, and for this reason it would be preferable that when either of the Sheikhs can be induced to venture on board the flag-ship he should pay the first call. Their excuse that if they board British ships it makes it difficult for them to decline to take the risk of boarding Turkish or Persian ships has a foundation which we can understand, but I have little doubt that their reluctance to visit men-of-war is partly due to the paucity of guns which would be accorded to them. Twelve guns would be most convenient, as, while placing the Sheikhs on a slightly superior footing to that of the Agents accredited to them, it gives the Commander-in-chief and Resident precedence. Unless, therefore, the accord of an even-gun salute, as is prescribed for the Chief of Makulla, is considered objectionable by the Admiralty for service reasons, twelve guns would, in my opinion, be most appropriate. The Sheikhs might be informed that the distinction was personal.

4. It may be well to note here that technically the salute of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, as a Persian official, should be prescribed by the Persian Government, but I do not imagine that they were consulted when the salute was formerly fixed at

five guns, and there seems no reason why we should do so now. They appear to have no definite regulations on the point.

5. The salute which our ships accord to the Darya Begi, Governor of Bushire, seventeen guns, is, properly speaking, too much for him, and should be considered personal to his Excellency and not to his appointment, which might be treated on a par with that of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. The practice of giving the Darya Begi seventeen guns arose in this wise: His Excellency having proceeded some years ago to call on one of His Majesty's ships in an Admiral's uniform, and being in charge of the "Persian navy" (that is, the "Persepolis"), and Governor of the Gulf Ports, was accorded a salute of seventeen guns. No great harm is done by our continuing the salute in his case, but his title, Darya Begi, or "Lord of the Sea," is not really a rank, but his personal title, and there is no reason why any successor of his should be accorded such an exalted salute.

6. As regards Bahrein, I am of opinion that an eleven-gun salute will be sufficient, the same as that of his Political Agent, and somewhat less than the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah.

As Major Prideaux suggests, the intimation of the grant of the enhanced salute might be postponed until Sheikh Isa has done something specific to earn such a favour.

7. Finally, if enhanced salutes are granted to the ruling Sheikhs, I would recommend that, in the case of Koweit and Mohammerah, when the eldest son visits one of His Majesty's ships, he be saluted with five guns, and in the case of Bahrein with three guns. I hardly think they or their people would understand an alternative salute, sometimes of three guns and sometimes of five on the lines suggested by Major Knox, and as regards the number five, it has been given by courtesy and with express explanation to that effect as the salute of the father, on occasions when the father, on account of sickness or from other causes, as at Koweit, has sent his son to represent him.

In the event of the Sheikhs themselves being now permitted to receive twelve, twelve, and eleven guns respectively, their sons might, if Government see no objection, be accorded five and three.

Inclosure 3 in No. 68.

Consul McDouall to Major Cox.

Sir, *Mohammerah, June 6, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that since the Governor of Bushire, in or about 1882, carried off certain Gulf Chiefs who had called on board the "Persepolis," the Sheikhs of Mohammerah have made it a rule never to call on board the vessels of any Government, Persian or foreign. Should, however, the Sheikh of Mohammerah ever alter this rule, the salute provided in the table, of five guns, would be inadequate.

This number was apparently fixed many years ago, when the Sheikh of Mohammerah was only Sheikh of the Muhaysin tribes and Governor of their district, and the position of the present Sheikh, both personally and administratively, is very different.

Personally, the Sardar Arfa, Sheikh Khazal Khan holds the highest Persian military rank, that of Amir Nuyani ("Lord of 100,000"), under which he might be considered by the Admiralty instructions to be entitled to a salute of fifteen guns; but, as presumably the Governor-General of Arabistan is entitled to a larger number than the Sheikh, I would suggest thirteen as a suitable number. The present Governor-General holds the same military rank as the Sheikh. At the same time it should be noted that the present Governor of Bushire receives seventeen guns as Admiral but holds the military rank of Amir Tomin ("Chief of 10,000") only.

The Sheikhs of Mohammerah receive their appointment as Governors of Mohammerah, Shat-el-Arab, and Karun, and Sarhad Dar ("Warden of the Border") direct from Tehran, but for administrative purposes are under the Governor-General of Arabistan, who, however, cannot summon them to attend him, and, unless of Royal blood, is not of higher rank.

The present Sheikh, the Sardar Arfa, is Sheikh of the combined tribes of the Muhaysin and Ghaib, and the districts of Mohammerah, Ahwaz, and Dizrak are under him, and also, but by the Governor-General's appointment, is in charge of the Hawijeh and neighbouring districts. During the absence of the Governor-General he is nominally in charge of the province. He has under him Deputy-Governors at Ahwaz and

Mohammerah, and officials at Felahieh, Mashur, and Hindijan, in addition to the Sheikhs of tribes.

His son Chasib Khan Nusret-el-Mulk is now Deputy-Governor of Mohammerah, and there is, as far as I know, no reason why he should not call on board Government vessels.

I would suggest that the same salute be accorded him as the Deputy-Governor of Bunder Abbas, viz., five guns, which his official position alone would justify.

A copy of this despatch is sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. McDOUALL.

His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Arabistan.

Inclosure 4 in No. 68.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, July 8, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to refer the question of the salute of guns to be paid to Sheikh Mubarak, on the occasion of his paying official visits on board British men-of-war.

2. At present, the Sheikh of Koweit, like other Sheikhs of his standing in the Persian Gulf, is entitled to receive a salute of five guns. In the course of my experience at Koweit, the Sheikh has never visited a British man-of-war, and therefore the salute has never been fired.

3. On the occasion of the visit of his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station, in 1906, the Sheikh was suddenly called away by the serious illness of his son Fahad, who died shortly after, and the Sheikh himself was unable to visit his Excellency. Sheikh Jabir paid a visit to the flagship, and a salute of five guns was fired as he left the ship; but I was instructed by his Excellency to explain carefully to Sheikh Jabir that this salute was fired only because he was regarded as his father's deputy, and in the absence of his father, the ruling Chief. The explanation was given to Sheikh Jabir in the presence of his Excellency.

4. At the subsequent visit of his Excellency in 1907, it would appear that no salutes were fired, though Sheikh Jabir visited the ship to welcome his Excellency. Sheikh Mubarak returned his Excellency's visit at the Agency.

5. When his Excellency visited Koweit in May of this year, Sheikh Mubarak paid the first visit at the Agency, which was returned privately the same evening. Again, Sheikh Mubarak paid the first official visit the following day, which was returned officially after the lapse of half an hour. Owing to the state of the tide, and the arrival of the flagship a day before expected, Sheikh Jabir was unable to pay the visit of welcome, but Sheikh Mubarak sent a formal letter of apology expressing his regret.

6. That the question of salutes is a matter to which the Ruler of Koweit attaches importance may be, I think, inferred from the correspondence that took place about the recent visit of H.F. "La Surprise." When the matter was referred to in your presence, Sheikh Mubarak said that he was unable to send his son to return the Commandant's visit, because he would not be received with the usual salute.

7. There has evidently been in the past some difficulty regarding visits on board of a man-of-war, and I am inclined to attribute it, at least partially, to the Sheikh's idea that the number of guns that he receives is not sufficient. The main difficulty would appear to be that the Sheikh cannot tolerate the notion that it is possible for a personage more important than himself to reside permanently in Koweit.

8. The distinction, therefore, made between himself and the Political Agent is particularly invidious in his eyes, and there is no doubt that it would be noticed by the inhabitants of Koweit, more especially as the visits of himself and the Political Agent would take place naturally about the same time.

9. It would be an unnecessary lowering of the dignity of the British Representative at Koweit to reduce his status, and would lead the Arab mind to the unfortunate conclusion that he no longer possessed the confidence of his Government.

10. The only course then appears to be to consider the claims of Sheikh Mubarak to the raising of his personal salute to the dignity of the Political Agent; I opine that his claims to this honour would be based on (*a*) his own importance and that of his principality, (*b*) the extent to which he supports and furthers British interests as far as lies in his power.

11. Both these points deserve careful consideration, and the difficulty is enhanced by the presence of arguments of considerable weight leading to opposite conclusions. With reference to the first, I think it will not be too much to state that one might search Arabia through to find a personage possessing a more real power than Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit at the present time. Thanks to British protection and to an equal extent to his own commanding personality and mastery of Oriental intrigue, he is practically the arbiter of the fortunes of Central Arabia, while his rich Fao estates and his strong friendship with Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah make him an important personage on the Shatt-el-Arab. He has shown his absolute power over the Bedouin tribes of the vicinity by imprisoning in the course of the last two years the two most important chieftains, among them, Sheikh Faisal-ud-Dawish of the Umtair and Muhammad-bin-Hithlain, the present *de facto* Chief of the powerful Ajman tribe, who defeated the Turkish troops at Al Ahsa, and looted the inhabitants of that district. It is now a matter of common knowledge that the only method the Turks could find for taming this man was blackmail, and the still more shameful proceeding of buying back from him a captured gun and mules. It goes without saying that Sheikh Mubarak is undisputed master of his own town, and it must be added that the town and surroundings are well governed and orderly, and may be, without exaggeration, termed a pattern administration for all Gulf towns.

12. On the other hand, before Sheikh Mubarak's accession Koweit was nothing more than a clean little Bedouin town, with difficulty repelling desert Bedouin outrages on the very outskirts of the town itself. His successor, if incompetent, or what is perhaps more likely, two rivals fairly equally matched, fighting it out between themselves could easily and in a remarkably short time reduce it to its old level of unimportance.

13. Two things are especially likely to hit Sheikh Mubarak himself very hard, and at no distant future. One is the desperate state of the pearl market, which will impoverish the town considerably, and will probably embarrass the Ruler at least temporarily, for he has made very large advances to his principal merchants, who were in a very shaky condition already.

The second is the probable loss of the large income that Sheikh Mubarak derives from the customs duties on arms and ammunition.

14. In the late prosperous times, Sheikh Mubarak seems to have abandoned the simple, frugal fashion of living that was probably an inheritance of the past, and, from this point of view, it would seem that the friendship with the Ruler of Mohammerah has led to disastrous results.

Various distinctly oppressive measures have made him decidedly unpopular in his own town, and both rich and poor have felt the burden, especially when the town is languishing under the ruinous condition of its principal industry. While large portions of the town are falling into ruin, Sheikh Mubarak has built a large palace, and has purchased a motor-car and a steam-yacht, and is making extensive additions to the bazaar in well-built shops, for which he is apparently experiencing some difficulty in finding lessees. His recent order, attempting to fill them by driving beggarly street hawkers out of the streets, seems a most unprofitable expedient.

15. The one satisfactory feature of the present situation is the prospect of a settled interior under the undisputed rule of Abdul-bin-Saud. This might, however, easily lead to such an increase of power in that Ruler as would materially shake the influence of the Koweit Ruler over the surrounding Bedouin tribes.

16. There still remains to the Ruler of Koweit his income from the Fao estates, but if the Turks realized that Sheikh Mubarak was embarrassed in other directions, they would not fail, either by open confiscation or by the more insidious procedure of encouraging rival claimants, to encroach in the Law Courts, to add to his embarrassments.

17. To sum up, the importance of Sheikh Mubarak and his Principality would seem to justify the enhancement of his salute. At the same time Koweit is a town of mushroom growth which might easily in the hands of a weak Sheikh, or by the force of circumstances which even Sheikh Mubarak could not control, dwindle in importance to its former insignificance.

18. I now turn to consider point (*b*), the extent to which Sheikh Mubarak supports and furthers British interests as far as lies in his power. The files dealing with Koweit show what a good friend Sheikh Mubarak has been to the English throughout his dealings with us. In all important matters, with the clear exception of the arms question and the half-hearted support he has given to us in quarantine, Sheikh Mubarak has shown himself ready to support the cause of law and order and the advancement

of British trade. The marine survey, the gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, all British travellers, private or official, have received a warm welcome from him and every possible assistance. He has facilitated my acquaintance with the neighbouring Bedouin Chiefs and my proceeding long distances into the interior of Arabia and the El Ahsa Coast, where I could not have moved 10 miles without his support. In the delicate question of the sale of Bahrein property, where Arab fellow-feeling might have been expected to prompt him to oppose us, he assisted me loyally in every way. Indeed, it is no fault of Sheikh Mubarak's that British influence is not paramount in Hail and Riadh and a British Agent and garrison in charge of the buffer State of El Kasim keeping the peace between the rival claimants to the rule of Central Arabia.

19. On the other hand, and here I wish to write with all reserve lest petty annoyances should have warped my judgment, I cannot disguise from myself the hundred little ways in which Sheikh Mubarak seeks to impress upon me that I must play second fiddle in his town, and that he is to control me, and through me, the British Government. As for my controlling him or advising him for his good, he would laugh at the notion. The policy is natural enough in a man who has had to face no serious opposition since he murdered his brothers and the disaster of Sarif.

While I do not disguise from myself the advantage of having only one man to humour or persuade in this town, there are ever present to my mind two dangers. The first is lest Sheikh Mubarak should by some rash ambitious venture, especially in the direction of Fao, entangle us seriously at an inopportune moment—and few moments indeed would be opportune—in a quarrel with the Turkish Government, in which we could not, with any sense of right, defend our protégé.

The second danger, to my mind, is internal. Sheikh Mubarak, by a violent act of bloodshed, came to power, and he succeeded to a town that had undoubtedly been well governed in the past. The people were contented, lightly taxed, and enjoyed a large measure of independence. The Sheikh of old times was merely *primus inter pares*, and rich pearl merchants had their say in all matters of administration.

Many traces of this former state of affairs still exist in the rough-and-ready Courts for the disposal of mercantile cases, the way the pearling is managed and all rights governed by custom, and the general attitude of the people, who show a remarkable ability to manage their own affairs without undue interference from either King or priest.

The old system, under the iron rule of Sheikh Mubarak, is rapidly breaking down, and the wheels turn rustily. The merchant Sheikhs are things of the past, and the few old survivals dare not call their souls their own. This would not signify if the Sheikh himself was above reproach. But a good year or two in the pearl trade and the sudden increase of revenue from the importation of arms have revealed in him a hitherto unsuspected taste for luxury and ostentatious display. The taxes are still low, but have increased rapidly of past years, and new extortionate demands have been levied on the people. Everything points to lean years to come, and it is problematical whether the Sheikh will have the strength of mind to economize. It is far more probable that he will increase his demands on the people and drive trade out of the town. At present the people, who complain continually, look to us as their deliverers. It will be an unpleasant moment for us when they arrive at a juster view of the situation and realize that it is our support chiefly that has enabled and will enable Sheikh Mubarak's despotism to flourish, and taught him that he need no longer rely on the affections of his people and their confidence in his strength, wealth, and justice.

20. It will perhaps be objected that a most, if not the most, important consideration of this problem has been lost sight of in this Report; this is the diplomatic advisability of keeping Sheikh Mubarak in good humour with a view to utilizing Koweit and its Rulers as a formidable outwork of British influence in the Persian Gulf. The thought is ever present, but here so much depends on strings that are pulled in London, Constantinople, or Berlin, that I may be freely forgiven for leaving this care to immeasurably wiser heads than mine.

21. I have ventured to use the question of Sheikh Mubarak's salute as a text on which to hang, I fear, a lengthy dissertation on problems that have long been troubling me. After detailing the considerations that have guided me to a decision, I have the honour to recommend the salute of eleven guns to Sheikh Mubarak as a personal salute. I venture to consider the personal proviso indispensable, and think that it should be carefully explained to Sheikh Mubarak that we do not consider the ordinary dignity of the Sheikh of Koweit entitles him to more than five—a salute of five guns to the heir-apparent, Sheikh Jabir, when he represents his father, and a salute of three guns when he visits on his own account.

Inclosure 5 in No. 68.

Major Prideaux to Major Cox.

Bahrein, July 11, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for consideration, the anomally which exists in regard to the salutes which the Chief of Bahrein and the Political Agent receive from British Government vessels (such as are authorized to fire salutes) at the termination of official visits on board in this port.

2. The Political Agent, on the analogy of Indian appointments of the same status, is entitled, I believe, to a salute of eleven guns whenever he pays an official visit to an authority who can pay the compliment. He ought, therefore, on a few occasions annually to be given such a salute by the Chief of Bahrein, but whilst Sheikh Esa receives only five guns from British men-of-war and Indian marine ships, it seems invidious to expect him to concede this compliment gracefully, and I have never mooted the point on my own behalf, though I have found no difficulty in getting salutes paid to the Naval Commander-in-chief and to the Political Resident when they have called upon him.

3. The present annual revenue of the Bahrein State may be estimated at 3 lakhs of rupees, though under a better administration it should be easily capable of expansion to 6 lakhs. I believe that a large number of Indian rulers, such as the Chiefs of Ajaigarh, Baoni, and Chhatarpur, who receive salutes of eleven guns, possess smaller revenues than the Bahrein Chief, and though their dominions may be more extensive, their political importance at the present day is perhaps not so great. In the circumstances, therefore, I would like to see the status of the Bahrein Principality enhanced to a suitable degree as soon as the general circumstances of the Chief's relations with the Government of India are considered to be sufficiently satisfactory. It might, perhaps, be found desirable to give the Chief ordinarily a salute of eleven guns, with a personal salute to Sheikh Esa's case of twelve guns (*cf.* the case of the Sultan of Shahr and Mukalla), which would properly mark his position below that of the Political Resident, but above the Political Agent's. If the salute of the Political Resident could also be enhanced, I would even advocate giving the Chief of Bahrein thirteen guns.

4. With regard to the question of the opportuneness of such modification, I am inclined to recommend some procrastination, as I do not think there is any occasion for immediately granting Sheikh Esa fresh favours, after remitting two years of his nephew Sheikh Ali's punishment of exile, and in view of the fact that the people of Bahrein would perhaps only think that the honour was being conferred in expiation for previous harsh treatment.

5. The obstinacy and folly which the Chief has displayed in persisting in the formation of his own Customs Department this year, by means of which he will probably obtain less than a lakh of revenue, is hardly likely to survive much longer, and I hope that within the next year or two, the force of circumstances will induce the Sheikh to accept our advice about the reformation of his administration in this respect. If in the interim Sheikh Esa sees that some of his compeers are being honoured by the Government and raised to higher grade than his own on account ostensibly of their friendship and amenity displayed towards us, the requisite incentive might possibly be provided to initiate a perfectly satisfactory condition of affairs here.

6. At the present time, with the one exception of the customs question, I think I can confidently assert that the relations between myself and Sheikh Esa are as intimate and cordial as can be wished for, and there are no outstanding cases in dispute calling for a reference to the Government of India.

[16323] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 175 (Telegraphic) T. ADANA

Constantinople, April 30, 1909

In continuation of my telegram No. 168 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report the cessation of massacres. British subjects all safe in Hadjin, which is said to

[16510] No. 70*.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon Howe to Admiralty.—(Communicated by Admiralty May 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *May 2, 1900.*

HAVE arrived at Marmarice in flagship "Ocean," accompanied by "Canopus," "Minerva," and destroyers. "Swiftsure" reports that the situation of the refugees at Adana remains the same, the report of the epidemic of smallpox there being, however, contradicted now.

have been relieved. Small-pox is reported to have made its appearance at Adana where there are at least 15,000 refugees, most of whom are starving. I have been pressing the Government in every possible way to dispatch medical assistance, money, and provisions to Adana, and they are now moving.

[15974] No. 70.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1900.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he cansed to be forwarded to the India Office a copy of your letter of the 8th ultimo relative to the proposed loan of 2 lakhs (13,333*l.*) to the Sheikh of Koweit, with an inquiry as to whether Viscount Morley was disposed to agree to the conditions laid down by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury with regard to the share which they are prepared to take in the transaction.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a further letter from the India Office,* expressing Lord Morley's regret that their Lordships have not accepted the conditions originally formulated by the India Office, and the hope that they may see their way to reconsider their decision, in default of which reconsideration the advance will not be sanctioned.

I am to state that, in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, it is a matter of great political importance not only to India, but to the Empire generally, that His Majesty's Government should retain unimpaired their influence over the Sheikh of Koweit, and that the refusal of the advance which that Chief requires would be calculated to weaken that influence in a marked degree.

I am accordingly to express the hope that their Lordships may see their way to reconsider their decision on this question, as suggested in the India Office letter, and that they will consent that any loss which may arise in connection with the proposed transaction should be shared equally between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers on the lines laid down by the India Office in their communication to this Department of the 19th March.

In view of the telegram from the Government of India which forms the second inclosure in this letter, I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be favoured with an early intimation of their Lordships' decision on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

[16527] No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 293.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 23, 1900.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 26th January last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus reporting an attack by Druzes upon the village of Bosra-Eski Sham.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 71.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Damascus, April 10, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 4th instant Druze peasants from the village of Kureiyeh disputed with Moslem peasants of Bosra-Eski-Sham in the Hauran for a slight matter, and as the two villages are only 5 miles from each other, the Druzes came in big numbers from Kureiyeh, Dibin, Hout, Mujeimir, Iry, and Rassas, amounting to about 2,000 strong, fully armed, and marched against Bosra. After a

* No. 65.

siege of three hours they entered the village, sacked the shops and houses and dispersed. The garrison in Bosra, of about sixty troops, fired from the fortress on the assailants, and killed and wounded many of them. The casualties in Bosra were 13 peasants, 1 soldier and 1 officer, with 20 wounded. Druzes losses are not known, for they carried off the killed, but it is heard from their side that their casualties were 22 killed and 50 wounded. Among the killed was Ifelal Atrash, Sheikh of Russass and brother of Yahya Bey.

The Government sent two infantry battalions to Bosra, and express a strong determination to punish the guilty.

The origin of the dispute was in respect of grazing rights, upon which Bosra people are understood to have encroached, but doubtless this outrage was largely brought about in retaliation for the murder of the two Druzes which occurred last December (as reported in a paragraph in my despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January last).

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[16530] No. 72.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 296. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 23, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 283 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna reporting on the political state of Mitylene.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Gerald Lowther.

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Smyrna, April 19, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32, Confidential, of the 16th instant, I am informed by Mr. Vice-Consul Hadkinson that an attempt had been made to assassinate Bostani, the Member for Mitylene, and he attributes it to the fact that he had attempted to obtain the release of the political prisoners from Polyknytos.

It is evident that the Government attaches considerable importance to the agitation among the Greek population, for this week half a battalion of troops from the Hud Army Corps arrived fully equipped for operations. They brought with them fifty tons of ammunition and thirty mountain guns and tents, and had some sappers with them.

The Government had asked for the surrender of the Acting Bishop of Polyknytos, who appears to have been very prominent in spreading sedition, but the Bishop of Mitylene protests that he can only be arrested through the ecclesiastical authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. D. BARNHAM.

[16532] No. 73.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 298. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 28, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirout, giving an account of the administration and economic condition of the Province of Mount Lebanon during the past quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 73.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirout, April 12, 1909.

Governor-General.—The most that can be said about the progress of affairs in the Beirout Vilayet is that the administrative machinery has been "kept together," and all that is wanted to strengthen the position of the Government is a little greater display of initiative and assertion of authority on the part of the Governor-General. Taking into consideration the fact that Edhem Bey had no practical experience of a Vali's duties before coming to Beirout, his efforts to govern constitutionally under trying circumstances are, however, worthy of praise, notwithstanding the unfair criticisms of the local press, which is now represented by about thirty newspapers, which are very free in their comments on the action of the Administration. They would wish to make the Vali personally responsible for the faults of the officials of the various Departments under his direction, and for the lawlessness that still reigns in the lower classes.

To the spread, too, of education by the scholastic establishments in Beirout, foremost among which are the Syrian Protestant College (American) and the Jesuits' College (French), must be laid the commendable attitude towards the constitutional Government displayed by the better classes, as compared to the unsatisfactory state of things reported from other large centres in Asiatic Turkey. The proximity of the Lebanon, where "disquieting elements" have not met with much encouragement, and whose leading men frequent Beirout, no doubt acts also as a deterrent to a possible reactionary movement.

General Provincial Council.—Amongst other important and urgent matters, the Vali has had to arrange for the election of members of the first General Provincial Council under the new Constitution, and to preside over its daily meetings, and discuss the numerous measures of reform submitted for his consideration. Though these numbered nearly thirty, they may be summoned up under the five following heads:-

1. Measures for assuring public security, including the revival of capital punishment.
2. The revision of the cadastre.
3. The construction of roads.
4. The best mode of levying taxes.
5. The improvement of public instruction.

The General Council, composed of ten Mussulman and ten Christian members, sat for over a month, and the discussions were long and serious. As your Excellency knows the powers of these Provincial Councils are limited to advising the Vali, and it remains to be seen how far their recommendations can be carried out by the local Government. As almost every reform necessitates either increased expense or at least alterations in financial arrangements, which cannot be undertaken without authority from the Sublime Porte, the chances of these measures being adopted are small, seeing the apparent unreadiness of the various Ministries at Constantinople to give their attention to matters of purely provincial interest, as evinced by the difficulty encountered by the Governor-General and heads of Departments in obtaining replies from the Sublime Porte to telegrams or letters on matters in general.

(It is reported that the Government has already authorized the augmentation of the annual grant for road construction from 10,000*l.* to 40,000*l.*)

Municipal Council.—The second important matter Edhem Bey had to deal with was the management of the municipal elections, which attracted the greatest interest, owing to the determination on the part of his Excellency and of the public to procure the services of the best men available, in which they were fairly successful. To insure regularity in the elections the Vali appointed a Special Commission composed of the Chief of Gendarmerie, the President of the Commercial Court, and two military officers, with the result that the elections took place in a more satisfactory manner than they have ever done before. Out of twelve members, eight are Christians and four are Moslems. With a view to assuring a more practical management of affairs the town has been divided into two wards, each with a separate Municipal Board of six with their own President, the one of the east ward being a Christian. In this case, too, the stumbling block to any rapid improvement is the financial situation, as they

have to meet a debt of 8,000*l.* with an annual income of only 16,000*l.*, unless certain important revenues, such as the slaughter-house, tanneries, and public criers' taxes, are reallotted to the municipality instead of being appropriated by the Ministry of Finance, as of late years. The new municipalities have shown commendable activity in setting things in order, and signs of improvement are already visible in the state of the former abominable state of the streets, caused by their utter neglect on the one side, and by the desultory and preposterous manner in which the new Tramway Company (Belgian) carries on its works of construction. In the department of hygeine a special Sanitary Board has drawn up and submitted prophylactic measures, and it publishes weekly returns of all cases of infectious diseases in the town. One of their salutary measures has been the removal of all the brothels to a special quarter on the outskirts of the town.

Mob Rule.—Another "thorn in the side" of the Vali is the continued existence of "mob rule," due to the prevailing misconception among the lower classes of the signification of the word "liberty," tempered with a shrewd appreciation on the part of the populace of the weakness of the police and gendarmerie.

The following are instances of attempts to take the law into their own hands:—

In January they assembled on the quay and stopped grain loading operations on the pretext that the wheat supplies were insufficient for local winter consumption. The Vali acted promptly and energetically, and quieted the agitation with assurances that the question would be attended to.

In two or three recent murder cases large mobs assembled at the Konak clamouring for the immediate arrest, condemnation, and hanging of the murderer, and would not leave until the Vali telegraphed to Constantinople for the death sentence to be carried out on four notorious characters recently tried and condemned for murder, and whose sentences had been ratified by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. As in many other similar urgent cases no reply has been received.

In connection with strikes, the intervention of the Vali has been required owing to the support given to the strikers by a powerful confraternity of some 200 bad characters distributed in the ranks of the strikers, and who take up a threatening attitude towards their employers and the police. I may mention the strike in February on the part of the auxiliary Customs hands, who, aided by their town sympathizers, caused a suspension of the Customs business for a day or two, and who were only brought to order by the intervention of the police and troops under the Vali's orders.

In the case of the threatened attack on the Khedivial Agency by outside brokers connected with the pilgrim steamers, reported in my despatch No. 23 of the 17th March, the Vali showed a readiness to take action in case of need when applied to by this Consulate-General. The satisfactory settlement of the strike of public coachmen in March was due to the steps taken by the Vali to induce the municipality on the one part, and the Lebanon Government on the other, to reduce the taxes on public vehicles; and an attempt to forcibly stop the Lebanese steam tramway from working within the town limits during the strike was promptly prevented by the police measures taken by his Excellency.

The latest, and perhaps most intolerant, case of mob rule took place last week, when the editor (a Maronite) of a local paper called the "Ahwal" was hustled out of his office, buffeted about, and taken off to the Konak by a Mussulman mob owing to an article he had published on the recent private visit to this neighbourhood of Sir Eldon Gorst. They insisted upon his imprisonment and trial, but the Procureur-Général having declared that there was no cause for his detention, the Vali had him escorted home when the excited mob had dispersed.

Article on Sir E. Gorst's Visit.—The publication of this article having caused a great stir locally, I append a translation, as the "imaginary" Report of Sir Eldon represents fairly well the actual state of things and reflects the inward feeling of many people, especially of the Lebanese, on the possibility therein mooted of a British occupation in the eventuality of a breaking up of the Ottoman Empire.

Revolverism.—With regard to the promiscuous firing in the streets and from the housetops, alluded to in the article, I may mention that the evil is not at all exaggerated, and shots are continually heard all over the place day and night. Notwithstanding the combined efforts of the police, gendarmerie, and military forces, the anniversary of the Prophet's birth ("Mevlud") was the occasion of as lively a battle as ever, suggesting a battle-field more than anything else. In the course of one week three revolver bullets were picked up in the garden of this Consulate-General. More stringent measures are now being enforced, and the summary trial of offenders has been instituted, but with a

police force of only sixty-six men (badly and irregularly paid) to a population of over 100,000 too much cannot be expected.

Smuggling of Fire-arms.—An evil that has still to be effectually suppressed is the wholesale smuggling of rifles and ammunition, and until a proper coast-guard service is established this flourishing business will continue, notwithstanding the efforts of the Vali, aided by the Commandant of Gendarmerie and Chief of Police, both good men. With the departure of the Turkish torpedo-boat destroyer last month and of the gun-boat "Marmaris" shortly for the Persian Gulf, this port and coast will be practically left without any coast-guard service. In one case last month the smugglers landed some boxes of rifles and ammunition on the quay near the custom-house in broad daylight, and actually defied the police, three of whose number were badly hurt for interfering.

Crime.—With such a universal carrying of arms by all classes, it is a wonder there is not more life taken and bodily harm done than is to be gathered from the following Beirout police report for the eight months succeeding the reestablishment of the Constitution, viz.:—

6 cases of murder.
99 cases of wounding with revolvers or knives.
11 arrests of thieves with stolen goods.
13 arrests of thieves without stolen goods.
8 cases of theft; authors unknown.
4 thieves escaped.
3 seizures of prohibited arms.
18 arrests for common assault.
9 arrests for threatening bodily harm with fire-arms.

It is satisfactory to state that in only two cases have British subjects been victims of this state of insecurity. One was Dr. Graham, a prominent medical practitioner, who was waylaid at night in the outskirts of the town when riding home from visiting a patient. He was held up by three masked men with a bull's-eye lantern, but, thanks to his coolness and good horsemanship, he got off unscathed, though four shots were fired at him. So far no arrests have been made in this case.

The other case was that of Mr. Abela, an agent of agricultural machinery, who in driving home from an evening party with his wife and two friends in January was assaulted by three drunken soldiers. He only escaped serious injuries from knives brandished by them by rolling into a ditch and then running for his life. The soldiers were traced and duly punished by the military authorities.

Incendiarism.—Another public danger that has shown signs of developing is that of incendiarism, for whereas the average of fires has hitherto been one in three years, there have been four important fires in less than twelve months, three of which were due to foul play. In the total absence of fire engines the outlook is a bad one for the insurance offices, of which most are British.

Finances.—As stated above, the chief difficulty in the way of the Administration is want of funds, owing to the very limited power of the Vali to deal with the revenue of his province, the apportionment of which is entirely subordinate to the authority of the Finance Ministry which appropriates every thing for Imperial requirements, only authorizing such local grants as are absolutely unavoidable. Even the small sum of 300 piastres, needed for a boat to the coast-guard service at Unfa, was refused by the Defterdar the other day, and an urgent application to the Ministry of Finance has met with no reply. I am credibly informed that the customs revenues are now also being sent to Constantinople without any deduction for the local custom-house expenses as heretofore, and that no salaries have been paid for March. There has been a distinct sign of recalcitrance on the part of the public to pay certain taxes, especially municipal ones, the legality of which is contested. The patent tax ("temettu") is also the source of much trouble in collecting, on account of the arbitrary manner in which it is apportioned. On the 26th February many shops and offices were closed as a protest against the tax. The Vali transmitted a largely signed petition asking for its reduction, but the reply was unsatisfactory. To facilitate matters, the Vali has suggested a remission of all arrears, and a revision of each individual case.

Tribunals.—The Judicial Department has been the object of much comment in the papers and the general opinion is that a more thorough cleaning is needed. This was shown in connection with a case before the Criminal Court of Appeal, a murderer (Mussulman) having been acquitted by the three Moslem members of the Court notwith-

standing overwhelming evidence proving his guilt, in consequence of which the two Christian members resigned as a protest against the action of the other three, whose conduct was considered as due to religious party spirit.

The annual election of the unofficial members (Assessors) of the various Courts took place recently, but the new appointments have not given general satisfaction, owing to the incompetence and mediocrity of the men chosen. But as long as the monthly allowance is only 3*l.* it is not to be expected that a better class of men will accept nomination.

The Commercial Court, in which we are most interested, continues work in a satisfactory manner under the presidency of Munir Bey, an honest and capable Judge, referred to in previous Reports. The Procureur-Général, Mahmoud Bey, who holds a very responsible position under difficult circumstances, is a capable and honest official.

Public Works.—In the domain of Public Works much has been proposed but little or nothing done.

Motor-cars.—The only line in which some activity has been shown is in private enterprises for the introduction of motor-bus services between Beirout and the principal towns in this neighbourhood. At present a daily motor-bus (French) runs to Sidon and back, and the same facilities will shortly be established, under British auspices, for reaching Tripoli, where two motor-cars (German) have already commenced running to Homs.

Steps are also being taken for the repair of the long-abandoned road across the Lebanon range to Damascus, which, when completed, will insure much more rapid communications with the principal summer resorts in the mountain and the rest of Syria. The number of private motor-cars imported since the restrictions were removed is very small; owing to the bad state of the roads in the town and neighbourhood, but the demand will increase as the roads improve.

British Agricultural Machinery.—The trade of Beirout, to judge from the general tone of the market during the past active business quarter, does not appear to have been affected by the unsettled political situation, nor by the Austrian boycott, and reasonable hopes are entertained that the steady development of agriculture in the districts of the hinterland, through which present or future railways run, will progress more rapidly by the introduction of labour-saving machinery on the part of large land-owners who are showing a disposition to manage their properties themselves, whereas hitherto, owing to the general insecurity of the country and other causes, they were contented with ridiculously small returns by letting them to small farmers under the "Metayer" system. With the development of cotton growing, already being tried by some with success, a new market is being opened up for British ploughs and cotton-ginning machinery.

Pilgrim Season.—The annual Mussulman pilgrimage to and from Mecca by rail was not so great as was anticipated from the reports about Bedouin raids between Mecca and Medina. The number carried over the Beirout–Damascus Railway was nearly 10,000, which represents a tolerably heavy sum left behind for lodging, provisions, and travelling requisites.

Fortunately there were no cases of cholera or plague to necessitate any special prophylactic measures against the spread of disease in the town.

The usual quarterly Reports from the Vice-Consuls under my superintendence are not yet to hand, except from Mr. Vice-Consul Abela at Sidon, whose remarks are given *in extenso*, as they probably apply more or less to all the other places:—

Sidon.—"A general disenchantment is the main impression felt here by the people with regard to the new Constitution. All of them have already painfully ascertained that the new régime has not conduced to any evident satisfactory result, while the Parliament has passed no important Bill as yet.

Insecurity.—"On the other hand, the insecurity is becoming general in every point of the Empire, and the cases of murder and burglary are reported to be most audacious and frequent; while the Government seems not to care for the present state of things, which dispirits even the most exalted individuals amongst the people. In this district and neighbourhood cases of murder and burglary have occurred frequently of late. The Kaimakam of Sidon, while personally most active and energetic, could not have these cases stopped and put down, as he disposes only of a single policeman, eight zaptiehs, and sixteen gendarmes, under the command of a Captain, though he has often applied for supplementary forces. In addition to this state of things, other difficulties resulting in the insubordination of the peasants have occurred. The latter, having wrongly understood the meaning of 'liberty,' avail themselves of the present situation to take revenge upon their masters for their former ill-treatment. The murder

at Beirout of Hadj Ismail Bey Zein, one of the most influential individuals in Sidon, was very impressive, and quite typical of the above statements. If the Government does not show more energy and severity than they have shown so far it will be an encouragement of the rebellion of the peasants, which is becoming every day more common and dangerous.

Popular dissatisfaction.—"The people of Sidon were pained to learn of the fall of the Grand Vizier, Kiamel Pasha, as he is personally known to most of them, and highly praised. They are also angry and dispirited at the silence of their Deputies. All the decisions taken by the General Council of the Vilayet of Beirout, as well as the Decree for the application of capital punishment, were welcomed here. The Society formed of late under the name of 'Mahommedan Union' was not encouraged here, and up to now no branch of it has been established here.

Local elections.—"The elections to the 'Idareh Medjliss' and to the Tribunals were carried out on the same footing as in previous years—that is to say, without equity and consideration for personal capacities. The elected members, therefore, to the Medjliss and to the Tribunal are mere ciphers. It is to be regretted that the pay of the Assessors to the Tribunals is quite inadequate, being 200 piastres a-month, otherwise many intelligent men would have brought forward their candidature.

Salaries Unpaid.—"It is reported that orders have been received here of late directing that the pay of all public officials for the month of March should not be handed over at the end of the month.

Municipality.—"There is nothing to be reported regarding the municipality, as no manifest improvements were made during the last quarter.

Motor Cars.—"Motor cars are now working on the road connecting Sidon with Beirout; but they are still few, and do not call regularly. Bridges are not strong enough, and the roads need to be macadamized, the cars could then be driven with greater ease and rapidity.

Military.—"The circular that emanated in the month of March from the Ministry of War instructing officers not to take part in political questions was badly received here by the officers of the 38th Regiment. The examination of the students ('Tollab Ulm') for exoneration from military service were very severe, and most of the said students were removed from the list.

Mail Service.—"The overland mail service is not going on in a satisfactory manner as to regularity.

Tobacconists' Strike.—"There has been a demonstration against the tobacco régie at Sidon by tobacconists who claim 15 per cent. discount instead of 9 per cent. allowed to them up to now. They threatened to strike, while many cultivators of tobacco are intending to plant with permits for the present year and not to submit themselves to the formalities of registrations."

The only occurrences of any importance specially reported upon by Vice-Consuls during the quarter are the following:—

1. Report by Acting Vice-Consul Harris on disturbances caused by the shooting of a Mussulman youth by a Christian at Tripoli (26th March).

Tripoli Disturbances.—"Since last Sunday evening there has been considerable excitement in the city and the port, owing to a series of events that have taken place.

"It was in my mind to have written to you before, but I knew there was nothing to fear, though the people have worked themselves into a great panic—were going to be killed, the Moslems from the city were going to sweep the place clean, &c. I knew, too, the Governor-General and the Commander of the troops, together with the Chief of Police, were able and willing to keep the peace; keep the Moslems from doing any thing serious to the Christians. These people fail to grasp the idea that there is a Constitution—that public meetings, public protests, are in order; they take what a lot of excited men, most of them still boys, in mind if not in size, say too seriously. They presume, because these men and boys gather in numbers, fire off a number of shots, shouting and cursing, calling God to punish murderers, &c., 'it means a general massacre.' Some three years ago one Yussif Dumani, the son of a physician here, now about 19 years of age, had some trouble with the brother of my cavass and some other Moslem boys. They were on the sands by the sea-side at 11 o'clock at night, and from what I could learn, they were doing to each other that vice so common here in the East. My cavass' brother said it was his turn, and Yussif refused, and there was a fight. Yussif complained to his father and he made a fuss, but it was soon shown to

him he had better take his boy in hand and keep him from such boys, and the incident was closed.

"About three or four weeks ago one Ahmed Danny, a member of a large Moslem family who command a 'Harrah' in one of the quarters in the city, and do not bear a good name, in fact, are considered to be from time to time engaged in unlawful practices, begin to shadow Yussif Dumani, following him into cafés and shops proposing that they go off together and enjoy themselves. Each and every time Yussif refused—in fact, it was very insulting indeed. Most people here knew of it, but the fear of such Moslems is so great they were afraid of saying much about it, thinking it would soon blow over.

"Last Sunday afternoon, about 5 o'clock, Yussif Dumani, his brother-in-law, Mitri-el-Khouri, and several others were returning from a walk, they came to an open place in the centre of the 'Meena,' they met Ahmed Darney who took the arm of Yussif Dumani and said, 'Come with me, I want to see you alone.' Yussif told him 'Go away,' and took a revolver from his pocket, when the Moslem saw the revolver he pulled one from his pocket. What occurred after then in true detail is difficult to know, because there are many versions, but I heard the story one hour after from a young man who was present, before he could be talked to by the friends of Dumani, who are trying to soften his connection with the trouble. His story is as follows:—

"'Both Yussif and the Moslem fired at the same time, Yussif was slightly wounded on one hand; he fired many times, so did all the men who were with him and many others. Some fired at the Moslem from the windows, the Moslem ran and many followed him; when they had gone about 300 yards a shot was fired from above which hit the Moslem on his leg and he fell, then some one struck him with a knife which passed through his back into his heart; he was dead in a moment. There was such a crowd, I cannot say who killed him.'

"On Monday, Yussif Dumani and Mitri-el-Khouri and fourteen others were arrested, and soon it was plain the crime was to be put on some one who was not arrested, so the police was looking for the man. When it was known he was in the 'Meena' for two weeks, it was another; he was said to have been away, then a third man was looked for. On Wednesday the Tripoli newspaper in its edition said: 'It is very plain to some that the killing of Ahmed Darney was not done by Yussif Dumani and Mitri-el-Khouri, and they should be set free and the right men be arrested.' This aroused the friends of the dead man, who had printed a pamphlet which was sent all over the town and the 'Meena.' Yesterday morning the friends of the murdered man put his bloody clothes on a tray, carried them, followed by a great crowd of men and boys firing off revolvers in the air and shouting like mad, went to the Government seat and made demand that Yussif Dumani and Mitri-el-Khouri be given to them for trial, or that a promise be given by the Governor that the regular examiner would not try and put the crime on some one that was not present and let free the two men who they thought were the guilty parties, &c.

"Without doubt, if the friends of the murdered man had so wished, they could have taken the prison by storm and taken the within and dealt with them as they wished, but when the Governor gave them assurances that full justice would be done, that no one would be let out until after it was known they were not guilty, the men went away, and half an hour after no one would have not known there had been any trouble.

"Many of the Christian shops in the city were closed, and all the shops in the 'Meena,' it was not until the police went about the streets making assurances that everything was passed, for them not to be afraid, they reopened them.

"This is all there is to report at present, all the men suspected and as usual many who have no connection with the trouble are in prison; there has been no examination as yet.

"Some people have, I am told, made complaints of the weakness of the Governor, but I think he has given the subject, up to the present at least, good judgment, and has prevented any trouble other than that I have mentioned, which has been childish in the extreme, but we must make allowances for these people who are volatile at best.

"It is a fact when a Moslem kills a Christian very little is said, but if it is a Christian makes away with a Moslem it is the other way, a great fuss is made; but, as you know, this is not new."

In consequence of these troubles the Vali proceeded to Tripoli, whence he returned in four or five days with the Cádi, who, it would appear, sided with the Mussulman

mob instead of assisting the Mutessarif and police in calming the excitement. In the meantime most of the men arrested have been released.

The intervention of Edhem Bey had the effect of restoring order, and the judicial inquiry is being proceeded with.

2. Report by Mr. Vice-Consul Abela on the formation of Mussulman Committee near Haifa for the defence of villagers against encroachments by influential parties (17th March, 1909).

"An assembly of the leading Mahommedan Notables residing in the villages of the Kaza of Haifa met on the 13th and 14th instant at Ikzim, a village four hours distant from Haifa. Twenty persons were appointed as the representatives of the people. These representatives appointed eight persons as their active Committee, who would hold a meeting every week. They took an oath in the mosque there to be faithful to each other. The purpose of forming this Committee is alleged to be for the defence of the rights of the inhabitants of the villages, the protection of their lands from any interference from the people of Haifa, and to take measures against the Government if the latter should interfere with their affairs."

Lebanon.

Parliamentary Representation.—As a final act in the agitation for the representation of Mount Lebanon in the Ottoman Parliament (*vide* despatch No. 93 of the 24th December), a Resolution was passed by the Administrative Council on the 8th February to the effect that, as the Government of Mount Lebanon had thought fit to consult the population, and as this referendum established a general non-acceptance, the Administrative Council desires to record such decision.

Koura Electoral Troubles.—The preliminary legal proceeding instituted in connection with the electoral troubles in the Koura district, reported in despatch No. 10 of the 21st January, resulted in the liberation of forty out of the 109 arrested for participation in the attack on the guard of the sub-Governor's official residence at Anfeh; fifty have been let out on bail and eighteen are detained in prison pending trial.

New Elections.—The elections of representatives in the Administrative Council for Djezzin (Maronite), Metn (one Maronite and one Greek Orthodox), and Kesrouan (Metwali) came off in March without any untoward event. The first and last did not cause much commotion outside the districts themselves. Suleiman Bey Kanaan, who secured the important Druze vote backed by the Greek Catholic influence, was elected in the first district, notwithstanding the support of the Patriarchate and the countenance of the French Consulate-General given to his opponent Mussoud Effendi Azouri.

In Kesrouan the successful candidate was Mohammed Effendi Mohsin, who defeated Ali Kazim.

The double elections in the Metn district caused a great deal of stir, as three Maronite and four Orthodox candidates presented themselves for election. These were—

1. Shedid Akel, the retiring member, whose suspension by the Governor-General last year formed the subject of my despatch No. 16 of the 15th February, 1909.
2. Youssouf Tohmé.
3. Nasri Lahoud.

On the eve of the elections Shedid Akel withdrew in favour of his brother, Khalil Akel, on its being made clear to him that he would not be allowed to take his seat, as the legal proceedings pending against him for corrupt practices were still pending.

To insure Khalil Akel's return, Youssouf Tohmé withdrew, so as not to split up the vote, but on the understanding, it is said, that Akel should retire in three years' time and help to secure Tohmé's return for the other three years of mandate.

The Druze vote having been turned towards Akel, who also had the moral support of the French Consulate-General, he won in a close fight with Lahoud.

In order to avoid possible trouble, the Metn and Djezzin elections took place at Baabda, the seat of Government, and an innovation was introduced by which the Sheikhs, in casting their votes, were not called upon, as hitherto, to affix their seals to their voting papers containing the name of their candidate. If reports are true, there would appear to have been bribery on an extensive scale resorted to on both sides.

The successful Orthodox candidate was Elias Shoueyri, notwithstanding the strong

sympathy shown by the Russian Consul-General for the other candidate, Haji Abou Haidar.

As was proved in the Koura election, Prince Gagarine "backed the wrong horse" this time too.

Appointments.—In administrative posts there have been the usual transfers and dismissals, though not on such a large scale as usual, owing, I have reasons to believe, to my friendly representations to the Governor-General as to the evil effects of dismissing officials on trivial charges usually emanating from personal adversaries. In the case of members of the judicial branch especially, I press home the necessity of a careful and impartial inquiry with interrogation of witnesses in the presence of the official whose conduct is being inquired into.

The principal appointments have been those of Selim Bey Nassif (Maronite) Kaimakam of Djezzin, and of Major Milhem Boy Houri (Maronite) as Colonel of gendarmerie in the place of Berber Bey Kazin, dismissed last year.

Case of Major Fouad Shoucair.—Major Fouad Bey Shoucair, who was suspended and tried by court-martial at Damascus for the alleged manslaughter at his orders of a Maronite horseman last autumn, has been acquitted, but owing to fears of revenge on the part of the relations of the man who was killed on that occasion, the Governor-General has shown a reluctance to allow him to return to his duties. It is hoped that a commission in the Imperial gendarmerie may be secured for him, as any harm done to him in the Lebanon, if he has to resume his duties, would lead to reprisals on the part of the Druzes. He is a good officer, and deserves every sympathy.

Crime.—The mountain has been comparatively free from crime, and there was only one murder due to "blood feud" between Druzes, under the following circumstances:

Four years ago a quarrel took place between the two Druze families of Bouyuis and Dabians in a village called Mazraat-ul-Shouf, and one of the Dabians was killed. The matter was hushed up by the interference of influential Druze Chiefs, the Dabian clan engaging to pay 400,000 piastres to the relatives. Notwithstanding the reconciliation, a Bouyni was killed whilst working in his field on the 23rd March and the two sons of the former victim are suspected of having done the deed.

To prevent further reprisals between the two clans, which might extend to their respective allies, the Governor-General has had to send the gendarmerie to the spot, so far with satisfactory results.

The Lebanese police were successful in "running to earth" a band of thieves whose depredations among the summer residences of wealthy Beirout families had been going on for two or three winters. A large quantity of the loot was found in the Druze Village of Medjdil Banah and hidden away in secluded places in the vicinity. Many objects were found in other Druze villages, but a lot of things were destroyed by fire to prevent discovery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH

Inclosure 2 in No. 73.

Extract from the "Ahwal" of April 6, 1909.

SIR ELDON GORST'S VISIT.

(Literal translation.)

WE announced yesterday the return to Cairo of Sir Eldon Gorst, His Britannic Majesty's Representative in Egypt, after a week's stay in our country to breathe the pure air of the Lebanon and for a short rest.

Some people insist, however, on giving to his short visit some political character, and on the supposition that he must have made a long report about this country in the style of the Report of his predecessor, Lord Cromer, which he wrote every year on the Valley of the Nile.

If their supposition is true, and they wish to know what this Report will contain, I am giving them here a résumé of it only, as the whole would require a complete volume.

After the preface, he says:—

I found that this Syrian tract of land, the neighbour of Egypt, is one of the best tracts in the world, no doubt it is so, as it is the land of promise which produces honey and milk; it is fertile, of good climate, but its population does not know how to make use of its treasures, and that were it in European hands its wealth would be doubled and redoubled, and we would convert it into a paradise.

I came to Beirout, which I heard spoken of as the "Bride of the East." I found that, as far as the bad condition and the filthiness of its streets are concerned, it is below the smallest European village, and that, in spite of the existence in this town of a large number of learned and wealthy men, who possess in it beautiful palaces, and of its splendid position for which it is envied by all the other towns. The improvements of its streets require very little money and trouble in comparison with that towns such as Cairo. Were it in European hands, we would make of it the rendezvous of travellers from all parts of the world, through the comforts and the amenties of life we would introduce in it.

Beirout is fit to be a winter residence for Princes and great personages owing to its mild winter. I would not exaggerate if I said that if we would pay a part of the attention we paid to Egypt, travellers would prefer coming to Beirout in every respect; even in summer travellers will continue to come, and will be more numerous, as it is the port of the Lebanon which resembles Switzerland; the Lebanon might become the best summer resort in the world.

I wish I could have spent one night at Beirout, but I was not able to do so owing to what I heard about the hot-headed class of the people, spending the nights in discharging revolvers and crackers which have a detonation resembling to that of a gun, and which prevent a man, however brave he might be, from coming out of his house lest he should be hit by some bullet which will put an end to his life. I believed what I heard, because I saw the bearers of revolvers going proudly about in the streets and squares, and I heard the discharging of revolvers in the middle of the day.

It is strange to see that the Government, as I had been told, is unable to stop this irregularity which might disturb the public peace. The inhabitants complained bitterly, and the newspapers protested, publishing daily deeds of wounding and murdering, all caused by the existence of arms in every hand, but no one to listen and no one to stop it.

The low class of the people, seeing that the authorities are unable to punish them, concluded that they approve of their doings, or that of some of them, of the old régime, are encouraging them as they pretend. Robberies in houses and shops became very frequent; the robbers made great progress in their profession, so that they began to set fire in the bazaars with the object of robbing.

Three important fires occurred during this month, though Beirout is built of stones: cases of fire used to be very rare, once perhaps in every three years.

I was also informed that the state of things in the interior is worse than at Beirout, towns, villages, and the smallest of Khans are full of arms and ammunitions; so that a revolution is expected, which will begin between two families in enmity, and will be spread to tribes, as is the case now in the Hauran, Bussorah, Hedjaz, Yemen, and Asia Minor. It will not be strange to see, in a short time, this country in flames, which will destroy inhabitants and properties, and the country then will be a heap of ruins deserted by the inhabitants.

I also see that the European capitalists, who rushed after the proclamation of the Constitution to invest their capital in Turkey for useful enterprises, have made a mistake in hurrying in their action, as owing to the anarchy that is spread throughout the country it is not safe to risk their fortune, and, I believe, that most of them have now abstained from proposing their money, and this will certainly cause great losses to this country, which wants foreign money to bring with it happiness and prosperity.

It is true that there are some wealthy people in this country, but these wealthy men do not spend one single farthing for such public enterprises, and I do not blame them, as they have never seen any encouragement from the former Government; on the contrary, it stood as an obstacle in the way of progress and prosperity.

Turkey is now in great need of European financial confidence; if this confidence is lost, I do not know how it can live, and I do not understand the secret of a policy which takes no trouble to maintain peace and tranquillity in the country, and loses the time in insignificant discussions.

We, as well as all Europeans, have commercial and economical interests, Societies and private individuals have also considerable sums of money, if the Turkish Govern-

ment will not be strong enough to protect these interests it is necessary to take new measures of precaution and protect our people by every possible means. The inhabitants of this country are accustomed to submission, if the Government take serious energetic measures they will fear it; they, however, consider the inert attitude of the Government in not punishing and in not maintaining the tranquillity energetically and justly is due to the adherents of the old party, who would like to facilitate the way for a foreign intervention in order to spite the Liberals. The majority of the inhabitants being still ignorant, not knowing the truth, move with every wind, and allow themselves to be blindly led by some leaders and their assistants; I will not be astonished to see that the old party has succeeded, and then nothing but ruin. I believe also that the enlightened class of the inhabitants, seeing the inability of the Turkish Government of improving the state of things after the Constitution as it was before, got disappointed, and are now inclined to seek their deliverance through whosoever he might be, and they envy their brothers in Egypt for the security, the tranquillity, and the wealth under the shadow of the occupation. I have also to add that by the justice we have done in the Valley of the Nile we have gained the sympathy of the Syrians, who twenty years ago disliked us. Things have changed, our prestige has increased where that of others has disappeared, and all that is due to the good English policy which stands on the foundations of equality amongst all the inhabitants without distinction or exception.

This is the résumé of the Report which it is believed the English Representative will send to Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in London, should he demand it or should he at his leisure amuse himself in writing it.

Let the heedless people take care in good time lest they have to repent later.

Many things in the Report were not mentioned owing to some considerations, as it contains some hurtful truths. We put them off to another favourable occasion, and the future is not far.

[16533] No. 74.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 299.)

Sir, *Pera, April 25, 1909.*

YOU will now have received the despatch No. 290 of the 26th ultimo addressed by His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad simultaneously to the Foreign Office and to this Embassy giving an account of the attack by the Mesopotamian Arabs on the "Khalifa," and thus giving a more detailed history of the matter than that which I was able to provide from the telegrams I had received, in my despatches No. 228 of the 31st March and No. 272 of the 15th April.

With regard to paragraph 4 of Colonel Ramsay's despatch, I feel it, however, incumbent upon me to point out that the recommendations made by him after the attack made in the spring of last year on the "Blosse Lynch" by no means escaped the attention of this Embassy.

In his despatch No. 394 of the 16th July, 1908, Sir G. Barclay explained very clearly the reasons which hindered him from pressing the Ottoman Government to undertake serious punitive measures against Sheikh Gadban, and since the date of my arrival in Constantinople I have lost no opportunity of urging the Turkish Government to take measures of a nature calculated to restore order and security in the valley of the two rivers, although the continual crisis through which this Empire has throughout this period been passing has been exceedingly unfavourable to the successful attainment of my object. But, like Sir G. Barclay, I hesitate to urge them on the lines recommended by Colonel Ramsay, and accordingly I have deferred bringing his suggestions to the notice of the Turkish Government, as mentioned in my despatch No. 228 of the 31st ultimo. In this same despatch he points out that the Arabs are not naturally very turbulent, but that they are goaded into turbulence by dishonest officials. It would seem hardly just or humane, then, to stir up the Turks to punish these people for offences to which they have practically been driven by Turkish misrule and to suggest to the authors of this oppression the means by which they may most effectively crush the Arab resistance; without, however, possessing any guarantee that a better administration will be maintained in the future or that the overthrow of the Arabs shall not be followed by still greater oppression.

Further, the Beni Lam have treated our steamers with marked care and consideration. That the Albu Mohammed fail to act similarly is deplorable and

reprehensible, but nevertheless I propose, subject to your concurrence, to devote my efforts, as soon as the state of the Government allows, to pressing for the appointment of a specially capable and honest man of Bussorah and for instructions to him to pay particular attention to the patrol of the river, bringing pressure to bear, if practicable, in connection with the claim for the attack on the "Blosse Lynch" on the lines indicated in your despatches No. 424 of the 10th October and No. 458 of the 3rd November, 1908, and my reply No. 774 of the 14th November, 1908, rather than to the advocation of the radical measures urged by His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad.

With reference to my despatch No. 272 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which has just reached me from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah giving a succinct account of the various circumstances which have been the immediate cause of the outbreaks in the different tribes. It would seem that as a matter of fact the Sheikh of Mohammerah was largely responsible for the present disorders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 27th instant, I have the honour to report that the disturbances below Amara are due to the following cause:—

After the death of Seyhood, who held the contract for Mejer-el-Kebir for the years 1324, 1325, 1326, his son, Abdul Kerim, wrote to the vilayet, agreeing to pay all arrears due on the year 1324, amounting to about £T. 8,000, and asking leave to retain the land till the expiration of the lease. The vilayet officially approved and accepted this arrangement. Later on, however, Zeban, the brother of Osman-el-Yessir, approached the Vali, Mobarrem Bey, on the subject, with the result that the latter changed his mind, and expressed his intention of cancelling the existing contract. The Vali also declined to renew the contracts for Al Hafra and Al Kussera, held by Falih-el-Seyhood, which expired this year. The Al-bu-Mohammed resented this treatment and endeavoured to stop navigation on the Tigris, as is their custom on such occasions.

The disturbances above Amara, where Ghadban of the Beni Lam is reported to have mustered his men in considerable force, are due to the following cause:—

The lease of Kumait, registered in the names of Seyyed Namer and Mollah Yunis, clerk to Ghadban, and held by Bolassim, brother of Ghadban, expired at the end of 1324. Sheikh Khazal, of Mohammerah, who bears Ghadban a grudge for assisting the Howeiza against him last year, availed himself of the opportunity to take the Kumait contract out of Ghadban's hands and secretly supports Fahad-el-Ghadban, the proposed new lessee, arranging with Jassim-el-Faizat, through some of his friends in Bussorah, to assign his (the Sheikh's) property at Saraji, in the Bussorah Vilayet, as security for the rent of Kumait.

I understand that the Sheikh of Mohammerah has two objects in view: first to revenge himself on Ghadban, and secondly to increase his prestige among the Arab population of this vilayet by giving trouble to the authorities, with whom he is on bad terms, owing to differences between them on the subject of land tenure in Turkish Arabia. The Sheikh of Mohammerah, as already reported, is a large land and house owner in Bussorah. The authorities have lately declined to register any more transfers of land in his name, and have interfered with various building operations on municipal grounds.

My attention has been drawn to a dispute which occurred between Abdul Jabbar, a wealthy land-owner in Abul Khassib, and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, regarding the sale of dates last year. The quarrel became acute, and on the 24th February Jabbar's house at Abul Khassib was invaded by an armed gang of more than fifty men, who terrified the occupants with their firing, killed several people—the owner was absent at the time—and plundered the premises.

When the Sheikh of Mohammerah proceeded last year on an expedition against the Howeiza, he applied to the inhabitants of Abul Khassib to assist him. Seyyed

Taleb was beating up recruits in the vilayet for the expedition, and many were sent, which annoyed the Turkish authorities considerably. In my despatch No. 92 of the 24th December, 1908, I sent your Excellency an account of these proceedings which appeared in a Bagdad newspaper. The people of Abul Khassib, however, refused to join, and incurred the Sheikh's resentment. When the attack of the 24th February occurred the general opinion expressed in the coffee shops was that the Sheikh of Mohammerah had organized the outrage, and it is openly stated both here, and I am informed at Mohammerah too, that the further attacks on this village on the 12th and 14th March were the result of this resentment and were the Sheikh's work. It seems probable that it is so. The inquiries made by the police confirm the fact that most of the armed gangs who have lately overrun the Bussorah district came from and returned to Mohammerah.

The ex-Vali reported, I am informed, to Constantinople that the river piracies last autumn were engineered from the Persian shore, and it is natural that the Sheikh, to revenge himself, would, in the Arab way, employ all means at his command to annoy the Turks and to create disturbance in the vilayet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[16538] No. 75.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 304.)

Pera, April 28, 1909.

Sir,

IN a despatch, giving a general report for the first quarter of the current year, which reached me on the 8th instant, His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mersina reported that the two provinces of Konia and Adana were apparently in a quiet state, but that there were disturbing elements below the surface, such as the large importation of arms and the dangerous weakness of the local authorities. The judicial authorities, for instance, refused to condemn guilty parties, however overwhelming the proofs of their guilt might be, for fear of incurring unpopularity, whilst the Vali of Adana was being strongly attacked in the local paper, which observed that he was a good clerk, but a bad Governor; an honest man, but one who was incapable of action; and recommended him to return to Constantinople and resume his avocation there as a Secretary.

Major Doughty Wylie's account indicated a general spread of lawlessness, but he stated that there was "nothing that a small show of force would not at once put down, and the force, though small, at the disposal of the authorities is sufficient, if they will only use it."

It came, therefore, as an entire surprise that I received on the 15th instant a telegram from Major Doughty Wylie, stating that he had proceeded from Mersina to Adana on the preceding day, having heard that the situation was very critical, and had found many people murdered on the way, whilst a conflict was in progress in the town. The Armenian quarter was armed, and at the moment was safe, but the Government was altogether incapable.

I shall doubtless receive from His Majesty's Vice-Consul a report of the whole matter, which appears to be an outcome of the events in Constantinople on the 13th April, but at present I am only able to give a résumé of the telegraphic information which has reached me, the messages generally arriving in a very corrupt state.

In the course of the fighting on the 15th two American missionaries, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Maurer, were killed, whilst Major Doughty Wylie was himself wounded in the arm while endeavouring to stop the fighting. I am at present ignorant of the precise nature of the wound and of the circumstances under which it was received. The reserves were called out, but this measure was the reverse of useful. The Armenians defended themselves well. On the 16th the situation in Adana was better, but the movement began to spread to the surrounding districts, and 400 armed men went by train to Tarsus, which they proceeded to burn and pillage, whilst grave alarm was felt at Alexandretta.

On the 17th instant, Major Doughty Wylie induced a deputation of Mollahs and Notables to swear peace before him, and a special train was sent to Tarsus to arrest the massacre there, but this force appears to have arrived only in time to save the Missionary School and the Ottoman Bank.

On the following day, I received news that Armenian farms and villages in the

neighbourhood of Alexandretta had been pillaged and burnt, and that the situation of Payas (on the Gulf of Iskanderun to the north of Alexandretta) and Chokmerziman, where bands of Circassian settlers and mountaineers were said to be gathering, was extremely serious. The panic at Aleppo was great, the population seeking refuge in the Consulates, the churches, the warehouses on the shore, and even in boats.

Meanwhile, there was reason to fear that there would be trouble at Beirout in connection with the murder of Emir Arslan Bey in Constantinople on the 13th April, and His Majesty's ship "Diana" had accordingly proceeded thither from Port Said; but, in view of the far graver situation in the north, she was dispatched to Mersina, pending the arrival of other ships of war from Malta.

On the same day I learnt from the Acting British Consul at Aleppo that a disturbance had broken out at Marash resulting in the death of some fourteen Armenians and some four or five Turks, whilst the press stated that pillage and massacre were the order of the day at Sis, Kars, Hadjin, Osmanieh, Deurtyol, and other districts in the region anciently known as Lesser Armenia.

The distracted condition of the Central Government prevented their taking any efficient measures, though orders were sent for the dispatch of troops from Beirout and from European Turkey, whilst the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Armenian Patriarchate telegraphed to the Notables in the vilayet affected to maintain order.

On the 19th instant Major Doughty Wylie, who is the only foreign Consul in the town, and is therefore protecting foreign subjects in general, telegraphed that the situation at Adana was still dangerous and that the authorities had failed to fulfil one of the conditions of peace which he had arranged, namely, to execute certain murderers who had been caught red-handed, thus indicating that the Muslem authorities were unwilling or afraid to inflict punishment, not only just, but insured by compact, on their co-religionists.

On the 19th, 100 troops arrived from Beirout. The telegram reporting this was very corrupt, but I gather that the massacre was continuing in Killis and the surrounding villages. Major Doughty Wylie found the loss of life in the town to amount to 2,200, of which a good proportion (600), owing to the gallant defence offered by the Armenians, fell on the Moslems, and he estimated that in the surrounding district it was from 15,000 to 25,000. Mersina was, he added, full of refugees.

Mr. Catoni telegraphed from Aleppo that he had received reports of massacres at Kirikhan and Zeitun, but he had no details, and the Acting British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta reported that the prison at Payas had been broken open and that it: 400 inmates had gone off to join in the attack on Chokmerziman, the situation of which now appeared desperate, while a village called Kithkar [*sic*] 30 kilom. from Alexandretta in the direction of Aleppo had been wiped out; the population of Alexandretta was in a state of the utmost terror until the arrival of the "Diana," which landed fifty sailors to protect the Consulate and the lives of British subjects.

On the same day a massacre of Armenians took place at Antioch, no British subjects, however, being harmed, and the dispatch of a man-of-war to Suedia, the port of Antioch, was urgently called for, with the result that His Majesty's ship "Triumph" was accordingly instructed to proceed thither, and rumours arrived of massacres at Birejik and the surrounding villages, which, as you will remember, have so great cause to be grateful to Mr. Fitzmaurice for his labours on their behalf during the massacres of 1895–6.

I further received news that an Englishman, named Gunter, who was at Osmanieh, and another, named Proctor, and the German subjects at Bagche were safe, and were expected to arrive shortly at Adana. They did, in fact, arrive there safely on the 22nd April.

Major Doughty Wylie had especially urged that as soon as a man-of-war reached Mersina, a guard, a doctor, and food should be sent up to him, and I requested the Commander of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" as soon as he arrived to consult with the Major as to the steps it was advisable to take.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, earnestly begged that no guard might be sent, as it would, he said, irritate the population and be the signal for further disturbances, and the local authorities were ready to guarantee the absolute safety of the British Consulate and subjects. He further offered to place a detachment of Turkish troops at the disposal of the Consul if the latter desired it. I inquired of Major Doughty Wylie his opinion on the matter, and he informed me in reply that a guard would no longer be necessary, but that he might find it useful to intimate that the ship was ready to land a guard if necessary, but that the assurances given by the Turkish authorities could by no means be taken literally.

He further communicated a report from the American missionaries for transmission to my American colleague, who takes a lively concern in these events, to the effect that there were in Adana 15,000 Christians in a state of destitution; that upwards of 200*l.* would be needed daily for bread alone; that nineteen Protestant pastors had been murdered; and that it would be necessary to start two large orphanages.

At Alexandretta there were on the 23rd April over 3,000 refugees from the surrounding district, where massacre was general. Beylan was being besieged, and a force sent to Choknerzinan only obtained an ineffectual truce of a few hours' duration.

Meanwhile the situation at Hadjin had been steadily growing more serious, and I received a telegram from an English lady missionary who is there, named Miss Bogman, appealing for assistance. Major Doughty Wylie was doing all in his power to move the local authorities to help, and an Englishman, Mr. Chambers, offered to go thither with a view to making peace, despite the difficulty of approaching the place, which is some four days distant, and where he would be exposed to the cross-fire of the opposing parties. The Vali, however, refused to take the responsibility of allowing his departure, and Major Doughty Wylie accordingly telegraphed to the head of the missionary establishment advising the Armenians to surrender, under guarantee, to such regular troops, 150 in number, as were there. These seem to have been ineffectual defenders, however, and on the 24th April the town was reported to be in flames, and on the following day the Captain of the "Swiftsure" reported that the disorders were worse than ever and that, though the white flag had been hoisted, no official presented himself to take the "surrender." The approach of the Salonica army and its investment of the capital rendered the Central Government more impotent than ever, and in fact the authority of the Ministers was repudiated by most of the Valis on the ground of their appointment being unconstitutional, whilst the Vali of Adana had already been dismissed by the Minister of the Interior.

On the 25th April news reached the Embassies that Deurtyol, a town some 7 kilom. from the coast in the vicinity of Payas, where 10,000 Christians had taken refuge, was surrounded, and that a massacre had commenced at Cassaba, a place south-west of Antioch, and the Vice-Consul at Alexandretta stated that three Armenian families which had fled from the butchery at Antioch had been murdered within half-an-hour's distance of Alexandretta. The number of refugees was so great as to render an outbreak of an epidemic likely, and the Commander of the British man-of-war was proposing to confer with the Captains of the French and Italian vessels as to the advisability of landing men to patrol the town. It is presumable that his intention was to leave this duty to his colleagues whilst the "Triumph" proceeded to Suedia to patrol the Bay of Antioch.

Meanwhile, I requested the Captain of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" at Mersina to consult with his naval colleagues and to inform me whether any steps were practicable for the relief of Deurtyol; yesterday he reported that two battalions of troops had arrived, and that a third was going on to Alexandretta, and he believed that they would reach the spot that evening. In another telegram, which reached me this morning, he stated that fresh fighting had broken out at Adana, adding that the new troops appeared to have the situation in hand. The first part of this message is confirmed by telegrams from missionaries, stating that fires were continual, and were endangering the mission house, and that there was heavy fighting, accompanied with grave danger to life and property; but the latter part is strangely at variance with a message which has been received at the French Embassy to-day, affirming that the new troops were assisting in the work of pillage and murder.

With regard to Hadjin, I have the honour to report that the Ministry of the Interior telegraphed yesterday to the local authorities to allow Mr. Chambers to proceed thither provided they could insure his safety.

Mr. Catoni reports a rumour which is current in Aleppo to the effect that the massacres are being propagated by secret agents of the old régime, and states that three individuals had been arrested on this ground. It is impossible to say what truth there is in such a report, but the revolt in Constantinople in favour of the Sheriat is not at variance with it.

I venture to recommend strongly to your favourable consideration an application made, as reported in my telegram No. 145 of the 20th instant, by Major Doughty Wylie that he be allowed to spend money for rewards at his discretion, at all events within a reasonable limit, as I am convinced that such expenditure will not be incurred improperly, but only to those persons who assisted him in his attempts to check disorders such as can only be paralleled in the great massacres of thirteen years ago.

[17116] No. 76*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May* 5, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 5th May, from the senior naval officer, Malta.

I am, &c.
C. L. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 76*.

Senior Naval Officer, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May* 5, 1909.

CONSUL HODEIDAH reports as follows, and asks that Foreign Office may be told:—

"The situation at Constantinople may render position here critical. Can ship of war be sent here, as Turkish troops have mutinied, and disturbances are expected? European community here in much anxiety."

I further have the honour to suggest that efforts be made to encourage the flow of private charity in the direction of alleviating the appalling state of misery which has been brought about by these recent barbarities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[15288] No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 3, 1909.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence with the India Office relative to the attitude of the Vali of Bussorah towards the Sheikh of Koweit, which involves an implication as to the status of Koweit inadmissible by His Majesty's Government.*

You will perceive that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Sheikh must be supported in his pretensions, though it must be left to your Excellency to decide whether the present moment is propitious or not for taking action.

I have to request your Excellency to take a suitable opportunity to make it clear to the Turkish Government that the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the status of Koweit has not been modified since the occurrence of the recent constitutional changes in the Ottoman Empire.

In view of the opinion expressed in the last paragraph of the India Office letter of the 22nd April, your Excellency should abstain from making any representations with regard to the particular case in point without further instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17275] No. 77.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to affairs in the Aden Hinterland.

India Office, May 6, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 3, 1909.

YOUR telegram of the 5th September, 1908. Rubeaten. Report from Resident, Aden, states that 1,200 dollars were recently exacted from Nawa as tribute by Turks, and that 400 Turkish Arabs are now in occupation of it. One of their Sheikhs, it appears, was murdered in December last by people of Nawa, and his family appealed for assistance to Mausatta Sheik. (? The latter) entered Juban, *en route* to Nawa, with 200 men; Nawa had, in the meanwhile, been occupied by 400 men under a Turkish Arab Sheikh named Ad Dahab, who informed Mausatta Sheikh that instructions to settle Nawa dispute had been received by him from Turkish Government. Appeal has been made to Resident by Mausatta Sheikh. The continuance of Juban as part of Kuza of Rada was condition of Ottoman Commissioner's admission, in *procès-verbal* of 20th April, that Dabiani, Rubeaten, and Nawa were Yafa. Encroachment would, therefore, appear to have been committed by both sides. Similar encroachments seem likely to continue so long as position remains indefinite and the grounds are doubtful for protest on our part.

It will probably be considered inexpedient to raise the question at the present time

* See No. 50 of previous Volume; and *ante*, Nos. 8 and 47.

at Constantinople, in view of political situation in Turkey. We therefore propose that Resident should be instructed, provided that he does not in any way commit Government to action in so doing, to endeavour to induce local Turkish authorities to vacate Nawa, if Juban is vacated by Mausatta Sheikh.

[17444] No. 78.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 1/291.)

Baghdad, March 26, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, a copy of my despatch No. 29/290 of to-day's date, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople regarding the recent attack on the steam-ship "Khalifah" by Arabs on the Lower Tigris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Inclosure in No. 78.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 29/290.)

Baghdad, March 26, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the British steam-ship "Khalifah," on which I was a passenger, left Bussorah on the 20th March for Baghdad. We started from Bussorah with an escort of seven soldiers, and when we got to Kila Saleh we were informed that the Arabs were in a very disturbed state and we were given five additional soldiers. Between Kila Saleh and the canal known as Mujar Saghir we were fired at on four different occasions; our assailants at one time probably numbered about forty. As the result of the four attacks we have found twenty-three bullet-holes in the ship, barge, and cargo, and there are probably more which cannot now be found, as the cargo used for barricading purposes has been shifted. We should probably have fared much worse if sheets of rain had not kept a number of the Arabs in their tents at some distance from the river.

On arrival at Amarah on the night of the 21st March we came up with the Turkish steamer "Hamidiyeh," which had left Bussorah a day before us; she, too, had been attacked, as had the gun-boat "Alus," which acted as her escort. I saw some bullet marks on the "Hamidiyeh," but cannot say how many bullets struck her.

On the morning of the 22nd March we left Amarah in company with the "Alus" and the "Hamidiyeh," and we were warned that we were likely to have a warm reception at the hands of the Bani Lam Arabs. At the head of the Liptera Canal there is a Settlement of Bani Lam Arabs occupying a line of huts about 2 or 3 miles long; these huts accommodate, among other people, the special fighting guard of Sheikh Ghadban. Before we reached this place, Bilasem, the brother of Sheikh Ghadban, who is himself absent, sent a horseman down to inform us that we might safely leave the "Alus" behind and steam on at our usual pace as we should not be fired on. We did not take advantage of this assurance, and when we got to the encampment we saw a large number of Sheikhs in the Chief's tent and a number of armed men collected behind the fort. We estimated the number at about 500 or 600, their banners were ready, and they were evidently in fighting trim. We passed this encampment without molestation. We were the leading steamer, and I noticed that Bilasem's horsemen did not convey his message to the Turkish steamer in rear of us. As we steamed along in front of the huts a man walked along the bank, apparently to see that no irresponsible person fired.

Later on in the day we came to Kumait, and here we found a body which we estimated at about 1,500 armed men. Before we reached this place another horseman came to assure us that we should be allowed to pass unmolested. Here again a person, apparently in authority, walked along the bank to preserve order. This body of men was divided into several parties, apparently distributed with a view to supporting each

other in case of attack, and when we passed they unfurled at least twenty banners and began to execute their war dance, known as a "houza."

2. Kila Saleh is under the Mutessarif of Amarah, and when we arrived at that place I went to see the Mutessarif to ask him why he had not sent back the "Alus" from Amarah to escort us. He replied that his orders were that the "Alus" was to run from Kila Saleh to Ali Gharbi, and he seemed quite incapable of realizing that it was his duty to carry out his instructions with some intelligence. The "Hamidiyeh" waited for us in Amarah, and the "Alus" should, of course, have been sent back to meet the British steamer, which always arrives on a fixed date. The Mutessarif seems a miserable old creature, quite unfit for a position of such responsibility. He seemed to think that if we went with the "Alus" and with the "Hamidiyeh" we need have no soldiers on board, but I declined to accept this view, and asked him to send for the Tabur Aghasi and arrange for an escort. After some time (it was about midnight) a decrepit old creature appeared and said that he would give us fifteen zaptiehs, as he could not spare more. I declined to allow the steamer to start with a smaller guard than twenty-five men, and these were eventually given.

The telegraph wires were cut on both sides of Amarah.

3. All this occurred in the Bussorah Vilayet, and Mr. Consul Crow will no doubt be able to supply your Excellency with more information than I can do about the local tribal politics. As far as I understand them they are somewhat as follows:—

After Nazim Pasha's visit to Amarah about a year ago Sheikh Ghadban of the Bani Lam and Sheikh Seyhud of the Albu Muhammad, who were old enemies, made friends and concluded a defensive alliance against the Turks. Seyhud has recently died after expressing a dying wish that the Chiefship of the tribe should go to his younger son, Abdul Kerim. It is said that the Government has agreed to recognize Abdul Kerim if he will pay up the arrears of revenue due from his father, and that Abdul Kerim has turned restive as he thinks that he may be pressed to pay these arrears: he is therefore showing the Government that he is in a position to make trouble for them if they do not accept his views. This probably accounts for the attacks made on the British and Turkish steamers, within the limits for which Abdul Kerim should be held responsible.

Sheikh Ghadban is also in a state of apprehension, for it is said that the Turks are collecting soldiers to oust him from Kumait, in favour of Jabud, who is one of his relations, and who is said to be popular with the tribe. The armed men were probably collected with the object of opposing a landing.

4. After the attack on the "Blosse Lynch" last spring I ventured to urge, with what was perhaps considered almost improper insistence, that if attacks on our steamers were allowed to pass unnoticed they would probably recur. Whether my views were accepted by the Embassy I have no means of judging, but I would beg your Excellency to read my letters written at that time. I have no wish to revive our complaint against Sheikh Ghadban and the Bani Lam Arabs for the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," but I cannot too strongly urge the need for serious action against the Albu Muhammad Arabs who have on this occasion attacked our steamer. These people mostly reside in the marshes, and experience has proved that the Turkish soldiers are no match for them among swamps and reeds. I do not think that any civilized Government would attempt to attack them in their swamps with regular troops. I think, however, that the tribe can easily be reduced to reason by other methods, and were I called upon to undertake the task I should act somewhat on the following lines:—

(1.) The first and most important need of all is for an honest Vali of Bussorah and an honest Mutessarif at Amarah, with military commanders who try to carry out their policy. I think it is universally admitted that the Arabs are not naturally very turbulent people, but that they are goaded into turbulence by dishonest officials. I have recently spent ten days in the company of Mr. Van Ess, an American Missionary, who has lived among the Arabs of the Bussorah Vilayet, and is obviously respected by them. He is a reasonable man who takes a practical view of affairs, and he tells me that Seyhud once told him that he would pay his revenue if he could thereby obtain peace, but that he did not know to whom to pay it; because the officials did not really want the revenue for the Government, but they wanted bribes for themselves; whether he paid his revenue or not made no difference as each official would still give him the utmost amount of trouble in order to make him pay more bribes. As long as this kind of thing is permitted it is, of course, impossible to expect the Arabs to settle down.

(2.) There are already two gun-boats, one the "Baghdadi" running between Gurna and Kila Saleh, and the other the "Alus" running between Kila Saleh and Ali Gharbi. These can escort steamers, which should also be provided with soldiers until things are more quiet. These boats, which are of no real naval strength, should ordinarily only be used for defensive purposes.

(3.) One of the new flat steamers, the "Baghdad" or the "Basrah" might be used for offensive purposes. I believe that it is impossible to follow the Arabs into the marshes with any hope of success, but fortunately it is not necessary to get near the Arabs to inflict severe injury on them. Their rice and other cultivation is dependent upon the river water, which they obtain by means of a few large canals and a great number of small canals. The "Baghdad" or "Basrah" could easily carry three or four field guns and some 800 men. The guns could be used to knock down any forts along the river that the Arabs attempted to hold, and those which they did not try to hold could easily be demolished by the soldiers. The soldiers could also fill up, say for half a mile, all the smaller canals, and forts could be erected at the mouths of the few large canals. I imagine that these measures, coupled with a threat to close the big canals as soon as the river falls, would be sufficient to bring the Arabs to reason.

(4.) A proclamation might be made that, until the inhabitants of a certain tract submitted and gave satisfactory security for their good behaviour, at any rate towards river traffic, no human being not in the Government service, or animal, would be allowed within rifle-shot of the river bank in that tract. Whether any one seen was or was not breaking this rule could easily be tested by the soldiers passing up and down the river.

5. The measures which I have suggested above would not require the use of large bodies of troops, and I cannot believe that they would fail to be effective if they were coupled with decently honest administration. Friendly Arabs could also be used to harass the recalcitrant, and they would be in a good position to do so if they could be certain of support from the river at a given time and place.

I dealt so fully last year on the danger of allowing attacks on our steamers to pass unnoticed that I need not trouble your Excellency with any historical account of previous attacks, or with any further remarks on the danger of allowing them to pass unnoticed.

6. On the present occasion the Bani Lam have given us no cause for complaint, and our quarrel is only with the Albu Muhammad Arabs, now said to be under Sheikh Abdul Karim, son of Sayhud.

7. I should have said that on her downward trip to Bussorah the "Khalifah" was fired on at Kunait by one or two men. It appears that the Sheikh of the Bani Lam, when he heard of this, immediately had the men tied up and beaten.

The Albu Muhammad having opened the campaign, I think that no time should be lost in taking measures to punish them, but it would be a pity to force the pace as far as the Bani Lam are concerned; for the present season is that at which the river annually rises, and consequently punitive action by means of closing large canals is not immediately possible. If, therefore, the Turks are determined to oust Ghadban from Kunait, I think they would be well advised to defer action until they can be sure of a falling river, and until Ghadban realizes, by the example of the Albu Muhammad, that the Turks can do him fatal injury without leaving the bank of the river, where he is in no position to resist the Turks supported by guns and steamers.

8. The safety of the river traffic is at all times a matter of first-class importance as far as local interests are concerned, but in the present circumstances of the Turkish Empire it seems to me that Imperial interests are injured by lawless proceedings on the river. Sir William Willcocks is of opinion that this country can be even richer than Egypt if capital is forthcoming for irrigation works, but if the capitalists think that there is no public security in the country in which their money is to be spent, the difficulty of raising loans will be increased, and additional securities for the service of the loans will be demanded.

I trust, therefore, that the Central Government will send capable and honest men to Bussorah and Amarah, and that they will see that it is in their interests to take serious and early action against the Albu Muhammad.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[17445]

No. 79.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 8.*)

(No. 2/308.)

Sir, *Bagdad, March 29, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 1/291, dated the 26th March, 1909, regarding the recent attack on the British steamer "Khalifah" by Arabs on the lower Tigris, I have the honour to submit for your information a copy of a further despatch No. 30/307 of to-day's date, which I have addressed to His Brittannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 79.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30/307.)

Sir, *Bagdad, March 29, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 29/290 which was written on board the "Khalifah," I have the honour to report that since my arrival in Bagdad I have seen the Commandant of the VIth Army Corps and made a number of suggestions which his Excellency apparently accepted, as he has proposed carrying them out. I inclose for your Excellency's information a translation of letter No. 11 dated the 27th March, 1909, from the Vali of Bagdad and a copy of my reply.

2. I think that the arrangements made are the best possible in the circumstances, but they are only of a defensive nature, and I cannot too strongly urge the need for teaching the river Arabs that it is not profitable for them to live on steamers.

3. I should perhaps have explained in my former letter that one of the objects to be gained by keeping the Arabs away from the river is to reduce the chance of their being able to make physical obstructions to river traffic, by sinking sailing vessels, or by making floating obstructions.

4. The "Khalifah" was attacked by only a small number of apparently irresponsible Arabs, but Mr. Consul Crow telegraphs that the Turkish steamer "Baghdad" had three killed and seven wounded, and that she also had 560 bullets in her hull; this shows that the Arabs are capable of attacking in very formidable numbers. The "Baghdad" is a fast vessel and she was going down stream. As long as steamers can keep moving they will probably be able to get through, but if a steamer should run ashore or have any accident to her machinery or steering gear, it would probably entail a very terrible disaster.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 79.

Vali of Bagdad to Consul-General Ramsay.

(Translation.) *March 27, 1909.*

THE Commander of the VIth Army Corps says in writing that, to protect the navigation and to maintain the security of the river the following measures will be used:

1. The military strength at Amarah is being increased.

2. The "Alus" will be supplied with guns and a detachment of soldiers and will run between Amarah and Kurna.

3. The old "Baghdadi," furnished with gun and a detachment of soldiers, will run between Amarah and Ali Gharbi.

4. The new big "Baghdad" will continually be used to carry soldiers.

5. As a precaution the steamers which will leave Bagdad will be escorted by a detachment and superfluous ammunition will be put.

But it is difficult to supply all the steamers which will start on different days with necessary escort for protection, therefore he (the Commander) wishes you to ask Messrs. Lynch to decide with the Hamidiyeh Company to send steamers once or twice a week together or separately and to inform him of the result.

He also suggests that the steamers of Messrs. Lynch which will leave Bagdad may start with the "Busrah" of the Hamidiyeh Company on Monday next.

He says that he has already informed the Hamidiyeh Administration.

Inclosure 3 in No. 79.

Consul-General Ramsay to Vali of Bagdad

Bagdad, March 28, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter No. 11 dated the 27th March, 1909, explaining the proposals of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief of the VIth Army Corps for the protection of river traffic.

2. I am sorry that I have not been able to arrange to get Messrs. Lynch's steamer off on Monday, but she will be ready to start at daybreak on Tuesday morning. I have discussed this matter with Messrs. Lynch and Co. and after examining a table of distances relating to the river and considering the speed of the "Alus" and the old "Baghdadi," we have come to the conclusion that it would be difficult to arrange for more than one convoy up stream and one down stream each week.

I therefore suggest that orders should be issued to have the escort in readiness for the down stream journey at Ali Gharbi at 4 A.M. every Thursday, and for the up-stream journey at Gurna at 4 A.M. every Sunday. I will arrange that the British steamers which wish to ply on the river during the continuance of the present disturbances shall be ready to start from Ali Gharbi and Gurna at the times mentioned. I trust that the Hamidiyeh Steam-ship Administration will find these arrangements suitable. I understand that in the present condition of the market the merchants are in no great hurry to receive their goods from Bussorah, and one convoy a week will I think meet all requirements.

3. I shall be obliged if your Excellency will let me know whether the times I have suggested meet with the approval of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and I shall also be obliged if your Excellency will convey to Muhammad Pasha my thanks for his communication and for the arrangements he is making.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY.

[17453] No. 80.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

Treasury Chambers, May 7, 1909.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of Sir F. Campbell's letter of the 1st instant, inclosing copy of a letter from the India Office further on the subject of the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Koweit.

Their Lordships direct me to state, for the information of Sir E. Grey, that they think Lord Morley may be under some misapprehension as to the intention and effect of their letter of the 8th ultimo, which was written, of course, on the assumption that the foreshore lease and rent will, so far as can be foreseen, continue for a period sufficient to provide for complete repayment of the loan by way of deduction, if necessary, together with any interest on overdue instalments if the Indian Government should ultimately decide to charge such interest. Their Lordships agreed to a continuance of the payment of the Imperial share of 2,000*l.* a-year during any period for which the whole rent might necessarily be withheld, and this secures the Indian Government against loss (if any loss is possible) to the full extent of the Imperial share

of the joint security. Further, under the last paragraph of the Treasury letter it was left open to the Indian Government to arrange, on the same security, for payment of interest, if they should decide to do so, although it appeared from the correspondence that the balances from which the loan would be advanced were not interest-bearing.

The form in which their Lordships assented to take a part in the arrangement appeared to them to be the most natural and convenient in view of the existing system of adjustment between the two Exchequers, and they hope that, on reconsideration, Lord Morley will see his way to accept it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MURRAY.

[17603] No. 81.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 312.)
Sir,

Pera, April 30, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 293 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, reporting the measures taken by the local authorities against the Druzes concerned in the attack on Bosra.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)
Sir,

Damascus, April 17, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 20 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that after the 1st and 4th battalions of infantry of the 40th Regiment went from this city to Bosra another battalion was summoned there from different stations on the Hejaz Railway, and a threatening attitude was taken by the Government towards the Druzes, who at once solicited for peace, and promised to comply with the Government demands and make restitution for things robbed at Bosra to the amount of about 4,000*l.* A few days ago the Government sent Emir Ali Pasha, son of the Algerian Abdul-Kader, to the Hauran to promote peaceful settlement, and it is hoped that matters will conclude without further bloodshed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[17609] No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 318.)
Sir,

Pera, May 5, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 268 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at Hodeidah reporting on the progress of the Turkish punitive operations against the Zereneek tribe in the vicinity of Hodeidah. You will observe that Mr. Richardson reports that the Sheikhs are now surrending, and that a settlement is probable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, April* 15, 1909.

SINCE posting my despatch No. 9 of the 10th ultimo to your Excellency, there has not been much to report with reference to the punitive operations proceeding against the Zereneek tribe.

Major Riza Bey, who had occupied a strong position at Husseinia for some six weeks previously, proceeded on the 27th ultimo to a place called Malahah in the vicinity, his object being to join hands with Yussuf Pasha's force in the south at Beit-el-Fakih. He engaged the tribesmen *en route*, who offered a very stubborn resistance and harassed his advance, and who were put to flight eventually, but only after they had suffered severely. It is reported that Riza Bey also suffered greatly in this engagement.

The Turkish gun-boat "Tash Kubri" disembarked here on the 31st ultimo about fifty of Riza Bey's wounded in the last action referred to, that were taken on board of her at Faza.

At the close of last month, the two principal Syyeds in the Tehama, viz., Syyed Abdul Barri, of Marawar, and Syyed Ahmed Bahr, of Monsooria, complained to the vilayet about the useless and wicked bloodshed going on in the Zereneek territory, where, they pointed out, the Sheikhs and tribesmen were prepared to surrender and assert their allegiance to the Ottoman Government.

Instructions were then sent to Syyed Ahmed Pasha Es-Sherai, the Mayor of this town, who possesses great influence with the Zereneek tribesmen and other Arabs in the neighbourhood of Hodeidah, to proceed to Beit-el-Fakih and lend his good offices in the matter of arranging a settlement with the rebel tribesmen now laying down their submission. The above-mentioned Notable set out on the evening of the 31st for Beit-el-Fakih.

The force under Riza Bey, after encountering some further opposition in its advance, joined the main army under Yussuf Pasha at Beit-el-Fakih on or about the 31st March, after setting fire to several villages *en route*.

According to reports to hand that reached this on the 2nd instant, and which have been since confirmed, it would appear that Yussuf Pasha and Riza Bey marched against the villages of Battalia, Alussi, and Kokar with their combined forces and punished the Arab inhabitants that had been in the habit of sniping the troops at Beit-el-Fakih. The above three villages, I am informed, were destroyed by fire before departure of the Turkish troops.

Several notorious Arab warriors were found amongst the dead after the last sortie.

The main force then continued its march to Monsooria, as the commissariat at its base at Beit-el-Fakih was now exhausted, and communication cut between it and Hodeidah, owing to the hostile attitude of the intervening country.

Supplies, however, have since been pushed from here to Monsooria during the first week or ten days of the current month, enabling Yussuf Pasha to return to his head-quarters with 150 camels of provisions.

On the 11th instant the Headmen of the El-Kahassi clan, an important subsection of the Zereneek tribe, entered Beit-el-Fakih and sued for peace.

It would now appear from reports received by the authorities here that nearly all the Zereneek Sheikhs, with few exceptions, have since arrived at Yussuf Pasha's camp to tender their submission.

Syyed Ahmed Pasha Es-Sherai is also reported to have arrived at Beit-el-Fakih, where the question of the surrender of the tribesmen is under consideration.

It is expected that the punitive operations will shortly cease.

Supplies are being now dispatched to Beit-el-Fakih and Zebeed, with which places communication has once more been restored.

A trade caravan of seventy camels bringing dyed stuffs from Zebeed reached this safely yesterday, the first to arrive for several months.

The Mutessarif of Hodeidah, who has been absent at Beit-el-Fakih during the past two months, is expected to return in a fortnight, his presence there any longer being considered undesirable by the military element.

Kaimakam Kadri Bey from Sanaa has been appointed to the Beit-el-Fakih Kaza, and leaves this evening to assume charge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON.

[17612]

No. 83.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 321.)

Sir, *Pera, May* 4, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 304 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two despatches, with their inclosures, which have now reached me from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mersina giving a full account of the massacres at Adana.

You will observe that the outbreak was entirely unexpected, just as was the outbreak in Constantinople of the 13th ultimo. The simultaneity of the two events is at least a remarkable coincidence. While the cause of the massacre is still obscure, it is certain that it commenced with the killing of two Turks by an Armenian, but whether these murders were or were not justified is a matter of doubt. They are said to have been provoked by the Turks having carried off the Armenian's wife. It is probable that the Hunajuk Society did much to stir up the Armenians and to alarm the Turks, as may be verified by a reference to the Reports on these revolutionary bodies which I have had the honour to forward to you from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van; also the ancient unquestioned dominance of the Turk has been shaken—at all events in appearance—by the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity about which there has been so much talk since the introduction of the Constitution.

It seems certain that the Armenian Bishop is also responsible to a large extent for inflaming the passions of his people and the fears of the Turks, for Major Doughty Wylie recognized it to such an extent as to prevent his landing at Mersina on his return to his diocese, in the interests of order. It is to be noticed that Major Doughty Wylie states that there is a unanimous distrust, and even hatred, amongst all classes of Turks against the Armenians, whom they believe prepared to break out into armed rebellion, and whom they think they must absolutely repress even though they deplore massacre.

On the other hand, he points out that the massacre began in very distant places at the same date and nearly at the same hour, so that the local provocation given at Adana could not be the real cause, and there is strong presumption that the outbreak was organized and premeditated.

But, once the outbreak had taken place, a heavy responsibility falls on the local authorities. The civil and military Governors both showed an entire absence of resolution and courage, and such measures as were taken to put an end to the carnage appear to be due in a very great measure to the initiative of Major Doughty Wylie, who, with the greatest bravery and with a remarkable exercise of his influence, put himself at the head of a body of troops and rode about the town (even when he had been seriously wounded), causing the bloodshed to cease—at all events, temporarily—wherever he appeared.

It would be difficult to commend his conduct too warmly, and amongst others who especially distinguished themselves by their efforts in the cause of humanity I venture to call your attention to the names of Mr. Nevil Chambers, Mr. Lawson Chambers (Canadians), and Mr. Trowbridge (an American citizen). I have been specially thanked (among others) by the Director of the Tobacco Régie for the valuable services rendered by Major Doughty Wylie to the buildings and the personnel of the Company, and by the American Ambassador for the measures he took on behalf of the missionaries and their establishments.

I have received urgent appeals both from Major Doughty Wylie and also from the Captain of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" for subscriptions on behalf of the sufferers, as I have had the honour to inform you in my telegrams No. 103 of the 24th ultimo and No. 180 of the 3rd instant.

The number of people whom it is necessary to relieve amount to-day to 22,000.

The Government is sending a sum of money—apparently £T. 30,000—to assist, and the Armenians of the capital are raising funds, to which the Sultan Mehmed V is said to be subscribing.

The district has been placed under martial law, and a special Military Tribunal has been dispatched from here to make a full inquiry into the whole matter and to punish the guilty parties. It is earnestly to be hoped that the result of this inquiry will be in marked contradistinction with the inquiries made in the Sassoun massacres and those of 1895 and 1896, and that real punishment will be inflicted upon the true authors of the outrages. Should this not be the case, the new constitutional régime will prove

itself no more just or enlightened than the detested rule of Abdul Hamid, whose fall is still at this moment being so loudly acclaimed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, April* 21, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following statement of the course of events in Adana:—

On Wednesday morning, the 14th April, I received a letter from Mr. Trypani, the British dragoman at Adana saying that there was a very dangerous feeling in that town, threats had been freely offered, there were some murders, and that the shops were all shut.

I went to Adana by the next train, arriving about 5 P.M. So little had I expected that any massacre was imminent, that I took my wife with me.

From the train, about two stations from Adana we saw a dead body, and a little further on several refugees running towards the train. All the people from the second class carriage got into the first, saying that there were men in the train to kill them. On going through the second class carriage with my cavass, I saw two armed Turks threatening the refugees running by the train. When they saw me they put away their pistols and were quiet.

The nearer we got to Adana the more bodies there were, and while I was escorting my wife to Mr. Trypani's house which is near the station, two or three men were killed under the very noses of the Turkish guard, which has a little guard-house about midway between Mr. Trypani's house and the station.

I got into uniform, went to the guard, and sharply recalled to the officer his duty to prevent murder. I took four soldiers as escort, and Mr. Edwards, Inspector of the Ottoman Bank, who asked protection, and walked through the town to the konak, about 1½ miles. I saw several men killed on the way, and the town was full of a howling mob looting the shops. There was firing in all directions.

On arrival at the konak I found all in disorder. The Vali and Ferik were both in the telegraph office in a state of panic. I demanded more soldiers to go to the American Mission, and other places where there were British subjects. They give me a few, very unwillingly, as they said they would take no responsibility for my life. They could not, or would not, give an officer, and there was no time to argue.

I afterwards found out from American and English witnesses, Mr. Gibbons of Tarsus and Mr. Lawson Chambers, that some little time before I got there two men had been killed in that very office, practically before the Vali's eyes—there was a grating between him and them—who was too frightened to protect them or punish the murderers.

I went in the dark to the American Mission, which is in the Armenian quarter. Around this place there was much firing. Finding all safe there, I left guards at the two schools. Days afterwards I found out that one of these guards did fairly well, but the other melted away.

I took Mr. Edwards to the Ottoman Bank, where I left more soldiers. I then made a search for Mr. Cokinakis and his wife—British subjects—at the other side of the town, and found them at last in a farm about 1 mile from their factory, where they had taken refuge. The owner, an Arab called Biblan Oglu, who was their friend, swore to me that he could and would be answerable for them.

I had then only four soldiers, and did not dare to take them through the mob in the town to Mr. Trypani's house, which was at least 2 miles away. However, two days after this I sent them an armed escort and brought them in, as their position had become untenable.

I then back to the konak, and found the Vali and Ferik had done absolutely nothing. I warned them that I should come again in the morning, and require fifty men and a senior officer and a horse to ride round the town. I was then searching for an American and an Englishman, who were missing from the Mission. I found they had been safe in the konak for several hours, and had been eye-witnesses of the murders referred to. They were also witnesses of the beginning of the outbreak, when the

Ferik went out with the troops. At the first shot he had turned back to the konak, and taken the troops with him.

I then paid another visit to the American Mission, and returned through the city to Mr Trypani's house.

The city all this time was in indescribable tumult, with heavy fighting going on in the approaches to the Armenian quarter, and murder and fires everywhere.

I had not force enough to do much to stop it.

My four soldiers, who had been murdering men on my arrival, followed me faithfully through it all. My cavass, Bedir, was also with me.

Next morning I went again to the konak, seeing on the way some soldiers joining in the murders. After some difficulty I obtained some fifty men from the konak (where, I think, there were about 500 soldiers) and the Commandant of gendarmerie (Alia Bey) to come with me. No superior officer to him would leave the konak. We paraded through the town with bugles blowing; the Ferik had lent me a horse and I had three or four mounted men.

Wherever we went the firing ceased. We cleared the streets sometimes by charging with the bayonet and sometimes by firing over the heads of the crowd.

We went through the Armenian quarter. Both sides ceased firing when they recognized me, with the exception of a few stray shots. I visited the Armenian an French schools.

I had it cried everywhere that every one was to go into his house, as I should fire down the streets. The city is a large one, and it is difficult to quiet many of its alleys and by-ways at once.

After I passed, apparently fighting was freely resumed.

I went back to the station and drove back a big crowd of villagers who were flocking into the town to loot and murder.

After I returned from there towards the Armenian quarter, a mile or so away, some of these villagers and guards murdered Armenians within sight of Mr. Trypani's house. The officer of the guard, on being called to by my wife, saved some women, all badly wounded.

When I arrived at the Armenian quarter I found that two American missionaries were killed. They had been gallantly working for an hour to put out a fire which was threatening their school, and were killed at the closest range by five Turks who had previously promised to let them alone. The third missionary, Mr. Trowbridge, who was with them, managed to escape.

They told me in the school that the bodies were lying in the street and that nobody could approach. My party carried them in; they were both breathing. While carrying them in fire was opened on us from a minaret within easy range. We went to clear it, but everybody ran away. Before this second visit to the Armenian quarter I changed my infantry at the konak, but the Alia Bey, a Captain of gendarmerie, and the mounted men remained with me all day. We also visited the quarter and dispersed threatening crowds. The big bazaar was blazing, and Turks and Armenians were carrying on a house-to-house fighting, which it was extremely difficult, and in some places impossible, to stop. In one place I left a guard to keep clear the road where the battle had been raging, and no sooner was I gone than it seems my own guard joined in the attack on the nearest Armenian house and killed everybody in it. Late in the afternoon I received an appeal for help from the Régie tobacco factory, inhabited by Mr. Abbott, a British subject. I went down there with the troops and gave him a guard.

While there, they told me that certain wounded Turkish soldiers were lying in some houses among some burning ruins not far away. We went to look for them, and while searching a tiny garden, where were eight or ten bodies of Turks and Armenians —men and women—an Armenian, from behind a window, fired at me from very short range, and broke my arm.

He was probably deceived by my military uniform into thinking that I was a Turkish officer, or else too wild with terror or despair to know what he was doing.

I should like to bring to your Excellency's notice the conduct of Mr. Lawson Chambers, who rode with me as my interpreter throughout this day. He speaks Armenian, and was very valuable to me. He is a nephew of Mr. Nesbit Chambers, a Canadian British subject, head of the American Mission in this town.

I had taken him with me in the morning from the konak, where he had passed the night for security.

Being afraid that this unfortunate accident would be the signal for a general storm on the Armenian quarter, I sent the Alia Bey to the Vali and Ferik to say that

even now, if they would stop the massacre, no indemnity or punishment would be demanded by me, but that otherwise I had already telegraphed for a ship in the morning, and the responsibility lay with them. I told them that they should surround the Armenian quarter with regular troops and good officers, and should allow nobody in and out, that at the same time they should patrol the streets of the rest of the town, driving people into their houses, and shooting freely if necessary.

This incident was the more unfortunate and inconvenient to me, as I could not write.

As regards the troops, the soldiers of my escort in the konak and in some of the guards were nizamieh, and behaved with some exceptions fairly well wherever there were officers, especially when we began to get the matter in hand a little. The Ferik had rallied up the reserves, who were armed from the barracks and turned loose without uniform into the streets. They came from outside villages and Tarsus, and did an infinite amount of harm. There were a few exceptions even amongst them. The Hojas were divided. I found one trying to calm the crowd, others took a rifle and fought themselves.

On Friday, the 16th, I had sent Lawson Chambers to the konak overnight, and he told me that the Vali and Ferik had promised all that I wished, but that he (Chambers) could get no officers to go with him to the Armenian quarter.

The day was spent in continual telegrams and messages. I was trying to save Germans at Bagshe, and Englishman at Osmanieh, and Americans at Hadjin. The streets were nearly as the day before. The refugees began coming in here escorted by soldiers. The Germans from the German cotton factory in Adana had taken refuge in Mr. Trypani's house, having been ordered to leave their factory by soldiers, who said they would kill the 500 Armenians left behind. I think these soldiers were redifs. I ordered the Yuz-Bashi of the guard near the station, which had become my guard, to go with the soldiers and save these Armenians' lives. With the exception of three men, he brought them all into the house of Mr. Trypani.

The men, I think, would have been murdered, but that I heard the firing and sent over to stop it. It is quite close to Mr. Trypani's.

Towards evening the Vali sent me news that peace had been made, and the Hojas and Armenian priests had kissed each other in the konak.

During the day fighting had been going on in places around the Armenian quarter, and Bashi-Bazouks had been firing house.

Mr. Chambers (senior) had a man killed actually in his arms, but with singular courage, and still covered with blood, managed to make his way, with some peace-makers, to the konak. From this visit resulted the peace which was announced to me by the Vali.

Mr. Trowbridge, an American missionary, made perhaps a still more dangerous journey to the konak on this day, which was the worst in the Armenian quarter, as detailed in reports which I inclose.

From Friday morning the murdering was done by Bashi-Bazouks alone. Except in isolated cases, so far as I know, I believe the Turkish soldiers made some effort to stop it.

On Friday, at 10 A.M., 400 Tarsus redifs seized a train, threatening the station-master, a British subject, with death if he did not give it. They left to massacre and burn Tarsus. I sent Mr. Chambers (junior) and Mr. Gibbons, under escort, to demand troops to send to Tarsus to protect the American and French schools, but none were given on that day. That night 100 nizamieh arrived from Beirout, and the next morning I got twenty-five troops and a good officer, and sent them with Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Christie (whose son-in-law had been killed on Thursday) by special train to Tarsus. The train was refused to me by order of the Director at Mersina, but I told the station-master I would take it by force if necessary, and would afterwards get for him the necessary order for it, which had to be signed by the Vali. He, the station-master, gave way, and for this action the next morning was censured and another man sent up to supervise him, because he had given the train contrary to the Director's orders.

I think this is a very hard case, and I recommend it to your Excellency's notice. Mr. Falanga, the station-master, throughout this crisis has done all he could to help, but his Regulations are against him. His station was surrounded with corpses, and he was often in imminent danger himself. The train in question may, I think, be said to have saved Tarsus school.

While I am on the subject of the railway I should like to state that it refuses to transmit telegrams for me. Their telegraph office is close to Mr. Trypani's house, while

the way to the other lies right through the heart of the town and is over a mile long. Also when it became an urgent necessity to send down messengers and refugees they refused trains. Military defence of the trains was never at all difficult.

Next morning, Saturday, the 17th, a deputation of Hojas and Notables came to me. They said that peace was made. I also saw the Messrs. Chambers, who told me the same thing.

I sent a message to the Vali that he was to telegraph the severest orders to outlying districts to stop the massacre.

Turkish officers came to me for orders, and I said that the streets were to be kept clear, fires put out, plunderers and anybody with arms in their hands to be shot. Anybody committing a murder to be killed by the troops without distinction of race or religion. These orders were accepted by the Hojas as being fair and just, but in spite of them there were a good many murders committed that day, and killing and pillaging in the villages went on as before.

I think it was on this day that your Excellency's telegram reached me stating that a British ship had sailed for Mersina.

I cannot give any detailed account of the days that followed. They were occupied from morning till night in bringing in refugees, telegraphing, and messages to and from the konak. Also with endless visits from people of all nationalities in urgent need of assistance in different directions.

There being no other Consul at Adana I did what I could to help the dragomans and nationals of all the Powers.

On Tuesday night, the 20th April, I got the telegram that the "Swiftsure" would arrive the next day, which news I promptly circulated, and which had a great effect in restoring confidence. Threats of renewed massacres were made at various and all hours, but gradually we began to persuade the people to return to their homes.

Mr. Trypani's house had 600 people in it, while there were thousands in the factories and in the American and French Missions. Many were wounded and the food question became acute. My wife opened a hospital the day after I was wounded, and with several excellent English volunteers has been very busy ever since. Mr. Chambers and I organized the beginning of relief work, and subscriptions were started. I am making great efforts to get the factories and flour mills working, but the people are too panic-stricken to do much yet. The dead had to be sorted and buried, and the wounded brought in. In all this, Mr. Lawson Chambers and other English and Americans were my untiring helpers.

Parties of troops have been sent to various places, such as Hamidieh, Osmanieh, Bagshe, Hadjin, and many villages, to try to save life.

The Hojas of the town have made a practice of visiting me in a body, with the exception of to-day, the 22nd April, and we have tried to arrange the restoring of women and girls abducted, and the general pacifying of the country.

The Armenian Bishop of Adana (Grogorian) was announced to be returning on the 21st, Wednesday, by the Khedivial steamer. Many Turks have spoken to me of this man as one of the prime causes of the trouble. On the Tuesday certain notable Armenians, through Mr. Chambers, asked me to prevent his return if possible, as they feared he would again stir up strife. I took upon myself to telegraph to my dragoman at Mersina to meet him on arrival and forbid him to land. I backed this up by telegraphing to the Mutessarif of Mersina to prevent him from coming to Adana, if he should, in spite of me, succeed in landing. He appealed to the Captain of the "Swiftsure," who backed me up.

At the Parliament of Hojas that day, when the question of the disarming of the Armenians was mentioned, some of them declared that the Armenians did not wish for peace, as they still kept their arms. I said that they did, and that I could prove it.

They had themselves asked me to prevent their own Bishop from coming, and I had done so. This produced an instantaneous effect, every Hoja jumping to his feet and coming to shake hands with me.

Causes.—It is still too early for me to have much idea of the real causes of this extraordinary massacre, which took me by surprise. I have for some time expected disturbances at Adana, but nothing on such an appalling scale.

The Turkish side of the question is that from first to last the Armenians are entirely to blame, that they armed themselves, and that certain delegates of the Hundjak Society, and preachers like the Grogorian Bishop, had openly urged the people to fight the Turks, and to set up a Principality for themselves, that the Armenians had shot two Turks in Adana, that they had fixed a certain day on which to rise and rebel against the Turks, and were all armed and prepared for it.

There is truth, I think, in what they say about the Hundjak Society, which, however, represents but a fraction of the people. It is also true that an Armenian did shoot two Turks (whether in self-defence or not is not established), and certainly there was much vain boasting and wordy provocation. But I cannot think, however, that such widespread destruction was without some secret preparation on the Turkish side.

Attitude of Turkish Authorities.—The massacre began in very distant places, on the same day and at nearly the same hour. The local provocation at Adana could not have effected this. I am inclined to think that some, at any rate, of the authorities know of the intended massacre beforehand. The extraordinary demoralization which I found in the konak on arrival was undoubtedly the result of the natural feebleness of the Vali, Djevad Bey. I do not understand why the Ferik, a Turkish General, has from the first displayed such pitiable cowardice. He refuses to leave his konak even now. Even the doubtful troops he held were sufficient to have scattered the howling, fanatical mob if resolutely handled in the first hour.

One of the very few officials of this province who has kept massacre from his town is the Mutessarif of Mersina.

Among the best of the Turks, both civil and religious, there exists still a unanimous distrust, and even hatred, of the Armenians. They deplore massacre, but all apparently believe in the idea of an armed Armenian revolution.

Beginning of Massacre.—Among the first Armenians who were killed was a well-known member of the municipality. He had been that morning through the bazaars, together with Turkish Notables, to persuade shopkeepers to open their shops. They had returned to the konak to report to the Vali. It is said that he was killed with these words: "I will begin with you, and may God increase the work."

This was one of the murders of which Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Chambers (junior) were eye-witnesses, committed almost in the Vali's presence, and for which no arrest or punishment has been made.

On the first evening five men were killed in the closed courtyard of the konak, where is the Vali's house. One Armenian cartdriver was shot the next morning under the Vali's window, and almost on his doorstep, by the very redifs he had brought in his cart. This courtyard contained at the time about 500 regular soldiers. took the Vali out myself, and showed him the fresh pool of this man's blood, and asked him how afterwards he hoped to clear himself of having abetted the murder. He was too frightened to answer.

Two regiments are reported to be coming from Gallipoli, and troops and cavalry from Syria, under the command, it is said, of Osman Pasha, commanding the Vth Army Corps.

Future.—It is undoubtedly necessary to make a military parade through certain districts to restore order.

I am afraid, owing to the slow processes of Turkish law, there will be little or no punishment.

The gravest question is imminent famine. It is reported to me to-night that there are in Adana city already 15,000 people in desperate need of food. The shops have been burnt and gutted.

The barley harvest begins in about ten days, but there will be great difficulty in finding the necessary labour, owing to the extermination of the Armenian workmen in nearly all the villages. It is said that there is left in Adana flour and wheat sufficient for twenty days, but the prices are already enormous, and will rise still higher. The new harvest cannot be of much use till the middle of July. Further, there are a large number of women and children whose supporters have been killed.

An enormous quantity of valuable property, much of which, I fear, will prove to be British, has been destroyed; many farms have been burnt with their agricultural implements. Many farmers and merchants will be bankrupt and unable to pay for goods obtained on credit. It is doubtful whether insurance will be held to cover such risks.

The country, which seemed so promising a field for English commercial enterprise, is ruined in credit and will take years to recover.

Disarmament.—The disarmament of the country is being taken in hand. My advice was asked by the Turks, and I have advised them not to press the house-to-press search for a few days, on account of the panic it would cause.

The Armenians sent one of the French priests to me to beg that if a search was necessary, foreigners should accompany the Turks. I declined to listen to such proposals, as they have nothing whatever to do with the foreigners.

Punishments.—I strongly urged on the Vali the hanging of murderers caught

red-handed since the peace, but without success. He has not the courage to take such a step. I propose, with your Excellency's approval, to assist as far as possible the relief-work which is now necessary, but to refrain from giving advice on subjects not connected with British interests. What I have done in this direction has been forced upon me by the entire absence of any respected authority and the risk of renewed massacre.

Osman Pasha's arrival or a change of Valis should put this right.

Casualties.—In Adana city there seem to have been about 2,000 corpses buried. Besides this there were a large number thrown in the river. A considerable fraction of these 2,000, about 600, were Moslems killed in the street-fighting in the Armenian quarter.

In the villages, while no exact number can yet be given, the loss has been enormous. It may be estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000; of these, very few, if any, can be Moslems.

In many cases women, and even small children, were killed with the men.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY WYLIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, April 24, 1909.*

Wednesday, April 21.—I have the honour to report in continuation of my last despatch that Captain C. F. Thursby, of the "Swiftsure," accepted my proposal to announce that the Consular Body was held in readiness to land if required, and only to assist Ottoman authorities. I accordingly wrote to the Vali stating that as he had asked me not to land a guard, and as we were extremely unwilling to do anything which could be thought to hinder instead of help the return of tranquillity, and as I had every confidence in the Ottoman soldiers whom he had placed at my disposal, I would ask that the guard be not sent to Adana; but that the right to disembark for Consular protection was reserved in case of necessity.

I suggested to Captain Thursby, by means of Commander Carver that an official visit from the Captain (if he were so disposed) to the Vali would have a calming effect on the town. Captain Thursby much improved on this by asking the Captains of the French and German ships to accompany him, and to make a formal visit together.

On this day we fed 1,100 people.

Great anxiety was felt about Hadjin. Letters were sent by zaptiehs urging on the Vali to send Mr. L. Chambers (junior) to make peace. The Vali, saying he would be killed, declined to take the responsibility.

Also this day I received answers to my telegrams from Konia, Caesarea, Marash, Aintab, and Ourfa, saying that all was quiet.

Thursday, April 22.—The German Engineers, and Mr. Gunter (Englishman), of the Indian Telegraph Department, were brought in by an escort sent out at my request from Bagshe and Osmanieh. I inclose an interesting Report from Mr. Gunter.* Surgeon Connell of H.M.S. "Swiftsure" arrived.

News from Hadjin was still very grave.

Thursday, April 23.—Captain Thursby, with the Captains of the French and German ships, together with French and American Consuls, arrived to pay official visits. The programme was arranged as follows:—

Visits to the Vali, Ferik, American Mission (Mr. Chambers' house), the Jesuit Fathers, the French Nuns, and the German factory, where M. Stoeckel is very kind and extremely useful in feeding refugees in concert with us. Two other visits, to the French dragoman's house and the Armenian Catholic Bishop were suggested by the French dragoman. I felt bound to oppose both, unless the French Captain and Consul particularly wished for them, as a joint official visit to the Armenians would certainly have been misunderstood; and if the Captains visited one dragoman they would have been expected to visit all, for which there was no time.

The question of the landing of Consular Guards was raised. I submitted to the

* Not printed.

meeting the copy of my letter (referred to) to the Vali, and it was pronounced to be entirely in accord with their instructions.

I could not go with them on their round, but was present when the Vali and Ferik paid their return visit at Mr. Trypani's house. Various questions were mentioned, the most urgent, that of the protection of Hadjin, being raised by Captain Thursby and myself. I offered again to send an Englishmen with a Turkish escort to make peace; it is very difficult for Turks to approach Hadjin, as they are apt to be taken for enemies and fired upon. My proposal was for the Englishman to leave his escort outside the danger zone and, going in alone, to tell the Armenians to surrender, under guarantee of safety. There are in Hadjin English, American, and I think, German ladies, but no foreign men. Their lives would be in the utmost danger in the event of the storming or burning of the town.

Captain Thursby backed up this idea, but the Vali was much against it; he said that it was too great a danger, and that the fact of sending an Englishman would be misunderstood by certain Turks, already fearful of foreign interference.

Hadjin is four days distant from here.

At the time of the meeting I had not had the news which I have had since, that a Canadian lady was among the missionaries, but I have assumed during this crisis the protection of Americans and other foreigners, as there was nobody else to do it. Captain Thursby told the Vali that we would speak and act for our American friends as we would for ourselves, until such time as their own ships arrived. The American Consul was present; he is a native of Tarsus, and had only arrived at Adana that morning by train. He cordially agreed in all that we said.

On the Vali's persistant refusal, a joint Turkish and Armenian deputation was suggested by me as an alternative. This was accepted. It was ordered to start at once, but in the end no Armenian could be found to go.

After the Vali had gone Captain Thursby told me that he would try and arrange what I wished about regular railway communication, and the use of the railway wire to communicate with the ships. The ordinary telegraph is a mile and a-half away through the middle of the town. The use of this wire might become of first importance, if other communication became dangerous, or was cut, as is now the case with the wire to Constantinople.

Mr. Eason returned to his ship, his place being taken by Second Writer Trussler.

I sent to Hadjin a long telegram addressed to Miss Lambert, an American, telling her of the collective meeting with the Vali, and what had resulted from it.

I advised her, in the name of us all, to assemble the Armenian leaders, and urge them to surrender to the officer commanding the regular troops, who would defend them against Bashi-Bozouks.

Saturday, April 24.—The Russian and Greek Consuls arrived from Mersina. (The Russian Consul is acting also for the Italians.) The Greek Consul asked me if I had official news that the English ships would, in case of necessity, protect Hellenic subjects. He had also asked Captain Thursby this, who replied that he had no instructions, but that, in case of necessity he would so protect them. I answered in the same sense as Captain Thursby had done.

I received a long telegram from Miss Lambert at Hadjin, saying that the Armenians there were most anxious to surrender, but that no officer or regular soldier was visible; that they were being fired upon by Bashi-Bozouks, and that part of the town was burning; assistance was imperatively necessary. The Vali had many times assured me that there are at Hadjin, sent from Fakeh, 150 to 300 regular troops, and that they had driven away the Bashi-Bozouks.

I sent Mr. Trowbridge, American missionary, to the Vali, with a copy of this telegram. While we were copying it, another, still more despairing, arrived. I wrote to the Vali, by Mr. Trowbridge, the most urgent letter I could think of, to speak in my name of the universal horror that the burning of these poor ladies would excite in all civilized men. The Vali replied by a Circular telegram to all officials, civil and military, to the Ulema and all Notables, that peace must be made, that the fire must be put out, that white flags must be hoisted and respected, and that the officer in command would be held responsible. This was a good telegram, but from his assurances three days ago he sent a similar one, which it seems had no effect. Later the Vali wrote to me that he had better news from Hadjin, that the fire was only on the outside of the town and was being got under. Hadjin, which I have never seen, is said to be built of wood.

Dr. Christie, of Tarsus, paid me a visit. He has 4,000 refugees in his school ground. There is not room for them all to lie down at once, so the men stand all night, and the women all day. I presume they dare not yet return to their homes, which, have, for the most part, been burnt.

Fortunately, there were only approximately fifty Armenians killed in Tarsus. This, I think, is partly owing to energetic orders from the Mutessarif of Mersina, and perhaps more, to the timely arrival of the guard from here.

The following are the present figures of the relief work, copied from lists made out by the heads of communities: 14,450 people without means of subsistence.

We are at present giving absolutely starvation rations of about one-third of a pound of bread per day. This must, I think, be doubled to enable the people to live, but it costs at present 83*l.* a-day. When we can get the factories to reopen some of this will be lightened, but the harvest, good as it is, will suffer enormously from lack of hands to gather it.

Besides the 83*l.* spent in flour alone, there are necessary expenses for transport of food, rice, soup, and milk for the wounded and children, and hospital expenses, there being several hundred patients already.

I telegraphed to your Excellency a rough proposal for the Committee of Relief, with Mr. Chambers (senior) as President. Since that time Mr. Chambers has pointed out to me that there is no one here except myself who can even hope to co-ordinate the various religions and nationalities into one general scheme. I have therefore telegraphed to your Excellency, proposing myself as President and Mr. Chambers as Secretary.

If you approve, I will approach the Vali, and try to secure the sympathy and help of the Government. Further, I hope to persuade a leading Hoja, a friend of mine, to serve on the Committee.

The country, generally, cannot be said to be safe or quiet. There are still murders and threatenings of renewed massacres. Fighting still goes on at other places besides Hadjin. The Christian population is altogether panic-stricken, both Armenian and Greek.

Reports.—I have the honour to inclose the following Reports:—

Mr. Chambers (senior) to Dr. Barton.
Mr. Trowbridge to Mr. Peet.
Mr. Trowbridge to Mr. Peet, second Report.
Mr. Trowbridge to Mr. Peet, third Report.
Miss Webb, Principal, Girls' High School.

These Reports were personal presents to me. I send them, thinking they may be of interest to your Excellency, but hope that they may be returned to me when convenient to you.[1]

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY WYLIE.

[17775] No. 84.

Sir G. Lanther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 324.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 4, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation from the Turkish press of the debate which took place in the Chamber of Deputies on the subject of the massacres at Adana.

It commenced with the reading of a despatch from the Vali, which gives a very partial and inexact account of the matter, stating, amongst other inaccuracies, that he and the Military Commandant worked day and night to restore order. His conduct and his despatch were roughly handled by both Christian and Moslem Deputies, one member alone defending him. It was stated that the orders sent from the Ministry of the Interior were similar to those sent with such disastrous results during the 1895-6 massacres—"Restore order"; and accordingly the Vice-Minister of the Interior, Adil Bey, who was responsible for the message, was summoned to attend the Chamber. In explaining the action taken by the Government he treated the whole matter very lightly, as being one of small importance, and provoked a considerable amount of indignation amongst his hearers. The task of criticising his explanations fell to Zohrab Effendi, who is the most distinguished of the Armenian Deputies, and who pointed out the criminal carelessness of the authorities in not taking early and effective steps for checking the disorders.

As a result of the debate it was decided that a court-martial should be sent to

[1] Not printed.

Adana as soon as possible, and that the sum of £T. 20,000 which had been voted for relief should only be regarded as an instalment.

There was a general tendency to regard the massacres as an outcome of the old régime, if not actually connected immediately with the reactionary movement at Constantinople and with direct Palace instigation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Summary of the Debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the Adana Massacres.

(Translation.)

IT was resolved to print the following despatch from Jevad Bey, Vali of Adana, and distribute it to the Naval Committee:—

"The disorders which broke out on the 1st (14th) April, at the chief town of this vilayet, between Armenians and Moslems lasted three days. The Commandant and myself worked day and night, and, in spite of the smallness of the military force and of other difficulties, order was re-established and lasted until yesterday afternoon, when reports of arms from the Armenian quarter were heard. The Moslem population became greatly excited and rushed the Government building. Soldiers were turned out and the quarter from which the reports came were put under guard, and then it was conclusively shown that the incident had been caused by some Armenian 'fedais' (*i.e.*, men ready to sacrifice their lives). At night fire broke out in two places, and although efforts to extinguish them were made, complete success was impossible, owing to the disorder and to the inadequacy of the fire appliances. Yesterday morning a few regular battalions arrived and were split up into guards. Every possible military measure was taken, order has been restored, and foreign residents' quarters, institutions, and property have been placed under protection. Disorder continues in some parts of the district and in Hajin, but the 8is battalion of Redifs was sent by forced marches to Hajin two days ago, and an Advisory Committee was dispatched, so it is expected that order will be restored there in a day or two. A battalion of regulars has been sent to Durt Yol, in the Sanjak of Jebel Bereket, to quell the disturbance there. It is clear that this force will serve to tranquillize both that district and those of Khassa and Ishdile, and strict instructions on this point have also been sent wherever necessary. In carrying out measures, great difficulties have been caused by the excitement and violence with which the regrettable affair began, by the fact that at first there was only one regular battalion of about 300 men, because the few battalions of Redifs who have been put under arms were local men without order and without uniforms (clothes). The quieting in three days of the population of 50,000 or 60,000 engaged in civil war, by such measures as instructing the soldiers to use their weapons in case of resistance from any quarter and by sending an Advisory Committee, is due to nothing but the adoption of military measures. Hence it is evident that had the military force which had been repeatedly asked for been present at the beginning of the incident quiet could have been restored yet more quickly.

"Information on the subject will be sent frequently.

"Vali of Adana,
(Signed) "JEVAD."

Dr. Arif Ismet Bey.—These regrettable events show that we have not acted up to our professions of brotherhood and equality. No attention should be paid to the explanations of the Vali, for we are only too familiar with the excuse on the score of lack of troops. The authors of this outrage must be severely punished, and I think the Chamber should take a decision to that effect. A special Committee should be sent to investigate the matter, and the instigators should be so punished that it will be a warning to others. We have no faith in the Vali's assertion that he took adequate measures.

Talaat Bey (presiding over the Chamber in the absence of Ahmed Riza).—Every Member must share the feelings of Ismet Bey.

Vartkis Effendi.—Jevad Bey's telegram is false on its own showing. If the people took refuge in churches and schools and stayed there, how is it possible that some "fedais" should appear five or six days later and fire arms? The same cursed hand

can be seen at work here and there. Had the Salonica army been unsuccessful here there might have been other massacres. The National Assembly should now decide what measures are to be taken. Martial law should be proclaimed, and commissions should be sent from the Salonica army and from Parliament. The duty of the latter would be to confiscate the goods of the instigators of the recent outrage and to compensate the sufferers, to take away the property of those who took part in plundering, and, finally, to confiscate some of the property of Abdul Hamid and give it to the people, for his was the accursed hand at work.

Talaat Bey.—Vartkis Effendi speaks of the Salonica army. The force that came here comprised the IInd and IIIrd Army Corps.

Jenany Bey.—The Vali's telegram shows him to be implicated in the matter.

The following Tahrir was read (the signatures were those of Vartakis, Dagavarian, Babikian, Ali Jenany, Hampersoun, Boyadjian, Arif Hikmet, Ihsan, and Kigham):—

"It appears that the disorder in the Adana Vilayet is breaking out again. As this is due to the fact that the instigators had not been punished, and that severe measures had not been adopted, we propose that the following steps be taken:

"1. The recent events being the result of the neglect of the Vali Jevad Bey and of the Mustechar (Under-Secretary) of the Ministry of the Interior, Adil Bey, to perform their duty, and of the actual participation of certain officials, these persons should be tried by court-martial.

"2. Places like Antioch and Zeitun in the Vilayet of Aleppo, where there had been signs of disturbance, should also be placed under martial law, and to insure the impartiality of the court-martial it should be appointed from here.

"3. To insure the safety of the Kassaba of Dourt Yol, which is now besieged and in danger, the necessary steps should be taken by telegraph.

"4. To save the unhappy sufferers from famine, and to provide them with shelter and food, the necessary sums should be granted, and the collection of funds locally being difficult, money should be sent at once from the capital.

"5. Mixed and impartial Commissions should be formed in each kasaba to restore the plundered goods to their owners, to assess the number and value of the buildings burned, to find out the number and the names of the dead, and to present a return to the Government."

Muradian Effendi.—In consequence of a telegram about the Vali of Adana, a visit was paid to the Mustechar, Adil Bey, who promised to see to the matter, but attached no importance to it. As the authorities were not punished after the first disturbance, a second broke out. The Vali appears to have acted in the same old way. He says in his telegram that he sent Redifs, but these Redifs attacked instead of defending the people. I trust that our proposals will be acted upon, since it is now seen that the Armenians are not the enemies of the nation and religion they were formerly considered. It has become evident that the statements of Valis who accuse the Armenians of evil are lies. Those who caused this disturbance at first molested foreigners, and the latter made complaints here, whereupon Adil Bey wrote: "Do not touch foreigners."

Daghavarian Effendi.—A telegram was written, saying: "Touch Armenians, but do not touch foreigners."

Vartakis Effendi.—The punishment of the prime movers in this affair being necessary, and it being clear from this painful incident that the Anatolian vilayets stand in need of reform, I propose that a Bill be discussed for the sending of a Commission of Investigation.

Ismail.—Information should be considered true until proved to be false, especially when that information is sent by the Vali of a constitutional Government to the Public Assembly, if this information is declared to be false on the evidence of letters from that place, with what object were these letters written? Until this object is understood, they cannot be taken as legal evidence. To those who deduce the Vali's guilt from his telegram, I reply that the telegram is a mere statement of events and does not incriminate the Vali. If the future proves his participation, he will naturally have to answer to the law. The matter should be considered calmly, and we should not be taken in by the speeches of Daghavarian Effendi and Vartakis Effendi. It is not true that Adil Bey said, "Touch the Armenians, but not foreigners." The Army of Freedom guarded the Embassies, which act meant that the houses of other people did not need defending. Why this talk of bringing Adil Bey to justice for such a telegram? Then Vartakis Effendi says it is impossible that any Armenian "fedais" should have been

out. Why is this impossible? His statement rests upon no argument whatever. These questions are questions of law. A Vali and a Mustechar cannot be tried merely upon a Takrir. The question of compensating sufferers from the goods of the instigators can be considered when the latter have been indicated. Nevertheless, I have no objection to the proclamation of martial law, and I agree to the proposal to send an impartial Committee from this Chamber.

Talaat Bey.—Reminds the Chamber that it can decide to have an interpellation, and suggests that Members would like that interpellation soon.

Kosmidi Effendi.—The Chamber of Deputies can do nothing but decide upon an interpellation, but, the matter being important, should sit as National Assembly. Had the decisions been adopted as extraordinary, it would have been better.

Vehby Effendi.—Since martial law has been declared, this discussion is superfluous.

Daghavarian Effendi.—According to my information men were sent two months ago to raise that disturbance which coincided with the disorders of the 31st March (13th April) in Constantinople. As it was Armenians who suffered, how is it that the order given was not to protect the people, but "protect the foreigners?"

Talaat Bey.—I do not think that a conscientious official would simply say "protect the foreigners."

Riza Tewfik Bey.—There is great danger in the diversity of races and in the ignorance, if you will pardon the word, of the people. I am sure the reactionaries have been at work there stirring up strife. In Constantinople there are many workless. What a tool for reactionaries, or for some rich party which could buy their consciences at 5 piastres apiece! We ought to apply the Military Conscription Law. I know the Armenians would be "fedais" for freedom. We cannot accuse them of wishing to separate from us or of disputing with other nationalities.

Zohrab Effendi.—(After thanking the previous speaker) I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the disturbances at Adana and Constantinople were simultaneous. While the Ottoman cause was in danger here we forebore to speak of Armenians, but now we can speak. There is not sufficient evidence to judge the matter fully. I saw the telegram from the Ministry of the Interior, of which complaint has been made, and its purport was in keeping with the traditions of the old régime. It did not say "Kill the Armenians," but "Restore order." The hon. Members know that that was the formula used under the despotic régime; formulas depend upon their interpretation, and it is certain that the phrase, "Keep order and protect the foreigners and banks in particular," would be misunderstood there. The Vali's having belonged to the Palace places a very serious construction upon the matter. Now, there are two points which call for immediate attention: In the first place order must be restored and adequate help sent—£T. 20,000 should be voted; secondly, military law should be proclaimed, but as it would be useless to appoint officials from there, officers should be sent from here to form courts-martial.

Emmer Feizi Effendi supports the two proposals.

The following Takrir from Zohrab was then read:—

"I propose that (1) £T. 20,000 should be sent to Adana and Aleppo as an earnest of help for the sufferers; (2) punishment should be meted out to officials, both high and low; (3) adequate forces should be sent to restore order."

Talaat Bey.—Puts the motion for an interpellation to the Chamber. It is passed.

Second Sitting.

The Minister of the Interior, Raouf Pasha, and the Mustechar Adil Bey present.

Talaat Bey.—In accordance with your decision, the Minister of the Interior and the Mustechar have come. The Mustechar, being more conversant with the matter, will give his explanations; if necessary, his Excellency the Minister will follow.

Mustechar Adil Bey. (Speech in full.)—The events at Adana are most regrettable, and those who caused them are accursed and hateful.

On the 1st (14th) April a telegram was received from the Vilayet of Adana announcing the breaking out of disorder and the appearance of plunderers. The necessary instructions were at once sent to the vilayet, their purpose being, "Turn out soldiers, gendarmes, police, whatever force you have, even the guards; give necessary instructions to both parties; restore absolute order. We will, moreover, write to the Ministry of War and the necessary military force will be sent. Until that time you must take all possible steps." At the same time a despatch was sent to the Ministry of War asking that sufficient soldiers should be provided from the nearest point. On the

two succeeding days the matter was followed up and instructions were continued. On the second Wednesday I asked Edhem Pasha, the Minister of War, at a Cabinet meeting whether the military force on the spot was sufficient or not, and received a negative answer. It was said that men would be sent from the Iind Army Corps district. As the news from the vilayet stated that two battalions would not be enough, I demanded that the Seletke Regiment should be sent also. It was replied that in that case there would be no need to send two battalions as well, but I said that both the two battalions and the Selefke Regiment should be sent. Unfortunately, for reasons such as the lack of steamers, the military arrived somewhat late, and the outbreak could not be prevented. If the Chamber wishes, I will read the telegram I wrote. A telegram was sent from the vilayet to the Ministry of Police. That is not in the *dossier* because (according to it) the vilayet appeared to be in its ordinary condition. It stated that the police were insufficient, and asked that an adequate police force should be sent. You know that a conflict was going on between Moslems and non-Moslems. Foreigners are impartial in such matters, so any attack on them would cause foreign intervention and political complications. The telegram does not easily lend itself to misinterpretation, but unfortunately it has been misconstrued.

In correspondence with the Commandant orders were given that guards composed of soldiers and gendarmes should be formed; that looting should be absolutely prevented; that the various classes of the population should not interfere with each other, and that special care should be taken of the Consulates and of foreign property. This was natural, and merely the Government's duty. The Government has no cause for regret.

(Adil Bey then read some telegrams and Minutes dealing with the subject.)

On the second day of the events the matter was discussed at a Cabinet meeting. It was asked what gave rise to the incident, and I said that that would appear from the investigations of a Special Committee to be sent, and this idea was accepted. A special court-martial will be formed and sent, and offenders, whoever they may be, will be punished. It therefore appears to me unnecessary to discuss the question more deeply. The work of the Committee of Investigation will result in the punishment of the criminals, whoever they may be. A few days ago some members of the Armenian Assembly came and questioned the Grand Vizier. I read these telegrams, but they replied that the incident was not caused by the Armenians; there being very few Armenians there as compared with Moslems. I said that the information I had given was founded on information I had received from the spot. There is no need to discuss the question on the basis of race. The real culprits must be sought out. There is no need of this dispute. A telegram has been sent authorizing the expenditure of the few piastres necessary to feed and house the sufferers. On receipt of an answer to a telegraphic inquiry I sent, a discussion will take place in the Cabinet, and if the future necessitates the expenditure of a few more piastres they will be spent. News was received from the scene of the occurrence, and was confirmed, that at the commencement a state of siege was proclaimed, but in a telegram received to-day the state of siege is mentioned as one of further necessary measures. The newly arrived Mutessarif either does not know about the state of siege or he has made a mistake. As to the number of deaths, the truth will transpire after local inquiries. We have received a telegram from Adana to-day saying that quiet has been restored there. I have sent this news for publication in the official "Takvim-i-Vikay"; as to the Committee of Inquiry the Grand Vizier says he has discussed it with Mahmoud Shevket Pasha and it has been resolved to send a Special Committee.

Zohrab Effendi.—The Mustechar has simply read to us the statements of the Vali of Adana and the Mutessarif of Jebel Bereket, as though either of them could be considered trustworthy evidence. A few days ago we asked him the approximate number of killed and wounded, and this official, who is at the head of the Executive, could not tell us. Well, let me give you some information. According to a letter written by the brother of the (?) Consular dragoman [*sic*] at Mersina, the slaughtered Armenians number 20,000 or 30,000. Had this information come from an Armenian I would not have accepted it. If you want letters and telegrams from Armenians there are plenty. Letters arrived to-day say that there are no Armenians left there; no churches, no schools.

A few people who have come from that mad-house say that the massacres came from the Government—that the first slaughter was brought about by Government influence, and that the massacres took place to the cry of "Long live Sultan Hamid!" [At this point the speaker read a telegram which had been sent to the Members for Aleppo.] My object in saying this is to rebut with all my strength the calumny that the Armenians rebelled against the Ottoman rule.

During the general massacre that took place here some years ago I was sent to protect the Armenians left alive. It was said of the Armenians who took refuge that they had "fortified themselves," and that is the meaning of the telegrams we have just read; but a man "takes refuge" in a church—he does not "fortify himself."

Now, what is the position of the Vali, Jevad Bey? Here is a man who came from the Palace—that is to say, a man trained by a despot. The Members for Adana present have asked the Ministry of the Interior to change him. The French say that to govern means to discover the future. The Minister of the Interior here ought to have knowledge of affairs; he did not have that knowledge. Well, let us excuse him; but when he did wake up he passed over the matter with a smile or two. Now, just see the neglect of the Vali, who simply said when the incident began that he needed a few police, and afterwards, when the disorders had spread in all directions, asked for soldiers to be sent! I cannot believe that there was good intention behind this carelessness; the events show neglect all along. First they want to send soldiers, and there are no steamers; then there are no arms. This question must be considered from the point of view of the public safety. The Mustechar speaks of a "state of prosperity," but there is no prosperity there. All the people are dying, and the nation should be prepared to make any sacrifice to save them. Let some serious proposal be made to us here. It is not governing to say, "Maintain order."

Mustechar.—Zohrab Effendi says the reading of these telegrams was out of place. I read them in accordance with the decision of the Chamber; I have therefore no cause for regret.

Nazim Mazilliah Effendi.—If the measures taken consisted only in sending telegrams there is cause for regret.

Mustechar.—The Ministry of the Interior had no magic army at hand. Instructions were sent for all the available gendarmes and police to be turned out, and to send soldiers from the nearest point. What else could the Ministry do? Besides, I was not at the head of the Ministry of the Interior. On the outbreak of the affair the Government resigned. On the 1st (14th) April the Tewfik Pasha Cabinet was appointed. I saw my name in the list and at once resigned. Nevertheless, to prevent a *crise ministérielle* I carried on the work out of patriotism. I therefore fail to understand why I should be blamed.

There is no need to dwell on the question of nationality. Let the traitors be punished whoever they may be. If there is anything else we can do, let us do it. Money has been sent from here by telegraph, and orders have been given for money to be paid into the Finance Department there. It is evident that the attack is a personal one. I much regret this. (Applause.)

Vartakis Effendi.—According to the Takrir, a Committee of Investigation is to be sent from the Chamber.

Artas Effendi proposes the discussion be closed.

As a result of the discussion it was decided that a court-martial should be sent as soon as possible, and that the sum granted should not be limited to £T. 20,000.

[17615] No. 85.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 325.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Major Doughty Wylie, reporting further on the course of affairs at Adana and the vicinity after the massacres of the 14th ultimo and following days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Major Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, April 28, 1909.*

IN continuation of my last despatch, I have the honour to report as follows:—

Sunday, April 25.—About dusk, firing broke out, and in the evening, even in this quarter where we live, there was instant panic; hundreds of people ran in here; and a few shots were fired, which they said were at them. One man was wounded, he says by a bullet, but I think he sat on a spike. Soldiers were at once sent from the town, and the night passed quietly here, with the exception of a little shooting, but in the town there was fighting, and a great many dangerous looking fires. I happened to have Mr. Trowbridge here, and endeavoured to send him up to see what was happening, but he was turned back by soldiers.

I telegraphed the situation to the Captain of the "Swiftsure" by means of the railway wire. By 10 P.M. an officer of the konak had reached me with a more cheerful report, and I decided to wait for morning before asking for a Consular guard.

Monday, April 26.—At dawn I telegraphed to Captain of "Swiftsure" as follows:—

"Town seems quieter this morning, but roads blocked. Am just going konak; wait news before doing anything. Consulate safe."

I rode up on Mr. Trowbridge's horse, accompanied by him and four soldiers. We went first to the American Girls' School, where Mr. Trowbridge lives, and found the place safe; that it was guarded sufficiently, and every one was very frightened. I then went to Mr. Chambers' house, where there was an enormous crowd of refugees; one man wounded, and several bullets had struck the house. I went from there to the konak; there was some shooting in the streets, but comparatively little, and I saw about twenty or thirty bodies. So far as I saw the guards from the two regiments of Roumelians were in hand, and did good work.

In the konak there was the usual confusion. I told the Vali that if he could not protect foreigners I would telegraph at once for troops, that he must send guards at once to the American Mission, and that I would give him till midday to restore quiet. It seemed to me that this could be done, and by 11 A.M. it was, practically, but there was still plundering, and the fires were terrible.

I went straight from the konak to the School of the Jesuits, taking with me fifty men and the Ferik's staff officer. On arrival I found so many houses burning close to it, that it seemed imperative to get the people out. There were over 2,000 of them. This was done, little by little, by Mr. Lawson Chambers and myself, assisted by the French priests. I had found Mr. Lawson Chambers in the konak, where he had been sent the night before with a message, and where he had passed the night for safety. With the first 200 refugees my staff officer and all the escort, except four, returned to the konak, and none came out again.

I do not think we were fired at, although there were a great number of cartridges going off in the burning houses, and wreckage was falling across the streets. However, stray parties of soldiers kept the streets clear for me, and we completely cleared the French school of men, women, and children, and I suppose eight or ten wounded. I took all these refugees to the konak and had them in a garden. I had paid a visit to the French nuns' school as well, and found it safe, and sufficiently far from the fires not to be threatened. I promised them a guard, and now took them one from the konak, shooting on the way a plunderer or two. After that I revisited Mr. Chambers and the other American school. A house near this had been burned, and the fire had been put down by some of his Armenian refugees. We left a few men in the French schools to work with buckets, &c., and as soon as we got the people out we got the pumps and water-carts, and then went back to the konak. Upon arrival I found Commander Carver, of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure." I told the Vali that as the troops were now well in hand I would keep my promise and would not ask for foreign assistance. I also said that the fire should be fought by the troops, as without discipline it was impossible to do anything.

The Staff officer arrived with new troops and asked me if I would come with them and some priests to search the churches for arms. (It is said that last night's dispute was caused by a small band of Hanjakists, who wished to bring about foreign interference, and who killed fifteen Roumelian soldiers who were on picket in the Armenian quarter. I do not know if this is true or not.) I said I would certainly go if it would help to make peace, and asked the Vali if he would personally request me to do so, which he did. We then started, and went to the Armenian (Gregorian) church. Troops on the way cleared the burning streets full of pillagers.

Long search was made in the church with the aid of the Armenian priests. Nothing was found except about ten or twelve old arms, which were brought in. No harm was done, the troops were perfectly in hand, and every consideration was shown to the priests' feelings. After this I found myself too weak to do any more, and came back to Mr. Trypani's house, leaving Mr. Chambers to go with the soldiers to the other churches. The bazaar was partly burning, and full of a looting crowd, whom the

soldiers drove away. When writing to Captain Thursby, of the "Swiftsure," I asked him to telegraph to your Excellency which of the foregoing he thought important, as even urgent telegrams are taking two days from here.

Hadjin.—Latest news from the Vali (if he can be believed) was the arrival to-day of Lufti Bey and the Commissioners sent from here. Lufti seized some horses, and turned his men into mounted infantry. I had considerable hopes from this officer should he arrive in time.

Adana.—The general burning and devastation of the town must render relief work harder than ever, as the numbers before this were 15,000.

Four marines arrived from "Swiftsure" to assist with the sick and wounded.

About 3 P.M., I suppose, two French nuns arrived from their school, saying that it was in danger of catching fire. Directly afterwards similar messages came from the American School. I sent Mr. Lawson Chambers to the konak for troops to escort refugees from both these places. Later on I went up myself, and going to Mr. Chambers' house first, found that the nuns' school would be safe, and that there was a good chance for the American Girls' School, and a chance for Mr. Chambers' house. The nuns and French priests were all by this time sent to Mr. Trypani's house; the Armenian refugees into Trypani's and the German factories. I brought down Mr. Chambers' wife and daughter, Mr. Chambers himself, his nephew, Sick Berth Attendant Pink, and Bombadier Hawes, R.M.A., who were left in the house. I went to the American Girls' School, and, after consulting with the missionaries, withdrew from there eighty girls, whom we placed in Mr. E. Trypani's house. The Americans will remain in the school unless driven out by fire. They have a guard of twelve men, which is amply sufficient to bring them in, as the girls have now been withdrawn. In the streets there are thousands of fugitives, but Roumelian soldiers are doing their work well, and there had been no killing or plundering that I saw. I spoke to the captain who had charge of the quarter containing Mr. Chambers' house and the Girls' School, in order to insure as far as possible that no plunderers should enter them.

It appears to me that about one-half of Adana city will be burnt. Efforts with pumps are being made, but the pumps are too few and too feeble, and the conflagration too widespread. I think that only a systematic scheme of blowing up houses to make a ring round the burning area would be of any use.

Tuesday, 27th.—I left here at about 7·30 A.M. and went to Mr. Chambers' house, where I found the fires were not out, but less threatening. Some houses had burnt themselves out. I also visited the American Girls' School and the French nuns' school. The nuns' school is close to the fire. The quarter contained some prowling thieves, who were driven out; but one can have no confidence that they will not return. I then went to the konak. The news from Hadjin of yesterday to the Vali was that fighting was still going on, but that the monastery alone was burning, and not the town, which is on the opposite side of the valley. He said that the Commandant sent had been wounded, and that he thought the reason why there had been so much delay in the surrender was that nobody would trust the Commandant. The Hodjas, sent from here to make peace, had arrived, and Lufti Bey should arrive to-day. The number of troops at the disposal of Lufti Bey would, it is computed, be about 400. I have had no telegrams from Hadjin for the last three days. I emphasized to the Vali that the first thing to be done was to put out the fires and drive out the pillagers with the severest measures. The Alia Bey and a party of men were sent to do what they could to demolish dangerous buildings and to work the pumps. I also talked about reliefs, now a still more burning question than before, as 10,000 people are in Trypani's factory without any food, and a very large number in the Germany factory. I have bought for the people in Trypani's factory this morning fifteen bags of flour, and I persuaded the Vali to give me five bags, the men in the German factory are being fed by Mr. Stoehell, but I have had no time yet to find out how. I arranged with the Vali to fix the price of flour and wheat, and on my submitting to him a list of people without food, to telegraph to Constantinople, to know if the factories will be at his disposal, he sent for the Defterdar, who said that no factories were available.

Returning from the konak I met Commander Carver and the Commander of the "Victor Hugo" coming up to the konak. I had asked the Vali if a party of men from the ship would be of use to him in saving the French and American property, but he said he would give me an answer in half an-hour, and Commander Carver went to the konak to get this answer. It was evasive. I visited the French school, the scene of the fire, and the American schools again. The Alia Bey and party had been round and left a pump with an unskilled party, who did not appear to me to be doing anything. I myself set them to work on one house, but had to leave them.

Commander Carver visited the American Church, which had no guard, and was full of refugees.

As all the other temporary hospitals in the town had been burnt, or are in danger of burning, 150 wounded were sent down to my wife's hospital. We have neither house nor beds nor blankets for these people. I am trying, but I am afraid vainly, to obtain them, so much has been burnt, and there is such universal disaster.

Commander Carver is going again to the konak, to press again for a guard on the church full of refugees. The French Commander is going to take back to their houses the nuns and priests now in refuge with me, and to stay with them, as he feels there is no security otherwise. I cannot help feeling very uneasy about the state of the town. The soldiers appear to me to be sulky, and some of the officers who were too cowardly to come out with me when the firing was going on, are now going round with parties of troops, ostensibly to prevent looting, but I think that instead of protecting the Armenians, they are threatening them with further punishment, as they call it.

Mr. Stochell, the manager of the German factory, reported to me this evening that his office in the town had been broken open by soldiers, and the safes and papers plundered. He lost 560*l.* in cash, and many valuable papers.

On his arrival there he found the rooms full of Roumelian soldiers and Bashi Bazoukas. The soldiers pretended to drive out the Bashi Bazoukas, and went out with them.

He also reported to me that a guard on his factory had refused to stay there, and that the men would not obey their officers. He had in his factory many thousands of Armenians, and there were 13,000 in Mr. Trypani's factory; both these factories are full of cotton, and the risk from fire was very great. I wrote for a guard on both places.

To-day a telegram from the Ambassador reached me, saying that the Minister of the Interior had given orders for Mr. Lawson Chambers to be sent to Hadjin as soon as sufficient escort was available. I wrote to the Vali to ask if he could start at once. The Vali replied that he had received no such orders yet, but that he would act on them as soon as he did so. I have had no news from Hadjin this afternoon.

We telegraphed to the Director of the railway at Mersina for the use of some of his depôt sheds for the wounded.

The Turkish municipal doctors came and asked us to receive 150 more wounded. There are over 100 wounded in the German factory. Commander Carver went up to the American Girls' School, from which the girls have all been sent to Mersina, and brought from there fifty beds. The Director kindly consented to give us a shed which would hold about fifty people, and it was fitted up. I am trying to get a small sesame oil factory, which is closed here and would do well, but the owner is a refugee in Mersina. The American Red Cross in Beirut asked us, at the suggestion of Mr. Gibbons, of Tarsus, for a list of what we required in the way of medical supplies. Miss Wallis is busy making this out.

The difficulty of feeding all these thousands of people in the factories is extreme. They have been hungry for days.

In the German factory some children have even died of hunger. The Municipality sent us fifteen sacks of flour and we managed to get about twenty-five ourselves, but the people are too thickly crowded to cook and in the struggling crowd proper distribution becomes impossible. Further, Mr. Trypani's looms are, he tells me, ruined by the crowd of people pressing against them and playing with them. Every effort must be made to-morrow to empty this factory, if only some small degree of confidence can be restored. There are also grave reasons of health why this should be done.

Soon after dusk two strong patrols of Roumelian troops visited the quarter and took charge of the factories.

I was relieved to see the officers and the discipline of these parties. An official message from the Vali reached me announcing the accession to the throne of the new Sultan.

Soon after this there was a great deal of shooting in the town and in this neighbourhood; so far as I know at present, this was a sort of *feu de joie* in honour of the new accession, but it caused a great panic. Thieves and murderers, who are waiting on the outskirts or in the slums of the town (there have been at least a dozen murders to-day in the neighbourhood of the German factory), took the shooting for a signal that their reign had again begun. Four ran into the hospital we had formed here, but were fired on and driven off by my guard. I have no news yet of what

happened in the town. This afternoon I was informed unofficially that the Vali had been dismissed, and that the new one was arriving in a day or two viâ Iregli.

The Arab battalions from Beirut have all been moved to the konak and to central positions. This is a wise measure, as their discipline does not admit of their being broken into small parties without some deterioration.

The same thing may be said of the Roumelian troops, but they are not so bad. All Redifs have, I think, been dismissed. There are a few Muhafis doing town guard in places.

An informal meeting of the Turkish members of the Relief Committee, with myself, took place, but little was done as the old list of refugees are now useless and we shall have to begin again. The urgent question is to somehow feed and house the starving people and systemize as far as we can.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY WYLIE,
Vice-Consul.

[17633] No. 86.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 10.)

THE Secretary of the Admiralty presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Foreign Office letter of the 8th instant, begs to state that the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, has been informed that the Levant squadron may remain in Ayas Bay to carry out gunlayers' tests if practicable. If not practicable, he has been authorized to withdraw to Malta, leaving, however, three ships in Turkish waters.

Admiralty, May 8, 1909.

[18136] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

Sir, *India Office, May* 12, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, ending with the letter from this Office dated the 28th September last, I am directed by Viscount Morley to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to the occupation of Nawa by a Turkish Arab sheikh in connection with the entrance into Juban of the Mausatta Sheikh in aid of the family of a sheikh murdered in Nawa.

The Government of India propose, in the circumstances, to instruct the Resident to endeavour to secure the withdrawal of both the encroaching parties, provided that he does not in any way commit the British Government to action.

Subject to any observations which Sir E. Grey may have to offer, Lord Morley would propose to approve these instructions, which may lead to a local settlement of the dispute. The question of making a communication to the Turkish Government on the subject at the present stage might be left to the discretion of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 3, 1909.

YOUR telegram of the 5th September last: Rubeaton.

Report from Resident, Aden, states that 1,200 dollars were recently exacted from Nawa as tribute by Turks, and that 400 Turkish Arabs are now in occupation of it. One of their sheikhs, it appears, was murdered in December last by people of Nawa, and his family appealed for assistance to Mausatta Sheikh. [? The latter] entered Juban, *en route* to Nawa, with 200 men. Nawa had in the meanwhile been occupied by 400 men under a Turkish Arab sheikh named Ad Dahab, who informed Mausatta Sheikh that instructions to settle Nawa dispute had been received by him from Turkish

[17912] No. 86*.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 11, 1909.

ADANA massacres.

The court-martial which has been sent from here should reach Adana by to-morrow. Meanwhile the situation in the district continues to be somewhat unsettled. The British vice-consul considers the attitude of the new vali to be unsatisfactory. He has had 300 Armenians arrested at Adana, declaring them all to be guilty, and he asserts that there have been more Moslems killed than there have been Christians. The Armenians who successfully defended Chokmeizinnan have now been called upon by the Government to give up their own arms. At Antioch there are 700 destitute, at Alexandretta 1,500, at Deortyol 5,000, and at Payas 3,600.

Government. Appeal has been made to Resident by Mansatta Sheikh. The continuance of Juban as part of kaza of Rada was condition of Ottoman commissioner's admission, in *procès-verbal* of 20th April, that Dabiani, Rubeaten, and Nawa were Yafa. Encroachment would therefore appear to have been committed by both sides. Similar encroachments seem likely to continue so long as position remains indefinite, and the grounds are doubtful for protest on our part.

It will probably be considered inexpedient to raise the question at the present time at Constantinople, in view of political situation in Turkey. We therefore propose that Resident should be instructed, provided that he does not in any way commit Government to action in so doing, to endeavour to induce local Turkish authorities to vacate Nawa, if Juban is vacated by Mansatta Sheikh.

[18133]

No. 88.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 387.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 13, 1909.

ABU MUSA red oxide.

I have received a private letter from my German colleague stating that his acting consul at Bushire telegraphs that preparations for shipment of Abu Musa oxide are being hastened on by British subjects. He asks that I should instruct His Majesty's consul-general to await the result of negotiations between Berlin and London before allowing these proceedings.

I have replied that the matter does not come within my province.

[17612]

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 310.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.

MASSACRE at Adana.

I have received your despatch No. 321 of the 4th May, and I request that you will convey by telegraph to Major Doughty-Wylie my entire approval of his conduct, together with an expression of my high appreciation of the remarkable courage, resource, and energy which he displayed during the progress of the recent terrible events. It is my sincere hope that he is recovering from his injury which, I trust, is not of a very serious nature.

I have also been greatly impressed by the services rendered by the Messrs. Chambers, and I am taking steps to inform the American Ambassador of the valuable assistance given by Mr. Trowbridge.

The services of Major Doughty-Wylie certainly, in my opinion, deserve public recognition, and it would no doubt be very gratifying to him if you could add to the telegram which you send him an intimation that you are recommending him, say, for a C.M.G., an honour which has been well deserved by his behaviour.

[17912]

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.

ADANA massacre.

I will send a reply as soon as possible to your telegram No. 187 of yesterday.

With reference to your telegram No. 186 of the 11th instant, I request that you will at the first available opportunity inform the Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government hope that the inquiry into the massacre at Adana will be carried out with strict impartiality and thoroughness, and that exemplary punishment will be meted out to the persons who instigated it.

[17485] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 145.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.*

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires made to me on the 6th instant a statement in the terms of the inclosed telegram which he had received from the Porte. I said that I felt sure that it accurately represented the view of the Turkish Government; the quietness of our press in face of the massacre at Adana was a remarkable evidence of confidence in the new régime, and I hoped that, now order and authority were restored at Constantinople, the Government would make every effort to re-establish order and justice in the provinces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Télégram received by Turkish Chargé d'Affaires from Sublime Porte.

LES troubles survenus dans le Vilayet d'Adana nous ont péniblement impressionnés. L'ordre a été déjà rétabli, un crédit de £T. 30,000 a été ouvert pour le moment au profit des nécessiteux.

Des ordres ont été donnés aux Valis de Smyrne et d'Alep d'envoyer d'urgence de grandes quantités de provisions. Son Altesse le Cheikh-ul-Islam et le Patriarche arménien prodiguent leurs conseils aux habitants de tout le vilayet et pour les amener à se réconcilier. Veuillez-vous énoncer dans ce sens autour de vous.

[16275] No. 92.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 13, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, and to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposed increase of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mahommerah, Koweit, and Bahrein, and the grant of salutes to the eldest sons of the two former Sheikhs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18364] No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

Sir, *India Office, May 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the telegram to the Viceroy of the 13th ultimo, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India, reporting that an official protest has been made to the Resident in the Gulf by the newly appointed German consul at Bushire against the mining of fresh oxide at Abu Musa for Messrs. Strick under the conditions approved in the above-mentioned correspondence.

Viscount Morley, subject to any observations that Sir E. Grey may have to offer, would recommend that the instructions the Government of India propose to issue to the Resident should be approved.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 11, 1909.*

SEE your telegram dated the 13th ultimo.

Following report received from Resident, Persian Gulf, as to Abu Musa oxide:—

"Strick has since had 500 or 600 tons of fresh oxide mined. No objection was taken to these operations by late German consul before proceeding on leave on the 18th April, though he must have been well aware they were in progress. Official protest, with demands that operations should be discontinued, has been lodged by his successor on the ground that excavation or shipment of fresh oxide is an encroachment on rights of German firm, whose claim is not limited to oxide previously mined."

In reply, Resident has stated that he is reporting for orders to Government of India. Memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, to German Government, as was pointed out in India Office letter of the 3rd February last to Foreign Office, only undertook that a limited amount of oxide should be procured by Messrs. Wonckhaus with a view to existing contracts, made before lease was cancelled, being fulfilled. The protest now made is therefore wholly unreasonable, and the effect of any abandonment of mining would be equivalent to surrender of our whole case. We propose sending instructions to Resident that no notice should be taken by him of German protest, and that, if German consul approaches him again, he should point out the limited nature of the undertaking given to the German Government in the memorandum, and draw attention to the fact that advantage was not taken of it by Messrs. Wonckhaus.

[18811] No. 94.

Note communicated by German Embassy, May 15, 1909.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to a communication from the Imperial consulate in Bushire, the English consular agent at Linga is demanding oxide on Abu Musa, against which the German concessionnaire is protesting. The firm of Traun, Stürken, and Co., in Hamburg, associate themselves with this protest.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, in their Memorandum of the 10th January, 1908, declare that it is not desirable that the Sheikh of Schargeh should, before the settlement of the Abu Musa dispute, sanction the further exploitation of the mines, as hereby further complications could easily arise; still more must the resumption of the working of the mines by another person than the company which have hitherto held the concession at the present time lead to the greatest difficulties.

[18453] No. 95.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 332.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320 of the 4th instant and previous correspondence respecting the disturbed state of affairs on the banks of the Tigris, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have just received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, giving an account of apparently indecisive operations carried on by the Turks in the neighbourhood of Amara. Mr. Crow apprehends a further possible spread of the rising to the tribes of the Montifik, and points out the defenceless position of the town of Bussorah in the event of their making an attack or of a rising of the local Arabs.

On the 25th ultimo His Majesty's Consul telegraphed that he had received a message from Sadun, Sheikh of the Montifik, through the Sheikh of Mohammerah's agent at Bussorah. Sheikh Sadun stated that he proposed to go to war, and inquired whether his operations against the Turks would meet with our approval, whether we would protect him in the event of defeat, and what course he should pursue if his grievances were irreconcilable. To the first two questions Mr. Crow returned a negative reply, and recommended the Sheikh to come to terms with the new constitu-

tional Government, and I informed His Majesty's Consul that his reply to the message had my approval.

On the 26th ultimo His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad suggested that, owing to the serious inconvenience being caused by the accumulation of mails and goods at Bussorah, a Lynch steamer should be allowed to run up the Euphrates, to Hindieh, as the local authorities reported that route to be safe. Mr. H. F. B. Lynch, who happened to be in Constantinople at the time, was informed of this suggestion, but he hesitated to run the risk of sending a steamer up the Euphrates. His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reported, however, on the 1st instant that part of the accumulated mail and a passenger had been sent in a Lynch launch up the Euphrates for Bagdad on the 29th April. He also reported that fighting had again taken place at Mejer Kebir, and that a settlement of the trouble was expected shortly, though the situation remained uncertain. On the 4th instant two Lynch steamers left Bussorah for Bagdad viâ the Tigris for the first time since the 20th March. They carried sixty soldiers and were accompanied by three Turkish steamers. At the same time the Montifiks were reported to be showing signs of unrest.

On the 8th instant I received a telegram from Mr. Crow reporting that the disturbances on the Tigris were over and river traffic was being resumed. I have as yet received no indication of the nature or cause of this cessation of hostilities, nor do I know whether any settlement has been arrived at with the Arabs, which is likely to secure the safety of the navigation on the river for any length of time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Bussorah, April* 15, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 20 of the 31st March last I have the honour to report that, owing to the disturbances up-river, the "Khalifa," which was detained a considerable time at Amara, did not arrive here until the 13th April. The Turkish steamers, with the exception of the "Bagdad," which was able to continue her journey up-river from Amara on the 11th instant, are still at Amara. The last to arrive at Bussorah was the "Bagdad" on the 25th March. The Lynch boat "Mejidieh" proceeded to Kurna on the 4th April, but finding no escort ready and hearing of further disturbances in the Amara district, returned to Bussorah on the following day. The "Kilid Bahr" proceeded as far as Surifa, a short distance below Ozeir (Ezra's tomb), but was unable to go on owing to her deep draught. The telegraph wires above Ozeir have been cut, and such communication as we have been able to obtain has been brought by runners from Amara to Ozeir, and thence telegraphed. The telegraph between Kurna and Ozeir has been working intermittently. The "Shelana" force seems able to repair it when interrupted. Telegraph communication with Bagdad by the Euphrates, the only way now, has been constantly interrupted.

On the 3rd April the four steamers "Bussorah," Hamidieh," "Burhanieh," and "Khalifa," with a force of some 750 men and guns, reached Amara, after severe fighting, from Ali Sheiji to Amara itself. Their progress was opposed by the Beni Lam tribe and their allies. Captain Cowley, of the "Khalifa," informs me that the firing was very heavy and that the banks of the river were not even visible owing to the smoke. The hottest places were Kumait and Hitaira, where the bullets came like hail. The loss on the ships was 12 killed and 30 wounded. On hearing the firing the Nishanji regiment, about 350 strong, went out from Amara to assist the steamers, which were thus able to reach Amara. Captain Cowley further reports that while the steamers were at Amara the Arabs continued to fire on the town and the vessels were repeatedly hit.

On the 4th April the "Bagdad," "Bussorah," and "Altis" left Amara with soldiers and guns, and a force of some 350 or 400 regulars, under Mezher Bey, accompanied them on land. Areybi and Khalifa, friendly Arab Sheikhs, joined this force with their local contingent, and the total number of men under Mezher Bey, according to the official account, was about 1,000. Severe fighting occurred at Mejer Kebir and Mejer Saghir, a short distance below Amara, on the 8th April, on the right bank of the river. The official version gives the number of the opposing Arabs as 8,000, but this is probably an exaggeration; but I do not think they were less than 4,000. The steamers in the river supported the Turkish operations on shore with their guns. The Turks seemed to have relied too much on the local Arab irregulars under Areybi and Khalifa, who did not assist as much as they expected, and the Turkish force, which ran short of ammunition, had to retreat to Amara by steamer, after inflicting considerable loss on the Arabs, due chiefly to the gun-fire from the ships. According to an account given me, the troops appeared panic-stricken when they returned to the ships and there was a *sauve qui peut*. The casualties on the Turkish side are unknown. Many Arabs were killed and the field guns mounted on the ships rendered great assistance. Mezher Bey reports that he requires at least 4,000 soldiers to deal with the Arabs.

On the 8th April the steam-tug "Kazimi" proceeded up-river with two guns, and was fired on by Arabs of the Al Bu Mohammed tribe the whole way from Ozeir to near Amara. The officer in charge was wounded and there were several casualties. The steamer, however, got through.

After the two engagements mentioned above there was a temporary lull, and during it the "Bagdad" left Amara on the 11th April for Bagdad, while the "Khalifa" proceeded down-river and arrived at Bussorah without incident. Yusuf Pasha left Bagdad, with about 600 soldiers and four guns, on the "Resafa," on the 7th April, and it is believed that the Arabs of the Al Bu Mohammed below Amara have gone northwards to aid the Beni Lam in opposing their progress, which would explain the temporary cessation of hostilities on the lower part of the river.

Colonel Ramsay has sent me copies of his despatches Nos. 290/29 and 307/30 to your Excellency, and I concur in the measures he proposes and hope the Turks can be induced to carry them out.

As the trouble is undoubtedly spreading, and the Arab tribes, who are gathering in large force on both sides of the river, will be encouraged in their movement by the unsuccessful Turkish operations at Mejer Kebir, I think it would be advisable to send a British man-of-war to Bussorah in view of possible emergencies, and I telegraphed this suggestion to your Excellency on the 12th April.

It is impossible to anticipate how far matters may go, but the recent attacks on the Turkish fort at Fao are not without significance, and if a ship can be spared temporarily from the Gulf for the purpose I shall be glad to have her sent here with instructions to protect the foreign community if required. The small garrison at Bussorah would not be able to defend the town in the event of an Arab rising, or if the Montifiks attempt a diversion to assist the Beni Lam and Al Bu Mohammed and attack Bussorah, as they have done before.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

P.S. *April* 16.—Since writing the above I learn that the Beni Lam Arabs attacked the steamer "Resafa," near Amara, on the 13th April. Yusuf Pasha, who was on board, was bringing reinforcements. Casualties reported are—5 killed, 7 wounded, and 7 mules killed.

F. E. C.

[18455] No. 96.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 334.)

Sir, *Pera, May* 11, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 324 of the 4th instant I have the honour to transmit to you herewith further despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mersina, giving an account of the disturbances at Adana, and the state of the town up to the 4th instant.

You will notice that a question has arisen concerning three Hunchakists who are alleged by the Turkish authorities to have been actively engaged in fomenting the disorders on the Armenian side. Their surrender was called for by the police, and Major Doughty referred to me for instruction, suggesting as a way out of the difficulty that they should be handed over to the Captain of the Turkish man-of-war under guarantee of a legal trial. I spoke with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and explained that I should be willing to ask for instructions as to whether they should be handed over, but not until specific charges of a criminal nature were brought against them by the authorities. Up to the present moment no charges have been laid. It is quite possible that the Government, realizing that asylum had been so recently given to

several members of the Committee by His Majesty's Embassy, may be unwilling to ask for the surrender of these men.

You will notice that the assistance given to the Armenians by the foreigners has aroused a certain amount of feeling against the latter amongst the Turks, but I do not believe that they are in any real danger now. On the other hand, it is regrettable to observe that the new Vali, Mustapha Zihni Pasha, a Kurd, father of Ismail Hakki Bey, the member of Parliament for Bagdad and editor of the "Tanin," is disposed to attribute all blame to the Armenians, and that he has arrested, and is still arresting, a great number of them—up to the present 300, all of whom he declares are guilty. According to a paragraph which appeared in yesterday's press, he has telegraphed reporting that the total of casualties is as follows:—

Mussulmans: 1,924 killed, 533 wounded.
Christians: 1,455 killed, 382 wounded.

This presumably refers to the whole vilayet, but does not in any way correspond with the information furnished by Major Doughty. It savours somewhat of the ways of the Hamidian régime, and can only be regarded as a reflex of the belief evidently held by the local Turks, and apparently encouraged by such people as those who were on the staff of the military commandant, that the Armenians had united in a great plot to annihilate their Moslem neighbours, a belief to which the activity of the Hunchakists, and, it would appear, of the Bishop, seem to give some verisimilitude. The fear among the Turkish population is evidently genuine, however ill-founded, and the apprehensions of the Armenians are not as yet being lulled by the action of the Government.

My American colleague has furnished me with a report from one of the most experienced missionaries in Anatolia, the Rev. Dr. Christie, which gives an account of the very origin of the massacre. A Turk and an Armenian, both worthless drunkards, had a quarrel, and a day or two later the Turk with one or two comrades attacked the Armenian with knives. He defended himself with a revolver, wounding two and killing one of his enemies, and he then fled. Dr. Christie then adds that the young Armenians of Adana are nearly all revolutionists; that arms and ammunition have been on sale for months, and that both sides have been laying in stores of them. He attributes a large share in the recent events to the evil counsels of the Armenian Bishop, whom he describes as a "very bad man."

A proposal was recently made in the Chamber to send a delegation of their members to investigate matters, but the majority to-day decided against this measure and the inquiry will now be limited to the military authorities.

Meanwhile Major Doughty telegraphs that the reactionary party are sending round emissaries secretly advising the Mussulmans not to give back all their booty and to complain to the Government of the loss of hundreds of imaginary friends and relations. The Vali yesterday informed Admiral the Honourable Sir Assheton Howe that more Moslems had been killed than Christians, but that order was now ensured. He omitted certain of the usual courtesies in returning the Admiral's visit and on general grounds Major Doughty-Wylie thinks he should be removed. He raised a somewhat frivolous point of form over a letter which was addressed to him by the Captain of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure," and his conduct seems decidedly obstructive.

I have as yet only received from British subjects one representation as to the material loss suffered in the disorders. It is to be presumed that French and German subjects have suffered similarly, and I propose to consult with my colleagues before addressing you on this point.

His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reports that there are 700 persons absolutely destitute at Antioch; 1,500 in the Alexandretta district; 3,600 in the Payas district, and 5,000 near Deurtyol. The situation at Cholmerziman is bad. The Armenians there successfully defended themselves against the bands who had come up against them, and the latter dispersed on the arrival of regular troops from Roumelia. The authorities then demanded that the Armenians should hand over their arms, but seeing that this would leave them at the mercy of the bands who might again easily assemble and renew their attempt, they are stated to have refused to do so except under a guarantee from the Powers in the hope that they would mediate and relieve their difficult position. On the other hand the bands who were repulsed are said to have sworn to destroy the town. Mr. Fontana considered that a warship at Alexandretta might keep a watch on the place, and I have accordingly requested the Admiral to keep a ship there.

The British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta, considered that although things appear

quiet at Deurtyol, there is still great anxiety. The authorities wish to disarm the Armenian, but not the Turkish, population and treat the former with insult.

With regard to Hajin, whilst Major Doughty's information is to the effect that it has been successfully relieved, a missionary report through Aleppo, says that there are innumerable killed and wounded, but no facts have so far reached me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 96.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, April 28, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 27th instant, I have the honour to report as follows:—

Hospitals.—Last night the railway authorities placed at our disposal two of their depôts for merchandize; they also undertook, I understand, to carry food for the Relief Committee; I telegraphed to thank them; I managed to find thirty-five sacks of flour. Commander Carver and Mr. Chambers were working extremely hard till night-time feeding the 13,000 people in Trypani's factory. They are all too frightened to go home and many of them have no homes left to go to. I went to the konak to present my official congratulations on the accession of the new Sultan. With the consent of the American Mission I offered to the municipality the use of the girls' school as a women's hospital; arranged for four ovens for their exclusive use, and the fixing of the price of bread. I endeavoured to urge the necessity of sending away some, at least, of the refugees to avoid sickness and panic. The reply was that the Mutessarif of Mersina was unwilling; naturally he would be placed in a difficult position, and, I think, fears that in such a case foreign interference would be too troublesome. I telegraphed to the Ambassador to know if the matter could be pushed.

Hadjin.—On asking for news of Hadjin, I was told by the Ferik and his staff officer (both of whom have done nothing but harm in this crisis) that the Armenians there were killing the Moslems, and were about to make further attacks upon them. This is the same lie which has served as an excuse for the massacre here. I telegraphed urgently to Miss Lambert for her news, also to Lufti Bey, Commandant, that I relied on him to preserve peace and to protect foreigners. In the evening news was sent down from the konak that the troops had driven away the Bashi Bazouks, and, in spite of a little firing, had entered Hadjin without firing a single shot themselves, and that the inhabitants had telegraphed their congratulations to the municipality of their district. I have no confirmation of this news, but have always hoped that Lufti Bey was capable of bringing such an ending to pass.

The konak was full of all sorts of people, including the heads of the Armenians, come in to offer congratulations on the accession of the new Sultan.

Huntjaks Society.—I drove from there to the American and French Missions. The Commander of the French ship "Victor Hugo," who had passed the night in the French Mission, was most emphatic about the absolute necessity of sending to Mersina. He has telegraphed in this sense. The night passed quietly, but a house near them had caught fire, and we sent for the pumps. It was a small house, and the fire was soon got under. Returning home, I found that three Armenian members of the Huntjakists Society were in the house. I presume they got in with the rush of fugitives just before the second massacre. The police had been asking M. Trypani to hand them over. Without knowing in the least whether they are guilty or not, I have always regarded this Society as extremely mischievous. I foresaw that to refuse to give them up would set every Turk against me, and deprive me of my present considerable influence. Further, that as this house is not mine, and sooner or later I shall leave, I could not long protect them even if I wished to do so, which is far from being the case, but at the same time they are under the British flag, and there are many ugly stories of torture in prison. To gain time I said that the police must ask me and not M. Trypani. When they did so I said that I must have a further letter from the Vali. When the result of this last request arrived, I telegraphed to the Ambassador. I regard the arrival of these firebrands in my house as a most untoward event, but I did not know of it at the time, and could not have prevented it unless I had left them to be killed on my doorstep.

Wounded.—200 cases are being dressed in our hospital to-day. In the German factory there are about the same number of wounded, and people are already beginning to die of starvation.

Threats.—Threats are not uncommon. Certain Turks say that they are still afraid of an Armenian attack, and the safety of these miserable refugees rests on the Roumeliot troops.

I received a visit to-day from the Armenian Catholic Bishop, who has lost everything except the clothes he stands in. His people are now in the factories.

Two regiments of Redifs from the Province of Konia are arriving.

April 29, 1909.

Fresh Panic.—About 8 A.M. a panic occurred. A cart came galloping wildly down the road. A crowd struggled to get into this house, but there was no cause for it. During the panic one of my baker's shops was looted, a very serious matter, as the bread supply is vital. An Armenian girl was carried off by the Turks.

Suspects.—It appears that in this house there are more suspected people than the three already mentioned. My wife came over from the hospital asking for a doctor as a man was bleeding to death. The ship's doctor, Surgeon Connell, is now in bed sick. An Armenian doctor was found, but it appears that he is a suspect, and would not leave the house unless he could guarantee him safety from arrest, which is of course impossible outside.

Hadjin.—Lutfi Bey, Commandant of Missus, who was sent to relieve Hadjin, at my request, telegraphed to me that he had entered Hadjin without firing a shot. I hope that this most deserving and capable officer may be rewarded. I telegraphed to congratulate him and sent the news to the Embassy.

Visit of Captains of Warships.—Captain Thursby, the Captain of the "Hamburg," and Mumtaz Bey, Captain of the "Abdul Hamid," came up by special train. There was a meeting at my house consisting of the former, the Military Staff Officers of Adana and Tarsus, and the French Commander, who has been living in the Jesuit school. The Turkish Captain said he would bring the Vali and Forik, but they never came.

The French Commander had received orders to evacuate Adana and take with him all the French priests and nuns, leaving the nuns' school, which is not burnt, at the mercy of pillagers. I begged him privately to leave somebody if he could, as for the French to retire would leave the English and Americans there isolated, and, in my opinion, be an enormous encouragement to renew fire and robbery. The Commander quite agreed with me and left the priests, taking the nuns.

The English and German Captains visited the hospitals and factories. The German Captain went through the burnt part of the city. I was told afterwards that he had telegraphed to his Emperor for a fully equipped hospital.

The talking at my house did not lead to much result. The Ferik's Staff Officer can think of nothing but plots, bombs, hidden arms, and dangers of Armenian insurrections. A poor old woman came in to complain that she had been robbed by an Arab soldier. The Staff Officer (Selim Bey) said at once that these old women had been burning the town, that most of the houses burnt were Turkish, destroyed by their Armenian tenants to injure the owners. Peace and reconciliation are not in this man's vocabulary. I think, and I know that the French concur, that he should be removed, together with his General. The Turkish Captain promised to send us two doctors, and to see what could be done for tents and food. The German Captain had brought 100 bags of meal. The question of sending refugees to Mersina was raised, but was left over for the new Vali, who arrives to-morrow.

The Turkish Captain said that, accompanied by Hojas and Notables, he would make a speech in Trypani's factory to reassure as far as possible the frightened Armenians. A few Hojas and Notables turned up just as the special train was going, and nothing could be done.

I have a feeling that he was put up to talk to the English and German officers, and had no real power at all.

I consulted Captain Thursby over my difficulty about the three accused Armenians in the house. I had not then received your Excellency's telegram which arrived in the evening. Captain Thursby spoke highly of the Turkish Captain, who is naturally very much under his influence. It occurred to me that we might hand over the prisoners under guarantee to the Turkish war-ship. Captain Thursby approving, I made the

suggestion in private, saying that of course it would have to be sanctioned by your Excellency. He said he would accept, and I hope told the Vali. As regards these men and your Excellency's telegram, the charges against them, which I have now asked for, would be that as prominent members of the Armenian Club known as Huntjak, they had preached revolution, used dynamite, killed Moslems, burnt houses, &c. I have no sympathy with these men personally, and imagine that some of these charges would be true, but I am extremely unwilling to place myself in any judicial position in the matter if it can be avoided. Such a position with regard to a notorious political club, would at once alienate every Turk, and encourage loose talk and foreign intervention, which is all too prevalent. At the same time, to hand over these men here in Adana, would at present I fear be to have them tortured by Selim Bey, and the very large party he represents. I hope that my offer to hand them over to the Turkish ship will regain for me the influence with the Hojas and soldiers, which I am in danger of losing. This house is now watched by police, and there are many small inconveniences.

In the evening the German doctor from the "Hamburg" told us that there were probably 200 cases of small-pox in Trypani's factory. There are also mysterious illnesses in my wife's hospital. The doctor saying that the open air, even without tents, would be better than the crowded factory, Captain Carver and I chose a camping place. I wrote to the Vali for his health officer, and we propose to clear the factory to-morrow morning. Commander Carver has made all arrangements.

April 30, 1909.

Alleged outbreak of Small-pox.—A telegram was received from Captain of "Swiftsure" recalling Commander Carver and all the men but two, owing to the outbreak of small-pox. The Commander and I both telegraphed in reply; I, to say that all the men were infected and were invaluable here, and the Commander to say that both he and the men volunteered to stay if they could.

Clearing Trypani's Factory.—The moving of the men in Trypani's factory began. The food cart went first as a bait, and the people followed in the squads Commander Carver had arranged. The sick were isolated by themselves, the remainder placed in open fields where we are working to make temporary shelters. By midday the factory was nearly empty, and is now being washed out.

Attempts to Disperse.—The Turkish authorities sent to ask me to advise the people to go to their homes; unfortunately one man had been wounded this morning by soldiers in his own home, and the rest were afraid. However, Mr. Chambers and I advised those who wished to return to their houses to go, and I hope to see all of them gradually return as confidence comes back, except those who have been burnt out.

Alleged Small-pox.—The "Swiftsure's" doctor, Surgeon Connell, arrived by the midday train with vaccine. I told him the Turkish doctors did not agree with the German doctor that the disease was small-pox, but said it was measles. Surgeon Connell and I went to visit the sick together, and he found no case of small-pox, but many of measles. We then went to find the German doctor, whom we met on his way to tell us that he was very sorry that, owing to an imperfect knowledge of English, he had said "small-pox" when he meant "measles." I telegraphed to Captain of "Swiftsure" to ask that the men might stay.

New Vali.—The new Vali arrived, and I am expecting to visit him this afternoon.

Flour.—We have now a flour-mill working, and people from Trypani's factory are getting a regular low starvation ration. I hope the new Vali will take energetic measures.

Food Supply.—I received a telegram from the Consul-General at Smyrna: "Admiral telegraphs you require urgent supplies. Telegraph immediately your requirements and mode of repayment. Barnham."

I will answer this telegram when I have seen the Vali.

Two Turkish doctors have arrived.

April 30, 1909, 9 P.M.

Visit to New Vali.—I visited the new Vali this afternoon. It is too early yet to have much of an opinion about him, but he promises peace. I noticed that everybody in the konak seemed afraid, and people in the streets distinctly sullen.

Foreign Interference.—I am afraid that to-day, being Friday, there has been some preaching in the mosques on the unwelcome interference of foreigners, and that the considerable army that is assembled here is to prevent them taking the country.

I have gone out of my way, in talking to Turkish friends, to point out that an occupation, although it has been mentioned in their papers, is not even remotely contemplated by the Powers; that, on the contrary, all we wished to see was a good Turkish Government, and equal justice for all. Another, and more undoubted cause of unrest are the police parades through the streets with strings of Armenian prisoners. They claim to have arrested over 100 Turks, of whom two were found with some sort of gunpowder fuses, to be used to set light to houses.

Refugees.—Commander Carver has got his 10,000 or more people comfortably distributed over the ground. They were all fed, and, assisted by some missionary ladies, the women were set to work to make cotton cloth shelters, as the sun is now very strong. The guard appears to have arrived at dusk, and the officer of my guard is in charge, but the place is perfectly open, and I confess I am much afraid of a panic, which would have horrible results. To-morrow, I hope, some of the people will go back to their houses.

Relief.—I have received telegrams to-night from the Consul-General, Smyrna, saying that he has sent 207 bags of flour. I am hoping this is a present. Also from the Armenian Union, Cairo, sending 200*l.* to alleviate distress in Adana and Aleppo. The Americans received news of a gift of 400*l.* to the relief fund, and more is promised. I spoke to the new Vali about relief, and of our eagerness to help him in every way we could. I told him of the Admiral's telegram through Smyrna, and asked him how I should answer it. He told me that he would make immediate inquiries about food, and let me know. A battalion of Redifs arrived from the Smyrna Leviate.

May 1, 1909.

By the morning train Captain Thursby and the Captains of the German and Italian war-ships arrived to pay their official visits to the new Vali. The three Captains said to the Vali that they congratulated him upon his appointment, &c., but that he had arrived at a very difficult time, and they hoped that by his efforts tranquillity would be restored. They stated that their various interests in the country were solely those of humanity and commerce, but that they wished to aid in every possible way the Ottoman Government, by helping to feed the wounded and hungry, and by endeavouring to restore a little confidence among the homeless refugees. I also spoke of several cases which have occurred these last few days of brutal assaults by soldiers, and hoped that stern discipline would be enforced. The Vali replied that he would do his very best to help, and he thanked all friends willing to assist him. The soldiers in fault would be severely punished. I asked him for an answer to the telegram from the Admiral about the shipload of flour from Smyrna. He said that he would let me know as soon as ever he could. The English and German Captains then went away. The Italian Captain stayed, as he had some business about his Nationalists. I went to call on the new Colonel, who is Acting General of the Division. He is an educated Bosniak, and makes a good impression. He was just about to publish a proclamation, stating that pillagers, murderers, and other criminals would be at once shot by the soldiers, and that every Ottoman should now work for peace and good order in the country.

Captain Thursby afterwards inspected the hospital and encampment at Eneyeni Mahalla, where Commander Carver has made things much more comfortable. Bombardier Hawes, R.M.A., takes over the stores and issues the rations, and does invaluable work.

In the afternoon the Acting General returned my visit.

Captain Thursby was still here, and we gave him details of various offences by the soldiers. Captain Thursby left by the afternoon train.

The General, his staff, and I went round the hospital, Eneyeni Mahalla, and the German factory. The General asked questions of the various wounded men, and noted down their answers. He means, I think, to enforce discipline and punish offenders.

The Vali said this morning that in two days time he hoped to be able to house the greater part of the people, that those whose houses have been burnt will be placed in huts which have already been ordered. The General, assisted by the military police, was to arrange that no soldiers without passes, or not on duty, should be allowed in the town.

They all believe implicitly in the existence of an Armenian plot to set up an independent community. They say that they can now prove that the Hunt̆jak Society had intended—

1. To assassinate all the Turkish officers.

2. To kill the soldiers.
3. To kill as many Moslems as they could.
4. To make themselves an independent community under the protection of some foreign power.

They say that the Bishop Musheck, whom I prevented landing at Mersina, and a certain Gueredalian were the chiefs, and that there were thirty-four members of the Committee, among whom were the three men now in refuge here.

I have received your Excellency's telegram saying that you could not support my proposal as regards these men until you knew what the charges against them were. I have not yet received these charges, but it will be very difficult for me to ascertain whether they are groundless or not, except by my becoming a member of some judicial inquiry into the Hunt̆jak Club. I submit that this would land me in a difficult position, and hope that some other means of solving the question may be found.

A battalion of Roumeliet soldiers have been sent to Mersina.

May 2, 1909.

News comes that the French schools are partly burnt. The priests are safe. I am just going there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 96.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May 2, 1909.*

IN continuation of my last letter, I went to the French school this morning and found about half the buildings destroyed. There had been no loss of life or injury. The fire arose in an empty mosque, used for the storage of cotton, which fills in an angle in the French buildings: the perpetrators unknown.

I went to the konak, but the Vali had never heard that the French school was on fire, but promised immediate help. As I had seen it would be necessary to save what we could of the French property and empty the rest of the building, I called on the Acting-General Mehelet Ali Bey and asked for help. He said he would come at once himself and did so, and sent fifty soldiers; the Brigadier-General commanding the town, and several senior officers. All that could be done was, I think, done. Some inquiry should be made into the conduct of the officers' guard at the French school, who do not appear to have done much.

I visited the American schools, consisting of Mr. Chambers' house and the girls' school, which are only about 80 yards from the French school. I advised the people in both places to pack up and get ready to move, and sent down some of Mr. Chambers' private baggage.

There are fifteen patients in the girls' school.

Whilst we were going round, the Brigadier-General and myself discovered another house on fire, from which an explosion occurred. It was said to be a bomb, and was certainly something of the sort, probably a tin of powder. These sort of things set the Turkish troops so much against the Armenians, and so many ugly stories are flying around, that one cannot feel at all sure that the massacre will not begin again.

I think this deliberate attack on the French may easily be followed by attacks on foreigners.

One battalion of Redifs arrived during the night and another this morning.

In the afternoon I went again to the konak to see the Mehelet Ali Bey and gave him a message from Captain Thursby as to the ugly stories set afloat of Alexandretta.

It is said apparently that the troops of the 43rd Army Corps had been massacring in Adana. This we will deny by every means in our power; further I told him in Captain Thursby's name and my own of the inflammatory language used by the local paper, the "Ittidal." This paper talks perpetually of further punishment of Armenians and of the dangers of foreign interference. He promised to send at once to the editor of the "Ittidal" and reprimand him. I told him that to-night Captain Carver would sleep in Mr. Chambers' house, and asked that a Turkish officer might also sleep there, and that by their presence I hoped to restore some confidence in the miserable people of the quarter, as well as to protect British property. He said it was a good idea and

he would send an officer and a special guard. They were having some sort of military Court of Inquiry on arms found in houses. All sorts of broken old guns and outlandish looking weapons were lying on the floor.

I am afraid suspected persons are probably being put to the question in various ways. A very large number of Armenians have been arrested, and so far none have come back to tell the tale.

From the konak I went to the American and French schools. Outside the French school I met the Vali, who was walking round to see the damage for himself. I took this as a good sign, that he, at any rate, appears not to be afraid of the absurd stories of Feddai, dynamite, &c., which are in every one's mouths. I took him to Mr. Chambers' house, introduced Mr. Lawson Chambers, and told him that Captain Carver was going to sleep in the house to-night with a Turkish officer, and he gave special instructions that he should be in every way assisted and protected.

I went to see Miss Webb, and Miss Wallis, an English lady, who are now nursing fifteen sick women and children in the American girls' school. I had removed from them most of their valuables and as much of Mr. Chambers' household furniture as could be conveniently carried away. Both these ladies were very cheerful and in good spirits.

Mr. Lawson Chambers and Bombardier Hawes will sleep in the house to-night to help in case of emergency.

There are very strong pickets of troops everywhere, and I do not see how the incendiary can get in without their knowledge.

Every Turk in the town is fully persuaded that the Armenians set light to their own houses, with, I suppose, the idea of bringing about foreign interference. They tell gruesome stories of Armenian atrocities on Moslems, such as poisoning the wells with dead bodies, the burning alive of wounded men, atrocities on women and the like.

It is true that some wounded and corpses have been burned, that many bodies have been thrown into wells, and that very many outrages have been committed, but I cannot think myself that many of these have been done by Armenians, who are always in the minority. There have, of course, been exceptions.

So far as I can find out a number of people varying from 500 to 3,000 were killed in the second massacre. I am afraid that the larger figure is more likely to be right on account of the extensive fires. Many streets were blocked by the blazing ruins, and when there was an outlet people were shot. I fear that a large number of wounded were burnt in some of the churches and schools. It cannot be said that there is any general feeling of sympathy with or sorrow for the Armenian population. The Turks talk still of nothing but punishment. Though there is no killing in the streets there are many stories of murder inside the houses, but I hope that these are exaggerated. The Armenians are now all frightened to death.

The Yeni Mahalli refugees were to-day more or less sheltered by long strips of cloth bought by the Relief Committee. They have all been fed.

M. Trypani has with great difficulty managed to get his mill going, and is grinding flour for us. In his factory, which for some days sheltered about 1,300 people, there has been an enormous quantity of damage done, all his looms are spoilt, some bits of machinery lost or broken, and the stock on hand entirely ruined.

The material loss of British and protected houses will, I am afraid, be very large indeed.

We have been working all day to transport to a place of safety as much of the furniture, pianos, &c., belonging to the French school as had not been burnt.

In the evening all the priests and nuns came down to M. Trypani's house. A guard was left on the house with a fire pump in case of any further attempt.

Received a telegram from your Excellency that British merchants at Smyrna are sending food and medical appliances to Adana. Consul at Smyrna has telegraphed to me, but has received no reply. I wired back that I had received a telegram through the Consul-General, Smyrna, 207 sacks of flour have been sent here, but not a gift, and that Smyrna had asked for further requirements; that I am trying to get the Turkish authorities to say what help they are prepared to give before spending large sums of money, as I have no news yet of any subscriptions, and that I would wire to Smyrna to this effect.

The funds at present stand: my wife and I provided 150*l.* as a gift and 500*l.* as a loan.

The American Mission gave 100*l.*, and 200*l.* has been wired by the Armenian Union of Cairo to be divided in this province and that of Aleppo.

This money has already been largely expended, and I hesitate to order food by the

shipload till I know where more is to come from. I have made myself personally responsible to pay not only the 207 bags from Smyrna, but have bought something like 750 bags of wheat or flour here, and about 200*l.* worth of rice, as well as butter, beans, and olives.

So far I can get no answer out of the Turkish authorities as to what they are prepared to give, although every day they give a certain quantity of flour for the use of refugees.

In my wife's hospital about 200 cases of wounded are treated daily. In the German hospital about the same number. The cost of this is borne by us and the Germans respectively.

Dr. Bokelberg of the German war-ship "Hamburg" is attending to the wounded at the German hospital.

Tuesday, May 3.—I received a note from Commander Carver last night, saying that a fire had broken out near the mosque at the Tarsus Gate, about 300 yards from the American school and to leeward. He said there was no danger to the schools so that I did not go up. This morning, I hear three houses are burnt in the place indicated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 96.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May* 3, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report the following in continuation of my letter of yesterday:—

Note from Captain Carver from the American Mission that the Brigadier-General Mahemet Ali Bey appeared on the scene of the fire last night about five minutes after Captain Carver himself arrived. The General took active and energetic measures to limit the fire area.

Before he got to the fire the promised Turkish officer had never been sent to the American Mission. The General now put this right.

I had an informal meeting this morning on the subject of the relief work with Mr. Chambers and the Director of the Ottoman Bank. Before the second massacre we had lists drawn up from each community of people wanting food, numbering some 15,000. We had a regular Committee formed. The Vali had nominated two members.

The second massacre disorganized everything. I do not know whether all the Committee members are alive. The communities are hopelessly scattered. It is said that 3,000 more people had been killed; a larger number than ever are homeless on account of the burning of the town. The lists are all burned.

The bulk of the Armenian population are in refuge in our camp at Yeni Mahalla and in Mr. Stockel's factory.

The relief work now is to feed the people in the camp and factory, a special camp, and the five hospitals. This we continue to do.

The Ottoman Bank is prepared to grant us credit, and for the present I propose to carry on like this until I can re-form another Committee. At present it would not be safe for Armenians to come to this house, which is closely watched on account of our undesirable revolutionary refugees.

Also the change of Valis, who may require slight changes, perhaps, among the Mostem members. The meeting of this morning think it best to have one central Committee to receive all subscriptions and to distribute them to different places which would form Sub-Committees. Also to add to the Central Committee the Adana Director of the Ottoman Bank.

I wrote to-day to Tarsus to Dr. Christie to ask him to form a Sub-Committee, and shall ask the French Consul to be President at Mersina.

The captain of the French ship and the French Consul came up to-day; they will take back to Mersina all or most of the priests and nuns. They say there are now many troops in Mersina, and there is an uneasy feeling.

The French Consul told me that a week ago in Beirout papers said that England

had occupied Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana. I suppose this arose from the landing at Alexandretta of the Consular Guard. There is also a story that the American battleships who are coming are to seize the Turkish war-ship and hold her as hostage for indemnity. It is said here that the French priests for an indemnity burnt their own schools.

All these things, distorted and exaggerated, produce a strong anti-foreign feeling.

If it became necessary to land troops at Mersina, it might be the signal for a fresh massacre here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 96.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May* 3, 1909.

AS soon as I closed my last letter, I received a visit from the General Mahemet Ali Bey and his staff officer. The General, who has now twenty-one battalions under his command, had come to tell me among other things that he was going to remove the sarik, or white hat-band round the fez that all Moslems put on for the massacre and are still wearing. He also told me that he was sending a battalion of troops out to-morrow to cut some of the harvest. This is highly necessary work, and I am very glad he is taking it in hand.

Certain matters of discipline among his troops, which had been brought to his notice in our hospital, were mentioned; he said he was most anxious to discover the perpetrators of such crimes and to punish them severely.

I judge him to be an honest, capable, and hardworking officer. His weakness being, like all other Turks, he puts down the massacre solely to the Armenian revolutionists, and even declares that they burnt their own houses in order to claim compensation.

The Russian Consul, and the Commander of the Russian ship which arrived yesterday, also called upon me. They had been to see the Vali.

In the German factory there are 5,000 people being fed. The Captain of the German ship is sending up food for these people, but by some stupid misunderstanding, not of his or Mr. Stockels making, there has been four days delay. Mr. Stockel is a member of the Central Relief Committee, and will, of course, work with us according to his requirements. He is entirely of opinion one Central Committee is a necessity which will be able to feed local Sub-Committees and Heads of Communities.

The total number of people fed to-day at Yeni Mahalla was 12,600.

I inclose herewith, a report from Mr. Herbert Gibbons for your perusal,* and I shall be glad if you will return same at your convenience.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 96.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May* 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report the following, in continuation of my letter of yesterday:—

Arrests of Armenians still continue on a large scale; there are over 200 in custody. One man with a bullet wound in his leg and unable to walk was arrested as he was being carried to my wife's hospital. I protested against the inhumanity of this; the Vali, in reply, sent a police officer to say that the man had been questioned and found guilty; he would now be sent to the Turkish hospital. If this is true he will be the only Christian in it. We have in our hospital two or three Moslems, a Syrian priest, and one at least of his flock. The rest are all Armenians.

Thirteen thousand five hundred people were fed in the Yeni Mahalla camp to-day.

* Not printed.

Some blankets received from Beirut were distributed. I thought it well to raise the ration, which now amounts to one oke of bread, one oke of flour and half an oke of rice to every eight men, and occasional olives and beans. The sick get soup and milk, as well as flour, rice, and oil.

I asked for a medical inspection of the camp to-day, two doctors were sent. I am afraid dysentery will soon be very prevalent. We have fixed on a spot for the dysentery camp and made thirty shelters for it. There is already a measles camp containing 300 or 400 people. Two dispensaries have been opened to-day, one under the Turkish doctor and one under Miss Wallis, an English nurse.

The Captain of the "Swiftsure" wrote to me officially on the subject of hastening some arrangements by which the Turkish authorities could take over medical and other relief, so as to set free the men from his ship in case he had to sail. He has recalled Commander Carver to-morrow, but kindly replaces him by a Lieutenant, temporary. I hope to have the pleasure later in sending an official Report to your Excellency on the invaluable assistance afforded by officers and men of the "Swiftsure."

The German factory was cleared to-day, and the men camped down in a similar quarter to Yeni Mahalla. They will number about 3,000—4,000 from the factory and 4,000 from outside. We are again working to prepare lists from the various communities of those in absolute want.

An Armenian Bishop from Constantinople called on me to-day; he said that his community were most anxious to work with the Central Relief Committee. I replied that the Committee existed to help everybody, and that if he would nominate a member and prepare a list we would supply the rations temporarily. He said he would do so, and further that he would have all supplies sent by his co-religionists consigned to me for better distribution. This Committee will replace the first nominee of the Gregorian community, who has now escaped to Cyprus.

On going into the ways and means, I find that we have spent at present about 1,600*l.* on relief, and that we have received about 1,300*l.* as donations, of which the bulk are 500*l.* from the Ottoman Bank and 500*l.* from the American Mission. I am most anxious to get the people back to their homes, but there is as yet no confidence.

I received from your Excellency a telegram offering me an Assistant for a month or two; I have replied that while the "Swiftsure's" were available such assistance was not absolutely necessary, but if they are withdrawn it will be most gratefully accepted.

Efforts are being made to get the people to go out harvesting: no Christians dare do it; but a new English threshing machine steamed away from the railway station to-day. Work in the fields and factories will tranquilize the country more than anything else. Turkish friends have assured me that there will be no more trouble, but I heartily distrust the vindictive spirit which shows itself in all the officials.

A large number of troops have arrived, of which I propose to send your Excellency a list to-morrow. I cannot discover myself any necessity for 10,000 men in Adana, and I am afraid they will further accentuate the distress already existing.

A certain number of seriks have been taken off to-day, especially in this quarter.

No proposal as to relief has reached me from the Vali yet; he asked for time to go into the food question.

I think I forgot to report the destruction of Missis. When Lufti Bey, who in the beginning preserved it, left for Hadjin, it is said that all the Christians were killed and their houses burnt.

I received your Excellency's telegram that a Military Commission to inquire into the massacres and fix responsibility was coming from Constantinople, and that the Chamber there had voted 20,000*l.*

It is said here that the extraordinary activity in arresting Armenians is caused by the desire of the local authorities, such as, if I may guess, the Ferik and his staff officer (Selim Bey), to whitewash themselves by the discovery of some monstrous plot, and to punish while they still have the power. Mahemet Ali Bey was in Erzeroum on or soon after the massacre fourteen years ago. He seems to me an intelligent man and a good soldier, but certainly detests Armenians. However, I do not believe that he will be guilty of the cruelties of which I strongly suspect the other two.

7 A.M., *May* 5.—A shot was fired about midnight, and a panic ensued among the Armenians, who left the German factory yesterday. Bugles from all directions sounded, and in about an hour everything was quiet. I don't know yet what damage was done. The officer of my guard has now charge of all the patrols around the

refugees, and had reported to me the night before what steps he had taken, which appeared to be sufficient.

By the sound of the bugles he had men all round the quarter where the disturbance was. It is said the shot was an accident.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[18458] No. 97.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 337.)
Sir, *Pera, May 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from the British Acting Vice-Consul at Diarbekir reporting on the disturbed state of that vilayet. A third despatch, of which copy is also inclosed, shows the remarkable and unexpectedly calming effect which the news of the deposition of Abdul Hamid produced on the local population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 97.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, April 21, 1909.*

OWING to the extraordinary state of unrest now prevailing here, and to the resulting uncertainty as to how matters really stand, I find some difficulty in describing to your Excellency the present situation in the town and Vilayet of Diarbekir.

Ever since the news of the fall of the Hilmi Pasha Ministry reached this town, rumours—some of the most alarming character—have been rife. On receipt of your Excellency's telegram of the 15th instant I considered it prudent, in order to allay the fears of the Christians here, to let it be known that tranquillity was being established at Constantinople and that there was nothing to fear.

The impression caused by the receipt of last week's telegrams from Constantinople and other quarters produced consternation among the greater number of Christians here, while a smaller party appeared to be inclined to adopt a somewhat bellicose attitude.

Both my French colleague and myself let our opinions as to the necessity of a calm and circumspect attitude being adopted be known locally, with the result that during these critical days the Christian inhabitants have pursued a wise and prudent course, displaying an attitude of indifference to the wild rumours that were flying about and a trustful confidence in the capability of the Government to quell possible disturbances.

I have also had interviews with his Excellency the Vali and the General Commanding the garrison, to both of whom I expressed the strong hope that all the necessary steps would be taken to quell at once any disorder.

There was a danger for a time of the Kurdish Club coming to blows with the members of the Ittihad Committee, the former having taken as their motto, "Away with the Kanoun Essassi! Give us the rule of the Sheriat and Padischah!"

The attitude adopted by Nazi Effendi and Sevidin Pasha at this juncture cannot be too strongly condemned. They have been daily inciting their followers to what appears to be nothing else than an anti-Christian campaign. On the 16th instant a mob of their followers invaded the Ottoman Telegraph Office, and forced the authorities to dispatch a telegram to Constantinople, containing 2,000 signatures, in which joy and thanks were expressed at the news of the revival of the Sheriat.

This last week has given a startling proof of the fact that this town is a hotbed of lawlessness and race hatred. In my humble opinion, also, the local Committee of the Ittihad are hardly more sincere in their wish for a "better era" than the majority of the Eshrefs. The former are, however, kept in check by the central Committees, who appear, fortunately, to be of a different stamp from many of the branch Committees, and which, like the Diarbekir Committee, are composed of utterly unimportant Yuzbashis and minor officers of not exceptional intellectual ability.

On the 20th instant a battalion of infantry (4th battalion 74th Regiment) arrived here from Dersim. The troops had been sent with the object of punishing the Karakotchi and other tribes for their raids, but on the request of the Vali and Ferik they have been ordered to remain temporarily at Diarbekir. There are now, therefore, two battalions quartered just outside the town, and, provided that the soldiers are to be relied upon, there is now sufficient military force to prevent the outbreak of disturbances.

The town is just at this moment suffering from a plethora of contradictory news; contradictory telegrams arrive from the Ittihad centres, and, although reassuring telegrams have come from the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh-ul-Islam, very little credence is given to these latter, especially among the Christian inhabitants, whom it is hard to make believe that any good can come from such quarters.

The fact is that with this stream of telegrams, all couched in different terms, nobody knows what, or how much, he ought to believe, and it is therefore impossible for a correct idea to be formed of the existing state of affairs at Constantinople.

In conclusion, I only beg leave to be allowed to state that, though there are at present no signs of immediate danger in the vilayet, it is only too evident that, when dealing with such highly inflammable material as the population of these districts, too great a caution cannot be insisted upon, and the immediate adoption of measures on the part of the Government, which would reassure the timorous and overawe the agitators, is a matter that, in my humble opinion, calls for immediate attention.

By such measures I mean the permanent upkeep of a sufficient military force, the giving of strict and exceptional orders to the Vali and the Commander of the troops, and the spreading of reassuring news—if such be possible—throughout the whole vilayet at the earliest possible moment.

Otherwise, though all is quiet now—and my French colleague is strongly of the same opinion—a crisis may break out that may have far-reaching and deplorable results.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 97.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, April 27, 1909.*

THE two telegrams of the 24th and 25th instant respectively, which your Excellency saw fit to transmit to me, were most opportune, as it enabled me to form an accurate idea of the state of affairs now existing at Constantinople.

Though all is still quiet here in the town, disquieting signs are not absent, and for this reason—and in order to calm the fears of the Christians—I went on the 25th instant, together with my French colleague, to call on the Vali and the General commanding the garrison.

In our interviews we laid stress on the gravity of the situation, and requested formal assurances that the necessary measures would be taken to quell possible disorder.

Both his Excellency and the Ferik gave us explicit assurances that, apart from any very exceptional circumstances, they would be perfectly able to enforce order, and further stated that they had already taken the fullest precautions.

After our departure the Vali summoned the heads of the Moslem and Christian communities, and warned them most severely that they would be held responsible in the event of disorders arising in their several communities.

His Excellency had also caused notices to be put up in the town to the effect that anyone who is found inciting to riot will render himself liable to being shot on the spot by the troops.

A telegram in the above sense has also been sent to all the outlying Kazas.

While matters seem fairly satisfactory in Diarbekir itself, news from the Kazas is more disquieting.

On the 23rd instant a public crier ("delal") created a panic amongst the Christians at Severek by proclaiming—as regards the Christians—"Let us cut the leaves off the tree, but leave the roots," by which it was meant that the rich Christians should be massacred with impunity, but that the working classes should be spared, as being a useful asset to the inhabitants in general.

Such words might have had most serious results, especially as such an exhortation

would be sure to find favour amongst the majority of Kurds, but it appears that the Mutessarif acted on this occasion with most commendable energy and promptness by firstly throwing the public crier into prison, and subsequently taking all the necessary measures to prevent disturbances.

On the 24th instant the Kurds (Moslems) of Sullivan and Bischeri sent a telegram to the Vali asking whether "they might protect themselves, as the Christians were about to attack them."

When it is stated that the Christians in these two places only number about 10 per cent. of the population, both the absurdity, and also the true meaning, of such a request will be understood.

His Excellency immediately perceived that this request to be allowed to defend themselves was really the Kurds' method of asking to be allowed to attack the Christians, and at once telegraphed to the Kaimakams of those two places that stringent measures must be taken to prevent any attack being made on the Christians there.

The attitude adopted by the leading Moslems of this town is one of pooh-poohing any idea of danger, joined with empty expressions of their great regard and esteem for their Christian fellow-countrymen.

The Christians, on the other hand, are inclined to go to the other extreme and to regard every Moslem as an enemy whose sole idea is to kill them at the earliest opportunity.

My own humble opinion is that, among the lower-class Moslems and Kurds, there certainly does exist an ever-burning fanaticism, but that there are many Moslem officials and officers who are sincere in their determination to put down any attempts to attack the Christians and who are really desirous of coming to a better understanding with the latter.

That there is absolutely no danger of any fanatical explosion is inaccurate, and those who most openly affirm this do so probably from mischievous motives, but that any great disturbances will take place in the near future in this vilayet is, I am glad to be able to say, unlikely.

If, however, license and disorder were to become rife in all the surrounding vilayets, it cannot be denied that the bad effects would be felt here, and it is doubtful whether the Local Government would then be able to cope with this unruly and excitable population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 97.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Diarbekir, April 28, 1909.*

SINCE my despatch of yesterday's date much has happened that may tend to the allaying of those fears expressed in that despatch.

Although to-day the whole town is making universal celebration, we passed through a critical moment on the afternoon of the 27th instant (yesterday).

About 5 P.M. yesterday afternoon a panic started among the Christians, and caused great excitement for about the space of two hours. People ran wildly hither and thither, the most frightened screaming out that a massacre had begun.

The trouble appears to have started by a Kurd stealing some tobacco which belonged to the "Regie," and the sight of the thief running away, pursued by a gendarme, seems, in some inexplicable way, to have so terrified some Christians standing by that they at once rushed into the Christian quarter and started this general panic.

Very soon afterwards, however, order was restored and panic was changed into a frenzy of joy, as the report got about that a new Sultan had been proclaimed.

At about 11 P.M. an enormous crowd, whose numbers it was impossible to estimate in the darkness, and headed by the military band, came to this Vice-Consulate and sent up repeated cheers for His Majesty and the British nation. An officer then made a short speech in French, in which he requested me to transmit the thanks of the army and Ottoman nation for the friendship of the British nation to your Excellency.

In reply, I confined myself to saying that I would gladly transmit their thanks and

good wishes to your Excellency, and expressed my hopes for the continued prosperity of the Turkish nation.

After continued cheering the crowd gradually dispersed and made a series of demonstrations before the French Consulate and in other quarters of the town.

To-day both my French colleague and myself have received official communications from the Vali informing us that "the official reception in honour of the accession of His Imperial Majesty will be held at noon."

I only beg to point out that the name of "His Majesty" is not stated in the communication, nor has my French colleague received any official intimation from his Embassy informing him of this important change.

How this great change will affect the vilayet it is impossible, so early, to predict, but Christians and Moslems appear to be just now giving themselves up to a day of delirious joy, and it is to be hoped that the new state of affairs may tend to minimize those difficulties upon which I have dealt in my despatch of yesterday's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[17453] No. 98.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo on the subject of the proposed loan to the Shoikh of Koweit.

I am to transmit copies of correspondence with the Treasury,* from which you will perceive that the Lords Commissioners adhere to their views in regard to the incidence of cost as stated in the Treasury letter of the 8th ultimo.

I am to inquire whether, in view of the further considerations advanced by the Lords Commissioners, the Secretary of State for India is willing now to agree to their proposals for a solution of the question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18136] No. 99.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant respecting the occupation of Nawa in the Hinterland of Aden by a Turkish Arab Sheikh, and the entrance into Dubai of the Mausatta Sheikh, and to state that he concurs in the instructions which the Government of India propose to send to the Resident at Aden, that he should endeavour to secure the withdrawal of both encroaching parties provided that he does not in any way commit the British Government to action.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18843] No. 100.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Paris, May 18, 1909.*

M. DENYS COCHIN, the well-known Conservative Deputy, yesterday put a question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the recent massacres in the Alexandretta region, and the action which the French Government had taken or should take in the circumstances.

He read to the House two letters, one from Alexandretta and the other from Mersina, dated the 24th and 26th ultimo, giving details of the massacres, and a telegram of a later date in which the complicity of the Turkish troops was mentioned †

* No. 80.

† Not printed

M. Denys Cochin asked whether the French Government had shown sufficient encouragement to the new régime in Turkey. He hinted that French diplomacy in Turkey had not been all it should have been in the circumstances, and read a translation of an extract from the "Times" respecting the retiring French Ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that he was too favourable to the Hamidian régime and had done nothing to neutralize the re-establishment of German influence in Turkey.

M. Denys Cochin went on to ask whether the French men-of-war sent to the coast of Asia Minor were to be of no use in stopping the massacres should they recommence; there ought to be no hesitation in allowing the French forces to disembark with this end in view.

M. Pichon, in replying to M. Denys Cochin, gave a short account of the disturbances and of the steps taken by the French Government to bring relief to the victims. As soon as the state of affairs in Asia Minor became known two cruisers were placed at the disposal of the French Embassy at Constantinople, and were subsequently reinforced by two other ships. Instructions were given to the Commanding Officers to concert with the Consuls to give refuge, if necessary, to the French colonies, to foreigners, and to the natives, whether Christian or not, whose lives were in danger. He had further been careful to come to an understanding on the subject with the various Governments who had sent naval forces to the locality. It was important that the action of the Powers should be concerted and that all unnecessary provocation should be avoided.

M. Pichon then dealt in detail with the sums of money voted by the Government and contributed from other sources, and paid a tribute to the offer of assistance made by the Red Cross Society. He also gave an account of the steps taken by the Ottoman Government to repress the disorders, and referred to the delegation sent by the Armenians to the Sultan, who had promised to take measures to restore order. The incident of the Turkish troops taking part in the massacres was an isolated one, and they had since done good service in preventing their recurrence.

With regard to the question of rights of protection, M. Pichon stated emphatically that the French Government were determined to exercise them. These rights were based on tradition and on right; they rested on the Capitulations, the Treaty of Paris of 1802, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and on the Franco-Turkish Arrangement of 1901.

Hundreds of French establishments had to be safeguarded, the preponderance of the French Bank in the East must be assured, and the privileged situation of France and her philanthropic and political interests had to be guaranteed; these were tasks which the Government would not fail to carry out. The profound change which had just taken place in Turkey must be taken into account. They were no longer in the presence of a Government which deliberately shut its eyes to the progress of civilization in Europe, which condoned the greatest crimes if it did not instigate them, and which tried to solve the Armenian question by massacring the Armenians.

"We are," said M. Pichon, "face to face with the foundation of a constitutional régime; the emancipation of a people, and the freeing of a nation. We must have confidence in Young Turkey. Not only must we do nothing to hinder her development, but we must make efforts to encourage and facilitate her evolution."

M. Pichon concluded his speech by expressing his confidence in the Young Turk Government to do its duty in preventing a recurrence of the massacres. This would be their best way, he added, of proving their gratitude for the confidence and friendship which France had shown and would continue to show them.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an account of the debate extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of to-day's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[18869] No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 15th April, relative to interruptions in the telegraph service between Bussorah and Bagdad.

India Office, May 18, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 101.

Consul-General Ramsay to Government of India.

Sir, *Bagdad, March 5, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my despatch No. 230/22, dated the 5th March, 1909, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

2. The last reference to this subject is my letter No. 64, dated the 25th January, 1909.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 101.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 230/22.)

Sir, *Bagdad, March 5, 1909.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with my despatch No. 223/20, dated the 1st March, 1909, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received from the Director of the Persian Gulf section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department an estimate of the financial loss caused, to the Turkish Telegraph revenue derived from the international traffic, by reason of defective communication.

The Director says that the traffic viâ Fao is very small, owing to the fact that the route is so unreliable, and he says that if improvements were made the traffic would largely increase. Calculations based on the actual figures for 1908 show that the interruptions in the Turkish lines, which almost always take place between Bussorah and Amarah, cost the Turkish Telegraph Department annually 52,750 fr. It seems clear therefore that a wireless installation would be as profitable to the Government as it would be to the commercial interests of the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 101.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 223/20.)

Sir, *Bagdad, March 1, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 63/5, dated the 25th January, 1909, inclosing a copy of my despatch (sent through His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to the Board of Trade regarding the establishment of wireless telegraphy stations in Mesopotamia.

When I saw the Vali to-day he asked me to let your Excellency know that he had written on the subject of wireless telegraphy to Constantinople, and he hoped that the Embassy would be kind enough to interest itself in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[19063] No. 102.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 340.)

Sir, *Pera, May 15, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 322 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, informing me that the presence of a gun-boat at Bussorah for the protection of British lives and property is now no longer necessary. Mr. Crow has informed the Commander-in-chief in this sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[19387] No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 346.)

Sir, *Pera, May 17, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 334 of the 11th May, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith four further despatches which have reached me from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mersina, giving an account of the events at Adana up to the 8th May.

The letter of Mr. Chambers, contained in the last of these despatches, is interesting as giving a glimpse into the point of view of the Turkish populace, who appear to have believed—a belief into which they could doubtless have been persuaded with but little difficulty, and for which some plausible grounds could easily be provided—that the Armenians were preparing a massacre of the Moslems, and that they were thus fighting a righteous and holy war. It is to be presumed that the Vali and the Military Commandant would have had no trouble in checking the disorders at the outset, had they acted with the smallest amount of determination, and it is questionable whether their inaction was not due to complicity rather than to cowardice, though the latter may have prevailed eventually.

It is extremely regrettable to note that the new Vali, Mustafa Zihni Pasha, is acting with marked hostility and partiality against the Armenians, but it is to be hoped that the special court-martial, and the Civil Commission, which, after all, is to be dispatched to the spot by Parliament, will rectify his action, and will specially amend the composition of the Relief Committee. The Vali himself is a Kurd connected with Bagdad, and this accounts for his appointment to the presidency of that body of such a man as Abdullah Bagdadli.

A similar line has apparently been taken by the Mutessarif of Jebel Bereket (that portion of the Adana Vilayet which comprises Payas, Deurt-Yol, Bagché, and other places where massacres have occurred), to judge by telegrams from him which have appeared in the local press, and which form my eighth inclosure. Statements of this nature tend to produce an unfortunate effect on the Government itself, as the Mussulmans are led to think that one of the results of the constitutional régime is to expose them to successful attacks from Christians.

With regard to the three Armenian refugees mentioned in my telegram No. 187 of the 12th May, I learn from Major Doughty that no specific charges have so far been brought against them, and that they are still sheltered at the Consulate.

The brutality of the massacre at Bagché seems perhaps to be somewhat in excess even of that shown elsewhere.

It is satisfactory to find that the suspicion entertained by Major Doughty of the conduct of the Roumelian troops have not been confirmed.

The latest news I have received by telegraph from Major Doughty is more reassuring. The people are beginning to leave the camp for their houses and vineyards—a highly desirable thing, as it is vital to secure as much of the harvest as possible, and also because the camp was threatening to become a centre for the spread of disease.

The Relief Committee are encouraging the movement by giving the people rations for four days and some tools.

The matter is occupying a full share of the attention of the Central Government and also of the Chambers, whilst the Sultan himself has undertaken to be President of

an International Relief Committee, having received the delegates of the Patriarchate in special audience yesterday, and he has promised that those guilty shall be severely punished. Consequently, it appears unnecessary for this Embassy to make formal representations on behalf of the Armenians, and undivisible, lest they should be considered to be interfering in internal affairs, which the proper authorities are, of themselves, doing their best to remedy. Further, you will notice from the first of the two despatches from His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirout, which I have the honour to inclose herewith, that the excesses in the Adana province "have caused the deepest regret in Moslem circles" there, and I have good reason to believe that this feeling is shared by respectable Moslems throughout the country. The authorities at Latakia and throughout the Beirout Vilayet were successful in checking all disorder in that province.

A curious Rescript of the Chamber has been addressed, under the signature of the President, to the Governors of provinces where the Armenian population is considerable, enjoining fraternity amongst the different religions. I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

In obedience to your instructions, I expressed to Rifaat Pasha the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that a full inquiry would be made into the massacres in the Adana district, and that it would be carried through with impartiality, and I trusted that the perpetrators who were found guilty would meet with the punishment they deserved. Rifaat Pasha begged me to assure you that the Turkish Government had been much pained by these events, and the strictest orders had been given for an impartial inquiry. I said it seemed to me unfortunate that figures had been published showing that the numbers of Moslems killed had been far superior to the Christians. Nobody believed this to be the case, and it created the impression that the Government did not really mean facts to see daylight. His Excellency, however, declared that these figures were not given officially. He believed that the total numbers had been very much exaggerated, and that they probably did not amount to more than 2,000. I advised his Excellency not to allow himself to be carried away too far in wishing to minimize the massacres, for these figures in no way corresponded to mine. I knew how difficult it was to form a correct estimate of a disaster when all was confusion, but the figures he quoted to me were, I felt sure, below the mark.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May 5, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report the following in continuation of my despatch of yesterday:—

I heard yesterday from Konia that it appears for twenty-four hours everybody was much afraid, and shops were closed, and many people took refuge in my house. A certain notorious fire-brand named Sheikh Ibrahim, of Cassaren, was in Konia. Mr. Sayabalian, my dragoman, asked for this man's removal; he also tried to persuade the Armenians to open their shops. Altogether he appears to have acted well and to have received from the Vali all the assurances necessary. The tension only lasted until the arrival of the news of the Sultan's dethronement, when all classes of the population displayed enormous enthusiasm and perfect confidence returned. Sheikh Ibrahim had been banished and a battalion of troops were under orders to go to Konia.

I answered Captain Thursby's official letter on the subject of the marines but to us here in Adana, saying that I quite understood that they might be recalled at any moment, and that we were endeavouring to organize a system in which they could be withdrawn more easily than at present. Commander Carver, who has been of the greatest possible service here, left to rejoin his ship. His place was taken by Lieutenant Phillips.

I received a further letter from Captain Thursby to the Vali and delivered it in person, translating it into French for his dragoman. In general terms it was to ask for assurance for safety for Europeans, and for the taking over of relief to wounded and refugees. Captain Thursby further said that the presence of the war-ships at Messina might have a disturbing effect on the country, and that they were only waiting for

some peaceable improvement in the situation in order to disperse. The Vali answered verbally, and will answer in writing, giving all possible assurances, saying that he was looking after the wounded and refugees—which is not in the least accurate, for the food he sends feeds, perhaps, 3,000 men, as against which 22,000 are on relief. He said that he had received a credit of 30,000*l.* from Constantinople, whereas we have only heard of 20,000*l.* I talked to him of the Relief Committee, and showed him a list of its members. The Committee consists of—

Myself, as President;
Mr. R. R. Chambers, of the American Mission;
M. Stöckel, German factory;
A delegate from the French priests;
Three Moslems;
M. Costi Trypani; and
A representative from each of the three Armenian churches.

I told the Vali that our object was to help the Ottoman authorities, and for that purpose it was better that we should each know what the other was doing so as not to overlap. I asked him who would administer the 30,000*l.* referred to. He said that a certain Abdullah Khadri Effendi Boghdadli will be President. I confessed this information startled me. This man has been a notorious robber for many years, is a bitter fanatic, and is freely accused of having started the massacre. He went down to the bazaar with twenty armed men, and on his farm all Armenian cultivators, numbering, I believe, about 200 and entirely unarmed and helpless, were butchered on the first day. The new Vali is also always with a certain fanatical Hodja. He even sends for this man when I go to see him. I know from the Russian dragoman that he has already been trying, through the unpaid dragoman here whose interests are entirely in his hands, to get a declaration that the whole affair was caused by the Armenians and by nobody else. He seems a stronger man than the late Vali, but I cannot think he is the man for the situation.

I asked for news from Hadjin, which was reported quiet. I have proposed, under the terms of your Excellency's telegram, to send Mr. Lawson Chambers, there if they will give him a proper escort, leaving here on Friday next. Up to now the Turks have protested that they could not afford a sufficient escort, but as they are sending troops to Hadjin to-morrow they can no longer say this.

Martial law, the Vali informed me, had been proclaimed. A fortnight ago this step was highly necessary. It can now be used in the present temper of the Turkish authorities as a cloak for wholesale executions of Armenians, which will again terrify the country. However, I hope it may be administered by the better sort of officer and that my fears in this direction may prove groundless.

Granting that certain Armenian revolutionaries had done an enormous amount of harm, the general population may be thought to have expiated their crimes by the loss of 20,000 men and burning of their houses, and their complete and abject poverty.

I received to-day 200*l.* from Messrs. Lynch for the Relief Committee, and 182*l.* for Miss Wallis from London, which she has placed at our disposal.

We fed to-day 13,425 people in the Yeni Mahalla Camp, while in the German factory the lists show 9,000, of whom M. Stöckel fed 5,000. The remainder have still little means of their own. We made a distribution of several hundred blankets to-day, and telegraphed for more. Fortunately the weather is hot. Few people have ventured back to their homes.

There arrived to-night from Beirout Dr. Dorman, one Syrian doctor, two trained nurses, and one helper. They will be of great use. Messrs. Whittal, of Smyrna, are, I think, sending another nurse.

The new American Consul, Mr. Nathan, from Mersina, arrived and will pass the night at the American school.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, May 6, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report the following in continuation of my letter of yesterday:—

Dr. Andre Papoutsakis, employed as doctor by the Bagdad Railway, arrived from Baghshe. He gave me the following account of the massacre there:

On Wednesday, the 14th April, he went to the Mufti's house and overheard the Mufti and some Hodjas say that they must arm themselves. He asked for a reason, and was given some evasive reply. A patient of his, an American woman, told him that all the Armenians were to be massacred. He went to the Kaïmakam, a friend of his, and asked him if there was any truth in this. The Kaïmakam replied that he did not know, and they went to the konak together, where they found the Mufti. The Mufti promised peace, saying that it was against the Sacred Law to massacre, but that all Armenians deserved to be killed, as they were a filthy nation. The Armenian priest who had been summoned went away crying that they would be killed. Dr. Papoutsakis warned the Germans, and advised them all to gather in one house, and then went to his own, which is half a-mile away. To his house hundreds of Armenians had come for refuge, principally women.

Wednesday night passed quietly; the massacre began Thursday at daybreak, when people were shot, clubbed, and stabbed to death without apparently any resistance being offered. Dr. Papoutsakis states that 200 armed men came into his house and demanded the Armenian refugees. He refused, but after some hours they began heaping tins of kerosine round the house and said they would burn it. He took refuge with the Germans, managing to save such Armenians as he could disguise in European dress.

On Friday morning a large crowd came to the Germans and demanded the Armenian priests who were hiding in the house. A council of war was held and at first the demand was refused, but later on the Kaïmakam sent a message that unless the priests were given up he could not be responsible for the safety of the Germans, that the people were savages and had threatened to kill even him. On this another council of war decided to give up the priests: one was killed at the door, the other was dragged to the mosque and told to become a Moslem. He obeyed and put on a sarik. Afterwards the Mufti in person took him to the door of the mosque and ordered the crowd to beat him to death, which they did. Numberless atrocities were committed, women and children killed and mutilated. The next day some soldiers arrived whom I had telegraphed for to protect these Germans. Instead of doing this, they and the Yuz-Bashi in charge of them said they had been ordered to make war to-morrow, and that they would go to Hassanbeyli. With the Mufti at their head they set out and burnt that village, consisting, I believe, of some 600 or 700 houses, nearly all Armenian. Some of the Armenians escaped towards Zeitoun and some towards Dortyol, but most were killed. In the end soldiers and zaptiehs arrived to take the Germans under escort to Adana, and on their way they brought also Mr. Gunter, an Englishman, from Osmanieh.

I hear that the Bin-Bashi, from Osmanieh, boasted that, thanks to him, there was not one of the vile Armenians left alive in his town. While on the road to Hamidieh it was discovered by the soldiers of the escort that among the Circassian guards and servants of the foreigners was an Armenian, disguised as a Circassian; they wished to kill him, but he was protected by the Circassians and taken safely to M. Sabatier's house in Hamidieh. This gentleman, a Frenchman, not only protected many Armenians, but fed and looked after the refugees. On arriving next day at Missis, it was found that Lufti Bey had saved nearly everybody. This was the Lufti Bey that I sent to Hadjin, which he also saved, but, most unhappily, after his departure Missis was burnt and destroyed. Mme. Papoutsakis was born an English subject and was with her husband throughout this terrible time.

General Mehemet Ali called on me to-day and told me the various punishments he had made against soldiers who had been looting and of his plans for sending out troops in all directions to allow the harvest to be brought in. In this connection I may mention I sent a Greek farmer to the Vali to-day with the following story:

The Greek whose farm had been burnt out nominated a Moslem bailiff to get his harvest for him, not daring to go back himself. The bailiff on arrival had been threatened

by the neighbours, who said that the Christians' harvest was lawful booty, and that they meant to take it themselves. I sent the Greek to the Vali with a note of introduction, to tell his own story. He states that the Vali, in reply, said that he could not meddle in such an affair. The farm in question is only about 3 miles from Adana City. The Greek said, at least give orders that the 150 bodies of dead Armenians in my farm be carried away. The Vali flew into a rage, said he did not believe a word of it, and that if the Greek would send him the Turk who had told him this story he would have him beaten. I report this by way of showing a light on the character of the new Governor, with whom I am more and more dissatisfied. He is a Kurd and the wrong man for Adana.

To return to Mehemet Ali Bey, he went down to our camp in the Yeni Mahalli and made a speech to the Armenians, promising protection and security. This was to try and induce them to return to their homes. Mr. Chambers and I both also advised this, and I believe about 130 people have gone to-night. I hope some more will go to-morrow.

Another battalion of the Hud Army Corps troops arrived to-night, and a battery of six mountain guns. I presume all this force was to resist foreign intervention, but it might also destroy Zeitoun and similar places.

Mehemet Ali Bey asked me eagerly (the "Times" newspaper had just come) what was the opinion in England. I told him that there could be only horror of the massacre, but that the events at Constantinople would certainly be very well received if they promised firm and just Government. He brought me a further answer to my proposal to send Lawson Chambers to Hadjin. Mr. Chambers starts to-morrow with six zaptiehs, and will catch on the next morning the battalion sent out to-day along the Hadjin road. I have officially nominated him to represent me in Hadjin, and have got the American Consul to do the same. I telegraphed to your Excellency to ask for sanction of his expenses. I am glad that he goes with the battalion of troops, for whose peaceable entry he will be some security.

Mehemet Ali Bey again repeated that the real cause of this outbreak was a carefully thought-out Armenian plot. The Armenian Bishop Mushech was to be King, with Guerderdian as Commander-in-chief. At Hadjin they had actually, he said, raised the Armenian flag and had men in uniform enrolled as soldiers, both there and at Dortyol. They chose the critical moment in Constantinople, and selected Adana, rather than Van or Zeitoun, as their capital, on account of the nearness of the sea. They hoped to have provoked foreign interference, which would have been impossible further inland. He agreed with me after a little that perhaps the late Sultan might have seen the opportunity to discredit by massacre any other Government than his own.

Forty-eight hours has been given for looted property to be returned. At the end of this time anybody found in possession of stolen goods will be dealt with under martial law. General Mehemet Ali Bey says that he will not hesitate to shoot or hang a few men for the tranquillity of the country. I told him of my distrust of Baghdadli, as President of a Commission to expend 30,000*l.*; that the man's reputation was a bad one, and, whether the reports about him were true or not, that they were quite sufficient to disqualify him for such a position. He said he would find out about it, as, being a stranger to the country, he did not know anybody.

We fed to-day 14,045 people in our camp. I have not yet the German figures.

Another American doctor and a nurse arrived from Mersina. As both English and German naval doctors are leaving, after consulting with the Germans the Relief Committee have asked Dr. Dorman to assume general charge of our medical requirements, to apportion nurses and doctors to the various hospitals and dispensaries, and prevent them pulling different ways.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Adana, May 7, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report the following in continuation of my letter of yesterday:—

Mr. Lawson Chambers set out for Hadjin. I received your Excellency's telegram allowing his travelling expenses up to 15*l.* I gave him this money and also 100*l.* from

the Relief Fund, with instructions to form a Sub-Committee at Hadjin. I also asked him for Reports from that district and, if possible, from Zeitoun.

Received news that Dr. Sheppard, of Aintab, had arrived safely at Baghsha, and, as President of the Relief Committee, I sent him a telegram asking if he found himself secure there (and his safety is guaranteed by Mehemet Ali Bey) he would like to stay and do relief work in Baghshe and Hassanbeyli. I know from the Report submitted yesterday that both these places have been practically destroyed. I offered to send Dr. Sheppard 50*l.*

I also sent 50*l.* to M. Sabatier, of Hamidieh, as I heard yesterday his factory was full of refugees. An appeal came from Marrash, where they say some of the refugees from Osmanieh and Baghshe have found their way; 50*l.* goes to Marrash.

The Relief Fund received 1,070*l.* from Mr. Peet, of Constantinople. We fed 14,582 people in the Yeni Mahalla camp to-day.

I received a visit from an officer of the Italian war-ship, who came to ask if they could be of service to the Committee. I believe they are very kindly raising funds in Italy to help us. I asked them to nominate a member on the Central Committee if a prominent Italian subject could be found in Adana.

The German war-ship "Hamburg" leaves to-day. The Relief Committee sent them a telegram of gratitude for the splendid work they have done here. They have fed about 5,000 for fifteen days with the able assistance of M. Stöckel, and their surgeon had done excellent work.

M. Grabowski, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a member of the Committee, has kindly undertaken to keep accounts. Subscriptions will be acknowledged in the press from time to time.

I received a visit from the Captain of the Austrian war-ship and his officers. They visited my wife's hospital, and their dragoman, M. Simeonoglon, has kindly placed at her disposal his large house, now empty, for a hospital. This will make hospital work much easier.

I am trying for the Relief Committee to obtain permission to send escorts for refugee women from Missis, &c., whose breadwinners have all been killed, and who are in a most miserable condition. They can be better looked after among their own relations in Adana. The Vali takes curious views of his responsibilities. The Director of the Ottoman Bank told me to-day that he visited the Vali to ask for some protection for the bank against fire. The fires were at that time raging in the city. The Vali replied that there was no danger at all, that nothing under his protection could be burnt. When the Director insisted that there was danger, as the bank might catch fire from neighbouring houses, the Vali said in that case he could not be responsible.

This evening the Vali and Ferik visited the Yeni Mahalla together. The Vali made a short speech assuring the people of safety. One of them replied that the same thing had been said last night; that over 200 men had gone to Ham, and that they were shut in by the police and were starving. This was perfectly true, only it happened to reach my ears, and I had got it altered by means of an able Turkish officer, and the hunji in question imprisoned. The Vali was able to point to this imprisonment as an evidence of good faith.

A new explanation was given me to-day of the second massacre, which I have never been able to understand. It occurred on the night of the arrival of the Roumeliot troops, who have been accused of having caused it. I never did believe this, and the explanation now given is of some interest to me. The Roumeliots had only become acquainted with that part of the town between the station and their camping ground. Of the Armenian quarter they knew nothing. The explanation is that they were pitching tents on their camping ground when shots fell among them from the direction of the Armenian quarter; they were told that these shots were fired by the Armenian revolutionaries. Parties were hurried off into the streets, but all was in confusion and fires were breaking out. They found some of the other soldiers both killing and looting, and the place full of Bashi-Bozouks. It became necessary to clear the streets, which was very difficult for them in the narrow and bewildering alleys, more especially as they did not know who were friends and who were enemies. In the part of the town they did know order, after the first five minutes, was strictly maintained and there were no fires. The shots fired at them which started the whole affair are said now by some of the Roumeliots to have been fired by Turks either with the wish to bring about a quarrel between the different sorts of soldiers or to raise more hope to rush the hated Armenian quarter. I believe the uncomfortable feeling resting on Roumeliot officers for this most unfortunate occurrence is something to do with their eagerness to prove the existence of a

revolutionary plot among the Armenians, and I give this explanation for what it is worth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Adana, May 8, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward the following in continuation of my letter of yesterday:—

I heard to-day that the Greek Patriarchate had demanded the dismissal of the Mutessarif of Mersina. I wired to your Excellency that if this was correct it was due to local intrigues, that the man had saved Mersina from massacre, and was an excellent official. The local enmity against him arises from the fact that he is the first Ottoman official there to refuse bribes and to refuse to be entirely ruled by the Greek clique in Mersina, headed by a certain M. Mavromati, who is the Russian Consul. Personally, I would like to see this official made Vali of Adana. The present man is a reactionary Kurd of whom nothing can be expected.

The Roumeliot officers here are beginning to see more and more the difficulties of their position; they say that there is nobody here they can trust, nobody who is not an intriguer and a fanatic. Reaction is not, I think, likely to take any active shape while they are here, but the whole feeling of the country is or will be against it. I sincerely hope that they will see that their only way is punish offenders.

A still more ludicrous account than that telegraphed to your Excellency of a certain Abdullah Boghdadli as President of the Turkish Relief Committee is that the same man is also President of the Commission of Inquiry into the massacre, of which he was one of the principal authors. This appointment seems to be caused by his being an old friend of the Vali's.

Troops to-day have been sent to Sis, Osmanieh, and Baghshe, all, I think, redifs.

Efforts are being made with some success to recover stolen goods, of which all the Turkish and Arab houses in this quarter are full. The Turks at present are too rich and the Armenians too terrified to work. Some of the barley is already falling, the wheat will not begin for another ten days, by which time I hope there will be more labourers.

I inclose a copy of a letter to Mr. Peet from Mr. Lawson Chambers.

Late this evening I received two bits of news:—

1. That a man I sent out under escort this morning to arrange for a Turkish bailiff to bring in his harvest, which is pledged to the German factory, had scarcely crossed Adana bridge when he met some Bashi-Bozouks. They said, "If you go on further you will never come back." The escort urged him not to fear but to go on, but he had not the courage to do so. This confirms what I hear several times every day, that no Christian dare go out to gather his harvest, and utterly despises the Vali's assurances that all was perfectly safe under his protection.

2. A certain Arab Notable employed by me on the Relief Committee was sent for to the konak to-day, at which loot had been gathered from his quarter of the town. He was told in the konak to pass round the word that all the loot need not be given back, but only a little without value; further, that statements were expected of hundreds of Turks and Arabs killed in that quarter. I rode through the quarter several times myself. It is the quarter in which I was wounded, and I am perfectly certain that a very few Turks were killed in it, while hundreds of Armenians were burnt alive; the women were outraged and then killed. Every house is full of plunder. The Arab Notable, who from the first did what he could to help, and is a friend of mine, sent me word secretly of these messages from the konak. He says he is in danger, and does not know what to do. I have wired to your Excellency in cypher as follows:—

"Vali and his reactionary party sending round secretly to Notables not to give back all booty, and to complain to Government of the loss of hundreds imaginary men. Threats still common. Trouble between Arab and IInd Army Corps troops not impossible. Feel that Vali should be removed."

Rumours have reached me that there is a growing uneasiness among the troops, and I notice that Mehemet Ali Bey is sending redifs out of Adana nearly as fast as he gets them in. The leaders of the reactionary and fanatical movement are perfectly well known; the chief among them has been made President to the two Commissions of Inquiry about relief, *i.e.*, the distribution of the 30,000*l*. I feel strongly that the Vali should be dismissed—nothing good can be expected. If the Reform party in Turkey wish to govern this province they must do so by means of their own men, with force and determination behind them. The present Vali was nominated before the fall of the late Sultan. Stories reach me of a telegram sent, not only here, but to Beirout, Aintab, and Mersina, from the Palace, ordering massacre of Young Turks and Christians together. I do not know if there is any truth in this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 103.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 34.)

Sir,

Beirout, April 30, 1909.

WITH reference to the first paragraph in my telegram of the 16th instant concerning the news received here of the revival of the Armenian massacres at Adana, I have the honour to report that the excesses being committed in that district have caused the deepest regret in Mussulman circles here, not to mention the apprehensions excited among Christians in general.

The American Mission at Beirout has been receiving daily Reports from their Missions in the towns affected and every effort is now being made to send relief in money, clothes, and food.

The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, at present in Beirout, whose diocese extends to Aintab, has also sent an appeal to England in a letter to the papers.

The only town in the Beirout Vilayet seriously affected is Lattakia, where there are some 5,000 refugees from the places to the north, most of whom were conveyed there by the French Messageries Maritimes steamer "Niger" (2,200) and the French battle-ship "Jules Ferry" (1,500).

His Majesty's ship "Triumph" was last reported to be off Cape Basit, relieving the large village of Kessab, after finishing with Suedia, and she will probably have conveyed many more to Lattakia or Alexandretta.

His Majesty's ship "Diana" is also at Lattakia, having gone there on the 27th instant in consequence of a telegram received by me from Mr. Vice-Consul Vitalis and by my American colleague, Mr. Raoudal, from the American Mission there, as to the critical situation caused by the influx of refugees and the hostile attitude of the Mussulman inhabitants.

I am glad to say that in a telegram received yesterday, Captain Kemp, of His Majesty's ship "Diana," reports that though the presence of so many Armenian refugees constitutes a source of unrest, the Governor had collected 500 reserves and expressed himself confident of his ability to maintain order, and as requiring no assistance. No attack from the outside was apprehended.

I am also informed by the Governor-General that he has been sending supplies of bread to Lattakia.

In Beirout itself there are only about 500 Armenians, principally Catholics, and there is no apprehension on their behalf so long as they remain quite. Owing, however, to the state of unrest existing here last week, it was deemed advisable to prevent the landing of a few hundred Armenian refugees from Mersina and they had to go on to Alexandria.

An Armenian Bishop of Adana who was turned back from Mersina and who tried to land here from the British steam-ship "Kosseir," was also prevented from doing so at the special request of the Adana authorities, and he had to go back to Alexandria, where he had embarked.

A great number of refugees from the Aleppo district have arrived in various Maronite towns in the Lebanon, especially at Zalilé.

Yesterday Colonel Mehmed Ali, Chief of the Staff of the Vth Army Corps, left Beirout for Adana to take charge of the troops engaged in the suppression of the

massacres. I am told by his Turkish acquaintances here that he can be relied upon to succeed in his mission, and that they believe he has sufficient troops at his disposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 6 in No. 103.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Beirout, May 7,* 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 30th ultimo, on the subject of the precautions taken at Beirout and Lattakia in connection with the Armenian massacres in the Adana and Aleppo Vilayets, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a Report received by me yesterday from Mr. Vice-Consul Vitale, giving an account of the measures taken at Lattakia to protect the Armenian refugees in that place and to relieve their distress, and in which His Majesty's ship "Diana" (Captain Kemp) took an active and useful part in conjunction with the French war-ships.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 7 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Vitale to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

M. le Consul-Général, *Lattaquié, le 3 mai,* 1909.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le vendredi, 23 avril dernier, des nouvelles furent ébruitées dans cette ville qu'Antioche a été saccagée et sa population chrétienne massacrée et que la horde des massacreurs marche sur Kassab, village arménien relevant d'Alep, sur Baghdgaze et les autres villages arméniens dépendant du district de Lattaquié.

Je n'ai pas manqué alors d'en aviser l'autorité locale, qui a envoyé un officier et dix gendarmes pour protéger et défendre les villages précités, et elle a donné les ordres nécessaires au Mudir du Nahié de Bassit d'aider l'officier et les gendarmes dans leur mission ; mais le soir même un courrier arriva de la part des religieux de la Terre Sainte au Consulat de France sollicitant son secours et l'informant que Kassab est cerné par la bande des massacreurs, et le lendemain matin des fuyards de Kassab sont arrivés et ont annoncé à la mission américaine que le village a été incendié la veille et qu'une partie de la population fut massacrée. Mes collègues de France et d'Italie sont allés avec mon fils voir le Gouverneur et l'ont trouvé à la caserne avec quelques Notables de la ville : à leur demande il a envoyé quarante soldats rédifs avec un officier pour protéger les villages arméniens se trouvant sur les limites et donna des ordres formels au Caïmacan de Sahyoun pour veiller sur la tranquillité des villages arméniens et chrétiens se trouvant dans son caza et les défendre et il a appelé les rédifs sous le drapeau.

L'arrivée des réfugiés de Kassab a surexcité l'esprit de la population mahométane, qui depuis quelque temps s'était approvisionnée d'armes et munitions et qui avait commencé ses menaces aux chrétiens et quelques-uns d'entre eux ont poussé l'audace même jusqu'à se présenter chez le docteur américain et lui demander le renvoi des réfugiés de Kassab se trouvant à l'école américaine, autrement il arriverait des événements fâcheux.

Comme il n'y a pas un Représentant des États-Unis dans ce district, le docteur est venu me rapporter le fait que j'ai communiqué à son Excellence le Gouverneur, qui a envoyé immédiatement un agent de police et deux gendarmes faire la garde à l'école américaine.

Devant tous ces faits et la frayeur générale des chrétiens je vous ai télégraphié comme suit :—

"Kassab latitaro Lattakia buckskins mangeorn keybasket arearon noverins dabriadie sullixing dizzied Lattakia tirselip pledgecup Lattakia.—VITALE."*

* Decode of telegram : "Kassab. Limits of Lattakia completely burnt, many being killed and wounded. Civil authorities have been notified. Danger threatening in districts of Lattakia. Ships urgently needed at Lattakia.—VITALE."

Vous avez bien voulu me répondre :—

"Foreign war-ship will reach Lattakia to-morrow or one day after.—CUMBERBATCH."

Le Vice-Consul de France ayant télégraphié à son Consul-Général pour le saisir de ce qui venait de se passer, dimanche matin, 25 avril, est arrivé le paquebot français "Niger" des Messageries, requisitionné par le Consulat-Général pour se mettre à la disposition du Représentant de cette Puissance sur notre place. Après une courte visite au Mutessarif par le Commandant de ce navire s'est rendu à Bassit (localité située à 26 miles de notre port) pour porter secours aux religieux franciscains qui se trouvaient menacés d'être assassinés dans leur couvent, situé à une heure de Bassit, ainsi qu'à d'autres religieux du même ordre dont le couvent à Kassab avait été incendié et pillé et qui avaient dû se réfugier dans les forêts comme tous les habitants du même village. Prévenus par le sifflement et surtout par quelques coups de canon tirés par le "Niger," les pauvres malheureux ont accouru sur la plage pour s'embarquer à bord du "Niger," qui les a reçus gracieusement et leur a immédiatement fourni la nourriture nécessaire, parce qu'ils étaient épuisés de faim et n'avaient pu rien manger pendant trois jours. Ce paquebot a stationné sur la rade de Bassit toute la journée du dimanche pour recueillir ces réfugiés, et le lendemain matin il est retourné à Lattaquié amenant avec lui 2,211 personnes, dont le plus grand nombre était des femmes et des enfants, qui furent débarqués ici sans aucun incident fâcheux, grâce à la présence de notre Gouverneur, qui s'est immédiatement rendu à bord du "Niger" et qui avait pris toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer leur débarquement. A part 600 réfugiés qui ont trouvé moyen de venir à Lattaquié par terre, le croiseur cuirassé "Jules Ferry" a passé devant notre rade lundi matin, 26 du même mois, se dirigeant sur Bassit pour sauver la vie aux autres chrétiens dispersés à la campagne et dans les forêts ; agissant de la même manière que le vapeur français "Niger," ce navire de guerre est venu dans notre port mardi matin pour débarquer 1,490 réfugiés qu'il avait pu sauver et puis il est parti quelques heures après pour Beyrout avec son Vice-Consul.

Comme dans cet intervalle la population musulmane de notre ville paraissait surexcitée à cause de l'arrivée sur notre place de 5,600 chrétiens réfugiés et que plusieurs mahométans s'étaient permis de dire qu'il fallait massacrer ces ghaours, et qu'il y a eu une terreur dans notre ville, qui ne possédait pas une garnison suffisante pour maintenir le bon ordre, et que la sécurité manquait, et que l'on s'attendait à de fâcheuses complications, j'ai dû, d'accord avec mes collègues, vous adresser le télégramme ci-après :—

"Six hundred refugees arrived yesterday by land, 2,200 Messageries to-day, majority women, children, pitiable condition. Population discontented. Governor managing excellently, must be sustained ; best war-ship remain till arrangements made : situation critical.—VITALE."

Vous avez bien voulu en réponse m'expédier les deux télégrammes suivants :—

"Unopposed strombola castrati forsooth keyring [illegible] cumberbatch.

"'Diana' portraited Lattakia adiantoide.—CUMBERBATCH."†

Mercredi matin, 28 avril passé, notre croiseur "Diana" est arrivé sur notre rade, accompagné par mon fils. Le Commandant a été faire visite à son Excellence le Mutessarif et lui a proposé de lui fournir une assistance au cas où il en aurait besoin pour maintenir la tranquillité publique. Le Gouverneur l'en a remercié en ajoutant qu'il venait de recruter environ 500 hommes comme soldats rédifs, et qu'il espérait maintenir le bon ordre et la tranquillité, et qu'après le départ des réfugiés pour le rapatriement desquels il travaillait il n'y aurait plus à craindre pour le salut de la ville.

La présence du "Diana" pendant trois jours sur notre rade produit l'effet voulu en faisant dissiper la frayeur qui y régnait et en tranquillisant les habitants.

Aussi je me fais un devoir de vous remercier bien sincèrement, M. le Consul-Général, de l'envoi de ce navire, dont la présence ici était aussi nécessaire qu'utile, d'autant plus qu'à part l'arrivée du "Jules Ferry" notre port a été visité par la frégate

* Decode of telegram : "Telegraph at once whether it is certain man-of-war purposes leaving, and I will send you British ship now here.—CUMBERBATCH."

† Decode of telegram : "'Diana' will proceed this afternoon.—CUMBERBATCH."

italienne "Piemonte" et le croiseur cuirassé français "Michelet," qui a séjourné pendant cinq jours à Bassit et a fourni des vivres à 800 personnes qui se trouvaient sur la plage mourant de faim.

Les auteurs des attaques qui ont lieu à Kassab ne sont pas ni des Circassiens ni des Kurdes, comme on l'avait dit, mais les mussulmans habitant les montagnes et les villages environants, dont on assure que le nombre s'élevait à 15,000 personnes.

D'après les renseignements que j'ai pu recueillir, les chefs des personnes criminelles sont Nedjib Aga Soukhta, Mohamet Aga Cassem, et Moustafa Mouhtedi, avec Khalil Kitazo, du district de Lattaquié; ainsi que les Agas du village Bedroussié relevant également de ce district; Djelal Aga, du village Ourdi, Hussein Cherif Aga, Surour Aga, et Aly Aga Younso, des villages dépendant d'Alep. Le Mudir du Nahié Ourdi donnait les ordres et dirigeait l'attaque avec le Moukhtar du village Elcheikh.

Le village de Kassab et ses alentours, dont le nombre des habitants s'élevait à environ 10,000 âmes, ont été pillés, les trois quarts de leurs maisons incendiées, y compris celle appartenant au missionnaire anglais Dr. Martin relevant d'Antioche et celles des missionnaires américains de Lattaquié.

On estime à 800 personnes le nombre des massacrés, sans compter cinquante jeunes filles qui furent enlevées par la violence.

Je crois utile d'ajouter que, sur la demande du Mutessarif d'ici, le "Diana" a remorqué un voilier emportant à Bassit des soldats redifs pour faire la garde au dit endroit et remorquant également un autre voilier chargé de 270 réfugiés pour les rapatrier et comme il devait se rendre directement à Beirout le Commandant vous aura rendu compte de tout ce dont il a été témoin.

Comme l'affluence de ces 5,000 réfugiés qui se trouvaient dans un état pitoyable, casés un peu partout, menaçait la ville d'une épidémie, l'autorité locale a dû prendre des mesures pressantes pour les rapatrier le plus tôt possible. En conséquence, on en a envoyé 700 par la frégate italienne "Piemonte," 1,400 par le croiseur français "Michelet," et, à part environ 300 personnes restées ici, les autres ont été embarquées en deux voyages par le petit vapeur ottoman "Syria."

Il vous appartient, M. le Consul-Général, au cas où vous le jugeriez à propos, de prendre les dispositions nécessaires auprès du Gouvernement ottoman pour faire punir les coupables et faire donner une leçon à la population musulmane afin que des événements aussi fâcheux ne se renouvellent pas à l'avenir.

Je me permets de vous faire connaître que le concours apporté par le Consulat-Général de France dans cette circonstance a été accueilli par les habitants de notre ville avec beaucoup de reconnaissance.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) N. VITALE.

Inclosure 8 in No. 103.

Newspaper Extracts.

Au Ministère de l'Intérieur.

UNE fusillade terrible continue encore. Puisqu'il ne viendra pas de troupes d'Alexandrette, au moins qu'on expédie de Nisse ou d'Alexandrette, sous escorte suffisante ou, à défaut, avec les gendarmes qui seront envoyés ici, 400 martinis et des munitions pour être distribués aux rédifs d'ici par les soins du Gouvernement ou du Capitaine du bataillon. Si, à Dieu ne plaise, une attaque se produit et si les habitants comme les fonctionnaires sont dispersés, les assaillants ne trouvant plus personne devant eux, Hassan Bey et ses 400 fédais se réunissant détruiront tout le sandjiak et iront, selon toute probabilité, jusqu'à Adana. Mais en tous cas, quoi qu'il arrive, l'envoi de troupes régulières est absolument nécessaire, et il serait on ne peut plus dangereux de perdre une minute. Car, il y a plus de 5,000 Arméniens, un grand nombre de mausers, de martinis, et de bombes.

Le Mutessarif de Djébéli Bérékot,
(Signé) ASSIF.

Le 3 avril, 1325.

Au Ministère de l'Intérieur.

Comme je l'ai exposé dans mon dernier télégramme, les armes du bataillon d'Iarpouz ayant été confisquées par la population, il n'a pu être mobilisé et venir d'Alexandrette, aussi est-il fortement présumable que les chrétiens de Dourt-Yol brûleront cette nuit les villages voisins et le chef-lieu du sandjiak. Les Caïmacans de Hamidié, d'Osmanié, et de Hassa ayant communiqué qu'il est indispensable d'expédier d'urgence au chef-lieu un renfort de 300 à 400 hommes, le Conseil Administratif du sandjiak prie le Grand Vizirat de donner des ordres dans ce sens et de hâter cet envoi de troupes au chef-lieu.

Le Mutessarif,
(Signé) ASSIF.

Le 3 avril, 1325

Au Ministère de l'Intérieur.

Dans le télégramme qui vient d'arriver du Caïmacan de Bagtché, il est dit que les habitants se massacrent et que si des troupes ne sont pas envoyées rapidement toute la population musulmane sera assiégée et en danger. Comme notre localité n'a pas de forces suffisantes, non seulement pour là-bas, mais même pour ici, il a été répondu au caza, en cas de nécessité, de recourir à l'aide de la population d'Islahié, par une levée en masse, de s'abstenir de toute agression tant que les Arméniens n'attaqueront pas, mais de riposter dans le cas contraire, comme aussi de recommander absolument aux Notables des deux parties de se garder de pillages, d'incendies, et de meurtres inutiles. La situation du sandjiak est terrible et les morts sont nombreux. Une invasion du chef-lieu par les Arméniens est probable. Prière d'envoyer d'urgence des troupes régulières ainsi qu'une force armée par voie de levée en masse, aujourd'hui, d'Alexandrette. J'attends une réponse au bureau du télégraphe.

Le Mutessarif,
(Signé) ASSIF.

Le 3 avril, 1325.

On voulait des armes et on demandait une levée en masse. Le Ministère n'y a pas consenti. Voici la réponse donnée:—

"*Au Mutessarif de Djébéli Bérékot.*

"On a écrit au Ministère de la Guerre et à Alep d'envoyer immédiatement toutes les troupes disponibles d'Alexandrette et des places environnantes, et à Adana, d'expédier au plus tôt tous les gendarmes, les agents de police, et les soldats qui sont à l'intérieur du vilayet.

"Il est prescrit là-bas aussi de poursuivre et d'activer ces envois, de prendre d'urgence toutes autres mesures possibles, en tout cas d'empêcher absolument les combats, les meurtres, les incendies, et crimes semblables, de faire d'énergiques recommandations aux meneurs des deux parties et, par leur intermédiaire, aux habitants et de faire connaître au Ministère le résultat et la réussite."

"*Le 3 avril*, 1325."

Tel est le télégramme expédié, et voici celui qui fut adressé par le Vali d'Adana en date du 3 avril:—

"*Au Ministère de l'Intérieur.*

"Aujourd'hui aussi, dans plusieurs endroits du vilayet, ainsi qu'au chef-lieu, les troubles continuent. Des patrouilles et des troupes circulent continuellement dans la ville. On emploie les armes contre les assaillants. Les étrangers et leurs établissements ont été autant que possible protégés. Les troupes sont insuffisantes. Quoique l'envoi graduel du régiment de Selfké ait été demandé, il serait très important que le Ministère de la Guerre en prescrivit l'urgence.

"Le Vali d'Adana,
(Signé) "DJÉVAD.

"*Le 3 avril*, 1325."

Rescript addressed to Governors of Provinces.

On débute par la lecture de la Proclamation de la Chambre, adressée individuellement aux Gouverneurs-Généraux des onze vilayets suivants : Trébizonde, Van, Erzéroum, Bitlis, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, Diarbékir, Sivas, Mossoul, Adana, Konia, et Alep. Ce rescrit parlementaire vise au rappel de tous les moyens propres, à ramener la cordialité et les bons rapports entre tous les éléments de la population de ces provinces et indique aussi la voie politique et administrative à suivre pour atteindre au but de l'entente qui s'impose.

Voici cette Proclamation :—

"Comme conséquence d'erreurs et d'instigations, l'union et la fraternité entre les éléments ottomans, musulmans et chrétiens, de l'Anatolie, dont le maintien est nécessaire, ont été altérées. La Chambre des Députés en a eu connaissance avec un grand regret et une pénible impression. Comme tout le monde le sait, le moyen d'assurer le salut et le bonheur de la patrie sacrée ne peut être obtenu que par la fraternité et l'union entre les éléments musulmans et chrétiens de la nation ottomane et par l'éloignement des faits qui peuvent semer, entre eux, la discorde. D'ailleurs, le Chéri et les lois ordonnent expressément l'amour de la patrie. Aller à l'encontre de cette prescription peut amener des maux sociaux et politiques incurables. Aussi la Chambre est-elle fermement convaincue qu'à la réception de cette Proclamation tous les éléments ottomans, plus que jamais, montreront, tous les uns envers les autres, de la fraternité et de la solidarité ; c'est ce que la Chambre conseille et elle est persuadée que ces conseils seront appréciés, et qu'ils provoqueront la démonstration de la philanthropie ottomane."

(Signé) "AHMED RIZA.

"*Le 2 mai*, 1325."

[19402] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 351.)

Sir, *Pera, May 18, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 312 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, reporting that the attempt of Amir Ali Pasha to bring about a peaceful settlement of affairs in the Hauran has only resulted in the conclusion of a three months' truce between the Druses and the Moslems.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 104.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Damascus, May 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Amir Ali Pasha, who was sent by the Government to settle matters in the Hauran in a peaceful way, returned on the 26th ultimo without much success. He was only able to bring about between the Druses and Moslems a truce for three months. The Druses refused to restore the things robbed by them in their raid upon Bussorah, thinking that the Government is at present too busy to deal with them severally. Their Chiefs are mostly inclined towards peace, but a few malcontent persons are still making mischief.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[19404] No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 353.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the course of events in that town on receipt of the news of the events in Constantinople on the 13th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 105.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, April 23, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following account of the events which have taken place at Erzeroum during the past week.

News of the demonstration at Constantinople leading up to the change of Ministry, which your Excellency was good enough to convey to me by your telegram of the 15th instant, had already some little time previously to the receipt by me of the telegram in question leaked out in the town, and there were many callers at the Consulate, among whom two prominent members of the local Committee of Union and Progress, viz., Nazim Bey, the Chief of the Public Debt, and Captain Hisameddin Bey, to inquire whether I myself had any information. In view of the prevailing excitement I felt justified in communicating so much of your Excellency's telegram as I considered would tend to tranquillise public opinion, laying stress on the fact that the capital was quiet, and that Parliament under the new Grand Vizier was continuing its functions. To Nazim and Hisameddin Beys, to whom the fact that the movement had been directed against the Committee of Union and Progress, appeared to be well-known, I ventured further to give the advice that since, as far as I could gather, the Constitution did not appear to be in immediate danger, they would do well to act with great prudence, and to wait for further information from Constantinople. The excitement among the Mussulmans had, however, by this time become so universal, and the feeling that an attempt was being made to bring back the old state of things was so strong that it seems to have been felt by the Committee that expression should be given to it by means of a mass meeting. This, as I had the honour to telegraph to your Excellency on the 17th instant, was accordingly done, and at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, the 16th April, an enormous gathering, estimated at some 10,000 to 15,000 persons, consisting of Mussulmans, Christians, and soldiers, assembled in front of the Government building, all the higher officials, including Tahir Pasha, the Governor-General, and Yussuf Pasha, the Commandant, being also present. Speeches were delivered by the members of the local Committee of Union and Progress, by the representatives of the various communities, Mussulman and Christian, and also, I am informed, by certain of the Ulema, and resolutions, amid much enthusiastic cheering, were passed affirming the determination of all present to adhere to the principles of the Constitution, and to defend them to the utmost. Telegrams to this effect were sent to Constantinople and Salonica with the further statement that the Fourth Army Corps was with the population and ready to furnish a contingent, if required, the Mushir at Erzindjan, I understand, having telegraphed his concurrence. A little later in the day a visit was paid to me by a member of the local Tashnak organization, who, after informing me that a movement was on foot for the formation of a corps of Mussulman Volunteers, and that his Society had reason to believe that an invitation to join it would be extended to Armenians, asked me what my advice was under the circumstances. I replied that I found it difficult to believe that such a measure could be in contemplation, but that, if it were, they would do well to give the matter their most careful consideration before committing themselves to a decision either one way or the other.

On Sunday, the 18th instant, the 7th—Nishantji—Battalion, in pursuance of the decision to effect a counter demonstration by the IVth Army Corps, left for Constantinople, though I have since learned that it was not intended that it should go further than Baibourt; its departure, which took place with military honours in the

presence of Yussuf Pasha and other officers of high rank, being made the occasion of another outburst of popular enthusiasm. On the day following some 800 Mussulmans gave in their names as volunteers, while on Tuesday 300 Armenians marched in a body to the premises of the Union Club for the same purpose, being saluted by the military as they passed, and preparations, I am told, were made to issue arms to both alike in case their services should be required.

Up to the day in question, viz., the 20th instant, the Committee seemed to be masters of the situation, while all information pointed to the fact that the IVth Army Corps were entirely with the population. The general body of Mussulmans, indeed, were so assured of this that they obliged the Governor-General to transmit to Constantinople a telegram, stating that they refused to recognize the authority of the existing Government. This confidence, however, was not of long duration, as, at 8·30 A.M. on the day following—Wednesday—information was brought to me that parties of soldiers unaccompanied by their officers had left their barracks, and were marching through the streets with cries for the "Sheriat" (canon law), the Sultan, and their old regimental officers, as distinguished from the younger ones, who had been through the military school, with the result that a general panic ensued among Mussulmans as well as Christians. All shops were at once closed, and the alarm among the Armenians was so great that many families took up their residence in the houses of their acquaintances near the various Consulates, so as to have a readier means of refuge if required. Further information, however, which I obtained as to the proceedings of the soldiers enabled me to allay somewhat the fears of the Christians in my immediate neighbourhood, and the impression I had gained, that no general massacre or pillage was intended, was strengthened by what I observed on my way to the Governor-General, to whom I paid a visit, having a short time previously been preceded by my French colleague. I noticed as I passed that some windows had been broken, and that the two buildings of the Union Club had been closed, but, apart from this, the various parties of soldiers whom I saw appeared to be well in hand, and to be conducting their demonstration with a certain method. They had their swords drawn, it is true, and rifle shots had been fired earlier in the day, but there were no signs of anyone being molested, although certain of the rabble, by whom they were accompanied, had evidently come prepared to profit by any chance of pillage which might offer itself. On my arrival at the Government House I found the Vali and the Commandant together, the latter apparently giving assurances to a deputation of soldiers that they should not be compelled to march on Constantinople against the Sultan. After a short conversation, in which they both assured me that they would fully answer for the safety of the town and of the foreign subjects under my charge, I left them and returned to the Consulate. The remainder of the day was not without a certain anxiety, for although, for the reasons above given, I did not believe that a general attack on the Christians was intended, it was obvious that the slightest collision might, in the prevailing state of panic, have led to the gravest consequences. Fortunately, however, nothing of the kind occurred, and towards evening the soldiers returned to their barracks. No officers were to be seen in the streets during the whole of the demonstration.

I may add that the following members of the Committee have taken refuge in the French Vice-Consulate, viz.: Nazim Bey, the Chief of the Public Debt; Ghalib Bey, the Director of the Telegraph Department; Captain Hismeddin Bey, of the cavalry; and Lieutenant Seyfeddin Bey.

At the time of writing, though the alarm has somewhat subsided, the Christians have not yet opened their shops, as no satisfactory guarantee appears to have been given them that a further demonstration by the soldiers will not occur.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 105.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Erzeroum, April 29, 1909.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 3 of the 23rd instant, I had the honour to submit to your Excellency an account of the demonstrations held by the people of Erzeroum in favour of the Constitution, which they considered as being menaced by recent events at Constantinople, and of the counter demonstration by the soldiers on the 21st of the

same month. In my telegram of the last-mentioned date, I had further the honour to submit to your Excellency the causes of this latter outbreak, as far as they were then known to me, viz., the fears entertained by the soldiers that the Sultan's life was being threatened, and that they might be required to take action against him; and, lastly, the step taken by the local Union Committee in enrolling Armenians as volunteers. I would now beg to add the following details which have since come to my notice.

In the first place, the ringleaders in the movement, and the first to quit their barracks, were almost all drawn from the fortress artillery, though they were joined later by their comrades of the field branch of that force. It is not certain how far the disaffection may have since spread to the infantry, but I am informed by various eye-witnesses that on the day in question only a portion of their number took part in the demonstration, and that even these did so with some reluctance. In the second place, it is important to note, as showing that the causes above referred to were by no means the only ones by which the soldiers of the fortress artillery were actuated, that it is now known that a feeling of pronounced hostility had for some time past been growing among them against the officers who had passed through the military school, as is evidenced by the fact that the dismissal of certain of the latter was peremptorily demanded by the malcontents, the officers themselves having been made so well aware of this hostility that, as reported in my despatch No. 3, above referred to, not one of them ventured to show himself in the street during the whole of the demonstration. Further, from such information as I have been able to obtain, I have little doubt that the feeling of discontent against these particular officers which, as far as the men were concerned, seems to have been due to injudicious and derogatory expressions made use of by the former towards the Sultan, and even towards Mussulman institutions, was fomented and encouraged by their sergeants, who saw in the existence of the officers in question an effectual bar to their hopes of advancement in the service.

It is also now universally believed, by both Mussulmans and Christians, that the actual outbreak was prepared some few days beforehand by emissaries from Constantinople, who were empowered to distribute money and promises to the soldiers, and that these proceedings were aided and abetted by certain of the reactionary Ulema and by the Commandant Yussuf Pasha himself. No direct proof of this has been furnished to me, but, as far as the latter is concerned, it is alleged that for some time past he had been intriguing with the discontented elements in the garrison, and the statement that he had latterly, contrary to all military precedent, been conducting the business of the army through sergeants is, I believe, not entirely without foundation. There is, moreover, direct evidence to show that he personally desired the removal of the two leading civilian members of the Union Committee, who have taken refuge in the French Consulate, and no doubt is entertained by these latter that the order to close the club premises emanated from him. I should, however, not omit to mention that Yussuf Pasha has the reputation of being a strict disciplinarian, and that his alleged enmity to the club, of which he was, however, himself a member, may have been due to a belief on his part that the share taken in it by the junior officers may have had a deteriorating effect on them from a purely military point of view. I should further state that whether the Commandant was a party to the movement or not, it was evident to me that on the day of the outbreak he was, from whatever motive, desirous of confining the demonstration within due limits, and that no excesses should be permitted. It is the fact, however, that he is regarded with universal suspicion by the population, and there is so much in his conduct which requires explanation that it would be desirable that an inquiry should be held by some competent and impartial authority.

Of the 52—not 53—officers whose removal from Erzeroum was reported by me in my telegram to your Excellency of the 26th instant, 5 only, it is worthy of note, were from the infantry, 16 belonging to the cavalry, 29 to the fortress and field artillery, and 2 to the Redifs. This deportation on such a large scale, which was strongly opposed by the Governor-General as being entirely unnecessary, led to some recrimination between himself and the Commandant, and I have since been informed by his Excellency that the dismissals actually demanded by the soldiers did not approach one-half of the total above quoted. This fact, which has been confirmed to me from several independent sources, has served to increase the suspicions as to the motives of the Commandant, for although the lives of some ten or fifteen of the officers above alluded to may have been in danger from the men on the day in question—one of them in fact having been slightly wounded by a bayonet thrust—it is not believed that the others, once the first excitement over, ran any risk whatever, or that their continued presence would have given rise to further disorder. Against this, however, it should be pointed out that, as the measure in question was a military one, the responsibility

lay solely with the Commandant, and that it was for the latter therefore to decide what course should be taken under the circumstances. The two officers who, as reported to your Excellency in my telegram of the 26th instant, above referred to, sought refuge in my Consulate, are named Captain Rifaat Bey and Lieutenant Feizullah Effendi respectively. The former, who served as clerk to the Commandant, had been informed by the latter that he was included in the list of officers under orders to quit Erzeroum. This circumstance—as he had only a few days previously obtained leave to visit Constantinople on private affairs—excited his suspicion that treachery was being intended, and I have been informed by Feizullah Effendi, who belongs to the 2nd battalion of the 28th Regiment, that similar fears were entertained by him. I may mention that Captain Rifaat Bey was accepted by me at the request of my French colleague, M. Braquehais, the accommodation at his disposal being barely sufficient for the four persons to whom he had already given refuge. I informed the Vali without delay of what I had done, and I venture to hope that, under the exceptional circumstances, my action will not have met with your Excellency's disapproval.

In concluding my Report I would beg to add that, whatever the truth may be with regard to the Commandant Yussuf Pasha, there can be no question but that the conduct of the Governor-General, Tahir Pasha, has been such as to deserve the gratitude of the entire community, whether Mussulman or Christian. The affair was one within the province of the Commandant rather than his own, but he is not unpopular with the soldiers, and I am in a position to say that such influence as he possessed with the latter was uniformly exerted by him in the best interests of law and order.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

P.S. *May* 1.—News has just been received at Erzeroum that the Commandant has been superseded and ordered to proceed to Erzuldjan, Djelal Pasha, Brigadier in command of the Redifs, being appointed to act in his place.

H. S. S.

[19405] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 354.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 18, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 337 of the 12th May, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Rawlins, Acting Vice-Consul at Diarbekir, reporting on the disorders in the vilayet, and on the departure of the Vali.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER

Inclosure 1 in No. 106.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, May* 2, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram of the 29th ultimo, in which I informed your Excellency of my official visits to the Vali and Ferik, on the occasion of the accession of the new Sultan.

On the 28th ultimo, but too late for me to be able to report upon in my despatch No. 16 of that date, Niazi Effendi, who had lately returned from Constantinople, and Sevidan Pasha were arrested by the soldiers and officers just as they were leaving the Serai, whither they had both gone in full uniform, in order to present their congratulations to the Vali on the accession of the new Sultan.

Both were somewhat roughly handled by the soldiers, and then cast—still in uniform—ignominiously into prison, where they are still lying.

Most people, except the partisans of Niazi Effendi and Sevidan Pasha, are delighted at the fate that has overtaken these two—as they call them—"reactionaries," while the officers have decided to accuse them of having openly incited to rebellion to the detriment of the public peace. Up till now, however, no definite action has been taken against

them, and their partisans are making prodigious efforts of every description to bring about their release.

Whether the present imprisonment of Niazi Effendi and Sevidan Pasha is legal or otherwise is, perhaps, immaterial, but that they are both worthy of grave punishment is not to be denied, and this becomes still more evident upon perusal of previous despatches addressed to the Embassy, in which reference is made to the misdeeds of these two personages.

I have received a letter, dated the 27th April, from Mr. Andrus of the American Mission, Mardin, portions of which will, I trust, be interesting to your Excellency, as they throw a light on the critical nature of the present situation.

Mr. Andrus reports that in the Kaza of Jezireh and round about Sert, Moosh, and other places, the Sheikhs have been keeping up a secret correspondence, and have agreed to rise against the Constitution. That these Sheikhs are also stirring up the local Beys and Aghas with a view to a general attack upon the Christians, and that the latter are naturally much alarmed.

How far anything like a "secret correspondence" has been going on, it is impossible for me to state with any accuracy, but it is certainly true that the majority of the Kurds have been exceedingly disappointed at the turn affairs have been taking at Constantinople and, together with other Moslem reactionaries, have been planning how best to thwart the Constitutional and "Ittihad" parties.

In my humble opinion, it is decidedly fortunate that the one party seems to have been so completely victorious at Constantinople, as before their dark designs were able to mature the authors lost courage and decided that it would be unwise to go to such extremes for the present.

As I have always tried to explain in my last despatches to your Excellency, it is impossible to prophesy one way or the other at the present moment, that is, whether those who favour the Constitution will be sufficiently numerous, powerful, and energetic, to be able to overmaster their enemies or not. The town itself is still quiet, but that a very different state of affairs exists in the districts will be clear from the following incidents:—

The villagers of Alooz and Saudi (Christian) have come to the town and reported that, on the 18th April, Mohammad Selim, Chief of the Halabiani tribe, together with five Beys and a following of about 2,000 men, attacked, and completely robbed, the villages of Alooz, Saadi, and Gunde Abdi. The inhabitants of the latter village appear to have defended themselves stoutly for the space of five hours, and then fled taking their cattle with them. Their village has been plundered, and they have not yet returned to it.

The inhabitants of the other two villages, on the payment of £T. 50 and £T. 40 respectively to the Halabiani Chief, received back a third of their stolen flocks, and have been allowed to return to their villages after having promised to pay a certain yearly sum to Mohammad Selim.

Heine appears to be a centre of reactionarism. The Mudir of that place, after consultation with the Beys, decided that no demonstrations or illuminations should take place on the occasion of the news of the change of Sovereigns, and further declared that he did not recognize the new "Padishah."

On the 30th instant the Kurds of the Tuika tribe attacked the village of Dibni, but were kept at bay by the inhabitants for two days. The Kurds have, however, driven off all the cattle that they found outside the village. The Vali has since sent a Binbashi and twenty-five troopers in order to release the inhabitants of that village and to drive off the Kurds.

The officers of the Military Club and "Ittihad" are the ruling element in the town, and the Vali and the Ferik are both afraid of them. The wildest reports are continually circulating, the officers declaring that both the Vali and Ferik have been playing a double game, and while outwardly showing themselves in favour of law and order, have, through the agency of Niazi Effendi and Sevidan Pasha, been trying to foment disorder and even inciting to massacre.

Here again it is impossible to sift the exact truth, but it may safely be said that, whatever secret leanings his Excellency and the Ferik may have had to the old régime, it is certain that they will quickly smother those feelings now and show themselves faithful supporters of the "Kanoun Essassi."

That his Excellency has been guilty of double-dealing I am most unwilling to believe. He cannot be reproached with having done any harm to any party in the vilayet, and his partiality for the person of the former Sultan is the only accusation

they can have against him. His Excellency has all along been the enemy of the local "Ittihad" Committee, but when one takes into consideration the incapacity of the local branch Committee, the Vali's enmity towards them is not to be wondered at.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 106.

Memorandum inclosed in Mr. Andrus' Letter from Mardin.

AT Ain-Kaf, Mohammad Selim, son of Hassan Temo Gowri, took from thirty-six Moslem houses £ T. 333. They had to sell their cattle, donkeys, and even bedding, to pay the levy.

At Tefle he seized fourteen rifles and took 6,000 piastres from six houses.

He also made levies of a similar nature upon the following places:—

1. Bab-un-Neer.
2. El Kasr.
3. Hösku.
4. Ajeeba.
5. Goondik.
6. Silabeen.
7. Chûla.
8. Kantare
9. Zwinge.
10. Hassar.

At the latter place the booty from the Agha's house was immense.

(Signed) A. N. ANDRUS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 106.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, May 3, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 2nd instant the Vali received an official communication telling him that his resignation had been accepted, and that on his departure for Constantinople he was to appoint the Defterdar as Acting Vali.

I understand that his Excellency will leave Diarbekir on Friday, the 7th May, for Constantinople.

The appointment of the Defterdar as Acting Vali cannot be expected to inspire confidence. An old and incapable man, he is pleasing to the "Ittihad" and Military Club, because, presumably, the officers feel that they will be able to do whatever they like with him.

The leading spirit among the officers is a Staff officer, a certain Shevki Bey, who is most enthusiastic for the new state of things, and to whose fiery eloquence his brother officers lend a ready ear.

Until, therefore, order is once more restored and a powerful Vali sent, it will probably be Shevki Bey and his brother officers who will be the *ipso facto* rulers of the vilayet, and there will be another spell of the *imperium in imperio* system, which the Central Committee of Union and Progress inaugurated last year, and to which they have so pertinaciously clung.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[19552] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 24, 1909.*

AFFAIRS at Adana.

According to an official Turkish statement, the authorities at Adana have caused 104 Moslems and 89 Christians to be arrested there on the charge of being implicated in the recent massacres. These numbers are considered to be probably correct by His Majesty's vice-consul, who states that Hajin has been saved, and that, as far as he knows, no women have been ill-treated.

[16533] No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 155.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 299 of the 25th April relative to the disorders on the Tigris, and I approve the course of action which your Excellency proposes to follow as indicated therein.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19796] No. 109.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 21st instant, relative to the proposed Order in Council conferring on the Political Agent at Bahrein jurisdiction over British subjects and foreigners in Bahrein.

India Office, May 25, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 109.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Secret.)
My Lord, *India Office, May 21, 1909.*

THE proposals made in your Excellency's Secret letter dated the 14th November, 1907, for regularizing the judicial powers exercised by the Political Agent at Bahrein, by the issue of an Order in Council placing both British subjects and foreigners under his jurisdiction, have been considered by His Majesty's Government in connection with the general question of the policy, political and commercial, to be followed in the Persian Gulf in order to meet the change in the situation consequent upon the development of the Bagdad Railway scheme.

2. The general conclusion at which His Majesty's Government have arrived is that "the competition to which British trade in the Persian Gulf is exposed is not merely commercial, but has a distinctly political object. British claims to political predominance in the Gulf are based mainly upon the fact of our commercial interests having hitherto been predominant, and should our trade, as a result of a German forward commercial policy, be impaired, our political influence would proportionately diminish. It follows that purely political action on our part, not having as its objective the development of material British interests, might have a prejudicial effect, both politically and commercially, by reason of the suspicions it would be likely to rouse."

3. The proposals which you have made for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Political Agent at Bahrein fall within the lines of policy approved by His Majesty's Government. Their adoption would mark another stage in the development of the virtual Protectorate which we exercise over Bahrein, to which the growing importance of the island as a centre of trade may be attributed.

4. It will tend to strengthen our position in Bahrein, and to remove risks of interference by other Powers, if jurisdiction over foreigners is placed in our hands; but our Protectorate has never been formally notified, except to Turkey and Persia, and in the event of controversy arising with other Powers as to the assumption of jurisdiction over their subjects by the Political Agent, it will be preferable that our action should be based* on a request from the Sheikh to be relieved of the responsibility of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners. When this has been arranged an Order in Council can be issued.† It does not seem expedient to make the Order in Council the medium of formally declaring a Protectorate over Bahrein. Persian and Turkish claims to the

* The words "not on usage, which may be disputed, but" have been omitted.

† The words "the preamble of which will recite the circumstances in which the transfer of jurisdiction has been made" have been omitted.

sovereignty of the island have been repudiated by us in a form to preclude the necessity of any further discussion of the question with them; but neither Turkey nor Persia has formally abandoned its claims, and the Persian Government have not recognized, though we have consistently asserted, our right to protect Bahreinis in Persian territory. In the present political conditions of Turkey and Persia it is clear that we should scrupulously avoid any action that could be represented as an attempt to utilize their difficulties for selfish purposes. There is also the risk that the formal declaration of a Protectorate might be regarded as a challenge by other Powers than Persia and Turkey, who might raise the question of our rights in a provocative form.

5. I request that the Political Agent at Bahrein may be instructed to approach the Sheikh, with the object of obtaining from him, as a necessary preliminary to the issue of the Order in Council, a request that the British Government will relieve him of the responsibility of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners in the island.

6. As regards British subjects, no difficulty arises in respect of the proposed Order in Council, in view of the terms of Article 4 of the Treaty of 1864, and of the usage that has been established.

7. It will be convenient that the first draft of the Order in Council should be prepared by your Excellency's Government, with a view to providing for any local peculiarities that may require consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

[19840] No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir, *India Office, May 25, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 17th instant, enclosing copy of further correspondence with the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury as to the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Koweit, I am directed to say that, in view of the explanations given by the Lords Commissioners, Viscount Morley has now decided to sanction the loan in question.

Copy of a telegram addressed to the Government of India is enclosed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY

Inclosure in No. 110.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 24, 1909.*

KOWEIT. See my telegram dated the 27th April as to loan to Sheikh.

You may now grant loan as proposed in your telegram of 22nd February. Papers as to liability of British exchequer are being sent by mail. Please bear in mind what is said as to evidence for audit purposes, in letter from Treasury dated the 8th ultimo.

[18811] No. 111.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, on the subject of an official protest made to the Resident in the Persian Gulf by the newly appointed German consul at Bushire against the mining of fresh oxide at Abu Musa for Messrs. Strick under the conditions which have been approved.

I am to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a note from the German Embassy, and the draft of a reply which it is proposed to return to it if Lord Morley agrees.*

* No. 94 and draft despatch to German Embassy.

Sir E. Grey concurs in Viscount Morley's recommendation that the instructions which the Government of India propose to issue to Major Cox should be approved; but he would suggest that it might be well to call Major Cox' attention to the fact that His Majesty's Government only authorised the mining of 400 tons of oxide as a sample for Messrs. Strick, and that as 500 or 600 tons have already been mined we presume operations will now cease. If Viscount Morley agrees in this view, I am to request that the instructions to Major Cox may be telegraphed.

I am also to enquire whether Viscount Morley sees any objection in the German Government being informed of the scope of the present operations, and of their probable early conclusion, while at the same time the rights of the Sheikh of Shargah in the matter are fully reserved. If not, a paragraph in that sense will be added to the draft reply which it is proposed to send to the German Embassy.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[20278] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 362.)
Sir, *Pera, May 21, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting on the appearance at Sabyeah of a Mahdi, Syyed Ali-ibn Ahmed El-Idreesi.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12/E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, April 14, 1909.*

SOME anxiety has existed in this vilayet during the past two months, owing to the appearance and activity of one Syyed Ali-ibn Ahmed El-Idreesi at Sabyeah, that is situated some 35 miles north-east of Ghezan.

The above-mentioned man is a Yemenite by birth, but has been educated in Morocco and Cairo. He returned to his native country about three years ago, shortly after the death of his father.

Syyed Ali Idreesi claims to be a Mahdi, and to be endowed with supernatural powers. He is gradually gaining a big following in the Sabyeah district; the powerful tribe of Beni Marwan are favourably disposed towards him, and his fame is spreading to the Province of Assyr.

He is attempting to organise a sort of autonomous government in his locality somewhat similar to that of the Imam Syyed Yahya in the Sahara district, and administers the "Chori" laws. He has begun to exact taxes from the inhabitants, who, it appears, are responding to his demands.

Syyed Idreesi is barely 30 years of age, professes the Zeidi faith, and is, I believe, in secret communication with the Imam, Syyed Yahya, at Kuflet-Azhar.

He is receiving visits from tribesmen from all parts of the Yemen.

The kaimakam of Aboo Arish not long ago reported to the Hodeidah Mutessarifilik that the Idreesi had been stirring up the population at Sabyeah against the Ottoman Government, and had caused the amputation of both hands of a prominent and loyal Sheikh of that district, Syyed Ahmed Maharish, one of the Yemen notables that visited Constantinople in May 1907, when he was decorated by His Majesty the Sultan, and the rank of "Mir Miran" conferred on him.

The Mutessarif of Assyr has since brought to the notice of the vilayet the fact of sedition being preached by the Sabyeah Mahdi; that is likely to influence the minds of the Arab population in the Assyr sanjak.

There was a rumour current here in February last that orders had been received at Sana'a from the Porte to dispatch six battalions to Sabyeah, with a view to crushing the Pretender. This movement of troops has not been possible since, owing to the operations proceeding against the Zeranek tribesmen in the south.

I now hear that seven infantry battalions have been detached from the Hedjaz division for the purpose, and that they will shortly arrive at Geezan. Some of the Turkish papers at Constantinople publish news to the above effect.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[20290] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 375.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 25, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch and its inclosures which I have received from His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General at Bagdad, in which he advocates, as being in the interests of both Turkey and Great Britain, the acquisition of a Concession for a railway connecting Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean at Alexandretta by way of the Euphrates valley and Aleppo.

The importance of the results which the realization of such a scheme would have for our commerce and for our political influence in this country are, I am aware, thoroughly appreciated by His Majesty's Government, and I need not therefore dilate upon them. As to the commercial prospect of the proposed line, I am in no position to express a decided opinion, as it appears to me that until Sir W. Willcocks' scheme for the irrigation of Mesopotamia has been advanced far enough to afford approximate data as to the economic development to be anticipated in these regions, the matter must remain largely speculative, and I therefore propose only to offer a few observations on some of the points raised in Colonel Ramsay's despatch, together with some remarks of a general character.

Colonel Ramsay dwells with some insistence on the necessity, for the success of the scheme under discussion, of preventing the German Bagdad Railway Company from acquiring the Concession for the line between Aleppo and Alexandretta, for, he argues, the German Company, if they obtained it, would be enabled, by applying over this section the maximum tariff permitted by their "cahier des charges," to maintain through rates for goods carried by the Euphrates Valley Railway to Alexandretta at a figure higher than for similar goods carried by the all German line, and thus secure the latter against effective competition. I am not convinced that this apprehension is well grounded. The German Company possesses its preference for the line connecting Aleppo with the sea only on condition that the prior similar rights of the Damascus–Hamah–Birejik Railway are respected (see Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. 4, pp. 166–7 and 228). Now supposing the French Company is willing to cede its right, it seems to me certain that whatever other conditions they may attach to the Agreement, they would certainly stipulate for favourable treatment in tariff matters for themselves, and in such case it is hard to conceive that the Turkish Government would not insist on equally favourable treatment for any railway starting from Aleppo for which they might grant a Concession. Thus, though no doubt serious, I doubt whether the competition of the Bagdad Railway would be as formidable as Colonel Ramsay anticipates, especially when the advantage which the Euphrates valley line would possess in its shorter route is taken into account. However this may be, there can be no question but that it would be desirable that the Concession for this important line should be in the hands of more friendly parties than the Bagdad Railway is likely to prove. Perhaps, if there were a reasonable prospect that the French Railway Company and the French financial houses interested in it were disposed to follow a policy more in harmony with that of their Government, some arrangement with the Damascus–Hamah–Birejik Company might offer a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. I hear, however, that the saying "L'argent n'a pas de patrie" is of too true application in Paris to allow of hopes in this direction.

Colonel Ramsay also suggests that, thanks to the double guarantee, for construction loan and for working expenses, which the Bagdad Railway enjoys under its Concession, that Company could without loss to itself lower rates to a point which a less favoured rival Company could not afford. This in practice would probably prove to be the case, but this advantage again is considerably neutralized by the shorter route along the Euphrates valley. It appears to me also that there is a limit beyond which the German Company could not cut rates, and that limit would be reached when the kilometre receipts of the line were so reduced as to fall below 4,500 fr., the amount of the working expenses guarantee, and the Turkish Treasury became liable to make good the difference.

In any case it seems indubitable that the Germans will make a strong effort to obtain a concession of the Alexandretta–Aleppo line. It did not need the debate on the Bagdad Railway Concession to show the Germans what the country at large think of the bargain they succeeded in making with the late Sultan, for the Germans had already hastened to assure the Minister of Public Works of their readiness to discuss that instrument, and, if need be, to modify it, but, so far as I am aware, no definite proposal for a basis of discussion has been put forward on either side. The Germans, however, will hardly consent to make a concession without some *quid pro quo*, and an alteration of the *tracé* of the railway so as to bring Alexandretta and Aleppo on to the main line, which they can colourably represent as being a modification as much in favour of Turkey as of the Company, will assuredly be one of their requirements. On the other hand they are still less likely to abandon the whole of the advantages in the nature of guarantees they now possess, and as Turkey, with the resources at present available to her, is quite unable to provide even for a reduced expenditure under that head, it seems probable that negotiations between the Company and the Government will be deferred until the latter has obtained the consent of the Powers to an alteration of the existing Customs régime.

In conclusion, I would hazard the opinion that whatever may be the prospect of a Euphrates Valley Railway, such as advocated by Colonel Ramsay as a purely commercial enterprise, the unsettled political condition of this country is likely to deter capitalists from engaging in so important an enterprise without some assured guarantee, at least for the interest on the capital invested. To expect Turkey to furnish this would, I fear, be in vain, but it seems to me that in view of the magnitude of the interests involved it would be worth while carefully to examine whether the prospects of such a railway are not sufficiently good to warrant His Majesty's Government in doing so. If the result of such examination is favourable the annuity should be required for only a few years, and provision might be made for the repayment by securing to the Treasury a participation in the eventual profits of the line.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Bagdad, March 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Excellency my opinion of the need for early consideration of the question of railway communication between Bagdad and the Mediterranean Sea.

2. If the new Government of Turkey wishes really to improve the administration of the country it is essential that the finances should be placed in a more satisfactory condition, and the engagement of Sir William Willcocks, with a considerable staff of engineers, appears to show that the authorities at Constantinople are alive to the fact that the remedy for the impoverished state of the Treasury is to be found in the irrigation of the fertile plains of Mesopotamia. Already the lack of means of communication acts as a serious deterrent to the development of the country, for when the condition of the market is such that the cultivating classes might fairly hope to make a handsome profit, they find either that they cannot get their produce out of the country, or that the steamer Companies take the lion's share of the profit. In 1908 there were large stocks of grain in the country, prices were high in London, and there was a famine in India. At the same time the tribes on the Lower Tigris were disturbed and the river was not safe for sailing craft, consequently the steamer freights rose until the Turkish steamers were getting 40*s.* a ton for carrying wheat from Bagdad to Bussorah, while at the same time Lynch's steamers were charging 33*s.* 4*d.* a ton. Even at these prices the steamer offices were besieged by people for space in the steamers. The result was that the entire advantage of the state of the market was taken by the steamer Companies. As long as this state of things is possible it is not likely that cultivation for export will largely increase. I find from p. 233 of Mr. Lloyds' Report that the average value of the trade of Bagdad with Europe and America for the years 1902 to 1906 was as quoted below:—

	£
Imports	1,401,791
Exports	602,495

and I find from Consular Trade Reports that the average rate of freight during the same period between the United Kingdom and Bagdad was—

	For Imports.	For Exports.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
River freight	2 5 0	1 1 10½
Sea-freight	1 12 9	1 4 6
Total	3 17 9	2 6 4½
Insurance w.p.a.	1 to 1½ per cent.	About 1 per cent.

It is questionable whether these rates are ever likely to be reduced by any material amount. The British River Steamer Company, I am informed, only declares a dividend of 12 per cent. (I must confess that I find this difficult to understand), and a shrewd man of business who has been many years in Bagdad tells me that he doubts if the present rates can be profitably reduced, because when harvests are bad, or when all export of grain is prohibited, the steamers practically get no cargo on the downward journey. As regards Sea Steamer Companies, all authorities seem to agree that the Hamburg-American Line has been losing money on its Persian Gulf service, and the British Steamer Companies have been urging that they cannot indefinitely continue to compete at the present rates unless they get some Government assistance. As regards this service, too, there seems little likelihood of large reductions of charges, because the conditions are such as to tell against low freights; the journey is a dangerous one through unlighted seas, the climate is very trying, the Suez Canal dues have to be paid both on the outward and the homeward voyage, and serious delays are often caused by insufficiency of water on the bar at the mouth of the Shat-ul-Arab, as well as by an entire absence of harbours in the Persian Gulf. Owing to lack of protection cargo cannot be worked in bad weather, and three steamers are maintained at Bussorah to lighten steamers crossing the bar.

More than half the import trade of Bagdad passes on to Persia viâ Khanakin, and for transport from Bagdad to Khanakin we must add about 20s. a-ton to the above rates, plus the cost of handling the cargo at Bagdad.

3. I believe that with cheaper freights and better means of communication our trade in Turkey would very largely increase, and it is obvious that cheaper freights will enable our trade to compete in the more distant parts of Persia.

If a railway to the Mediterranean is desirable in existing circumstances, it will be readily admitted that it is absolutely essential to the success of any large irrigation projects. Sir William Willcocks has now had sufficient time to make a detailed study of the country, and I understand from him that nowhere in the world could more promising projects be proposed. He estimates that 6,000,000 acres can eventually be brought under perennial irrigation, and that by using occasional rises in the river, and what would otherwise be the surplus water of the high floods, he will be able to flood 10,000,000 acres more, when needed, and so enormously increase the grazing capacity of the country. This is a very important point, for the country is eminently suited to the raising of sheep and cattle, owing to the large quantities of lime in the soil and water and also because the pastoral population is present to take advantage of any grazing facilities afforded. An increase in grazing seems desirable on political as well as commercial grounds, for it will bring the pastoral population into touch with the agricultural population and so, by force of example, lead them to the more profitable occupation.

Even if Sir William Willcocks' figures are many times too sanguine to be realized in the near future, it is clear that any serious irrigation works will need an economical outlet to the chief consuming markets. In ordinary years all the surplus produce will go by the Mediterranean, but when there is a famine in India it would be of great value to that country to be able to draw on such a granary as Mesopotamia.

There is already a considerable trade in animals from the Vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah to Aleppo. Animals are marched up all the way, they are liable to be robbed or to die, and I am told that it is not an unknown thing for the whole herds or flocks to disappear; yet the trade is profitable. From the Consular Report for Aleppo for the year 1907 it appears that 191,512*l.* worth of sheep and cattle were annually shipped to Egypt from Alexandretta during 1903–7, and no doubt this trade could be largely

increased if grazing was improved here and if animals could be sent cheaply and safely to the sea coast. On one occasion a man applied to me for a special escort for 2,000 head of cattle that he was marching from Bagdad to Aleppo, and a Bagdad merchant, who is engaged in the trade, has given me the following estimate of the number of animals which annually pass through Bagdad on the way to Aleppo:—

Sheep	10,000 to 15,000
Cattle	2,500 to 14,000

The proposition that irrigation works must be supported by a railway to the sea is so obvious that I have perhaps already said more than was needed. The point which I wish to emphasize is that what is wanted is an outlet on the Mediterranean rather than an outlet in the Persian Gulf.

4. I inclose a map* showing—

(*a.*) The main line and branches of the Bagdad Railway according to the Concession of 1903.
(*b.*) The branch lines upon which the Germans have preferential rights.
(*c*). The area which Sir William Willcocks thinks most likely to be irrigated.
(*d.*) The line which I suggest as a basis of discussion.

It will be necessary to discuss various parts of the railway lines separately, but it may perhaps be convenient if I first notice the earlier correspondence regarding the Euphrates Valley Railway, which is available for reference at Bagdad.

5. The record of the proceedings of the Select Committee which sat in 1871 and 1872 to report on the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway is a voluminous document, largely made up of matter which is of no present interest. From the evidence taken I have extracted such information as is likely to be of present use, and attached it to this Report as Appendix No. 1.

At that time Turkey was very anxious to have a railway from Alexandretta to the Persian Gulf, and was willing to give England guarantees if England would herself guarantee the necessary loan. The conclusions at which the Committee arrived were that a line of broad-gauge railway could be built from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf for about 10 millions; that in process of time there would be sufficient traffic to support it; that the political and commercial advantages of establishing a second route (to India) would at any time be considerable, and might under possible circumstances be exceedingly great; and that it would be worth the while of the English Government to secure them, considering the moderate pecuniary risk that they would incur.

I understood from a pamphlet published by Captain Felix Jones that these recommendations were not acted upon because the condition of the money market was not favourable, and also because French influence became very powerful in Turkey.

6. It is not my province to discuss the political advantages of having a second route to India; they are certainly not less apparent than they were in 1872, provided the second route is in British hands.

7. In a country where no statistics are published it is impossible to make an estimate of traffic and to show the system on which the estimate is based. It is, however, easy to show that the productiveness of the country has largely increased since 1872. The Trade Report for the year 1888–9 shows that the total tonnage of steamers entering the port of Bussorah in 1888 was 104,246 tons; the tonnage in 1906 was 229,127 tons.

In 1903 Lynch had two steamers and the Turks had four small steamers running between Bagdad and Bussorah; now Lynch has three steamers, and the Turks have added four large steamers to their fleet. There is also a small stern-wheeler running up to Samarra, above Bagdad. The trade appears to have been created by the transport facilities, and there is no reason why the same thing should not occur along the Euphrates.

As a matter of fact, cultivation has largely increased along the Euphrates. Captain Powell went from Feluja to Meskene in 1872, and he recorded on a map of the river all existing cultivation. In the spring of 1908 I travelled up and down the Euphrates Valley, and took pains to compare existing facts with those recorded on the map. I found a very large increase of cultivation. I attach a note (Appendix No. 2) of my observations.

8. I venture to suggest that we should at once turn our attention towards obtaining the construction of a British—or British managed—railway somewhat as follows:—

* Map not reproduced.

Alexandretta to Aleppo.
Aleppo to Meskene.
Down the right bank of the Euphrates to Falluja.
From Falluja to Bagdad.
Bagdad to Bussorah or the Persian Gulf.

I am aware that we shall not obtain a Concession for such a railway without difficulty, but it is important that the most direct line to India should be in our hands, and also that the line serving irrigation works carried out under British engineers should not be in the hands of any other nation. I presume that the money for the irrigation works will be found in England, and if this is correct we must insure as far as possible that our enterprise is not taxed by others. We know that there is abundance of water, a vast expanse of fertile soil, and that the levels are almost ideally convenient; consequently the only undetermined factor in the problem is the cost of getting produce to the European market.

As the difficulties to be overcome are not the same for all sections, it seems desirable to examine each section separately :—

Alexandretta–Aleppo Section.—The first thing on this section is to obtain permission to make any harbour improvements that may be required at Alexandretta. Under their Concession of 1903 the Germans have no rights in the port of Alexandretta.

From Alexandretta to Aleppo there was no engineering difficulty that could not easily be overcome in 1872, and engineering and mechanical science has since then made much advance.

The chief difficulty lies in the engagements which have already been made between the Turkish Government and the French and German railways which are to join at Aleppo.

Article 12 of the German Concession stipulates that should the Government decide on the construction of branches joining the "line which forms the object of the present Convention" to the sea between Mersina and Tripoli it can give the Concession exclusively to the Germans provided that due consideration shall be given to the existing rights of the French railway.

I have not been able to obtain a copy of the French Concession, but I understand that Article 36 of the Concession gives to the French Company a right of preference on equal terms over any branches joining their line to the sea.

As far as the German Concession is concerned it seems clear that the Turkish Government is free to make a railway from Alexandretta to Aleppo should it wish to do so, provided it gives no concession to a third party, otherwise than in accordance with the French Concession.

Without having seen the text of the French Concession I can express no opinion as to the rights of the French Company.

9. According to Article 24 (9) of the "cahier des charges" of the German Concession cereals in full waggon loads, booked for not less than 900 kilom. are carried at 6 paras per ton per kilom., while the rate for cereals booked under other conditions is 22 paras per kilom. per ton.

The rate for sheep is 4 paras per head per kilom. and that for cattle is 27 paras per head per kilom. In the case of sheep and cattle I have not found any provision for a reduction of rates on long distances.

Sesame is charged 35 paras per kilom. per ton, with no provision for reduction in case of long distances. The whole classification of merchandise should, in my opinion, be examined by a traffic expert with a view to seeing how it could be used to injure a direct railway from Bagdad to Aleppo.

To take one instance. If the Germans construct the Alexandretta–Aleppo Railway, and the branch from El Bajh to Hit, the distance from Hit to Alexandretta will be, approximately, as shown below, taking the railway as a straight line from point to point, in both cases :

	Miles.	Kilom.
Hit to Aleppo	380 or	608
Aleppo to Alexandretta (railway alignment of 1872)	92 „	147
Total		755
Hit to El Bajh	70	
El Bajh to Mosul	160	
Mosul to Tel Habash	330	
Tel Habish to Aleppo	40	
Aleppo to Alexandretta (railway alignment)	92	
Total	692 or	1,107

In the case of cereals in bulk the freight by the all German route would be 1,107 kilom. at 6 paras a kilom., or 29*s.* 10½*d.* a ton for the journey.

In the case of the direct route the cost would be at 6 paras a ton a kilom. from Hit to Aleppo 16*s.* 5½*d.* a ton, and from Aleppo to Alexandretta, a distance of 147 kilom., at 22 paras a ton, 14*s.* 7*d.* a ton.

Hit to Alexandretta per ton by the all German route 29*s.* 10½*d.*

Hit to Alexandretta by the direct route 31*s.* 0½*d.* a ton.

The rates quoted in the "cahir des charges" are maximum rates, and there is nothing to prevent the German railways from making reductions on all kinds of merchandise should it suit them to do so, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent them from charging maximum rates on the Alexandretta–Aleppo section should it seem to them desirable.

According to the maximum rates I find that the freight charges per ton between Alexandretta and Aleppo work out as follows :—

Ninety-two miles = 147 kilom.; 4,000 paras = 1 lira. First-class goods at 35 paras a ton a kilom. would pay 1*l.* 3*s.* 1½*d.* a ton.

Second-class goods at 27 paras a ton a kilom. would pay 17*s.* 10*d.* a ton.

Third-class goods at 22 paras a ton a kilom. would pay 14*s.* 7*d.* a ton.

Cattle at 27 paras a head per kilom. would pay 17*s.* 10*d.* a-head.

Calves, donkeys, and pigs, at 9 paras a-head would pay 5*s.* 11*d.* a-head.

Sheep and goats at 4 paras a head would pay 2*s.* 7¾*d.* a head.

From the figures given at p. 174 of the "Statesman's Year-Book" for 1908, I have worked out the average charge per ton per mile on all goods traffic carried on the Indian railways in 1906. It comes to ·421 pence per ton per mile, or 3*s.* 3*d.* a ton for 92 miles.

These figures show clearly that a Euphrates Valley Railway will be at the mercy of the German Company, if the latter is allowed to construct the Aleppo–Alexandretta section ; if it is allowed to have the port works at Alexandretta its position will be even stronger.

The best solution of the difficulty, as far as the German Company is concerned, would appear to be that the Turkish Government should itself construct the Alexandretta section, and so prevent others from levying a tax on the productiveness of irrigation works in Mesopotamia.

If the preferential rights of the French Company extend in theory to a preference over a Government Railway, they could scarcely be enforced in practice, for the Turkish Government could afford to make the railway on terms, *e.g.*, as regards rates of freights, which no Company could accept, because, in the case of the Government, what it loses in freights it gains in the value of the produce of its irrigation works.

Aleppo to Bagdad Section.—The Select Committee established the fact that this section presented no engineering difficulties, though a bridge would be needed across the Euphrates.

There are no previous Concessions, as far as I know, to interfere with this section. It would probably cross the Euphrates near Falluja, so as to run on the south of the navigable canal which will join the Euphrates near Falluja to the Tigris near Bagdad. This large canal would ensure the line from all danger or difficulty connected with inundations.

Bagdad to Bussorah Section.—The right to make this, or to have it made under British management in the future, should be obtained. The Germans could have no reasonable objection, provided one or both of the great rivers was kept between their line and the proposed line. The need for this line is not so urgent as is the need for an outlet on the Mediterranean, and I think it is not possible to form an opinion as to whether the line should run on the right or left bank of the Tigris, until Sir William Willcocks' survey are further advanced and more is known about existing marshes, and how the irrigation works are likely to alter them. Eventually the line will probably be needed, especially if the canals take so much water as to render navigation more difficult than it is at present during the low season.

10. Of the branches to which the German Company has a preferential right on equal terms, the one which is of most importance to a future Euphrates Valley Railway is the branch from El Bajh to Hit. This branch might not be valuable supposing that the German Railway was open from Aleppo to Bagdad, because this railway would tap the rich wheat-growing districts south of Mosul, as well as the Persian trade ; but the El Badj–Hit branch would be valuable if the German line was not open ; and the fact that the Tigris near El-Badj was in direct railway communication with the sea, might

tend to deter the German Company from prosecuting its plans for further railway development in that region. It is clear that if the Euphrates Valley Railway reaches Hit before the German Railway reaches El Badj, the former Company will be in a position to offer terms which could be accepted by no one else.

11. As the possession by the Germans of the Aleppo–Alexandretta section would injure the westward traffic along a Euphrates valley railway, so the possession of the Sadija–Khanakin branch would injure all British trade with Persia. It is therefore most important that we should obtain control of this section if possible. The control of the Bagdad–Kerbela–Bussorah section is not so important commercially if there is an alternate line on the other bank of the Euphrates, but the control of this section is required on political grounds which have many times been discussed.

12. Sir William Willcocks has represented to the Minister for Public Works the necessity which exists for the Turkish Government to retain freedom of action in the matter of the Aleppo–Alexandretta Railway. Sir William has also written a "private" Memorandum containing his views on this railway. I inclose a copy of this document as Appendix No. 3. I believe that Sir William has sent a copy of this document to some of his capitalist friends in England with a view to stimulating their interest in a scheme which he intends to urge on the attention of financiers when he visits England this summer.

13. The arguments which I have tried to develop may be briefly summarized as follows :—

(1.) The regeneration of Turkey depends upon financial assistance to be obtained from Mesopotamia.

(2.) The success of irrigation works in Mesopotamia depends upon direct railway communication with the Mediterranean.

(3.) If the Germans obtain the management of the Aleppo–Alexandretta line they will be able to reap large profits, which fairly belong to the irrigation works.

(4.) If the port of Alexandretta is also in their hands their position will be even more dominant.

(5.) Neither the German nor the French Concessions make it impossible for the Turkish Government to make a railway from Aleppo to Alexandretta, which can be under British management.

(6.) There is nothing to prevent a direct Bagdad–Aleppo line.

(7.) The Germans in possession of the Khanakin–Sadija branch will be able to tax our trade with Persia.

(8.) The Germans in possession of the Bagdad–Bussorah section will be able to tax all our trade with India and our sea-borne trade with Europe unless we have an alternative line on the left bank of the Euphrates.

(9.) Until improvements are made, steamer freights are not likely materially to decrease.

(10.) The irrigation of Mesopotamia will be a protection for India against famine

(11.) This Report is only written from the commercial point of view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Appendix No. 1.

Notes of Information contained in the Evidence recorded by the Select Committee.

Surveys then Existing.

Q. 48–50.—Colonel Chesney surveyed the whole route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf; he surveyed and mapped the country from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates on the scale of 2 inches to the mile, and these surveys were then in possession of the Admiralty.

Q. 376.—In 1857 and 1865 Mr. Telford McNeill surveyed the harbour of Seleucia, and for a railway from there to Aleppo via Antioch.

Q. 668.—Mr. Thomas K. Lynch presented to the Geographical Society a map of the country between Hilla and Meshed (Nedjef), he thinks in 1845.

Page 61, *Appendix* 4.—Mr. W. J. Maxwell was sent out in 1870 to make surveys.

He was employed by Mr. Telford McNeill and Messrs. Cutbill, Sons, and De Lundo On the Euphrates he did not apparently go south of Belis.

Q. 58.—Mr. Latham made a reconnaissance survey from Alexandretta to Bussorah.

Q. 502.—Captain Felix Jones, at the time of the Persian expedition, made a survey of the Bussorah Bar.

Q. 1547.—Mr. Andrews stated that existing surveys of the difficult (*i.e.*, Alexandretta–Aleppo) portions of the line were sufficiently detailed to enable a contractor to make an offer.

Q. 2069.—Sir R. Burton says that an American, Colonel Romer, made a survey of the country to Tyre and Tripoli.

Q. 2109.—This survey was contradicted by a survey made for the Duc de Luynes, but Sir R. Burton believed in Colonel Romer's work.

Estimated Cost.

Q. 132.—Mr. Telford McNeill estimated the cost of a 4′ 8″ gauge railway, including stations, rolling-stock, &c., at—

	£
Alexandretta to Aleppo	10,000 a-mile.
Aleppo to Euphrates	6,500 "
Euphrates to the Persian Gulf	8,000 "

The last item to include two bridges on the Euphrates. It seems that Mr. McNeill had never seen the site of the lower bridge.

The estimates were said to be both careful and generous.

A landing-stage at Alexandretta would cost 50,000*l.*

Q. 831.—Sir John McNeill said he would make a 3-foot gauge line from Alexandretta to the Gulf for 6,500,000*l.*, including rolling-stock and interest on capital during construction.

Page 59.—Sir John McNeill gives details of his scheme, and says that he will work as Engineer and take payment in shares at par.

Q. 1966.—Mr. Robert Fairlie describes his idea of a railway which could be made for 5,000,000*l.*

Prospect of Returns.

Q. 150.—Colonel Chesney thought that the railway would give a certain return.

Q. 750.—Mr. Lynch said that the country on the right bank of the Euphrates only wants water to make it productive; the Arabs find water at 12 feet.

Q. 415.—Captain Felix Jones says that if the railway was under British management the country would at once become populous. Expresses this opinion in spite of Sir H. Rawlinson's opinion to the contrary, because from Babylon to Belis there are the remains of large irrigating works, which time has scarcely ruined in any sense; showing that the country must have had enormous population.

Q. 487.—Considers Tigris less well cultivated than Euphrates valley.

Q. 8.—Sir H. Rawlinson was against the Euphrates line, because he said the country could never be rich.

Appendix No. 2.

Note on Condition of Country between Hit and Meskene during the Spring of 1908 (*May* 8 *to* 18, 1908.)

Meskene to Rakka: 60 *miles by River.*—There is much cultivation on both banks, the irrigation being done by "charads" (*i.e.*, pony, pulley, and waterbag). Cultivation appears to have largely increased since 1872.

Rakka to Halabi Chelebi Hills: 36 *miles by River.*—A good deal of tamarisk and little cultivation. (Where tamarisk grows the ground is suitable for cultivation.)

Halabi Chelebi Hills to Deir: 72 *miles by River.*—Almost continuous cultivation is found on both banks, irrigation being done by charad.

Deir to 25 miles below Abu Kemal. Distance by River 111 *miles.*—There is extensive cultivation along both banks.

Above Spot to Nahaya. Distance by River 47 miles.—Little cultivable area and less cultivation, as the country is said to be frequently raided by the Dehaim Arabs.

Nahaya to Ana. Distance by River 27 miles.—Above Nahaya there are ten water wheels, those on the right bank in good order, those on the left bank in ruins. Below Nahaya forty-five water wheels, of which twenty-six are in ruins. There are many water wheels in the town of Ana which were not counted. Date cultivation begins just above Ana.

Ana to Hit. Distance by River 98 miles.—The whole of this stretch is dangerous to navigation owing to the existence of submerged ruins, dams, and ruins of water wheels. Excluding the numerous water wheels in the towns of Ana and Hit the following wheels were counted (approximately):—

In work, 183.
Ruined, 48.

Below Hit.—The delta begins.

The river winds much, and the above note shows that there is cultivation along nearly the whole length of it.

On my way from Hit to Meskene by road I took the road across a number of the bends, and I remarked large areas of cultivable land lying fallow.

It is clear to me that between Meskene and Hit fertile land, a cultivating population, and water are available. To make the country rich all that is needed is security and a market.

Between Ana and Meskene I saw enormous numbers of sheep, and there must have been many more that I did not see.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Appendix No. 3.

Babylonia.

I HAVE been very carefully examining the country between Samarra and Babylon (Hilla) past Bagdad and Ctesiphon, and have had a special opportunity owing to the fact that I am spending 30,000*l.* on the repairs of the Hindiya Barrage, and the first thing that strikes one is the fact that all possibility of the real development of this country depends as much on a railway direct from Bagdad to the nearest port on the Mediterranean as on irrigation. The best route is Bagdad, Hit, Ana, Deir, Aleppo, Alexandretta; and the next best is Bagdad, Hit, Ana, Deir, Palmyra, Damascus, Beirout. These are the two real trade routes of this country. Both are under 600 miles. Nearly everything we produce goes to Europe, and very much of it to the Eastern Mediterranean countries, and what we chiefly want are European goods and cheap coal. This is a country strangely devoid of fuel, and we pay for coal in Bagdad 3*l.* 15*s.* per ton by the time it has gone through the Suez Canal to Bussorah and come up the 520 miles of the Tigris. Now, if we had a railway from the Mediterranean we should have coal here as cheap at any rate as at Assouan, which is considerably more than 600 miles from Alexandria. The railway, moreover, which ran from Beirout or Alexandretta here would have cheap coal bought on the Mediterranean and not dear stuff bought in Bussorah and Bagdad. The Euphrates valley is very rich, and can be irrigated, and is irrigated, very cheaply by water power the whole way, and the current is strong enough to turn wheels and lift water. It is too strong for navigation.

We here are a great grain-producing country with unlimited capabilities for extension, and the whole goes to the Eastern Mediterranean or Europe. What, however, has struck me more than anything, and I am forming my projects accordingly, is the fact that this country is even more a sheep and cattle and horse-breeding country than a granary. We can irrigate with the supply of the river 6,000,000 acres, but we can irrigate, in addition, as pastures 10,000,000 acres on which millions of sheep and cattle could feed. All these would go west. In a year of drought like this sheep are worth a song, because they cannot be got out of the country (and droughts are common here). If we had a railway to the Mediterranean direct the transport for sheep and cattle alone would occupy a line the whole winter, and then would come the harvest of

wheat, barley, and winter cereals, and then the summer harvest of rice and Indian corn all going west.

Turnips for feeding are grown over large areas and could be grown over tens of thousands by irrigation the day we have weirs. The turnips are very fine indeed, the best I have seen, and, as they are a winter crop here, swedes and mangels would do well. The 12 per cent. lime in the soil and water are excellent for all animals, and the animals of this country are in consequence very fine. All this needs an outlet on the Mediterranean.

A railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean, would fill the country with visitors who would see for themselves, bring money into the country and open it. If the Nile opened into that hole and corner place, the Persian Gulf and not the Mediterranean, and there was no railway connecting it with the Mediterranean, the value of the produce and the land of Egypt would fall over 100 per cent. if not 200 per cent. The more I think, study, consult local merchants, and understand the country, the more I am convinced that in a Euphrates valley railway lies the development of the country. The Euphrates valley can produce and does produce every kind of fruit to perfection, and the valley, compared with what it was fifty years ago, is already another world.

To transport wheat from Bagdad to Bussorah costs 1*l.* 8*s.* per ton and from Bussorah to London (including transhipping) 1*l.* 2*s.* or 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton. Put that on Argentine or Canadian wheat and you would strangle the trade.

Mesopotamia could produce some 4,000,000 tons of wheat, and barley for export and, without exaggerating, many millions of sheep, all for the west. English trade would benefit immensely, for English goods would come direct here instead of going round by Aden and Karachi and Bussorah, while the trains would take back all the things England needs.

I say nothing of oil seeds, excellent beetroot for sugar, and cotton, which we can produce. They would be an additional asset. And all that is needed is under 600 miles of railway, the whole length of which very nearly is capable of being cultivated and in ancient days was cultivated and thickly populated. The population to-day is increasing by leaps and bounds in spite of every discouragement to transport.

(Signed) W. WILLCOCKS.

Bagdad, February 14, 1909.

[20296] No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 381.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 26, 1909.*

YOUR despatch No. 112 of the 5th ultimo concerning the difficulties with which the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company was meeting in the development of its enterprise, arrived at a moment unpropitious for any action to be taken with the Turkish Government.

I have the honour, however, now to report that, as soon as tranquillity was again prevalent, I approached the Minister for Public Works on the subject, and his Excellency informed me that he had suspended the commissaire who had proved so obstructive, and had dispatched an inspector-general to investigate the company's complaint. The main point at issue was whether a certain tunnel should be built of a size to contain a single or a double track of lines, and the company's desire to build only the smaller tunnel has now received assent.

I also spoke to the Minister of the Interior, who was quite recently Governor-General of Smyrna, on the matter, and Ferid Pasha told me that he had been very much impressed by the excellent way in which the Smyrna–Aidin Railway was conducted. He would be glad to assist it in any way in his power, though unofficially, as it did not lie within the sphere of his Department, but with that of Public Works.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[20297] No. 115.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 382.)

Pera, May 25, 1909.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 346 of the 17th instant I have the honour to report that I have received a series of further despatches from Major Doughty Wylie, bringing his narrative up to the 17th instant. As most of the information in them had been contained in his telegrams reported in my above-mentioned despatch I do not propose to trouble your Department with them, but merely to summarize them. I inclose, however, copies of two letters which he has received* one from Mr. Chambers, written from Sis, on his way to Hajin, and containing a number of interesting details on the situation in the outlying parts of the vilayet; as Mr. Chambers points out, the greatest problem which the Government will have to face is how to prevent a really serious famine; the local Turks throw the blame for the massacre on the nomadic Turcomans and Aidinlis, and in the town of Sis they combined with the Armenians to defend it from massacre and plunder. The success of the local officials at Sis and Fekké in preserving order is in striking contrast with the apathy of the Vali of Adana at the beginning of the troubles.

The other letter is from an American missionary, Miss Billings, which is interesting as being the first authentic information which has reached me from Hajin. Contrary to reports which had reached Major Doughty Wylie, practically no damage seems to have been done in the town, and there were very few casualties. Indeed, no serious attack seems to have been made, the resolute attitude of the population, which appears to be almost entirely Armenian, being apparently too much for the rabble from the villages that collected for the massacre.

The attitude of the new Vali at Adana continues to be unsatisfactory; in my despatch No. 334 of the 11th instant I reported that Major Doughty Wylie had telegraphed to inform me that the reactionary party were sending round secretly urging Moslems not to give up their loot; it appears, however, that the Vali is acting similarly, and Major Doughty Wylie took an opportunity of calling on Mehemet Ali Bey, accompanied by Captain Thursby, to bring this fact to his notice; the General promised that the utmost strictness would be shown in the matter of the restitution of loot; at the same time Major Doughty Wylie informed him that he had received a message through the dragoman of the Russian Consulate from the Vali asking him to subscribe to what Major Doughty Wylie describes as a "Consular round robin," to the effect that the Armenians alone were responsible for the disturbances, and adding that if he were accused of having sent this message he would deny it. A further instance of the Vali's hostility to the Armenians is the case of an Armenian who went out under escort to get in his harvest; on arriving outside the town he was threatened with death, and on the matter being brought to the notice of the Vali, he expressed a wish to see him, and guaranteed his safety if he came; however, the man was promptly thrown into prison on the charge of having killed four Turks, and being a member of the Fedai.

On the 10th instant Sir Assheton Curzon Howe arrived, and Major Doughty Wylie took him to call on the Vali. In the course of the conversation the Admiral impressed on him the horror of Their Majesties the King and Queen at the atrocities which had been committed, and the Vali replied that more Turks had been killed than Armenians, and that the latter had intended to establish a kingdom under Russian protection.

Major Doughty Wylie reports that the circular to the effect that 90 per cent. of the Moslem farm labourers have been killed is being eagerly signed by the Moslem notables, and that this is no doubt being done with a view to impressing the Commission from Constantinople.

The Civil Commission has now started and is composed of Faik Bey, President of the Court of First Instance of the Council of State; Mosdijian Artin Effendi, Judicial Inspector at Monastir; and Youssouf Kemal Bey and Babikian Effendi, Deputies, and Major Doughty Wylie reports that two officers are on their way from Macedonia, apparently to watch the proceedings on behalf of the Committee. I gather from the Government that the instructions given to the Civil Commission are somewhat elastic, but, generally speaking, their duties are more to discover the origin of the massacre than to deal with individual cases.

* Not printed.

Major Doughty Wylie reports two terrible occurrences which he had omitted in his earlier despatches: one, the destruction of the Gregorian school in the course of the second massacre, when nearly 2,000 persons were believed to have been burnt to death, and the other at Injerli on the outskirts of Adana, where 1,000 persons collected in the church which was fired, the only survivor, as far as he can ascertain, being one woman. The destruction by fire in the Armenian quarter seems to be almost complete, only two Armenian churches, the American girls' school and half the French nuns' school, remaining of all the foreign and Armenian churches and institutions.

Major Doughty Wylie is still unable to learn the origin of the second massacre, but he is informed that the members of the League of Mohammed asked the Mufti for a "fetwa" to massacre and that the Mufti gave it; the moving spirit in the League seems to have been Bagdadli and his sons, of whom the latter have escaped from Mersina on a Russian ship, but Bagdadli himself continues to be President of the Turkish Relief Committee.

On the 14th instant the Military Commission arrived from Constantinople; Major Doughty Wylie at first found them firmly convinced of the existence of a great Armenian plot, and his subsequent telegrams stated that the Armenians were afraid to give evidence; however, confidence is growing that justice will be done by them, and Messrs. Chambers and Troubridge, who have been examined were impressed by the impartiality shown. In the course of his examination Mr. Troubridge gave evidence as to the death of the American missionaries Messrs. Rogers and Maurer, and was questioned on the subject of the responsibility for the massacre; he stated that he considered the Vali and Ferik primarily responsible, and after them the Armenian Bishop and others; a great impression was made on the Commission by his repeating the late Vali's statement to him, that as there had been an armed insurrection of Armenians he could not be responsible for what had happened, and by his answer that in any case the Vali had no business to give the town over to anarchy. Up to the present 104 Moslems and 89 Christians have been arrested by orders of the Commission on the charge of complicity in recent events. I have received from the Sublime Porte no definite charge against the three Armenians in the Vice-Consulate where they remain, and I have recently received a *note verbale* stating that two more revolutionaries have joined them. This, however, is denied by Major Doughty Wylie.

He reports some interesting details of the massacre at Hamidieh where the only Armenians saved owe their lives to the great courage shown by the French subject, M. Sabatier, who owns a factory there, and in spite of threats to destroy the place, gave asylum to a considerable number of persons. M. Sabatier reports that the massacre was led by the Mufti, Kadi, and some Notables, and that the Captain of the Nissis regiment turned his men loose to join in the massacre, which lasted three or four days, while the Kaimakam aided and abetted. It appears from reports which Major Doughty Wylie has received from his dragoman that a massacre had also been arranged at Konia, but that the leading hojas were not in agreement; at Caesarea also there was at one time serious anxiety. Turkish villagers poured into the town crying that the Zeitunlis (Armenians) had killed all the men in the villages surrounding the town and that vengeance must be exacted. The Mutessarif, however, refused to give them arms in spite of the refusal of the Ferik to assist him in maintaining order. Mr. Suyabulun, father of Major Doughty Wylie's dragoman, who is the Deputy Governor to the town, averted trouble by inducing the Chief of the Hunterak Society to leave Caesarea and his departure restored quiet. Sir William, Lady, and Miss Ramsay have gone to the village of Korla, 10 miles from Konia, with a small escort, and the authorities state that they are quite safe. Trouble was threatened at one time at Ammur; the Admiral therefore called there, at Major Doughty Wylie's request, on his way to Marmarice, and the latter has since been informed by the manager of the Karamanian Iron Corporation, which is a British concern, that the visit produced an excellent effect. Security in the country behind Adan seems to be improving, as two American missionaries have been able to leave for Hajin and a German lady has gone to Bagché.

The numbers on relief at Major Doughty Wylie's camp continues to be about 15,000, though every effort is being made to induce the refugees to return to their homes and get in the harvest.

I have the honour to inclose a despatch from Mr. Donok, British Vice-Consul at Antioch, reporting on the massacres in that town and in the neighbourhood. You will observe that Mr. Donok accuses the local authorities of complicity.

I have not reported to you the various steps I have taken with the Turkish Government in connection with these massacres, but I have throughout brought to the notice of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior such facts as are reported to

me by Major Doughty Wylie and others which may assist the Government in fixing the responsibility for the tragedy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Vice-Consul Douek to Acting Consul Cuboni.

Sir, *Antioch, April* 30, 1909.

FROM the telegrams which I addressed to you during the last ten days you will be tolerably well acquainted with the condition of affairs in Antioch. I now beg formally to report to you.

On Monday, the 19th instant, at half-past 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the Mahommedan portion of the population went to the Armenian quarter of the town and perpetrated a massacre of all the male Armenians they could reach. And this massacre continued till Friday evening, every male Armenian and Protestant Armenian being diligently searched for, and by that time the poor condemned race, as respects males, had become nearly extinct in Antioch.

The number of victims in Antioch itself is estimated at from 200 to 350, and in the near neighbourhood to a distance of half an hour all around, the number killed is estimated at 100.

Two Armenian Bishops and one priest were killed, and the Old Armenians' Church building* and the Protestant Armenian Church building were both pillaged.

Kessab has perished, having been attacked by a great force of many thousands. Accompanying the massacre here there was violation and outrage upon the women and girls, and the robbery of the Armenian houses and shops of everything they contained.

As to my opinion respecting the moving influence in the terrible affair, certainly the local leading Mahommedans determinedly promoted it; but I also think the authorities responsible, because rifles and ammunition were distributed at the barracks to the military reserves (Redif), as also some to the Bashi-Bozouks, and when this was exhausted the barracks renewed it; and because, had it been the wish of the local Government to stop the massacre, they could easily have done so at any moment, as they had at their disposal force enough for that purpose.

Twenty-four hours before the occurrence I had written a letter to the Governor saying that I apprehended such trouble and requesting that he be on his guard. The Governor, in reply, ridiculed my representations, expressing surprise that I could suppose any such things. During about ten days all business was arrested in the town.

Refugees entered these Vice-Consular premises in great numbers, as also the mission buildings in charge of the Rev. Dr. James Martin. The numbers are not less than 1,300, and of all non-Mahommedan sects, for these all were naturally terrorized by the manner of the attack upon the Armenians, which was so savage.

On the forenoon of Monday, the 19th, I handed in at the telegraph-office a telegram addressed to you setting forth my serious apprehensions. This telegram was refused, and this, too, indicates that the hand of the local Government was in the affair. Later, when the massacre had begun, desiring to give your Consulate some sign as to what was going on, I sent a series of telegrams of a covert nature—one telegram every two hours.

I thank you much for securing for us the presence of a war-ship. The arrival of His Majesty's ship "Triumph" caused the massacres to cease. Had the "Triumph" been delayed only a few hours I believe that thousands of Armenians of the Swedia villages would have been added to the victims. The Commander of His Majesty's ship "Triumph" honoured us with a visit here on the 27th, and was able to inspect matters here with his own eyes. He has since visited some of the Armenian villages between here and the sea.

Matters now seem quieted. We are now face to face with a most difficult problem, namely, what is to be done for and with these poor, destitute Armenian widows and orphans.

There took refuge in various places, some with me, some with Dr. Martin, some at

* Probably Gregorian Church.

the Latin Monastery and French Vice-Consulate, and so forth, widows, orphans, &c., to the number of 500 or 600—very many of these not only homeless and hungry, but nearly naked, and a considerable number wounded.

If it is possible, I would respectfully beg of the Consulate to appeal—and as widely as may be—for funds for the relief of these pitiable refugees.

Pursuant to your telegram, I used my good offices with all diligence on behalf of the Orthodox Greek Church community

I have, &c.
(Signed) DAVID DOUEK.

[20504] No. 116.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to the Admiralty, dated the 25th May, 1909, relative to the proposed increase of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein.

India Office, May 29, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 116.

India Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *India Office, May* 25, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of correspondence as to the proposed increase from five to twelve guns of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and from five to eleven of that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; also as to the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and of three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives.

Subject to any observations which the Lords Commissioners may have to offer, Viscount Morley would propose to approve the introduction of these changes, and to leave it to the discretion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to decide, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the Sheikhs concerned.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

[20500] No. 117.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 21st May, relative to affairs in the Aden hinterland.

India Office, May 29, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May* 21, 1909.

ADEN hinterland. Your telegram dated the 3rd May:
I approve proposed instructions to Resident as to Nawa.

[21027] No. 118.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

Sir, *Admiralty, June* 4, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter, dated the 12th May, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, together with copies of its inclosures, relative to the recent situation in the Levant.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 118.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

Sir, "*Exmouth*," *at Mersina, May* 12, 1909.

IN submitting the enclosed reports from Captain Cecil F. Thursby, of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure"; Captain William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O., of His Majesty's ship "Triumph"; and Captain Thomas W. Kemp, C.I.E., of His Majesty's ship "Diana," he pleased to submit to their Lordships that, on the arrival of Rear-Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, K.C.V.O., C.B., at Marmarice in my flagship on the 7th instant, I transferred my flag from "Ocean" to "Exmouth," while Sir George transferred his from "Exmouth" to "Ocean." I then proceeded in His Majesty's ship "Exmouth," and arrived at Mersina on the evening of the 8th, passing several corpses floating on the sea some 20 to 30 miles from Mersina.

2. Captain Cecil F. Thursby, the Senior Naval Officer of the ships of the various nations present, informed me of the state of affairs.

3. Some 10,000 troops of the 42nd Army Corps have been drafted to Adana, and were brought to Mersina by transport and rail.

4. Mehemet Ali Bey, who was chief of the staff at Beirout, arrived on the 26th ultimo in command of all the troops lately sent. He is actually subordinate to the lieutenant-general, Feik of Adana, who is under grave suspicion of having had a great deal to say to the recent massacres. Mehemet Ali Bey is, however, a man of firmness and command, and has acted since his arrival with the greatest zeal, common sense, and tact. The general state of the vilayet has undoubtedly improved since his arrival. He has organised the whole country into military districts, and is in telegraphic communication with each. These measures, provided word is given from Constantinople to keep the peace, will be effective; otherwise, of course, the whole place is at their mercy. There are now over 10,000 troops available in the vilayets of Adana and Aleppo.

5. The new Vali, Zekni Pasha, arrived about the same time as Mehemet Ali overland. He is a Kurd, and is not satisfactorily reported on by Captain Thursby or by His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul, Major C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie.

6. Having conferred with Captain Thursby, and left with him two destroyers, targets for gunlayers' test, and money brought in "Exmouth," the latter weighed at 5 A.M. and proceeded to Swadiyeh. On the way we picked up a caique containing twenty armed men, who seemed to me to be on a filibustering expedition; they swore, however, they had had no food for three days, and were becalmed, so were supplied with bread and water.

7. Arrived at Swadiyeh at noon, where were found His Majesty's ships "Triumph" and "Diana" and the Ottoman ship "Abdul Hamid," which got under way and left for the south without communicating. She did not salute. After hearing the reports of Captain W. C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O., and Captain Thomas W. Kemp, C.I.E.,

[20513] No. 117 A.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May* 29, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the commanding officer, His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure," dated the 13th May, 1909, which has been received through the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the recent situation in Asia Minor.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure in No. 117 A.

Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, "*Swiftsure*," *at Mersina, May* 13, 1909.

IN continuation of my last report, His Majesty's ship "Exmouth," wearing your flag, arrived about 7 o'clock on the 8th instant, and I repaired on board and reported to you personally. She sailed again for Alexandretta about 10 P.M.

On the 9th I proceeded to Adana, to inspect the camp and hospital. I also took the opportunity to visit Mehemet Ali Bey, the general commanding the troops, and thanked him for the good order his troops were keeping, and brought to his notice several alleged cases of the authorities aiding and abetting people who refused to give up plunder, also cases of people who had been threatened, and thereby prevented from leaving the refuge camp. He listened with great attention, and promised to give orders for increased severity on these points.

The consul informed me that subscriptions towards the relief funds were now coming in satisfactorily, and he has been able to send relief to Hadjin, Bugsho, Marash, Osmanieh, Missis, and other places.

The captain of the Austrian war-ship, Captain Brandmeyer, very kindly prevailed on his dragoman, Mr. Sineonoglon, to place his large house, then empty, at Mrs. Wylie's disposal as a hospital. Surgical cases have all been removed to it, and the old hospital turned into a medical one.

Representatives of various nationalities, who expressed a wish to help, have been added to the committee, and amongst them the American vice-consul has been elected vice-president of it.

Hospital work has been systematized, and fresh helpers are arriving daily.

On the 10th the "Exmouth" arrived, wearing your flag, and I proceeded with you to Adana, to call on the consul and the various Turkish officials. Since you have left things have remained much the same. On the 11th a scare occurred in the camp; the Armenians stated they had been told there would be another massacre. The consul went to the Vali and general, who took immediate steps to allay the panic, doubling the guards, and making enquiries, which event usually resulted in their beating and putting into prison a Turk. It has, however, prevented any more people from leaving the camp. The following numbers of reliefs for yesterday may be of interest:—

Total number fed	14,388
Died in camp last twenty-four hours	6
Seriously ill	67
Slightly ill	323

Numbers in hospitals:—

British hospitals	106 in-patients, 160 out-patients.
German hospital	48 in-patients, 100 out-patients.

With regard to the general situation, I am of opinion that the military authorities are behaving well and keeping good order, but the civil authorities are not attempting to restore order or to administer justice impartially. All their efforts appear to be directed towards finding a scapegoat on whom to put blame before the arrival of the commission of inquiry from Constantinople.

The collier "Monksgarth" arrived this forenoon, and I am now coaling from her. After the destroyers have also coaled I am sending her on to Alexandretta to coal "Triumph," and then return here with the remainder of the coal for "Minerva," which latter ship, I was informed by wire from you to-day, is to be expected here on Saturday.

The committee of inquiry from Constantinople arrived at Mersina this morning, and proceeded to Adana by the afternoon train. I called on Kemal Pasha, the president, and received satisfactory assurances from him on the points I brought to his notice.

As things are now fairly quiet I propose to leave to-morrow for Ayas Bay, leaving a destroyer behind until the arrival of "Minerva." I propose to carry out the light Q.F. test during the week commencing the 15th, and the heavy-gun layers during the week commencing the 23rd. I have ordered "Triumph" to join me there as soon as possible after coaling.

As reported to you in my telegram of this date, the United States cruiser "North Carolina" arrived to-day.

I have, &c.
CECIL F. THURSBY.

[20596] No. 117 B.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

Sir, *India Office, May 29, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 26th May, 1909, forwarding copy of a note from the German Embassy protesting against the mining of fresh oxide for Messrs. Strick at Abu Musa, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the draft reply enclosed in your letter, and sees no objection to the proposed additional paragraph.

The reservation of the Sheikh's rights will presumably leave His Majesty's Government free to authorise the renewal of mining operations at any time hereafter, if it should be found desirable, even though the settlement with the German Government may not be finally concluded.

Copy of a telegram addressed to the Government of India is enclosed.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 117 B.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 28, 1909.*

ABU MUSA. See your telegram dated the 11th May. Instructions as proposed should be telegraphed to Resident, Persian Gulf, but it should be pointed out to him that the mining of 400 tons only of sample oxide for Strick was authorised by my telegram dated the 13th April, and that it is presumed by His Majesty's Government that no further mining operations will now take place.

The restricted nature of the undertaking in regard to Wönckhaus is being again brought to the notice of the German Government in reply to a note from the German Embassy. Scope of present negotiations and probability of their early conclusion are also being intimated to German Government, but full reservation is being made of Sheikh's rights in the matter.

[20237] No. 117 C.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 2, 1909.*

KARUN irrigation. For reference see your telegram No. 191 of the 31st May.

Please communicate the following to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad:—

"Sir W. Willcocks's promise is very gratifying, and I am much obliged to him. When he comes to London he will doubtless come and see me here."

[20735] No. 117 D.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 3.)

Sir, *Admiralty, June 2, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter dated the 5th May from the commander-in-chief Mediterranean, forwarding copy of a despatch from the officer commanding His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure," reporting on the recent situation at Adana and district.

I am, to invite the attention of the Secretary of State to the opinion expressed by the commander-in-chief with regard to the energetic action taken by Major Doughty-Wylie, His Britannic Majesty's consul at Adana.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117 D.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

SUBMITTED for the information of their Lordships observing that Captains Thursby, Pakenham, and Kemp appear to have acted with promptness, vigour, and discretion.

Major Doughty-Wylie, His Britannic Majesty's consul, has evidently displayed the greatest energy and courage, and I beg to bring his name to your notice for the information of the Foreign Office with my strongest endorsement, as many hundreds owe their lives to his unsupported courage.

A. G. CURZON-HOWE, *Admiral,*
Commander-in-chief.

"*Swiftsure*," *May 5, 1909.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 117 D.

Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, "*Swiftsure*," *at Mersina, April 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that in accordance with your orders I left Malta at 6·30 A.M. on the 18th instant at 12 knots speed, increasing to 15 knots in compliance with your signal of Sunday evening.

The passage was fine and uneventful.

We arrived and anchored off Mersina about 5·30 A.M. on Wednesday the 21st April.

No officials boarded the ship on arrival, so I sent an officer on shore to the consulate and told the officer to bring the consul or his representative on board, and to find out about the state of the town. The officer returned about 30 minutes later, bringing with him the consular dragoman, and an interpreter, as the dragoman could not speak English. I was informed that the town was perfectly quiet, but great relief was felt at our arrival, as they were fully expecting an outbreak similar to that at Adana. He informed me that the consul was at Adana, and was wounded in the arm, and he also handed me telegrams, &c., copies of which are enclosed herewith.

I immediately went on shore, and interviewed the governor (Mutesswif), asking him to let me have a train to take two officers, a sick berth steward, and some ambulance men with medical appliances to the consul at Adana. I also asked him if it was necessary or advisable to send a guard, armed or otherwise, to the dragoman's house

at Adana, where the consul and his wife have been staying, and if it was perfectly safe for my officers and ambulance party to go to Adana. He assured me that it was perfectly safe, that Adana, for the past two or three days, had been quite quiet, and the Vali there had sufficient troops to keep order.

Under these circumstances I decided not to send a guard until I had further communication with the Consul.

I returned on board at 11 A.M., and dispatched Commander Carver with Mr. Eason, my clerk, to assist the consul in his clerical work, a sick-berth steward, and three marines as ambulance party, with medical appliances, &c., giving Commander Carver orders to go thoroughly into the situation with the consul, and to return the same evening with his report. I also told him to communicate with the American mission at Tarsus on the way up or down, as most convenient.

On his return he reported that all was quiet at Adana and Tarsus, but that the British dragoman's house, at which the consul has his head-quarters, and the American and French missions, both at Adana and Tarsus, were full of wounded and refugees, who had to be attended to and fed. The consul's arm had been set and was going on well. Many of the refugees had returned to their homes, but there were still many who were either afraid to go out or had no houses to go to.

As surgical assistance and food were much needed, on the 22nd I sent up Surgeon Connell, and with him surgical appliances, 192 full rations, 700 lbs. of flour, 48 lbs. of salmon, 15 lbs. of tea, and 50 lbs. of chocolate, to tide over their present needs.

I informed the consul that I would go up the following day and would pay an official visit to the Vali. I communicated my intention to Captain de Lajarte, of the "Victor Hugo" and Lieutenant-Commander Hildebrand, of the "Loreley," French and German war-ships then in port, and invited them to accompany me. They both accepted my invitation, so on Friday, the 23rd, we proceeded to Adana. I had again to have a special train, as the usual service of trains had been suspended since the 18th instant, and the governor of Mersina would not yet allow them to run.

On arrival at Adana we proceeded to the English temporary consulate, and shortly afterwards drove to the Vali's official residence. We informed his Excellency that we looked to him to maintain law and order in the province, and to protect foreign subjects and property, and assured him that if he had not sufficient troops to maintain order, and at the same time guard the foreign subjects, we would land armed guards to assist him. He very much deprecated the landing of armed foreign guards, as he thought it would irritate the populace, and stated that he had enough troops now to keep order in the town, and was expecting more.

We next called on the general commanding the troops and then drove round the town, and visited the various foreign missions and schools, which were crowded with wounded and refugees.

The heads of the various establishments were all full of the gallant conduct of our consul, Major Doughty-Wylie; and all agreed that if it had not been for his prompt action there would not have been a Christian left alive in the town. He obtained a guard from the Vali, and rode at their head through the thickest of the firing, visiting the foreign establishments, irrespective of their nationality, placing guards, and assuring himself of their safety. We found the Christian quarter of the town in ruins, gutted, and burnt to the ground.

The Turkish authorities had commenced to clear away the débris, and there were no dead bodies to be seen.

The Vali returned our call at the British consul's house, where we impressed on him the importance of saving the American and British subjects at Hadjin, and offered to send Mr. Lawson Chambers, a Canadian, who volunteered there to assist in getting them away; but he refused our offer, as the risk was too great.

On our return to Mersina we stopped at Tarsus, and visited the American and French missions there.

From what I have gathered from communications with the leading officials and merchants, trouble had been brewing for some time. One of the first acts of the Armenians on the granting of the Constitution, was to buy arms. This gave them great confidence, and at the same time alarmed and irritated the Turks, so that any small explosion would at any time set the whole country alight.

The loss of life in the country districts was great, owing to the fact that there were a large number of Christians from a distance in the province who come annually to assist saving the harvest.

From evidence gained from people who have come from other towns, it appears that the outbreak commenced at Adana, and spread from there. The Vali, in addition

to having insufficient troops at his disposal, appears to have been totally unequal to coping with the situation.

On Saturday, the 24th, three battalions of Turkish troops from the IIIrd Army Corps arrived here. Two were landed and proceeded to Adana, and one went to Alexandretta, arriving there on the afternoon of the 25th, and was immediately sent from there to Dortyol.

The two battalions which landed here proceeded at night to Adana, dropping a few men at Tarsus on the way. At about midnight, I got a wire from the consul at Adana—"Fresh fighting, please be ready." He also informed me that the new troops appeared to have the situation in hand, but many fires. I sent the dragoman to the governor for any news, but received no reply, so at 7·30 A.M. I sent Commander Carver with three more marines, unarmed, to Adana, and told him to return in the evening with a report of the situation. It appears that firing broke out in the evening, in the quarter where the consul lived, and hundreds of people ran in, several shots being fired at them as they did so. They remained there all night. In the morning Major Doughty-Wylie, in spite of his wounded arm, rode to the konak, passing about twenty or thirty dead bodies on his way, and urged the Vali to restore order. By 11 o'clock this was practically done, but there was still a good deal of plundering and the fires were terrible. He then went to the school of the Jesuits, taking with him fifty men and the Ferik's staff officer. There were 2,000 refugees in here, who were got out by himself, Mr. Lawson Chambers, and the French priests, and taken to the konak, where they were placed in a garden. The refugees in the American schools were in a similar plight, and most of them had to be taken to the konak.

I consider the position of the Armenian refugees is desperate, and they should be removed to a place outside the city as soon as possible, and taken out of the country. Their homes are destroyed, their churches and schools in which they took refuge are burnt, and at any sudden panic which might be caused by the accidental discharge of a gun they would probably all be murdered.

This evening at 6 o'clock, the captains of the foreign men-of-war met on board the "Victor Hugo" in order to concert combined action. We telegraphed to the Vali at Adana in our joint names, calling on him to put down the disorder at Adana and protect Europeans, and pointed out to him that it was the duty of the Turkish Government, responsible for these disorders, to provide for the subsistence of refugees at all the missions and to take measures to grant them a safe conduct to a place where they could live in security. A copy of this document was also sent to the governor of Mersina, and he was told that if similar troubles occurred at Mersina the commanders of the foreign war-ships would land sufficient armed men to ensure the safety of their consulates and other foreign property.

With regard to the situation at Alexandretta and district, "Triumph" took a party of Turkish soldiers to Dortyol (where fighting was going on) on her arrival on Wednesday, the 21st. On Friday, the 23rd, "Triumph" reported:—

"Daily murders, Alexandretta. Antioch, extensive massacre. Tchok Mergeumum again fighting. Dortyol fighting; also Buylan. Larger reinforcement required to keep order."

On Sunday a battalion of troops was sent to Alexandretta, arriving there at 2 P.M. They were immediately transferred to a smaller steamer and sent to Dortyol. As soon as they had gone "Triumph" sailed, according to your orders, for Suweidiya, accompanied by the French cruiser "Michelet," in accordance with an arrangement made with them on hearing of the massacre at Kassab on the 24th.

I have just received news that "Jules Ferry" embarked a large number of refugees a few miles to the south of Kassab Bay. No news yet of Dortyol. Suweidiya in great terror, but not attacked yet.

With regard to Beirout and district, latest news from "Diana": "All quiet at present."

I have, &c.
CECIL F. THURSBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 117 D.

Telegrams from Major Doughty-Wylie to Captain Thursby.

(1.)

April 18, 1909.

ADANA not quiet. Please send, if possible, guards, stopping by the way at Tarsus to visit American and French school to see if all safe. Living here difficult for a day or two, but tents not required. Doctor and medical supplies welcome.

(2.)

April 18, 1909.

Consider guard urgently necessary to assist temporarily overworked Turkish authorities.

"Exmouth," left at 4 P.M. and proceeded to Alexandretta, arriving there at 8·30 P.M. to enable me to confer with His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul, Mr. Augustine Catoni, of Aleppo, and his son, both of whom have been most useful to Captain Pakenham, and who, he told me, were thoroughly conversant with the situation. There were here the "Jules Ferry," flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Pivet, and the German cruiser "Hamburg." I begged Rear-Admiral Pivet that he would take no notice of me, as my object was to confer with the consul, and it was after dark. Having had a long conversation with Mr. Catoni on my return, I found Rear-Admiral Pivet on board waiting for me, and who, as an old friend, gave me his views.

8. The "Exmouth" proceeded at 10·30 to Mersina, arriving at 5 A.M. to enable me to catch the train for Adana. Having spent the day there interviewing the Vali and various officials, I, and the officers with me, returned by evening train, and the consul having told me that an English mine had been threatened near Cape Ancmur, on account of employing some Armenians, the "Exmouth" proceeded at once to take me there and regulate the matter. She arrived there at 6·30 A.M., landed me, and having ascertained that all was quiet, I re-embarked at 8 A.M. and proceeded to Marmarice to confer with Rear-Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, K.C.V.O., C.B., and give the necessary orders to the ships there to carry out their Lordships' instructions.

9. As regards the enclosed reports, it will be observed that each one varies a little in colour, as evidenced by the sympathies of the writer. The following, therefore, is a small summary of the position as it appears to me, merely stating the bare facts of the moment:—

10. Mersina has resumed its confidence; shops are opened, and everything in normal conditions. The presence of so many ships of various nations may be considered as affording absolute protection there. Until passing Tarsus no signs of recent events are apparent, but from there on every house and settlement of the Armenians has been destroyed and burnt. In Adana the Armenian quarter ceases to exist. There are 17,000 refugees encamped outside the town, close to the station, and under the control of a committee, and rules by the executive orders of Lieutenant William H. W. Phillips and a bombardier named Hawes, who supervises the issue of provisions.

11. The original disposition of this camp was organised and admirably conducted by Commander Edmund C. Carver, under the orders of Captain Thursby, so long as his services could be spared. He was relieved by Lieutenant Phillips.

12. The refugees were simply camped out on the bare ground, but some cover was supplied so as to form little shelters, and latterly Mehemet Ali Bey issued 150 to 200 military tents, which naturally have conduced very much to the comfort of these poor people. A Turkish guard, with an officer, is stationed there to secure their immunity from attack.

13. The endeavours of Captain Thursby and the consul are to induce these refugees to resume their habitations in their ruined homes of the town, and the country people to go back to their vineyards and homes; but the terror still exists, and no doubt the most violent threats are still hurled at them when seen, so that up to the period of my visit only about 1,700 had left the camp. During the daytime they gradually steal to their ruined homes and bring back bits of charred wood so as to make their fires during the night in camp; nothing else is left to them.

14. Having requested an interview with the Vali, he answered that he had no proper clothes to receive me in. This, however, Captain Thursby said, could not be the case, as he saw him in uniform. However, I went to him, and, considering he was spoken to by me with all the force and directness that are possible through an interpreter not too brilliant in the Turkish language, he was perfectly civil, and afterwards returned my call at the temporary consulate.

15. The Ferik and Acting General Mehemet Ali Bey were also called on, and returned my visit. To the former, who is a Circassian, and who professes to be devoted to the English, it was pointed out that these excesses disgraced the name of the Ottoman Empire; the latter was warmly thanked for his exertions and good-will in restoring discipline and order. He is quite an excellent type of Turkish soldier, but, although the moving spirit of the military, he is under the command of his superior officers.

16. The dangerous situations are now at Dortiol and Kassab, where the [illegible] have rounded-up the Armenians and practically besieged them. Mr. Catoni (senior) proposed to go there with Captain Pakenham yesterday to try and persuade the Armenians to give up their arms and to accept the promises of the Turks, which naturally they are very reluctant to do. The hatred of the latter is absolutely uncontrollable, and on the slightest pretext will break out again into fresh massacres. The whole race to

rests with the authorities at Constantinople. If they are sincere and honest in their promises it can be easily governed by the very large military force in this part of the Empire. Half a word in the opposite sense would, however, join the troops to the fanatical portion of the Turkish inhabitants, who simply crave for the occasion to exterminate the adult population and to loot their possessions.

17. Beyond the crops now there is nothing to take, except possibly some buried money.

18. The English hospital, which has been entirely constituted and managed by Mrs. Doughty-Wylie, was inspected by me, and this lady merits my highest tribute of sympathy and congratulation at so nobly carrying out her stupendous work of charity and inestimable benefit to the 200 wounded in-patients and 600 out-patients that she, with very few helpers, has undertaken. The praises of the consul, whose personal courage, self-abnegation, and devotion have been the means of saving thousands of lives, although most severely wounded himself by a rifle-bullet fired at him whilst riding through the town to stop the carnage, the charity and extraordinary generosity of Mrs. Doughty-Wylie, who has given up all her own existence to be head nurse and manageress of her own hospital, are on the lips of every soul at Mersina and Adana, and no words of mine could acquaint their Lordships with half what I feel in the matter.

19. In conclusion, the exertions of Captains Thursby, Pakenham, and Kemp merit my highest approval, and are such as their Lordships would expect from such good officers. They have been most ably and zealously supported and assisted by their officers and ships' companies, and the British Navy has certainly not suffered any detraction in prestige in these provinces since they began their watchful help.

20. I shall be glad if my testimony can be added to that of others for the information of the Foreign Office respecting Major and Mrs. Doughty-Wylie.

21. The arrival of the "Diana" at Alexandretta would seem to have actually averted an attack on that place, and the news of the "Triumph" being off Swadiyeh to have done the same at Aleppo and Antioch.

22. On meeting Rear-Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, K.C.V.O., C.B., I shall request him, when the gunlayers' test with light quick-firing guns has been completed, probably by the 15th instant, to take the "Ocean" and "Canopus" to Malta, and there carry out the gunlayers' test with heavy guns.

23. Captain Thursby has been requested to carry out both tests, if possible, of "Swiftsure" and "Triumph," at Ayas Bay, summoning the "Diana" to take his place while doing so. The "Medea" will relieve the "Diana," and the latter will return to Malta.

24. It is my intention to relieve the "Swiftsure" and "Triumph" with "Minerva" and "Diana" until the return of the "Barham," when the "Minerva" will be available for other duties; but I would submit that the condition of the situation in Asia Minor and Syria would be benefited by the presence of the "Minerva," "Diana," "Barham," and "Medea" for the next two months, or until our return. The "Hussar" appears to be still far from completion, and will certainly not be ready by the 1st June, according to latest report.

25. On all sides I have been assured that the opportune arrival of His Majesty's ships has averted a still more deplorable massacre, and has saved the loss of thousands of Armenians.

26. There has evidently been a movement amongst the Hunchakist Armenians with a view to insurrection, but the penalty has fallen on the unfortunate country people, who have had nothing to do with it.

I have, &c.

A. G. CURZON-HOWE, *Admiral,*
Commander-in-chief.

P.S.—I must not omit to mention the names of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers, who are the heads of the American mission in the villayet. Mr. Chambers, having been at the last massacre of Armenians at Erzeroum, is unfortunately only too well experienced in these horrors, and has and is rendering the greatest and most valuable assistance. His advice and help are, of course, quite the most relied on and invaluable of any that could be offered.

A. G. C.-H.

Inclosure 2 in No. 118.

Captain Pakenham to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, *"Triumph," at Alexandretta, April 22, 1909.*

ON arrival here at 9 A.M. yesterday, the captain of "Diana" and the British vice-consul came on board, and the former informed me that he had landed fifty men for the protection of the British consulate during the night; also that he proposed sending an expedition, consisting of forty Turkish soldiers and of men from "Diana," to the help of an Armenian village, situated 2 miles north of this and 4 miles from the coast, which was belengured, and whose inhabitants were threatened with extermination. At the same time Captain Kemp showed a letter calling on God and humanity for aid.

The Turkish military governor of Alexandretta being willing to accompany his troops, they were embarked in "Triumph," together with about twenty of the leading men of Alexandretta, who, in compliance with the request of the governor, were to accompany the expedition. "Triumph" then proceeded, detaining "Diana" (who reported Beirout orderly) for charge of Alexandretta, in case the disorderly element should take advantage of the absence of a portion of the military force, upon which depended the relative quiet prevailing in Alexandretta.

Occasional columns of smoke on the hills showed that pillage was in progress, but the tale of killed appeared small. The difficulty and danger in Alexandretta lay in the influx of several thousands of refugees, and of some hundreds of the Circassians, Teherkesses, and Kurds, who are said to constitute the unruly and unsettled element in this district; but crime had not been abnormal, although only 100 soldiers were in the town, and every passing day would strengthen the hands of the Government. Military reserves have been called out, but had deserted with arms, ammunition, and uniform, and it is the weapons thus provided that seriously endanger a peaceful solution of the present situation.

The "Triumph" anchored off Tchoknerzamen, the village to which she was bringing help, district of Payass, at 1·30 P.M. The lives of British subjects not being in peril, it was not thought proper to land a naval party. At the last moment the governor, persuaded by the prominent citizens, announced a change of intention. He would send copies of a manifesto, which he had composed during the passage, to the contending faction, and would await answer in the "Triumph." Pressed to adhere to his original intention, he and his men, together with as many notables as could be found or could be urged out of the ship, eventually landed, but after walking a short distance he sat down, and said that he would not advance until a friendly reception had been assured. He said that the people were in rebellion, that his party was too small, and that he could not guarantee the life of the acting British vice-consul. The notables also were warmly solicitous for the life of this officer, though for themselves indifferent to risk.

The consul overcame this difficulty, and accompanied the advance of the soldiers, followed by the governor, who was old, and found the march difficult, and at a greater distance by the notables. The road wound through an open plain, backed by mountains, among the trees at whose bases lay the destination of the expedition. Landing had been unopposed. Two mounted zaptiehs and a few other people had indeed come up and joined themselves to the governor's party. No military precaution was preserved. After walking a couple of miles a gathering of people was observed who were apparently seeking cover behind the shrubby bushes. The road then led past the high embankment of an old dyke, and this was soon crowned by perhaps a couple of hundred armed men, observing the approach of the soldiers. If these had showed apprehension firing would almost certainly have begun, but, as it was, the soldiers passed, with flank presented, under the men on the bank, without the least sign of interest, and being then less than a mile from Tchoknerzamen, halted, with backs to the enemy, and began to smoke.

On his arrival the governor announced that he would hold a general palaver under some near-by shady trees. Cushions were brought, and the leaders sat down in a growing crowd which must have numbered over 1,000 men with arms. An escort went to invite representatives from the Armenian village to attend the palaver. When ever the pressure of the crowd became too great, some unarmed person would spring up, push, strike, or threaten with a riding-whip all the fierce-looking blackguards within reach. A dropping fire could be heard; beggars begged, water-carriers shouted, stallions neighed, broke from their pickets, and fought.

The escort returned with five hang-dog emaciated-looking Armenians.

Mr. Kennedy, an Irishman and a missionary, had been the chief emissary. He had come suddenly upon a Turk, who had been so startled by the clerical dress that he had emptied his shot-gun at it. Business began about 3:30, and some sort of conclusion had been reached by 6 P.M., when the Armenians were accompanied to their homes. Towards 7:30 the escort returned saying the Armenians declined to carry out the agreement, which, among other things, had been that nine Turks, whom the Armenians held as hostages, should be released in return for the restoration by the Turks of the water supply.

Thus the expedition could not hope for complete success. However, the Turks had promised that hostilities should be suspended for a short time, and they had listened attentively to the governor's admonitions, and to his promises that when he had at command, as he shortly would, a force sufficient to ensure the restoration of order, he would make a point of enquiring into and punishing offences. The local Turks seemed quite reasonable, and said they should welcome the arrival of troops, as then the insurgents in the district, who were the cause of the trouble, would be expelled.

The local Turks also told the governor that though they themselves felt no animosity to the Armenians, the root of the quarrel lay in the objection of these to any government based on Moslem religious law, and that hence the Moslem priests had made every Turk swear that he would extirpate the Armenians. The impression received was that if the Armenian stockades were held with the smallest courage danger could not be imminent, as a skirmish that took place within view of the palaver, and in which perhaps 200 Turks participated, showed that none of the besiegers were indifferent to the safety of his person.

The meeting broke up with three vociferous cheers for the Sultan. On the way back to the boats the fears of the notables for the British consul again became so acute that they implored him not to leave them. The whole party was disembarked at Alexandretta at 11:30 P.M. without accident. Being without news of the governor after sunset, Captain Kemp had again landed men, in case rumour of failure should give rise to trouble.

"Diana" sailed for Beirout this morning.

Only prompt reinforcement of the troops can ensure permanent order in this district.

I have, &c.
W. C. PAKENHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 118.

Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, "*Swiftsure*," *at Mersina, April* 28, 1909.

IN continuation of my report, the situation still continues critical at Adana. Commander Carver remained up there last night, reporting by letter at 3 P.M., which arrived on board at 6:30 P.M. He states that there is a large fire about 800 yards in diameter, which has already destroyed nearly a third of the town. There are not sufficient men or fire-engines to get it under. All refugees have been taken out of the foreign missions and schools, and are now divided between the large Greek factory and the German factory, both of which are only a few hundred yards away from the consulate. There are 10,000 of them in the Greek factory alone.

The soldiers, who began well, are getting out of hand and do not obey their officers. Several authenticated cases of pillage by them have occurred. The situation for foreigners is more grave than at any time hitherto.

On receipt of this communication I went ashore, accompanied by the French and German and Turkish captains, to interview the governor, and pointed out to him the gravity of the situation. He was quite willing to co-operate and assist in any way possible as soon as any further information was available. We then went to the telegraph offices and communicated with the consul and Vali, receiving from each reassuring answers, so no further action was taken.

The governor informed me that he had official news that the Sultan had abdicated and his brother had been proclaimed; also that the Vali of Adana had been superseded and that the new Vali would arrive there to-morrow, travelling overland.

The question of feeding the refugees is getting very serious and the Turkish

authorities are giving very little assistance. The captains of the foreign men-of-war are going up to-morrow to pay an official call on the new Vali, on returning from which I will report more fully on the whole situation. I am to-day, at the request of the Turkish authorities, dressing ship and firing a royal salute at noon in honour of the accession of the new Sultan.

News from "Triumph" was to the effect that the situation at Antioch was grave, so I gave Captain Pakenham permission to send an officer up to report on the situation of the Europeans there. He sent Commander Bruton, who is expected to return to-day.

"Diana" has been sent to Latakieh, at the request of the consul-general at Beirout.

April 30.—I proceeded to Adana yesterday in company with the captain of the "Hamburg" and the captain of the "Abdul Hamid," who arrived on the 27th.

We found on arrival there no change in the situation.

We took up some food with us, which we gave to the consul to distribute between the Greek and German factories.

There were 12,000 in the Greek factory and 3,000 or 4,000 in the German. They are at present being fed by committees presided over by our consul and the manager of the German factory, M. Stoehell. Food is provided by the English consul as president of the Relief Committee, by the manager of the German factory, and by private subscriptions. Mr. Trypani, the English dragoman, in whose factory the greater number of the refugees are congregated, is most generous in supplying anything that is needed at his own expense. The factories were much overcrowded, and the refugees much too frightened to go outside. We urged on the Turkish authorities that if they could not guarantee their safety or distribute them in places of security an epidemic would undoubtedly break out. Over 15,000 people are being fed daily at the two factories by foreigners, with little or no assistance from the Turks.

With regard to the wounded, Mrs. Doughty-Wylie established a hospital in a house close to the consulate. She has eighty beds available and about forty of these are at present occupied by the more serious cases, and there are about 160 out-patients, who come in daily and have their wounds dressed. The majority of them have three or four wounds each. One man I saw come in to be dressed had eight wounds, either from bullets or sword-thrusts; another young girl had eleven bullet wounds, and children of 2 to 3 years old had several, which from their number and position must have been deliberately fired at them. Miss Wallis, at the American Mission, also has a hospital, in which a small number are treated, and another one has been organised in the German factory. Mrs. Wylie herself is in charge of the consular hospital. She has had considerable experience in hospital nursing, and is at work dressing and bandaging from the first thing in the morning till the last thing at night. Surgeon Connell, from this ship, visits this hospital whenever I can spare him. I have sent two sick-berth stewards and half a dozen marines to assist in dressing the wounded and keep watch at night, &c. Two of these also assisted in Miss Wallis's hospital, until it had to be evacuated on account of fire. Mrs. Wylie is also assisted by Miss Alltree, an English governess in Mr. Trypani's family.

The captain of the "Hamburg" brought his doctor up with him to start the German hospital and left him there, very kindly offering his services at the English hospital, if necessary, in the absence of Mr. Connell.

The Turkish principal medical officer sent over to-day to ask the consul to take 150 of his wounded, as he was short of medical material.

The new Vali had not arrived, but I saw the old Vali's dragoman, his staff officer, and some of the leading Turkish and Armenian residents, hojas, and priests.

Just before leaving some suspicious cases of small-pox were reported from Trypani's factory. I told the consul to make enquiries and let me know the result. On arriving at Mersina I got a wire from him as follows: "Small-pox diagnosis confirmed." On receipt of which I telegraphed to you to inform you. However, I sent Surgeon Connell up to-day, the 30th, with a supply of vaccine, and after a consultation between him, the German doctor, and the Turkish official doctor, the consul wired to me that they had not got small-pox at Trypani's factory. The German doctor, who diagnosed the case, intended to convey that the case was one of measles.

I regret having wired you without first verifying, but, under the circumstances, and in view of the reluctance of the Turkish authorities to clear the overcrowded unsanitary building, I considered the case urgent and admitted of no delay.

The fire had nearly burnt itself out, but nearly half the town has been burnt down. The only European building that has been destroyed as yet is the [illegible]

Fathers' College. We also heard that Hadjin had been relieved, a telegram from Miss Lambert arriving while I was in the Consulate. The Consul reported to me that in a scare that occurred three Armenians, members of the Huntjaka Society, had got into his house, and that he had refused to give them up until he had heard from his Ambassador.

We heard from the "Diana" that she had returned to Beirout. "Triumph" reports remaining at Suweidiya, captain proceeding in picket boat to Alexandretta to settle about Dortyol.

On the 30th April I heard from the consul that the majority of the refugees had been removed from Trypani's factory, and formed into a camp under the superintendence of Commander Carver of this ship.

The new Acting General Mehemet Ali Bey arrived. I called on him and discussed the situation.

On the 1st May I went to Adana with the captains of the German cruiser and the Italian destroyer to call on the new Vali, Zihni Pasha. Before going we discussed the situation with our consul. He was of the opinion that there is a growing feeling among the Turks against foreigners. They are very suspicious of foreign intervention, and view with distrust the large number of foreign war-ships assembling at Mersina. Threats have been heard against the foreigners, and inflammatory articles published against them in some of the native newspapers.

We then visited the Vali, and, after paying him the usual compliments, we said that he had arrived at a very difficult time, and we hoped that by his efforts tranquillity would be restored. We stated that the various foreign interests in the country were solely those of humanity and commerce, and although we wished to help in every way possible to feed and attend the hungry and wounded, it was the duty of the Turkish Government to provide for them. We hoped he would do what he could to restore confidence, so as to enable those who had homes to return to them, and allow those who had money with which to leave the country to do so. We also called his attention to many brutal assaults by soldiers which have occurred during the last few days. The Vali replied that he would do all in his power, and the soldiers at fault would be severely punished. We then returned to the consulate, and I went to see the refugees who have been organised and are being arranged for by Commander Carver, assisted by American missionaries. They are now in three places: At Trypani's factory about 2,000, in a garden, 200 yards from the Consulate, there are several hundred sick women and children, amongst whom there are over 200 cases of measles. A little further on, in a large open space by the Tobacco Régie, are the main body, consisting of about 10,000, whom Commander Carver has organised into divisions, and where he has established a depôt for the issue of provisions. In addition to these, there are between 3,000 and 4,000 in the German factory, who are being organised and arranged for by the commander of the German cruiser "Hamburg," and the German employés at the factory. I also visited the German hospital, which is a fine house in the German inclosure, and where they are treating 100 cases daily.

May 2.—The only news I have heard as yet to-day is that the French Sisters' school was burnt last night. The authorities did all they could to assist putting it out, but I hope there will be an enquiry into the conduct of the officer of the guard on duty at the school. As the American schools are only a short distance from this, the consul advised them to get ready to move. There are fifteen patients in the girls' school, some of whom it will be difficult to move.

"'Triumph' reported 'Dortyol settled;' Captain Pakenham visited it, and found all quiet, with not much damage done.

"Disquieting news from Suweidiya, shall arrive there about 3 A.M. 'Jules Ferry' expected to relieve 'Vorité,' who proceeds to Beirout. On arriving at Suweidiya, 'Triumph' reported 'Situation very delicate.'"

I have ordered "Diana" to ship officer and stores for "Triumph" on arrival at Beirout, and take them to her.

May 4.—Yesterday Captain Lajerte of the "Victor Hugo" paid his official call on the new Vali. He told me that the Vali was very polite, and had promised much, but that he did not himself see much change in the situation. He also informed me that it was due to Captain Carver that the French school was not entirely burnt, about one-half of it being saved by his exertions. The American vice-consul arrived at 1 A.M. this morning.

With regard to relief, a committee was formed, and list drawn up in each community of people wanting food, numbering some 15,000. The second massacre disorganised everything, and I do not know if all the members of the committee are

alive. The communities are hopelessly scattered, and it is said that 8,000 more have been killed, and a still larger number than ever are homeless on account of the burning of the town.

The only funds available were 150*l.* given by the consul and his wife, 500*l.* loaned by them in addition, 100*l.* from the American Mission, 200*l.* from the Armenian Union of Cairo. The Turkish authorities every day give a certain quantity of flour, but the consul cannot obtain from them definitely what they are prepared to give. In addition to the refugees, there are over 300 cases of wounded treated daily in Mr. Wylie's and the German hospital, the cost of which is borne by us and the Germans respectively. The consul informs me that he had an informal committee meeting yesterday of himself, Mr. Chambers (head of the American Mission), and the Director of the Ottoman Bank. The Ottoman Bank is prepared to grant them credit, and he has written to Tarsus to ask Dr. Christie of the mission there to form a sub-committee; and he has also asked the French consul at Mersina to join the committee. It will be difficult at present to get any native members on it.

The American missionaries have telegraphed to their head-quarters in America, and the various consuls to their respective Governments, asking that private subscriptions may be raised. It is impossible as yet to estimate the amount of money required, but the committee will doubtless report as soon as they can get to work. The main question is to provide for the refugees from day to day, and this the British consul is doing on his own responsibility on the credit of the Ottoman Bank.

May 5.—The American consul arrived at Mersina, and called on me yesterday.

The British consul informs me that the refuge camps are still full. We fed 12,600 yesterday, and the Germans 5,000.

I have written to the Vali asking him to inform me of the progress already made towards the pacification of the province of Adana, and towards providing for the wounded and refugees.

"Triumph" reports, "Excitement Suweidiya subsided; Antioch quiet. Have just returned with British consul from Kassab; many houses burnt, all looted, but not many people killed. Many now returning. District quiet."

May 8.—During the last few days the situation has remained unchanged. The refugees have been cleared out of the German factory and formed into a camp. Nurses and doctors are commencing to arrive from Beirout, and I hope soon to be able to withdraw some or all of my men.

Commander Carver has returned to the ship, and I have lent to the consul a lieutenant to assist him, and also a writer, as he is unable to write himself, being wounded.

There are still over 14,000 in the refuge camp, but the authorities appear to be making some effort to make it safe for them to come out. The worst part of the situation seems to me to be the undisguised hostility of the Turks to the Armenians. Although many of the Armenians are killed and nearly all ruined, they have none of the pity that an honourable opponent feels for a beaten foe, the only talk one hears is of punishing them still more, and, if the Armenians spread out again over the country, nothing but the severest measures will prevent a recrudescence of the troubles.

The new military commander, Mehemet Ali Bey, seems an able and energetic man, and I think honestly tries to do his duty with equal justice to both sides. I have at present not so good an opinion of the new Vali, who seems to side with the Turks against the Armenians. He has done little or nothing to assist the sick and wounded, to provide for the refugees, or to produce a better feeling between the two hostile parties. He has only been here a short time, so perhaps it is early to judge.

There are now over 10,000 troops in the province of Adana, and some artillery, but whether they are here to keep order or for fear of foreign intervention, or whether they are sent to crush the Armenian towns further north, I am unable to express an opinion.

Mehemet Ali Bey told the consul that they had discovered that the outbreak was the result of an Armenian plot. The Armenian Bishop Mesheck was to be King, with Gnerdelian as commander-in-chief. At Hadjin, he said, they had actually raised the Armenian flag, and had men in uniform, enrolled as soldiers, both there and at Dortyol. They chose the critical moment in Constantinople, and chose Adana, rather than Van or Zeitun, for their capital, on account of its nearness to the sea. They hoped to provoke foreign interference, which would have been impossible further inland.

There is no doubt that the Turks all believe this, but I do not think the outbreak was started by the Armenians, as they were so utterly unprepared. I still think, as I

said in my previous letter, that there was a serious tension on both sides, and it only needed a spark, which was supplied by a fatal quarrel between some Turks and Armenians, to start the conflagration.

I enclose herewith letters of proceedings of "Triumph" and "Diana." Captain Pakenham's personal visits to Antioch, and other centres of disturbances in his district, undoubtedly had a tranquillising effect, and Captain Kemp, by his promptness in landing an armed party to protect the consulate at Alexandretta, did much to prevent an outbreak in that town.

At Adana I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Major Doughty-Wylie, the British vice-consul. He has been the leading spirit throughout the trouble, and it is undoubtedly due to him that the massacres were not even more serious than they have been. Mrs. Doughty-Wylie started a hospital as soon as she arrived there, and has been untiring in her efforts to tend the sick and wounded. Mr. Trypani, the British dragoman at Adana, has placed his house and factories at the disposal of the British consul for the use of refugees and wounded, and has been most generous in supplying food and necessaries at his own expense.

Of the officers and men of this ship, who have been assisting them, I will report later.

I have, &c.
CECIL F. THURSBY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 118.

Report by Major Drage.

THE first thing that strikes one on reading the report of His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul for Adana is that the massacres at that town and in the neighbourhood coincided with events at Constantinople.

Major Wylie had no suspicion that serious trouble was brewing until he received a letter on the 14th April from his dragoman at Adana warning him that a dangerous feeling existed. In a similar way the European authorities at Constantinople had no knowledge that the mutiny of the garrison was contemplated; the day of the 13th was a holiday, and the mutiny broke out in the small hours of the 14th.

It is conceivable that, when the mutiny and so-called reactionary movement at Constantinople was premeditated, directions were given for disturbances in Asia Minor, and that the reactionary ulemas at the capital—and possibly the Sultan—may have been to a great extent responsible.

Major Wylie states that the massacres, even at far distant places, began on the same day, and that he is of the opinion that at any rate some of the Turkish authorities knew of the intended action against the Armenians.

I do not feel competent to express a decided opinion as to what the reactionaries may have hoped to gain by instigating Armenian massacres, supposing such instigation to have proceeded from them, nor am I acquainted with the reason of the deep-seated hatred of the Turk for the Armenian, a hatred which far exceeds that for the Greek and Jew.

The Turks have always been afraid of a rising among the Armenians, but that such a rising should be considered as likely to have serious consequences for the Ottoman Empire does not appear to have a great deal of justification.

The newly appointed governor at Adana, a Kurd, on being questioned by Major Wylie, stated that the Armenians chose the moment for a rising on account of the critical situation at Constantinople, and selected Adana rather than Van or Zeitun as their capital on account of its nearness to the sea. The Kurd also stated that the Armenians hoped to provoke foreign interference, which would have been impossible further inland. He eventually agreed with Major Wylie in saying that, perhaps, the late Sultan might have seen in Armenian massacres the opportunity to discredit by massacre any other Government than his own. On the other hand, unless an Armenian rising was actually being organised in the Adana vilayet, it is difficult to understand why the Turks did not attack the more especial head-quarters of the Armenians in their ancient kingdom, which originally stretched from Erzinjan nearly to Tabreez, and where the Turks would have been entirely free from direct foreign interference.

In 1894–6 massacres of Armenians to the number of 80,000 took place in the Sasun district (in the heart of Armenia), and culminated in the massacre at Constantinople. The primary cause of this latter was the attempt of the Armenians to throw bombs into the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and so bring their troubles and grievances more immediately before the European Powers.

In the Constantinople massacres none but Armenians were knowingly attacked, and it appears that if, on the present occasion, the few Europeans had remained neutral instead of gallantly assisting the unfortunate people, no attempt would have been made upon their lives.

In the provinces the Armenians are bankers, money changers, merchants, and traders of every kind, and the greater part of the trade is in their hands; this fact, coupled with their ambition, conceit, and habit of exaggeration, may have exasperated the Turks against them. The restrictions against carrying arms were annulled on the granting of the constitution, and possibly the Armenians, feeling more secure, may have boasted that they were now going to have the upper hand, and that their turn had come for massacring Turks.

Major Wylie is of the opinion that the Armenian bishop (Gregorian) of Adana and the delegates of the "Hunjak" society had been stirring up the people, perhaps with the idea of establishing an independent principality. This was the view that the Turks took, and is borne out by the fact that Major Wylie's prompt action in preventing the return of the bishop to Adana had a soothing effect on both sides.

The Conduct of the Turkish Authorities and Troops.—The governor (Vali) appears to have been incompetent and a coward, and the same may be said of the ferik, or general commanding the troops. (Both of these have now been replaced, a Kurd having been appointed governor and a general, by name of Mahomet Ali Bey, has been appointed in command of the troops.)

The action of the original authorities in not using such troops as were available—Major Wylie judged that there were 500 troops at the konak itself—in vigorous measures at the outset cannot be too much condemned, nor their stupidity or guile in calling up the redifs (reserve men). These latter, of course, increased the trouble; they would naturally be Turks living in surrounding villages, and as such no better, but perhaps rather worse, than the other massacres.

The conduct of the Macedonian troops sent from Salonica appears to have been on the whole fairly satisfactory, but they could scarcely stifle their repugnance for the Armenians. The new general, Mahomet Ali Bey, appears to be giving satisfaction.

On the other hand, British prestige, as so splendidly upheld by Major Wylie prevented the rank and file from joining in the massacre, but only so long as they were under the immediate supervision of the Englishman.

The Action of the Railway Authorities.—Except Mr. Falanga, the station-master, the action of the railway authorities appears to have lacked the initiative which the situation required. Major Wylie complains that they refused to transmit telegrams for him, communication with Constantinople being cut and the ordinary line running through the heart of the town. Also that when a train was required for the relief of Tarsus, the director (Behrt, a Swiss) could not obtain one without the Vali's sanction. M. Behrt might, one would have thought, been in a position to disregard the authorities and dispatch a train on his own initiative.

Foreign Consuls.—It seems that the only consul at Adana was Major Wylie. On the other hand, at Mersina nearly all Powers are represented. As Mersina was apparently safe in the hands of the Mutessarif (lieutenant-governor), it appears rather strange that our vice-consul should not have received any assistance from them. I may be mistaken in this matter, but Major Wylie only speaks of the arrival on the 24th April at Adana of the Russian and Greek consuls—the former also representing Italy—and later on of the appointment of a native of Tarsus to be acting United States of America consul, and a few days ago of the arrival of the newly-appointed United States of America vice-consul, Mr. Nathan. No mention is made of others, and Major Wylie does not seem to be a man to omit mentioning any services rendered.

The question of Foreign Intervention by means of Armed Guards.—That foreign intervention was the hope of the Armenians can scarcely be doubted after reading Major Wylie's despatches. It appears that if anything could have still more exasperated the Turks, the presence of armed men from the ships would have been the cause—most valuable, as more Europeans would have been in checking the Turks at Adana. On the other hand, they might have been the cause of the conflagration spreading to other and less accessible districts, possibly to all the country inhabited by Armenians.

While one cannot but commiserate with the unfortunate Armenians, exposed to the

most brutal ferocity of the Turks, yet one feels that their action and intrigue is much to be deprecated, especially at the present time, when there is a chance—if remote—of a new era for Turkey.

GILBERT DRAGE,
Major R.M. and I.O.

"*Exmouth*," *at Mersina, May* 10, 1909.

Inclosure 5 in No. 118.

List of Casualties and Refugees at Adana.

ESTIMATED number killed at first massacre, Adana (including about 600 Moslems), 2,200.

Estimated number killed at second massacre not yet obtainable, judged to be between 1,000 and 3,000.

Number of wounded treated in European hospitals (temporary):—

English hospital: 70 in-patients, 200 out-patients.
German hospital: 40 in-patients, 200 out-patients.

Number of refugees under care of Europeans at Adana after second massacre of the 26th April, 17,000.

Note.—Many of these came in from the country districts. The number killed in outlying districts since commencement of massacres cannot be estimated, but it is stated that it cannot be less than 10,000 to 15,000, many villages being entirely wiped out.

Inclosure 6 in No. 118.

Captain Thursby to the Vali at Adana.

"*Swiftsure*," *at Mersina, May* 5, 1909.

Your Excellency,

AS you have now been at Adana for five days, and have had time to acquaint yourself of the situation, I should be glad to have your assurance of the safety of the Europeans at Adana, and also some definite statement of the future as regards the sick, wounded, and refugees.

On my arrival at Mersina on the 21st April I found that there had been a great fight between two sections of the population, namely, Turks and Armenians. The Armenians were beaten, and the majority of the survivors had taken refuge under foreign flags, seeking there the protection which the Turkish authorities were then unable to afford them.

On Sunday, the 25th April, a fresh outbreak occurred, which demonstrated the powerlessness of the Government to keep order, and the Armenian quarters of the town were burned to the ground, and with them some European property. Since then troops have been poured into the country, and there is now an ample force to deal with the situation.

I should be under a great obligation to your Excellency if you would inform me of the progress already made towards the pacification of the province of Adana and towards providing for the wounded and refugees. It has been brought to my notice that pillage and arson still occur, and that the Turkish newspapers are allowed to publish inflammatory articles.

I would also urge on your Excellency the danger of the existing state of affairs. The presence of so many warships may have a disturbing effect on the population, but until there are some visible signs of returning tranquillity they will be unable to disperse.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informs me that the Turkish Chamber has voted 20,000*l.* towards the relief of the refugees.

I have, &c.

CECIL F. THURSBY,
Senior Naval Officer in vicinity of Mersina.

Inclosure 7 in No. 118.

Consular Corps to Officer commanding "Victor Hugo."

Vice-Consulat de France, Mersina,
Mon Commandant, *le* 25 *avril*, 1909.

LE corps consulaire, réuni au vice-consulat de France, a l'honneur de vous exposer que, contrairement aux assertions officielles, le massacre général et les incendies ont repris à Adana. Les troupes de la Macédoine débarquées avant-hier y participent, et à Mersina même la situation s'aggrave. Les soussignés vous prient donc de télégraphier sans fil pour aviser toutes les Ambassades à Constantinople et pour demander d'autoriser un débarquement qui, dans ces conditions, semble s'imposer.

Veuillez, &c.

CHRISTMANN, *Consul d'Allemagne, Gérant d'Italie.*
(Illisible), *Vice-Consul de Russie.*
(Illisible), *Vice-Consul d'Espagne.*
DIPHAS, *U. S. V. et D. Consul.*
JAUREGUIBERRY, *Vice-Consul de Belgique.*
SPATHARIS, *Consul de Grèce.*
JEANNIER, *Consul de France.*
(Illisible), *Consul d'Autriche-Hongrie.*

Pour copie conforme:
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau, Commandant le
"Victor Hugo,"
H. DE LAJARTE.

Mersina, le 27 *avril*, 1909.

Inclosure 8 in No. 118.

Naval Captains at Mersina to Governor.

LES commandants des navires de guerre présents à Mersina, réunis à la nouvelle des graves événements qui se sont passés à Adana aujourd'hui, ont l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence qu'ils adressent à son Excellence le Vali d'Adana le télégramme dont copie est ci-jointe.

Ils rappellent à votre Excellence qu'ils sont à sa disposition pour maintenir l'ordre à Mersina.

Dans le cas où des troubles produisaient en ville les commandants réunis croiraient de leur devoir d'envoyer des hommes armés dans les consulats.

Fait en rade de Mersina le 26 avril, 1909.

H. DE LAJARTE.
CECIL F. THURSBY
Ritter v. MANN.

Inclosure 9 in No. 118.

Naval Captains at Mersina to Vali of Adana.

(Télégraphique.) [*Non datée.*]

LES commandants des navires de guerre présents à Mersina, réunis à la nouvelle des graves événements qui se sont passés aujourd'hui à Adana, ont l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de faire cesser les désordres et de donner protection à tous les Européens. C'est le devoir du Gouvernement ottoman, responsable des désordres, de pourvoir à la subsistance des réfugiés dans toutes les missions et d'assurer leur émigration dans un endroit où ils pourraient vivre en parfaite sécurité.

Inclosure 10 in No. 118.

Captain Pakenham to Captain Thursby.

Sir, "*Triumph*," *at Sudeu, May* 2, 1909.

WANT of time has hitherto prevented me from writing. I have now the honour to submit a report of doings since the arrival of "Triumph" at Alexandretta.

April 21.—9 A.M., arrived Alexandretta. Found there "Diana," who was just embarking fifty men whom she had, by invitation of the military governor, and on the recommendation of the British acting vice-consul (who, for shortness, will be called the B. C.), landed on her arrival on the 20th instant to aid in the maintenance of order. I was told, and later experience has tended to confirm the truth of the statement, that the arrival of the "Diana" occurred at a most critical moment, and that her presence and the disembarkation of her men almost certainly averted a massacre of Armenians.

The captain of the "Diana" informed me that the Armenian village of Dortiol (otherwise Tcholakmerzamen) was besieged by Moslems, and that the military governor of Alexandretta had agreed to embark in "Diana" with forty Turkish soldiers and to proceed to try to disperse the besiegers.

As "Diana" had been ordered by commander-in-chief to proceed to Beirout after arrival of "Triumph," Turkish troops and governor were embarked in "Triumph," and were transported to the sea-shore nearest Dortiol. B.C., Mr. Kennedy, missionary, and self, accompanied the Turks to Dortiol, interviewed about 1,000 armed Turks and some representative Armenians from Dortiol, and returned, disembarking the troops, &c., at Alexandretta about 11·30 P.M., having perhaps obtained a temporary relaxation of the attack.

"Diana," whom I had detained at Alexandretta during absence of "Triumph," had very properly again landed her men to counteract the weakness caused by the absence of part of the military garrison.

April 22 and 23.—"Diana" left for Beirout. Time spent in visiting authorities, consuls, and refugees, and in gathering information on related subjects. Situation in Dortiol again acute. "Verité" and "Ferruccio" arrived.

April 24.—10 A.M. Mr. Kennedy represented position Dortiol desperate—no food, water supply cut off, number of besiegers increasing. Resolved, in last resort, to raise siege by force.

5 P.M. Alternatives that seemed preferable had come to mind. With B.C. again visited governor. It was evidently impossible to get help from him until it had been settled who was to have the upper hand in Constantinople.

7·30 P.M. Consultation with B.C. and Mr. Kennedy.

8·30 P.M. We visit "Verité," and arrange to make joint representation on following day.

10 P.M. B.C. and Mr. Kennedy again visit governor.

10·30 P.M. Alarm ashore, believed to be from isolated house of British subject. Send two armed boats and twenty marines. Prepared landing party. Alarm false.

April 25.—2 A.M. Signal from B.C. saying that governor had consented to send a few soldiers to Dortiol.

9 A.M. French, Italian, and British captains and consuls visit governor, threaten him with identical unfavourable reports to Constantinople. He finally capitulates, and promises that troops expected from Mersina shall at once proceed Dortiol.

2 P.M. Troops arrive at 11 A.M., and leave for Dortiol without disembarking Alexandretta.

3 P.M. All possible having now been done for Dortiol, cries for help from Swadiyeh, which had been becoming daily more urgent, could now be attended to. Weighed for Swadiyeh.

7·35 P.M. Anchored off mouth of Orontes.

April 26.—6 A.M. Boat loads of hysterical Armenians having represented danger pressing, I landed and walked to Swadiyeh. Massacres had recently taken place at Antioch and Kussab, places from 20 to 25 miles distant from Swadiyeh. It was said that the several thousand attackers of Kussab were even then on their way to wipe out the Armenians of the Antioch-Swadiyeh-Orontes valley.

7 A.M. Visited Mudir, Swadiyeh. He said his few soldiers were enough for defence of Swadiyeh, but that he would not be able to do anything for the rest of the valley.

11 A.M. Re-embarked, went in steam-boat to Kussab Bay to see if any refugees there. None. Saw "Jules Ferry" in Bazeit Bay. On board was shown about 1,000

refugees, and was told that 1,000 more were expected, also that a Messageries Maritimes steamer had embarked 2,000 on previous day.

9 P.M. Excited British subject came on board saying that he had "cut his way" through from Antioch, where the Christians were practically held prisoners, and were not allowed communication with outside. 20,000 armed men on the road. Had come for fifty men and two machine guns with which to subjugate this part of Asia—much more to the same effect.

Being thus informed that the state of panic extended to Antioch, and having witnessed in the "Jules Ferry" the result of panic not quickly suppressed, determined to go to Antioch, as there lay the centre of alarm and of whatever authority might exist to allay it.

April 27.—7 A.M. Told Mudir, Swadiyeh, to warn kaimakam, Antioch, to expect me.

9 A.M. With a soldier as guide started. The 20,000 armed men who had held the road on the previous night were not seen.

Noon.—Saw twenty or thirty mounted Europeans. Thought the European residents of Antioch must be evacuating. Found it was a deputation to welcome.

1 P.M. Ceremonious entry into Antioch. Troop of cavalry, numerous infantry, deputation, and throngs of natives.

3 P.M. With consuls called on kaimakam and delivered an address to him and to leading officials. Received assurance of compliance. To advertise as widely as possible the presence of a British officer, in company with French and British vice-consuls and Dr Martin, missionary, and escorted by troops, made a tour of the sacked part of the town, visited burying ground, wounded, and refugees.

Killed, number uncertain; perhaps 300. Had seen bodies in sea and river. Wounded, few; bullet wounds, bruises, torn ears. Refugees, numerous; happy enough until cortege was sighted; then smiles and chatter gave place to tears and groans, changing quickly to cries and then to howls. Heard of deposition of Abdul Hamid.

5·30 P.M. Kaimakam and leading officials called. Renewed protestations, "traditional friendship with England," &c. Recommended Europeans not to evacuate.

April 28.—4 A.M. Left Antioch with two consular cavasses. Again saw no one on the road. See attached "1."

8 A.M. Swadiyeh. Found appeal from Yoghoon-Olok, a group of Armenian villages 10 miles distant in the mountains.

2 P.M. Left for Yoghoon-Olok. Immense reception. Repast in Capuchin convent. Spoke hopefully.

7 P.M. Returned. Advice from Alexandretta that situation at Dortiol had again become serious. No food admitted; water supply not restored; a British subject imprisoned.

April 29.—Considering presence of war-ship at Swadiyeh indispensable, provisioned picket boat for three days.

11 A.M. Left in her for Alexandretta.

3·30 P.M. Alexandretta. Consultation with B.C. Interview with governor and with captain of "Verité." Dispatched cutch loaded with flour and rice for Dortiol.

6·30 P.M. Mohmmed Ali, who was assuming command of the troops at Adana, being in port, called and spoke of Dortiol. He said an escort was to be given us.

April 30.—With four soldiers and an officer, and with B.C., left Alexandretta in picket boat.

5 A.M. Disembarked for Dortiol. Besiegers dispersed. Promise food should be admitted; water supply in process of restoration. With Turkish colonel walked through village of Dortiol. Distress not apparent. Defences notable. Addressed leading inhabitants, telling them to bear in mind that they were Ottoman subjects, and must therefore be obedient to Ottoman law. They sly and sullen.

11·30 A.M. Returned Alexandretta, bringing back Mr. Kennedy, the British subject. Mail from Mersina give detailed accounts (see attached "11") of enormous massacres at Adana, perpetrated from the 25th to 29th by troops newly arrived from the north. Great alarm. All seemed about to begin again. These reports were subsequently found to be either false or gross exaggerations.

2·30 P.M. Left for Swadiyeh.

7 P.M. Swadiyeh. Not knowing truth about Adana, was greatly concerned for safety of Alexandretta and Dortiol, as these places were guarded by the other half of the troops reported guilty at Adana. Thus, though thinking presence of warship at Swadiyeh important, thought safety of Alexandretta more so.

Midnight. Left Swadiyeh in "Triumph" for Alexandretta. Received from "Swiftsure" contradiction of reports.

May 1.—5·30 A.M. Alexandretta. Condition more settled.

8·45 P.M. Left for Swadiyeh.

3 A.M. Swadiyeh.

4 A.M. Landed. Saw Mudir. Serious trouble impending.

It is difficult to summarise a situation that changes from hour to hour. So far as it has been possible to ascertain, the party of Sultan Abdul Hamid has as its leading idea the massacre of Armenian Christians. Wherever representatives of his party have the upper hand, trouble is either brewing or is present. The soldiers at Dortiol belong to the IInd Army Corps, to whom the whole of this district properly belongs. It is said that committees who favour the restoration of the old régime are being formed throughout the neighbourhood; and, moreover, that ulema in disguise are arriving from Constantinople with the intention of preaching that Asia ought to cut adrift from Europe, have a Sultan of its own, and exterminate Christianity within its borders.

The times have brought good men to the front. Mr. Kennedy, of the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland and Ireland, should be mentioned as the saviour of Dortiol. Mr. Joseph Catoni, acting British vice-consul at Alexandretta, is an extremely able man; he speaks all local and several European languages, and is respected alike by Turks and Christians; he is the leader of the foreign residents of Alexandretta, consuls and all, and I am greatly indebted to him for his most valuable assistance; his firmness, decision, and courage are remarkable, and his commercial relations seem to weigh with him only as aids to his consular functions. In Antioch I had the pleasure of meeting another splendid fellow, M. Potton, French vice-consul. Had he been able to regain his post in time, massacre would have been much sooner arrested. Without other weapon than his own personality he seems to have gained a remarkable ascendency in that fermenting city.

I have, &c,

W. C. PAKENHAM,

Inclosure 11 in No. 118.

Vice-Consul Dower to Captain Pakenham.

(I.)

Sir, *Antioch, May* 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Antioch has been quiet these days owing to your visit and the presence of your ship. But there is a wide feeling of insecurity should your ship leave. The Mahommedans of Antioch have been purchasing all the arms and ammunition they could get, but with what purpose we do not know. We beg you to remain for a little time if possible.

Best respects, in which Dr. Martin and family and M. Potton desire to unite.

I have, &c.

DAVID DOWER.

(II.)

On nous rapporte d'Adana que—

La situation s'était bien améliorée et les troubles d'Adana et Tarsous avaient cessé, lorsque, le 24 avril, un bateau du Mahsoussé avait débarqué ici environ 1,500 soldats, du IIe Corps, dit-on, qu'on a envoyés la nuit de ce jour-là à Adana.

Ce même bateau a débarqué, nous dit-on, environ 600 soldats à Alexandrette aussi.

Or, le lendemain 25, à l'arrivée de ces soldats à Adana, ceux-ci ont essayé de faire remettre les armes à certains Arméniens qui s'étaient réfugiés dans leurs maisons, et qui se défendaient encore, craignant de se rendre, et d'être par la suite massacrés. Ces Arméniens, peut-être au nombre de vingt ou trente personnes, ayant refusé de se rendre sans avoir une garantie pour leurs vies, et menaçant de tirer sur les soldats si ceux-ci approchaient, il n'a pas fallu plus que ça pour que des soldats, nouvellement arrivés, se mettent en fureur, et dès le soir du 25 mettent le feu aux maisons où se

trouvaient ces Arméniens, et toute autre maison où ils soupçonnaient qu'il y avait des Arméniens, fussent ces derniers gens qui ne se défendaient pas: femmes, enfants, blessés, et malades; de sorte que cette nuit-là et le lendemain, 26, la ville était en grande partie en flamme, et le nombre des victimes qui ont péri par les flammes et les balles des soldats était énorme; on parle de 7,000 à 8,000 personnes, et on porte maintenant le nombre total des personnes péries à Adana même de 25,000 à 30,000 âmes.

Ces carnage, incendie, et pillage ont duré toute la journée du 26 et la nuit, et n'ont commencé à diminuer que dans l'après-midi du 27; le 28 ils avaient presque cessé, et le 29 c'est bien calme, dit-on.

Cette seconde atrocité était bien supérieure à la première, et a laissé des familles entières, arméniennes et non arméniennes, sur le pavé. Des personnes qui possédaient la veille de £ T. 5,000 à £ T. 30,000 se sont trouvés le lendemain complètement ruinées par le feu et le pillage.

A part les réfugiés ici et ceux qui ont quitté ici pour Chypre et ailleurs, il y a à Adana seulement sur le pavé, et presque crevant de faim, environ 20,000 personnes, dont la majeure partie sont des enfants, femmes, et blessés.

On nous dit le l'établissement des Jésuites a brûlé et une partie de l'établissement des Sœurs Saint-Joseph aussi.

Il se peut que dans ce rapport il y a de l'exagération, mais ceux qui le racontent le font avec la plus grande conviction.

Inclosure 12 in No. 118.

Captain Kemp to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, *"Diana," at Beirout, April* 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that I left Alexandria on the 16th April and arrived Beirout on the 18th.

2. I left Beirout on the 19th and arrived Alexandretta on the 20th.

3. Leaving Alexandretta on the 22nd I arrived Beirout on the 23rd instant.

4. The French man-of-war "Jules Ferry," flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Pibet, arrived here at 6 A.M. on the 25th, and leaves at 6·30 P.M. for Latakia.

I have, &c.

T. W. KEMP.

Inclosure 13 in No. 118.

Captain Kemp to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, *"Diana," at Beirout, April* 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that on arrival at Beirout I communicated with His Majesty's consul-general, who informed me that things were quiet but unsettled here, and that disturbances were possible when the body of the late deputy of Beirout (who had been murdered by mistake at Constantinople) arrived for burial on the 25th or 26th instant.

2. In accordance with telegraphic orders I proceeded to Alexandretta, and arrived there at 7 A.M. on the 20th.

The vice-consul there informed me that things were in a critical state; that there were many refugees in the town from the surrounding district, which was in the hands of the insurgent Kurds and Circassians; and that a descent on the town might be feared at any moment.

He also informed me that the Armenians of the surrounding district, numbering between 5,000 and 7,000, had collected in a village called Chokezaman, about 10 miles to the north-east of Alexandretta and 4 miles inland; that the village was surrounded by insurgents, all communication cut off, and that the situation there was desperate. I visited the kaimakam, and the officer commanding Turkish troops soon afterwards, who confirmed these statements and asked for assistance from the ship in view of contingencies.

These officials came on board about 1·30 P.M. on the 20th instant, in company with the vice-consul, and we agreed that something should be done to relieve the situation at Chokezaman. I promised, as soon as the affairs at Alexandretta permitted

of the ship moving, to embark a party of Turkish soldiers and the officer commanding troops, and proceed to the village for the latter to carry on negotiations. About 5 o'clock the same evening I received news from the vice-consul that 150 armed Kurds had come into the village and that the place was in a state of panic. I accordingly landed a party of fifty men to protect the consulate, which restored confidence.

3. I was in wireless communication with the "Triumph" during the night, and briefly explained the situation.

4. The "Triumph" arrived at 9·30 A.M. next day, and embarked a body of Turkish troops, religious and civil authorities, His Majesty's vice-consul, the officer commanding Turkish troops, and proceeded to Chokezaman.

5. I considered it advisable to again land a party at the consulate that night, owing to the absence of the principal authorities and a considerable portion of the garrison on the service aforesaid.

6. The "Triumph" returned to Alexandretta between 10 and 11 P.M. that day, and I left at 6 o'clock next morning for Beirout.

7. The body of the murdered deputy arrived at Beirout on the 24th instant and was interred on the 25th. No disturbance took place and Beirout is quiet at present.

I have, &c.

T. W. KEMP.

Inclosure 14 in No. 118.

Captain Kemp to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, "*Diana*," *at Swadiyeh, May* 8, 1909.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 25th April, I have the honour to report that, disquieting rumours having arrived from Latakia, I left Beirout for that place on the 27th April and arrived there on the 28th.

2. I found there between 4,000 and 5,000 Armenian refugees, which created a source of unrest.

The governor, of whom everyone spoke very highly, assured me, however, that there was no grave cause for disquiet; that he had already collected about 500 reserves and was collecting more; and that he was confident of his ability to keep the situation in hand.

He assured me that the refugees would be sent back to their villages gradually, as circumstances permitted, and requested me to tow a party of the latter, under the guard of some Turkish soldiers, to Bazit.

3. I accordingly left on the 30th April for this purpose, and conveyed the refugees as requested. I found the "Jules Michelet" at Bazit, which was looking after some 400 refugees on shore. I left the same day and arrived at Beirout on the 1st May, where I received provisions and stores on the 6th May, leaving for Swadiyeh the same evening, arriving there on the 7th, where I found His Majesty's ship "Triumph."

4. The consul-general at Beirout considers matters quiet there; he also considers that the only source from which trouble is likely to arise is in the event of some accidental collision between the Christians and Mahommedans.

The Mahommedan authorities are, however, doing all in their power to minimize the danger.

I have, &c.

T. W. KEMP.

[21184] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 395.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 4, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 332 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, giving an account of the gradual progress and final termination of the disturbances on the Tigris.

You will notice that the river is now reported safe for navigation, and that traffic is being resumed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 119.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Bussorah, April* 29, 1909.

VERY little news of an authentic nature has reached me from up-river since the 16th April, the date of the postcript to my despatch No. 22 of the 15th April last.

The defterdar, who seemed anxious to push up stores and ammunition to Amara, informed me on the 18th April that the river was safe, and that Lynch's steamers, the "Khalifa" and the "Mejidieh," could leave under the escort of the "Kazimi," but stated that he accepted no responsibility for their safety. The arrangements for protecting these vessels, however, appeared inadequate, and the "Kazimi," having no river steering gear, was not considered suitable as a convoy. The idea of dispatching Lynch's steamers was therefore abandoned.

In the meantime Falih and Abdul Kerim-es-Seyhood and Ghalban made overtures for peace to the Bussorah vilayet, but, as military operations were in progress, they were not entertained, and matters were left to Yousuf Pasha to settle. The local authorities having learnt that Falih and Abdul Kerim-es-Seyhood had deposited their valuables with Hamoud-el-Jabbar, Sheikh of Medina, the acting commodore left for Medina, and the "Kilid Sahar" proceeded there from Kurna. On the vessel's arrival the Turks opened fire on the Arabs, and discharged their cannon, presumably in the air. I am informed that, on inquiry, the report about the hidden treasure was found to be incorrect, and a certain Sheikh Salem having intervened, and invited all parties to a feast, peace was speedily made, and the acting commodore informed the authorities that the incident had been satisfactorily settled, whereupon Sheikh Salem was dispatched to Bussorah to receive the thanks of the Imperial Government.

News was received here that the Arabs were getting up ammunition from the coast, and that caravans were passing by way of Zobeir and the Euphrates. Troops were dispatched from Bussorah and Zobeir to intercept, but no caravans were found. Shamil Pasha, the commandant, told me later that some of his men had heard that a caravan had been seen, but nothing authentic was known of the matter.

As Lynch's steamers were not proceeding, the authorities got the "Kazimi" down from Amara to take up stores and ammunition. This vessel reported that Yousuf Pasha had entered Amara, that there had been some fighting, that the Albu Mohamed had been defeated and standards captured by the Turks, but that the Beni Lam were still intact, and massed in large numbers above the town. The "Kazimi" left again on the 24th April with 100 soldiers, stores, and ammunition, and on arrival at Shattra on the 25th April the Arabs, led by Falih-es-Seyhood, opened fire on her and killed and wounded five people. The Arabs displayed thirty standards, and must have attacked in considerable force.

Arrangements have been made with the Ottoman Bank for providing £T. 15,000 for military expenses. The director of the bank tells me that £T. 7,000 have already been paid, and a "havalé" for the remainder is awaited from the Ministry of Finance. The Customs have, I hear, been instructed to pay their receipts into the vilayet treasury for the same purpose.

On the 24th April the defterdar informed my dragoman that things were now quiet on the Tigris, that the muqata'as of Kumait and Jezrah had been leased to the son of Fahad-el-Ghadban, and that the other leases would shortly be arranged. The subsequent attack on the "Kazimi" shows that the defterdar was too optimistic, and I am informed that on the 26th April he wired to the Grand Vizier, at the request of the administrative council, asking that Yousuf Pasha might be superseded, as his inactivity in military matters had greatly encouraged the Arabs. The telegram also stated that trade was at a standstill, and that frequent complaints were made by the British consul at Bussorah about the interruption of river navigation.

I visited the defterdar myself with the commander of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" on the 28th April, in response to his invitation to congratulate him on the accession of the new Sultan, and he then said that the Turks had had another brush with the Arabs at Mejr Kebir on the 27th April, and had severely punished them, but again no details had been received. The defterdar added that the river above Amara was now quiet, and that navigation would be restored in a few days. The troops from the north, intended to reinforce Yousuf Pasha, had apparently been deflected elsewhere, owing to the disturbances in Asia Minor. Both the defterdar and the commandant assured me that the trouble was over, and that there would be

no more military operations. In the absence of any more specific news from the scene of the disturbances I am inclined to distrust their buoyant optimism, and Shahil Pasha's sanguine reassurances seemed to me at least to be rather due to his toasting the new Sultan's health too liberally, and perhaps also to the general jubilation, than to any intimate knowledge he possessed regarding the situation.

Native launches have been running up the Euphrates as far as Kufr, and so opening up communication with Bagdad by the western route. The authorities say it is safe, but no steamers have yet returned from Kufr to confirm this. Messrs. Lynch Brothers dispatched their launch "Ishtar," chartered by Sir William Willcocks, on the 29th April by this route, with part of the mails and passengers, including some of Sir William's own staff. The last post sent to Bagdad was that taken by Sir William Willcocks in the "Bagdad" on the 28th March last. On the 25th April the Sheikh of Mohammerah's agent, Mirza Hamza, approached me on behalf of Sadun Pasha, sheikh of the Montifiks. Sadun has been frequently outlawed, and is constantly in hot water with the Turkish Government. He can, I believe, put about 5,000 men into the field. The Sheikh proposed to fight the Turks, but gave me no details as to the scene of his operations. From other sources I hear he contemplates a raid in the neighbourhood of Damascus. In reply to his enquiries I informed him that His Majesty's Government would not sympathise with any hostile action on his part against the Turkish Government, and could not protect him if defeated. I suggested his best course was to come to terms with the Government. This is not the first time that Sadun has made overtures of a similar nature to this consulate. He also advocated the establishment of a British consul at Nasriye. I said I would convey his suggestion to your Excellency, but I thought, at the present moment, the position of a British consul there would be somewhat that of a hostage. Sadun is wholly untrustworthy, and his emissary shares this opinion.

The arrival of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" has reassured the minds of the foreign community, who were feeling somewhat uneasy. The town has been comparatively quiet of late, and no disturbances of importance have been reported to me. The present garrison is under 300 men, including marines, and there are four field guns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 119.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Bussorah, May 7, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 23 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to information received here, Turkish troops occupied Kumait on the 20th April, and Fahad, the new multezim, was installed there. On the same day three Turkish steamers, with about 600 soldiers and field-guns, proceeded to Mejir Kebir, where Areybi and his friendly Arabs crossed the river to assist them. A desultory fire, directed against the Albu Mohammed, under Abdul Kerim-es-Seyhood, who were some distance off, was kept up for four days. On the 1st May Abdul Kerim attacked Areybi and the friendly Arabs, and a hand-to-hand encounter ensued, in which it is said Areybi lost 300 men. The Turkish troops were withdrawn to the steamers, where they supported Areybi with their fire. There were no casualties among the troops. After the fight Abdul Kerim applied to his brother, Falih-es-Seyhood, at Hafra, for assistance. The latter burnt down his own huts at Hafra and joined Abdul Kerim with a considerable number of his followers.

Telegrams from Yusuf Pasha, commander of the Turkish force, the mutessarif of Amara, and the acting kaimakam of Shattra state that Ghadban, sheikh of the Beni Lam, is dead; that Falih and Behussin, Ghadban's brothers, and Abdul Kerim and Falih-es-Seyhood have fled to the marshes near Jezair and Howeyza; that the Arabs are submitting to the Government in large numbers; that the river is safe for navigation; that the telegraph line on the Tigris is being repaired; that the Turks have captured an Arab fort at Mejir Saghir, held by Falih-el-Ghadban, and have taken one cannon; that the Arabs of Areybi and the tribe of Azerij are helping the Turks; that the Arab forts at Kumait and Ibaira have been occupied by the troops, who burnt the huts of Falih-es-Seyhood (my information is that Falih burnt his own huts before joining his brother); that the military posts on the Tigris at Kumait and Ibaira are being strengthened and the "shebaia" (river police) are being reinforced; that the insurgents are being punished; and that steamers can now travel between Bagdad and Bussorah, but should be accompanied by soldiers as a precautionary measure.

The new vali left Bagdad on the 4th May for Amara, on board the "Hamidieh." From the above reports it would appear that the river trouble is now practically over.

Captain Bowden, of the Royal Indian Marine ship "Comet," who left Bagdad on the 16th April in the Turkish steamer "Bagdad" and arrived here yesterday after being three weeks on the way, informs me that the "Bagdad" brought 700 soldiers for Kumait and Amara and landed 300 at the former place. The vessel was fired at on several occasions above Amara, and replied. There were no casualties on board. He states that the river below Amara seems quite quiet and that the Arabs are settling down and rebuilding their huts. The Turkish troops do not seem to have taken any active part in the fighting except at Mejir Kebir and Mejir Saghir, and most of the work was done by the Arab friendlies. The Turkish commander showed no disposition to fight, and let the insurgent Arabs run away without pursuing them. Huts at Ibaira have been burnt and Mejir Kebir and Saghir destroyed. No apparent damage has been done at Amara, and the crops have not, as far as Captain Bowden could see, been interfered with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[21185] No. 120.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 396.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 130 of the 3rd instant, respecting the demand made by the Vali of Bussorah on the Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit that, in registering his purchase of the new date gardens near Fao, he should describe himself as an Ottoman subject.

I note that you instruct me to take a suitable opportunity to make it clear to the Turkish Government that the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the status of Koweit has not been modified since the occurrence of the recent constitutional changes in the Ottoman Empire, but in this respect I beg to call your attention to my despatch No. 138 of the 28th February last.

There exists, of course, as was pointed out by Lord Lansdowne in his memorandum of the 21st March, 1902, considerable doubt as the what is the precise *status quo* in Koweit, and at that time, when both parties expressed their maintenance of it, it appeared as if both placed their own interpretation on the phrase. It would be possible to inform the Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government have not modified their attitude as to the status of Koweit, and the Turkish Government might answer that neither had they, but the matter would not be advanced thereby. On the other hand, there is the possibility that they might asseverate that His Majesty's Government had modified their attitude in that they had, in 1907, obtained a perpetual lease of the Bunder Shweikh land, &c., knowledge of which, as shown in my despatch above mentioned, appears to have leaked out and arrived at the cognisance of the Ottoman Government. They are in a position to state that this is subsequent to any declarations concerning the *status quo*, and they might, quite conceivably, be disposed to view the yearly payment of 4,000*l.* to the sheikh, not in its proper light as rent, but as a subsidy.

However this may be, the Turkish Government is too much occupied at present with the problems or the reorganisation of the administration; and it would seem advisable to leave the question of the status of Koweit alone till such time as they shall find themselves in a position to enter upon a discussion of the principle involved, when it is probable that their views will depend largely upon the success with which their efforts at the regeneration of the Government of the country will have met.

In the meantime I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bussorah, in which, in continuation of his despatch forwarded in my No. 170 of the 10th March last, he reports the successful settlement by Sheikh Mubarek of the question of his irrigation scheme at Fao, and I desire particularly to call your attention to Mr. Crow's observation that, according to

his experience, the sheikh can manage his own business far better than we can, and that these difficulties settle themselves if left alone.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

Consul-General Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Bussorah, April 30, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 12th February last on the subject of Sheikh Mubarek's land at Fao, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency copy of a letter received from His Majesty's political agent at Koweit on the same subject, in which Mubarek gives his own explanation of the withdrawal of all opposition to his irrigation schemes.

My own experience in these matters is that the sheikh can manage his own business far better than we can, and that these difficulties settle themselves if left alone.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 120.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

March 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. T. 100 of the 9th March on the subject of the Fao embankment question.

I enquired yesterday from Sheikh Mubarek how it was that the Fao authorities had withdrawn their opposition to the repair of the embankment in question, and reminded the sheikh that the matter was under reference to our embassy at Constantinople, and that it was important that his Excellency should be kept informed of all developments.

The sheikh replied that it was principally due to the changes among the military authorities at Bussorah. He had, through Kassim-el-Khederi (agent of the Bombay and Persian line), approached the new ferik, Yousuf Pasha, with a request to be allowed to put pipes into the plantation behind the enclosed ground that formed the subject of dispute, representing that owing to the destruction of the embankment the plantation behind it was endangered. Yousuf Pasha did more than he was asked to. He suggested that Sheikh Mubarek should repair the old embankment and plant it, thereby ceding all that had ever been in dispute. He sent a yuzbashi down to see that no one interfered with the execution of the work, which was carried out, according to Sheikh Mubarek, unknown to the civil authorities of either Fao or Bussorah. Sheikh Mubarek explained to me that the predecessor of Yousuf Pasha, Tahir Pasha, was not actively hostile to Mubarek's execution of the work, and even assisted the sheikh by letters addressed to the Vali of Bussorah. It will, however, be remembered that His Majesty's acting consul, Mr. Geary, at my visit to Bussorah in July last, came to a very different conclusion regarding the attitude of the military commandant towards the embankments in question.

[21189] No. 121.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 400.)
Sir, *Pera, June 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 152 of the 3rd March last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch, which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, giving the substance of a telegram which Sir William Willcocks has addressed to the Minister of Public Works regarding the sums that should be expended on irrigation and other works in Mesopotamia in the course of the year.

I am informed at the Porte that £T. 300,000 have been allotted for Mesopotamia, but I am as yet unaware to what special objects the money is to be devoted.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 402.)
Sir, *Bagdad, April 24, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 30, dated the 27th January, 1909, I have the honour to report that, on the 22nd April, Sir William Willcocks, in reply to a demand made by the Minister for Public Works, telegraphed to him that the sums detailed below could be spent before the end of February 1910:—

	£T.
Hindieh barrage and silt cleaning of the Hillah branch of the Euphrates ..	60,000
Kut barrage	5,000
Felluja barrage	5,000
Embankments at Bagdad	5,000
Navigable canal between Felluja and Bagdad	5,000
Embankments and barrage at Sakhwiyeh	5,000
Canal and drainage works at Bussorah	5,000
Total	90,000

In addition to these sums Sir William Willcocks said that £T. 20,000 would be needed from the 1st May to February for surveys and levelling.

I have, &c.
J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[21190] No. 122.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 401.)
Sir, *Pera, June 1, 1909.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 302 of the 26th ultimo no further details of marked interest have reached me from Major Doughty-Wylie. The situation at Adana seems to be gradually settling down, and the attitude of the vali, which caused Major Doughty-Wylie great dissatisfaction, is improving. Mehemet Ali Bey and the court-martial appear to be determined to bring Turks to justice, and up to the 22nd 200 arrests had been effected, and prisoners were still being brought in from the villages. Though the authorities appear therefore to have the situation well in hand, the Armenian population is still very nervous, being afraid to give evidence before the court-martial for fear of subsequent reprisals and being liable to panic.

Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Chambers, who have given evidence before the military commission, find themselves still convinced of the existence of an Armenian nationalist plot, and it must be admitted that the comments of Dr. Christie on an Armenian account of the origin and beginning of the massacre go far to show that among a number of them, headed by their bishop, some such idea did exist. The account referred to dwells on the mistrust and jealousy of the Turks for the progress, both commercial and educational, of the Armenians, while the details regarding the massacre are very similar to those furnished by Major Doughty-Wylie. Dr. Christie is described by the American Ambassador, who was so good as to communicate his letter to me, as the soundest and most experienced of all the American missionaries, and his comments, enclosed herewith, are therefore of special interest.*

On the 19th ultimo Major Doughty-Wylie reported that the Armenian Catholic bishop gave evidence before the "sub-committee," but when he stated that the massacre was organised by the authorities he was called a liar, and ordered to put on paper and sign any further evidence he wished to give. In the same despatch Major Doughty-Wylie reports the very gallant rescue by two French priests of 600 persons from the Armenian school, where, as I have already reported in my above-mentioned despatch, the whole of the 2,000 persons in it were thought to have been burnt to death.

As regards other places, Major Doughty-Wylie reports the arrival at Adana of Mr. Irwin, a Canadian member of the American mission at Caesarea, who had been sent by the mission to Hajin and Saigetche. At the former place all is quiet, though the

* Not printed.

distress is great. At Saigetche Mr. Irwin obtained some details of the death of a number of Armenian Protestant pastors; no attempt was made by the mudir to save them. A special commission is to be sent from Aleppo to restore tranquillity in the Sis, Hajin district. At both Alexandretta and Mersina threats have been made to kill all Christians on the departure of the foreign war-ships. Mr. Catoni has reported most unfavourably on the acting governor at the former town, and the Minister of the Interior has promised that he shall be removed. This measure should no doubt have a good effect. Some ten days ago I received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, stating that the Armenians at Marash were afraid to leave their houses, and the Minister of the Interior informed me that confidence has been restored by the arrival of troops and the proclamation of a state of siege.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[20296] No. 123.

Foreign Office to Lord Rathmore.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 9, 1909.

WITH reference to your Lordship's letter of the 6th April regarding the obstructive attitude of the Turkish Ministry of Public Works towards the Smyrna–Aidin Railway in the matter of the Egerdir extension, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople took the first suitable opportunity to bring the complaint of your company to the notice of the Minister of Public Works. His Excellency informed Sir G. Lowther that the commissaire, who was the main source of obstruction, had been suspended, and that an inspector-general had been dispatched to investigate the complaint of your company. Sir G. Lowther was given to understand that in the matter of the size of the tunnel, apparently the main point at issue, the desire of your company to build only the smaller tunnel, had been agreed to by the Ministry of Public Works.

I have, &c.
L. MALLET.

[21711] No. 124.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Pera, June* 10, 1909.

NINE Moslems and six Armenians hanged this morning at Adana.

[19397] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 10, 1909.

ARMENIAN refugees in the British consulate at Adana.

See your despatch No. 346 of the 17th May.

Do you think that the Turkish authorities will demand the surrender of the refugees (see my telegram No. 312 of the 14th May)? I should like to know whether you think it probable that they will take any further steps in the matter, as the refugees have now been several weeks at the consulate.

[21873] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 349.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1909.

ARMENIAN refugees at Adana (your telegram No. 204 of the 11th June).

I think we cannot legally insist that our consul should attend the trial of Turkish subjects, nor has he a legal right to refuse the surrender of the refugees if their arrest

[21872] No. 125*.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 11, 1909.

ADANA refugees.

In reply to your telegram No. 343 of the 10th June I have forwarded to the vice-consul at Adana a statement of the charges brought against the Armenian refugees at the Consulate. According to this statement, which I received on the 7th instant, the charges were that they were members of a revolutionary committee, they had manufactured bombs, dynamite, infernal machines, and had imported and distributed arms about; that some had killed Moslems, and that some had been the first to fire shots on the day of the massacre.

Major Doughty Wylie did not seem to consider these charges very genuine, and he characterised as worthless the evidence of the witnesses named; but he is at present making further enquiries regarding the evidence.

The Government is not at all disposed to agree that the vice-consul should be present at the trial; meanwhile I have had hopes, and still hope, that he may come to some agreement about the men with the commission of enquiry.

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is properly authorised and if it is reasonably clear that they are accused of an offence against the laws of the Ottoman Empire. But you should tell the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we hope that these men will be given a public trial. It would then be possible for the vice-consul, as a private person, to attend at the proceedings.

[22014] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 407.)

Sir, *Pera, June 7, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. Constans requesting me to convey to Major Doughty-Wylie the thanks of his Excellency and of the French missionaries at Adana for the services rendered by him during the recent massacres there.

I have sent a copy of this letter to Major Doughty-Wylie.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 127.

M. Constans to Sir G. Lowther.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ambassade de France, Péra, le 31 mai, 1909.*

JE suis heureux de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les appréciations élogieuses qui sont adressées à mon Ambassade au sujet de la conduite tenue par le consul d'Angleterre à Mersine, lors des derniers événements d'Adana.

Le Père Chauvin, provincial des Jésuites à Lyon, confirmant ainsi les informations que je possédais déjà, vient de me déclarer que, grâce à l'intervention de ce représentant de la Grande-Bretagne, les missionnaires français d'Adana, ainsi que des milliers de chrétiens ont pu être protégés et sauvés. C'est pour moi un devoir de vous transmettre aussitôt l'expression de la reconnaissance du Père Chauvin. J'y joins l'assurance de la mienne propre, et j'éprouverais une réelle satisfaction à ce que le consul d'Angleterre à Mersine reçût avis de mes remerciements.

Veuillez, &c.
CONSTANS.

[22027] No. 128.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 420.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 8, 1909.*

THE reports received from Adana since I wrote my despatch No. 401 of the 1st instant go to show that, on the surface at any rate, quiet continues to reign there, and that the work of the court-martial is having a calming effect upon the populace. Martial law is being severely enforced in the town, and even foreigners who are well known to the local authorities have to obtain leave to travel. Military courts of enquiry are to sit at Sis, Hajin, Tarsus, Mersina, Hamidieh, Osmaniah, and Deurtyol; they will have no powers of life and death, but will merely commit cases for trial before the central court-martial at Adana. A number of executions are expected to take place this week, and Major Doughty-Wylie reports that a good effect has already been produced by the parading through the town of two Turks, who were proved to have threatened Christian witnesses before the court-martial, with their offences hung on a scroll round their necks. They were sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The members of the court-martial informed Major Doughty-Wylie, who called on them on the 26th ultimo, that they were simply overwhelmed with work, and were eagerly awaiting the arrival of the new parliamentary commission, which reached Adana on the 30th. They were receiving from 150 to 200 written petitions a-day, in addition to all their other work, and there were many complaints, they declared, that never reached them at all. They appeared to be genuinely desirous of seeing justice done, though still inclined to make the most they could out of the supposed Armenian plot.

At the same time I gather from Major Doughty-Wylie's last reports that, if it were not for the strong measures of repression that are being taken or threatened, the powerful reactionary feeling among the Adana people, which is only kept down by the presence of the military forces, would show itself; in one despatch, indeed, he declares that "the enormous majority of feeling is in favour of the reactionaries," and in support of this impression he points out that none of the important men who are considered to be the real authors of the massacres have as yet been arrested, as it is thought that it would be difficult to extract the necessary evidence against them. Much bad feeling has been aroused by the search for arms in Turkish houses, it appears; the Turks say that the Government told them to kill and burn, and they do not not understand why their arms are now being taken from them. On the 28th ultimo a new panic occurred owing to rumours of impending troubles between the Roumeliot and Arab troops; Major Doughty-Wylie warned General Mehemet Ali, however, and the latter took the requisite precautions and succeeded in restoring confidence among the people.

As regards the difficult question of the origin of these massacres, the enclosed copy of an address to the court-martial from the heads of the Armenian and Syrian Churches will give you the facts as viewed from their standpoint, which ascribes the events of the 14th–16th and of the 25th of April entirely to Moslem fanaticism and Hamidian reactionaryism. Against this, however, Major Doughty-Wylie, writing on the 30th ultimo, furnishes evidence of a Greek named Nicolaides, an employé in the telegraph bureau for free correspondence, who, by his own confession, went to the police two days before the massacre with a story of 700 fedai Armenians who had dynamite, &c., and intended to destroy the town. He afterwards appears to have said that he had seen fedai in the konak, and it is possible that his statements were responsible for the murders that subsequently occurred there. The man is now mad with terror, and convinced that the parliamentary commission will hang him.

A few additional reports have come in from the district round Adana which were afflicted by the massacres. The "Swiftsure," returning on the 25th ultimo from Ayas Bay, brought news of the massacre there of sixty-five Armenians and ten Greeks. Only two Armenians apparently were saved—one by becoming a Moslem, the other by hiding behind a rock in the sea; and, from a Turk, they heard a gruesome story to the effect that two miserable Armenian victims were passed through a machine for chopping tobacco. The customs-house and warehouses were looted, and several buildings destroyed. Similarly, the French consul-general, on whom Major Doughty-Wylie called on the 26th, gave a terrible account of the condition of some of the villages through which he had passed on his way back from Aleppo. The enclosed account of the origin of the troubles at Hajin by Mr. Lewin, a British subject and member of the American Mission at Tarsus Cuesurea, may be of interest as showing the Christian view that the troubles at Hajin were the direct result of the news of the Adana massacres, and also as putting in a more sober light many of the exaggerated reports that had been spread about with regard to them. Here again the following incident, reported by Major Doughty-Wylie on the 29th, inclines one irresistibly to the view that the Moslems were not alone to blame:—

"A crowd of Armenians going along one of the Hajin roads before the outbreak murdered a puzzled and unresisting Circassian chief. They burnt his body and skinned his horse to prevent identification. They did not themselves know who he was, but first robbed and then murdered him. This incident has not yet leaked out . . . . It was a particularly brutal murder, as the Circassians saved the village of Chur and protected many Christians."

News reached me on the 5th instant of rifle and artillery fire having been heard at Deurtyol on the night of the previous Thursday. Enquiries into the matter have elicited the information that the incident was caused by a drunken soldier in the Turkish camp, who fired his rifle into a tent and killed one and wounded six Turks, including, it is believed, an officer. The noise of the firing seems to have produced a panic in the camp, which was enhanced by the fact that a heavy thunderstorm was raging at the time, and the soldiers, believing that a descent was being made on Deurtyol by the mountain villagers, turned their guns upon the villages and wounded two Christian women. The soldier who originated the panic has been arrested, sentenced to death, and was hanged on Saturday. This is the official version of the incident, which I have received from various sources, and it was volunteered to me by Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, who assured me that the authors of the disturbance would be punished. I received a telegram, however, last night from His Majesty's consul at Alexandretta, stating that

the soldiers who fired on the villages remain unpunished; that great terror still prevails among the villagers, who are convinced that a deliberate attack was being made upon them; and that nothing will pacify them short of the severe punishment of the officer in charge of the battery and the immediate removal of the military commandant.

Major Doughty-Wylie reports the arrival on the 26 ultimo of Mr. Erfield, director of the Deutsche Orient Bank, who came to start a new bank at Adana. He did not know how far he would proceed with the venture in the present circumstances. He also heard from M. Mavrogordato, of the Bagdad Railway, that they hope to renew work soon. He hopes that, if this is true, it may have a steadying effect on the outlying districts, and put money into the workmen's hands. The vali and land speculators are anxiously enquiring where the station and railway bridge in Adana will be.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 128.

Address of Armenian and Syrian Churches to Adana Court-martial.

QU'IL nous soit permis de vous soumettre nos connaissances sur les douloureux événements d'Adana et de ses dépendances.

Le 14 avril écoulé, un jour de mercredi, quand une partie de la population chrétienne se rendait à la campagne pour vaquer à ses affaires, l'autre partie descendait au bazar pour ouvrir ses boutiques ou magasins. On remarquait déjà dans les rues une foule de musulmans armés de gourdins, de massues, d'armes à feu. Les pauvres chrétiens, saisis d'effroi, retournent à leurs maisons.

Là-dessus, l'ex-Vali, Djévad Bey, a fait appeler les chefs de communautés chrétiennes; leur a dit qu'il n'y avait rien d'alarmant; les chrétiens devraient ouvrir leurs magasins et s'occuper de leurs affaires. Nous attirons l'attention de l'ex-Vali sur la foule armée et menaçante qui encombrait le bazar. "Cette multitude sera dispersée," nous dit-il, "quand les chrétiens auront fini d'ouvrir leurs boutiques." Nous parcourons alors marché et bazar pour exhorter les chrétiens à vaquer, en toute sûreté, à leurs occupations, en leur réitérant les ordres du Vali. Sur ces entrefaites nous voyons deux blessés chrétiens dirigés vers le Gouvernement, tandis que ceux qui les blessaient n'étaient nullement molestés. Cet état d'incertitude a duré encore quelques instants. Il était déjà midi lorsque de différentes parties de la ville une vive fusillade se faisait simultanément entendre. Aussitôt après commencèrent les massacres et les pillages. Les deux premiers tués étaient, l'un David Effendi Ourfalian, qui tâchait, sur les ordres du Vali, de faire ouvrir les magasins; tandis que l'autre, c'était M. Chadrikian, qui était mutilé dans les salles de l'hôtel de ville.

Les signes indicateurs marqués avant le pillage sur les magasins musulmans nous montrent que c'était un coup monté d'avance.

Pendant les tristes événements tous les employés du Gouvernement, sans exception aucune, ainsi que toute la population musulmane, avaient leur bonnet entouré d'un turban blanc caractéristique. Si cet affublement nous a un peu surpris au début, par contre, nous avons finalement compris que c'était un signe conventionnel arrêté de parti pris.

Les massacres, le pillage, et les incendies du 14 au 16 avril ayant presque anéanti la population chrétienne, réduit à sa plus simple expression la possession individuelle, le Gouvernement local, sur nos supplications, promettait de mettre un terme à cette situation intenable. Malgré les promesses du Vali, du général divisionnaire, Mustapha Remzi Pacha, des ulémas, de la notabilité musulmane, une seconde catastrophe a commencé avec une telle fureur que les malheureux chrétiens—c'est-à-dire, le gendre de Lazezzadeh, Khatib Effendi, Boshmazadeh, Rahim Effendi, Tokchazadeh Osman Bey ont précipitamment évacué leurs maisons, sises au quartier chrétien, pour aller se fixer parmi les musulmans. Ce fait n'indique-t-il pas suffisamment que la seconde catastrophe se tramait déjà parmi les turcs?

Dimanche soir, le 25 avril écoulé, sur les assurances formelles du Gouvernement, nous étions réunis dans nos églises avec nos ouailles, lorsque de tous côtés de la ville une fusillade vive et très uniforme se fit de nouveau entendre. C'était le signal de la seconde boucherie. Les immenses incendies et les massacres qui commencèrent ce jour durèrent jusqu'à lundi matin. La ville d'Adana n'était plus qu'un amas de ruines. Le Gouvernement, sous prétexte de mettre fin à cette hécatombe, a réuni tous les chrétiens au jardin de la municipalité. En ce temps-là les incendies ont pris une

extension peu commune. C'est là qu'ont disparu nos églises, nos écoles, nos maisons, et nos magasins. Nul ne saurait douter du mobile de ces tristes événements.

Nos soldats, d'accord avec la population, avaient élevé un arc de triomphe aux jours de la promulgation de la constitution comme pour commémorer la régénération de la Turquie. Le 26 avril, au soir, il était mutilé à coups de hache et renversé devant une foule immense, aux cris de "Vive le Sultan Abdul Hamid! A bas la liberté!" Tous ces faits montraient clairement à quoi cela tenait.

Durant ces tristes événements quelques vils menteurs et ennemis du bien public, non contents d'exciter par de basses calomnies les musulmans contre les chrétiens, ont largement contribué à la ruine du pays. A ce propos nous avons attiré l'attention du Vali sur la conduite de la feuille "Tidal." Sur cela il nous a dit qu'il ferait fermer l'imprimerie et empêcherait la publication de ce journal. Le Vali a non seulement réagi contre lui, mais il a même permis qu'il nous plongeât dans une misère plus noire encore.

Après tant de massacres, de pillage, d'incendies, et d'atteinte à la pudeur, il fallait encore pour ces chrétiens quasi-anéantis, aller, sur de mensongères dénonciations, subir le cachot et les tortures. A eux seuls il est défendu de bouger, même dans les limites du vilayet. Nous attirons là-dessus votre bienveillante attention.

Tous les chrétiens après avoir tout perdu, dépourvus de tous moyens d'existence, sans pain, sans abri, sans vêtement, incapables de rien entreprendre, sont livrés à la plus noire misère. Nous fixons votre bienveillante attention sur cette situation qui nous est faite.

Lorsque nous nous rendions au Gouvernement, soit sur invitation spéciale, soit *propriâ motu*, il nous est souvent arrivé de constater que la notabilité musulmane, de concert avec ses ulémas, ne manquaient d'y tenir conseil. Cela prouve que tous ces événements se passaient à leur su et de connaissance faite.

Quand nous étions habitués, au milieu de nos souffrances, à considérer notre armée comme le seul soutien de notre constitution, par conséquent notre unique refuge, il a paru bien amer de la voir, hélas, faire cause commune avec la réaction pour pratiquer, sur une plus large échelle, le pillage, l'incendie, le massacre.

Les tristes événements qui ont débuté à Adana et dépendances à la même heure, et avec les mêmes procédés, et leur coïncidence avec ceux de Constantinople, nous font toujours penser qu'il y a une intime relation entre ces faits arrivés en différents endroits.

Pendant les premiers tristes événements il n'a pas suffi de massacrer littéralement la population mâle, d'incendier les villages, les machines agricoles, les batteurs, les fermes, coûtant des milliers de livres, il a été encore procédé impitoyablement à l'extermination de cette population flottante qui venait chaque année en cette saison prêter appui à la main-d'œuvre du pays. Aucune conscience humaine, aucune justice ne saurait tolérer un acte aussi inqualifiable.

Qu'il nous soit permis de dire avec une profonde conviction que ces grandes désastres proviennent du régime Hamidien, qui, sous le voile de la constitution, a voulu exterminer en cette région les chrétiens et le christianisme. Il ne tient qu'à votre justice de réparer, par une légitime compensation, le tort qu'on a fait, de cette façon, à la malheureuse population chrétienne.

En somme, il n'y a aucune raison plausible qui puisse justifier ces irréparables dommages causés à la ville d'Adana et à ses dépendances. Aussi il ne tient qu'à vous d'effacer par des moyens efficaces l'outrage fait à l'humanité, à l'islamisme, et au titre d'Osmanli. Nous sommes, en cas de besoin, à la disposition de la cour pour les renseignements jugés nécessaires sur les articles énumérés dans la présente.

(Suivent les Signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 128.

Statement by Mr. Irwin respecting Origin of Massacres at Hajin.

ON Sunday, the 23rd April, we saw two Christians, who had just arrived at Talas from a village near Sis, having travelled from there under the guise of Moslems. They stated that, while passing between Hajin and Fekke, they had met many villagers going in the direction of Fekke, and were told by these villagers that Hajin had risen in rebellion against the Government, killed all the Moslems and burnt the mosque, and disarmed and imprisoned all the soldiers of the garrison. That therefore they were going to Fekke, where they would exchange their flintlocks for Martinis, and return to

reduce Hajin. They met also soldiers coming from Fekke, who told them the same story.

While going to Hajin from Talas, I had an opportunity to talk with some of the Avshars and Fushaks, who had been present at the investment of Hajin. They told me practically the same story, with the addition that a force of 500 Hajinlis and Zeitounlis had left Hajin for Roomloo, with the purpose of destroying the Moslem population of that place, and afterwards of wiping out the surrounding Moslem villages. That therefore they had besieged Hajin, so that the population might not get out for this purpose. They stated further that even at that date—after the siege had been raised by the arrival of the troops from Missis—the population was still holding the soldiers at bay outside the town.

On my arrival I found that a large part of this story was false. Perfect peace reigned in the town, the relations between the troops and the people were very friendly, the Missis colonel was guest at the house of the leading Christians, the mosque had not been burnt, although the vineyard houses, the school buildings connected with the monastery, and one or two houses at the outskirts of the town, near the Government buildings, had been destroyed. Flags of truce were flying from the two leading Armenian churches and the Turkish flag from many buildings.

The story, as told by the Christians of Hajin in regard to the beginning of this occurrence, is as follows: For a day or two previous to Saturday, the 17th April, they had been receiving telegrams from Adana, which had led them to believe that something serious was happening there. On Saturday the Moslem merchants did not open their shops, but they and the Government officials were strolling about the streets, anxiously looking towards the mountains, as if expecting the arrival of someone. At about 8 or 9 o'clock *à la turque* a dried-pea seller called out in the market: "Do you not know that at Adana all the Christians have been destroyed? Are there no faithful Moslems here? Rise and kill," or words to that effect. Then, drawing his revolver, he began to shoot at the Christians. (At the same time a Merjimekji from Albustan called out words to the same effect from the roof of a house in the Moslem quarter.) The merchants closed their shops, went to their houses for their guns, and, returning to the market, began firing. Some who had revolvers on their persons may have begun earlier. A gendarme who was in the street was shot in this fusilade, and died seven days later.

The population, fearing an attack from the villagers, hurried to the outskirts, so as to guard the roads leading into Hajin. On the Shar road they met a captain, by the name of Teber Effendi, who had been out in the villages collecting the reserves. With him was a zaptieh and the tasildar. The Hajinlis called upon them to surrender (some say forbade them to enter the town), upon which Teber drew his revolver, and, after reviling them, began to shoot. The zaptieh took shelter behind a rock, from which he fired, and the tasildar hid under the river bank. In the firing that followed Teber was shot and killed, but the zaptieh escaped to the barracks. The tasildar was overtaken and disarmed; he claims to have been robbed also of £T.150. The Christians claim that Teber Effendi was a man of evil character, and therefore they were afraid to allow him to enter the town, fearing that he might set it on fire.

With Teber Effendi, or rather following him, were twelve redifs, who went to the barracks. These men being villagers, the Hajinlis feared that they might do some harm, and therefore locked them up in a room in the khan. This incident probably accounts for the story told by the villagers, to the effect that the garrison had been imprisoned.

On Monday, the 19th April, a corporal and fourteen soldiers accompanied the judge and a large number of the people of Hajin, on the road to Roomloo, to look into the condition of affairs there. When about one and a-half hours from Hajin the soldiers refused to go further. The Hajinlis thereupon offered to exchange arms with the soldiers, and, allowing them to return, to go ahead without them. The soldiers demurred to this, but the judge, fearing the result, advised them to give up their rifles. Twelve of them did so. The rest escaped, although the Government claims that the corporal was shot. This doubtless is the basis of the story as to the disarming of the garrison.

The same day, or the next, a party of fifty to sixty Hajinlis went to Roomloo for the purpose of bringing in the effects of the Christian population who had fled to Hajin. This party found the Bashi-Bozouks in possession of the village. A few shots were exchanged, after which the Hajinlis returned to their own town. This incident, I presume, gave rise to the story about 500 coming to attack the Moslem villages.

When the Fekke colonel arrived before Hajin, he did not enter, nor did he

attempt to do so. Seeing this, communications were sent to him by messenger, asking him to enter the town. Flags of truce were also raised upon the more prominent buildings. Still he refused to enter. Finally, the Head of the Armenian Church, in company with two others bearing the flag of truce and the Turkish flag, attempted to reach him at the barracks, but were fired at, and had to return. Many attempts were made to get into communication with him, most of which proved futile, because the messages were intercepted by the Bashi-Bozouks and Ibrahim Effendi, a captain of the Fekke soldiers. I say most of them failed to reach him, for it appears that one sent by the hand of a mullah, and one sent by the Régie Mo'mur, Hidayet Bey, did reach him. The former was torn up in the presence of the mullah and his companion, and they were sent bound to a village outside Hajin. An answer was given to Hidayet Bey's communication, so that the communication must have reached him.

Lutvi Bey, the Missis colonel, was welcomed with open arms by the population of Hajin as soon as they knew he had arrived.

[22288] No. 129.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

Sir, *India Office, June 12, 1909.*

WITH reference to the Secret despatch to the Government of India of the 30th October last, on the subject of the rights of the Sheikh of Koweit to the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, I am directed to enclose copy of their reply, reporting that the inquiries of the political agent have not resulted in the production of any fresh evidence as to the ownership of Warba.

Viscount Morley, subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, proposes to inform the Government of India that His Majesty's Government do not think it advisable, in present circumstances, that any steps should be taken to raise the question of the sheikh's rights either to Warba or Bubiyan.

I am, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 129.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)
My Lord, *Simla, May 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of your Lordship's despatch dated the 30th October, 1908, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, regarding the rights of the Sheikh of Koweit over the islands of Bubiyan and Warba.

It will be seen that Major Knox's enquiries have not resulted in the production of any fresh evidence as to the ownership of Warba Island. In the circumstances, we do not consider that it is desirable to take any steps towards the assertion of the Sheikh's claims, so far as this island is concerned.

We have, &c.
MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.
S. P. SINHA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 129.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, March 28, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 27th November, 1908, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter which I have received from the political agent, Koweit, regarding the Sheikh of Koweit's rights over the islands of Warba and Bubiyan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 129.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, March 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter dated the 7th March, 1909, on the subject of Sheikh Mubarek's right to Bubiyan and Warba Islands, enquiring whether the sheikh had any further evidence to put us in possession of, and directing me to submit a final report.

2. I asked the sheikh yesterday the above question, and he replied that he had no further proofs to offer. He mentioned that Warba Island was almost entirely submerged at some high tides, and that no one could live there.

3. I regret that I am compelled to report that I see no prospect of being able to add anything useful to the reports already submitted by me on this question.

[20596] No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

SIR EDWARD GREY has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from the German Chargé d'Affaires on the 15th ultimo, stating that the firms of Wönckhaus and Co. and Traun, Stürken, and Co. have protested against the recent renewal of oxide mining operations on Abu Musa Island.

In reply, Sir E. Grey would point out that there appears to be some misunderstanding as to the offer made to the German Government in July last, which, he had assumed, was acceptable to the German Government, in view of the fact that they had taken no exception to it for nine months.

In that note, Sir E. Grey stated that His Majesty's Government were prepared to use their good offices in order that temporary arrangements might be made whereby the firm of Wönckhaus would be enabled to procure a limited amount of red oxide to place them in a position to fulfil such contracts as they might have entered into before the cancellation of the lease, but no undertaking was given that the Sheikh would be advised not to allow mining operations at all at Abu Musa.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to add that the mining operations which are the subject of complaint were merely for the purpose of extracting a few hundred tons of oxide as a sample for a firm which is interested in the trade, and that they have now ceased.

His Majesty's Government are very desirous of arriving at a speedy settlement of this question, and they venture to hope that they may be favoured with a reply to their last note.

Foreign Office, June 14, 1909.

[22369] No. 131.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 134.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 204 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a document from the Minister of War, given

me by Rifaat Pasha, setting forth the accusations against the refugees with Major Doughty-Wylie.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 131.

Minute, dated May 20, 1325 (June 2, 1909), drawn up by the Adana Court-martial.

IT is hereby submitted that it appears from the notes of statements made by Ovedes, ex-dragoman of the vilayet; Agop, gendarme; Ohannes Semekian and Hadjji Takis, teachers in a preparatory school; and the police officers, that Corabet Tchalian, Zacharia Bezdikian, his brother Dikran, Isai Bezdikian, treasurer of the municipality, and Doctor Rejebian, now in the British consulate, are members of the Adana Revolutionary Committee, and that before the events, i.e., massacres, they distributed arms to the "revolutionaries," and that they entertained the idea and intention of provoking the intervention of foreigners by causing an incident at Adana, and thereby bringing into existence an Armenian principality, and that they caused to be imported at Mersina, Ayas, and Coratash, Mausers, Martinis, Meiters (?), and other weapons, and that they manufactured dynamite, infernal machines, and bombs in an underground passage, which certain of the fedais opened up secretly between the lower church belonging to the Armenians and the Armenian school, and that one of them, Zacharia Bezdikian, together with his companions, fired the first shot from the roof between four and half-past four in the morning of Wednesday, the first day of the events, at the Moslems in the Kemr Alti Mosque, and that during the events, not only Zacharia, but also Corabet Tchalian and Dikran Bezdikian and Isai Bezdikian and Doctor Rejebian went about various quarters armed and slew Moslems. . . . . And it is further submitted that the truth of the said statements is confirmed by the Armenian national insignia, by the contents of letters seized, and by fifty bombs with nozzles and provided with capsules, and by other things which were found in their possession.

[22552] No. 132.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 206.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 16, 1909.*

TWO soldiers have died since the disorders at Aivali, and I learn that about forty Greeks have been wounded. Troops have been sent from Mitylene and Smyrna to reinforce the garrison.

[22807] No. 133.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

Sir, *India Office, June 17, 1909.*

I AM directed to enclose copies of a secret letter and telegram from the Government of India, as to the opening of a dispensary by American missionaries at Mutra against the wishes and express prohibition of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat. Mutra, it may be explained, is a town only 2 miles distant from Muscat town and practically co-terminous with it.

The Government of India ask that steps may be taken to procure the recall by the Arabian mission of Dr. Thoms, the missionary who has opened the hospital. They also express the opinion, which seems to Viscount Morley to be justified by the correspondence, that the action of the American vice-consul in the matter has been arbitrary.

The present case is in some respects not dissimilar from that which arose in Bahrein in 1899* when, in connection with complaints of the action of American missionaries on the island, assurances were given† by the Board of Trustees that they

* See letter from India Office to Foreign Office, July 28, 1899.
† See letter from Foreign Office to India Office, December 18, 1899. [P. L. transmitting to India Office copy of Mr. Choate's letter and inclosure of December 9, 1899.]

would "gladly take all reasonable measures to remove or prevent all just causes of offence to the sheikh, or other residents of Bahrein, on the part of our missionaries." But our *locus standi* at Muscat is not so strong as in Bahrein, where we have special engagements with the sheikh as to his dealings with foreign Powers, whereas, the relations of the Sultan with the United States of America are governed by his treaty with them of 1833.

Major Cox thinks the vice-consul at Muscat must have reported to the American Government by letter or telegraph. His report, however, may not have given full information as to the nature of the Sultan's objections to the dispensary. Lord Morley would propose, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, that the facts reported in the correspondence should be brought to the notice of the United States Government. If they are satisfied that the Sultan has objected to the dispensary on administrative grounds, they will, no doubt, use their influence to put an end to the difficulties which have arisen.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 133.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.) *Simla, May 6, 1909.*

My Lord,

WE have the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, copies as noted in the accompanying list of correspondence which has been addressed to us in regard to the opening by American missionaries at Mutra, near Muscat, of a dispensary against the wishes and express prohibition of his Highness the Sultan of Muscat.

2. We need not emphasise the desirability on general grounds of supporting the Sultan of Muscat. We regard the action of Dr. J. Thoms, of the American mission, and Mr. Muhammad Fazel, the American vice-consul, as arbitrary and antagonistic to our interests no less than to those of the Sultan. And we trust that His Majesty's Government will represent the matter in the proper quarter with a view to the recall of the doctor by the Arabian mission.

We have, &c.
MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.
S. P. SINHA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 133.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 21, 1909.*

AMERICAN missionaries at Mutra. Please see our secret letter of the 6th instant. In reply to letter of 3rd ultimo from American vice-consul, Sultan has again refused to permit opening in Mutra of charity dispensary, stating that matter is one in which missionaries have no right to insist. American Government is being communicated with by vice-consul.

Inclosure 3 in No. 133.

Mr. Holland to Government of India.

Muscat, April 3, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for information, copy of letter dated the 3rd April, 1909, and its inclosures, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I forward a copy direct, in view of the fact that the matter may possibly become urgent and the Resident may desire to express his views to the Government of India by telegraph.

Inclosure 4 in No. 133.

Mr. Holland to Major Cox.

Muscat, April 3, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of letters regarding an attempt by the American Mission in Muscat to commence medical work in Mutrah contrary to the wishes of His Highness the Sultan.

2. The Sultan informed me that the missionaries made arrangements for taking a house in Mutrah and for opening a hospital there without obtaining his sanction. On learning of their intention early in March, he informed them that he could not sanction the proposed enterprise, and requested them to confine their energies to Muscat. He asked my opinion as to his legal rights in the matter, and, after consulting you by telegram, I informed His Highness that if he had reasonable administrative grounds for his objection they would probably be upheld.

3. The Sultan has now sent me copies of a letter which he has received from the American vice and deputy consul on the subject and of his reply about the terms of which he consulted me before dispatching it. His Highness has requested that such assistance as is possible may be given by us in order to prevent the missionaries from carrying out their intentions.

His Highness is strongly opposed to the project, and I gather that his reasons are as follows:—

(1.) His sanction was not asked.

(2.) He has just raised a public subscription for the construction of a Muscat and Mutrah hospital, and fears that missionary medical work may prejudice the success of his enterprise.

(3.) He fears that the mission might gain undue influence among his subjects by medical work and endeavour to convert them from their religion.

(4.) He fears that the missionaries might commence to interfere in administrative matters, as he has heard they have done in other countries.

(5.) He fears that if the missionaries were allowed to do medical work in Mutrah it would be difficult to refuse them permission to go inland for the same purpose; if they went inland trouble might ensue, and demands would then be made upon him for compensation.

4. The Sultan's position, which is based on administrative grounds, appears to me to be a reasonable one, and I venture to recommend that, if the American Mission appeal to the United States Government, as they probably will, in order to enforce their claim, such diplomatic assistance as is possible may be rendered to His Highness in the matter by His Majesty's Government.

Article 6 of the Muscat Treaty with the United States, quoted by the vice-consul, does not appear to apply to the case of missionaries, and although missionaries have, of course, a right to protection from their Government, it seems only reasonable that a Mahommedan ruler should decide under what conditions and within what limits Christian missionaries should be permitted to live and work in his country. No other mission is now doing medical work in Muscat.

5. The Sultan has also informed me that when he told the Reverend Mr. Barny of his objections to the enterprise, the latter was rude to him, saying that if he had asked for permission to open a liquor shop, His Highness would doubtless have granted it.

Finally, in spite of His Highness's intimation of his wishes and in complete disregard of them, the missionaries have just concluded a lease of a house in Mutrah, and have made preparations for commencing medical work.

Action of this sort is greatly to be deprecated as tending to weaken His Highness's authority over his subjects. I have personally reasoned with Dr. Thoms and endeavoured to persuade him to achieve his end, if it can be achieved, by more tactful means, but in vain. He is determined to insist upon what he considers to be the undoubted rights of an American missionary, and to pursue his object in the face of all opposition.

6. In view of the fact that you may desire to express your views on this subject to the Government of India by telegram, I am forwarding a copy of this correspondence to Simla.

P.S.—At the time of posting the American vice-consul's reply to His Highness has arrived, and is included.

Inclosure 5 in No. 133.

American Vice and Deputy Consul to Sultan of Muscat.

(After compliments.) *Muscat, March 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to quote treaty concluded on the 21st September, 1833. Article 6 states that the citizens of the United States resorting to the ports of the Sultan for the purpose of trade shall have leave to land and reside in the said ports without paying any tax or imposition whatever for such liberty other than the general duties on imports which the most favoured nation shall pay.

From "International Law Digest": "*Protection of Missionaries.*—Missionaries sent out by religious communions in the United States to Mahommedan or pagan lands are entitled to all the protection which the law of nations allow this Government to extend to citizens to reside in foreign countries in the pursuit of their lawful avocation."

I have quoted these in reference to Dr. J. Thoms, of the Arabian Mission, who intends opening a dispensary in Mutrah. He has rented a house there, and I request your Highness to extend the same protection to him as mentioned above. Dr. Thoms is anxious to go to Mutrah as soon as possible, as he thinks any delay will cause serious inconvenience to him.

Inclosure 6 in No. 133.

Sultan of Muscat to American Vice and Deputy Consul.

Muscat, 10th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1327 (April 2, 1909).

I HAVE received your letter of the 23rd March. I have understood it. There is a treaty always between us. We are friends at all times—most sincere friends—we are grappled with iron hoops of friendship. We have a mutual understanding about permitting others for trade and living here. I protect your subjects at all times with the greatest care. They are very comfortably and conveniently carrying on their business, and for the clergymen who come to see the place we provide all comforts, excepting the doctor, who now wants to open a hospital here. I cannot permit him. I have already arranged for a physician at Mutrah to work charitably, and I do not think any more is required there.

Inclosure 7 in No. 133.

American Vice and Deputy Consul to Sultan of Muscat.

(After compliments.) *Muscat-Oman, April 3, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Highness's letter of yesterday's date and to thank your Highness for acknowledging the rights and privileges of the American citizens.

With reference to what your Highness says about new doctor, I have the honour to say that I must strongly object to any disparaging discrimination being made against American doctors and their rights in your Highness's dominions.

Inclosure 8 in No. 133.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *April 14, 1909.*

FOLLOWING telegram sent to Muscat repeated to you for information dated the 9th March:—

"With reference to your recent letter. It is my personal opinion that terms of commercial treaty between the two States cannot be considered applicable and that question turns to other problem of international law. I doubt if Sultan could ultimately

make arbitrary refusal not based on definite grounds. On the other hand, if he has reasonable grounds for objection I believe that will be upheld. In any case, work contemplated could not be carried out in practice in teeth of opposition from Sultan and (in) reported circumstances could not expect the countenance from us which it is sure to need from time to time."

Inclosure 9 in No. 133.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 14, 1909.

I HAVE received following telegram, dated 12th instant, from Political Agent, Muscat :—

"Please see my letter of the 3rd instant. In spite of Sultan's refusal to grant permission, Thoms occupied house at Mutrah and has opened dispensary. Sultan has asked American consul to refer matter to his Government. I was unable to discover whether any telegram has been sent by latter, but he must have reported by letter or by telegraph. Sultan would be very thankful for any diplomatic support that can be given with a view to recall of doctor by Arabian Mission."

Inclosure 10 in No. 133.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 14, 1909.

REFERENCE letter, dated 3rd April, from Muscat and my telegrams of 13th April.

Sultan will, I trust, have all possible support. The aggressive tactics of missionaries are probably due to their knowing that an effective hospital scheme is being started by Sultan and ourselves, and they are anxious to gain their medical footing first. Sultan can, to some extent, render their efforts nugatory by adopting a policy, which is frequent in Persia, of forcing his subjects not to patronise the mission hospital, but prevention is better than cure, and the first two grounds advanced by His Highness seem reasonable and capable of diplomatic support.

With reference to this question, please see the last enclosure of the India Office despatch dated 5th January, 1900, to the Government of India in connection with Bahrein Mission, in which an allusion is made to Muscat.

[22891] No. 134.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, and with reference to the letter from the India Office of the 17th instant, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 27th May, relative to the objection of the Sultan of Muscat to the establishment of an American mission hospital at Mutrah.

India Office, June 18, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 134.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, May* 1, 1909.

IN continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram dated the 14th April, 1909, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a further communication received from the political agent at Muscat on the subject of the Sultan's objections to the establishment of an American mission hospital at Muscat.

[23153] No. 133*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 358.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 18, 1909.

I AM much pleased to hear from Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company of the effective manner in which you have supported them. Company have reported present state of negotiations to me.

You, of course, understand how important it is that the concession should be given to the proposed Anglo-Turkish Company, and how desirable that a speedy settlement should be reached before end of Turkish parliamentary session. I hear that a Turkish company is competing for the concession, and that it has the support of the Deutsche Bank. This concession is vitally important to interests of Great Britain in Mesopotamia, and you should do all you can to obtain it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 134.

Mr. Holland to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Muscat, April* 14, 1909.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 3rd April, 1909, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter dated the 20th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1327, received from Saiyid Taimur-bin-Faisal, which he addressed to Mr. Muhammad Fazil, the American vice and deputy consul at Muscat. The reply from the latter is also enclosed.

Inclosure 3 in No. 134.

Saiyid Taimur-bin-Faisal to Mr. Holland.

(After compliments.) *Muscat, April* 12, 1909.

I AM sending you a copy of a letter I wrote to Muhammad Fazil.

Saiyid Taimur-bin-Faisal to Muhammad Fazil.

Muscat, 20th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1327 (*April* 12, 1909).

YOUR letter dated the 3rd April reached me. I became informed of its contents. As regards the doctor, you should remember that I can certainly not permit him to open a hospital in Mutrah. I have already informed you to this effect, but you seem to have paid no heed to it. You should refer this matter to your Government in America, and if your Government sends any reply, I shall reply to that. I am not at all prepared to accept your request for opening a charitable dispensary at Mutrah, and the missionaries have no right to insist in the matter. United States of America will not compel me in connection with these missionaries. I have written what I had to write.

Muhammad Fazil to Saiyid Taimur-bin-Faisal.

(After compliments.) *Muscat, Oman, April* 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness' letter of yesterday's date. I am communicating with the Department of State on the subject.

Inclosure 4 in No. 134.

Government of India to Major Cox.

Simla, May 17, 1909.

I AM directed to inform you that a reference has been made to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the subject of your communications dated the 14th April and the 1st May, 1909.

Inclosure 5 in No. 134.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, May* 21, 1909.

PLEASE see my secret despatch of the 6th instant. In reply to American vice-consul's letter of the 3rd April, Sultan has repeated his refusal to allow charitable dispensary to be opened in Mutrah and has stated that missionaries have no right to insist in the matter.

American Government is being consulted by vice-consul.

[22972] No. 135.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 19, 1909.*

EUPHRATES and Tigris Navigation Company.

With reference to your telegram No. 358 of the 18th June.

I have done all I can with regard to the concession, and was assured by the Grand Vizier on the 13th that the matter would soon be satisfactorily solved. His Highness told me that the Turkish Government was not inclined to grant the concession to other competitors.

[22987] No. 136.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 20, 1909.*

EUPHRATES–TIGRIS navigation.

With reference to my telegram No. 208 of the 19th June, the concession has been granted to Lynch by the decision of a council of Ministers; this includes rights of navigation as far as Meskeneh and Mosul on the Euphrates. The Minister of Public Works has received papers enabling him to draw up a *cahier de charges*. It will be necessary to obtain the sanction of the Chamber.

The deputy for Bagdad, Sassoon, a member of the committee, is opposing this concession. It is believed that he is being supported financially by Germany. As the Hilmi Cabinet has incurred the displeasure of the committee, this man may succeed in organising a formidable opposition in the Chamber. I do not believe that Lynch met him while he was in Constantinople.

The Parliamentary Commission for Public Works deals with the matter before it is submitted to the House. I have consequently advised Lynch's agent here to get into communication with it.

[23051] No. 137.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 438.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a very interesting despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the subject of the navigation of the Euphrates. As a result of a journey which he recently made down that stream in company with Sir William Willcocks, Colonel Ramsay has entirely changed the view which he had previously entertained of the value and importance of the Euphrates as a water-way.

I have allowed Mr. Edwin Whittall, who is acting as agent for the Lynch Company, to peruse this despatch, in the belief that it might assist and guide him in his negotiations with the Turkish Government for the acquisition of the Seniyeh steam-boat flotilla.

There has been considerable ambiguity as to who were the people who desired to purchase these boats, as it appeared that a certain Mr. Theodoridi and a Mr. Callos were working on behalf of Sir George Mackenzie, whilst offers were being made on behalf of a third party by a Mr. Tucker. It was consequently very useful to learn from your telegram No. 344 of the 10th instant what the real state of affairs was, and that Messrs. Lynch were the only serious applicants.

I have the honour to enclose an article which recently appeared in the "Tanin" written by the member of Parliament for Bagdad, Sassoon by name, opposing the projected transaction. At a recent interview with the Grand Vizier I discussed the matter with his Highness, who told me that the negotiations with the representative of the Lynch Company were proceeding favourably, and that the Government were altogether well disposed towards the scheme; he had, he said, criticised Sassoon for his article, which was not sound, for it was essential to introduce foreign capital to open up the resources of the country, and it was not possible for Turkish enterprise to grapple with the task unaided.

He did, however, raise the objection that Lynch's charges were unduly high, but he seemed to be satisfied when I pointed out the obvious reasons which necessitated high freights—the unhealthiness of the climate, the difficulties of navigation, and above all the interruption due to the lawless conduct of the riparian tribes.

I have therefore, at the present moment, good reason to hope that these important negotiations will be brought to a successful issue.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 374/40.)
Sir, *Bagdad, April 16, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a journey down the Hindiyeh and Euphrates rivers in company with Sir William Willcocks has given me cause to revise the opinions expressed in my letter No. 916/117, dated the 19th October, 1907, regarding the possibility of profitable navigation of the Euphrates for commercial purposes. I based my former report on the best information that I could obtain in Bagdad, where the inclination has rather been to look upon the Euphrates and Hindiyeh "canal" as passing through wild and disordered countries mostly populated by Bedouin Arabs.

Sir William Willcocks is of opinion that the Hindiyeh "canal" is no canal at all, but that the Hindiyeh has formed the main stream of the Euphrates from time immemorial. The best existing map of the Hindiyeh is that published by the War Office in 1907, and it is very far from accurate, even the important town of Hindiyeh, or Towarij, is placed about 8 miles too far down stream; the names of the great majority of places are not to be found on the map—in fact, it may be said that the map reproduces nothing more than a rough sketch survey, probably made by a man having no knowledge of the language of the country.

The Euphrates proper, from the Hindiyeh barrage to Samawa, is now dry at all times except during a very high flood. From Samawa, where the Hindiyeh and the Euphrates used to join, to Bussorah we were able to refer to a copy of a survey made by Lieutenant H. A. Ormsby, of the Indian Navy, between the years 1826 and 1830; this is drawn on a scale of about 2 miles to the inch, but we found that many features of the ground had changed to such an extent that the map is now of no practical value.

2. *March* 13.—We went from the Hindiyeh barrage to Kifl, passing the town of Hindiyeh. Throughout this day both banks were cultivated with water lifts, and also by some canals where the levels allow of this. Hindiyeh is a very prosperous little town, and is a point of delineation for Kerbela. We chanced to pass it on a day peculiarly sacred to the Shiahs, and found it filled with immense crowds of pilgrims who had come from the villages down the river. In front of the Hindiyeh must have been moored from 150 to 200 sailing craft of various sizes. The town also contained enormous quantities of rice.

Kifl is a small place, chiefly noted as containing the tomb of the Prophet Ezekiel.

March 14.—Kifl to Hamidiyeh. A small distance below Kifl the river divides into two branches, the right branch, which used to be the most important, goes to Kufa, which is the place from which Nedjef draws its water supply, while the other branch, which we followed, is called the Shamiyeh channel. The Kufa branch is rapidly silting up. By floating down stream all night we reached Hamidiyeh in the early morning of the 15th March. This place is not marked on the maps, but it is a remarkably prosperous place with a bridge of boats, a bazaar, large gardens, and a considerable population. From this place Nedjef bears 280°.

March 15.—As we had met a steam-tug at Hamidiyeh we were able to get from there to Shinafieh in one day. At about 20 miles below Hamidiyeh we reached a village called Kharam, which is a town of huts rather than a village, and about 4 miles below Kharam we entered the lake which extends from here to Shinafiyeh. Our boat was drawing about 3 feet of water, but we had no difficulty in the lake except when our captain, owing to want of decision, took a course between two channels.

March 16.—Nine hours' steaming, at about 5 or 6 miles an hour, took us to

Samawa. During the whole of this time the river is between fairly high banks, and few people or cultivation are seen.

March 17.—Samawa to Nasiriyeh. For the first 20 or 25 miles there is practically no cultivation, except quite close to the town of Samawa, but after this there are scattered areas of cultivation by water lift until the palm groves of Nasiriyeh begin about 3 miles above the town.

March 18.—Nasiriyeh to Suk-es-Sheyukh. The date groves are almost continuous in many stretches on both sides of the river.

March 19.—Suk-es-Sheyukh to Medina. We did not continue down the Suk-es-Sheyukh channel, but returned about 2 or 3 miles up stream and took the Saffah channel leading to and across the "barka" (*i.e.*, Lake of Himmar). It was seven and a-half hours from the time that we entered the lake by a very sharp and awkward turning in the channel to the time that we again got into comfortably deep water. At many places we had under 3 feet of water, and the bottom, though not really hard, is distinctly firm. From the place where the open lake ends there is a well-defined and deep channel running through thick reeds on both sides. The swamps appear to extend on each side as far as the eye can reach.

March 20.—Medina to Gurna. There is a deep channel with extensive swamps on both sides, but a large number of palm trees are visible on the banks which sometimes appear between the channel and the swamp. Medina is really on a backwater, as the Euphrates now runs from the lake to Garmat Ali, where it joins the Shatt-ul-Arab about 10 miles above Bussorah.

As the steam-tug had been hired by Sir William Willcocks, who had kindly asked me to be his guest, I could not delay it with a view to making any detailed observations or enquiries, but the following remarks may be of some value :—

3. *Difficulties of Navigation.*—On the day on which we left the Hindiyeh barrage, the river was 2½ metres above low water, and was slowly falling. As far as I could judge, there are only two places between the barrage and Gurna, where any steamer, at present running on the River Tigris, would have any difficulty. For most of the time we followed a broad, deep, and well-defined channel.

There may be difficult places in the Shinafiyeh Lake, but it appeared to have a well-marked channel through it, and the only time that we grounded was when we got out of the channel. If there is any place in this lake where want of water would prove a difficulty it is towards the down stream end of the lake. When we passed through the lake the water was sufficiently low for the edges of the channel to be visible in most places, but if the water was higher it would be very difficult to find the channel unless it was marked.

The other difficult place is on what is known as the "barga." Enquiries made by us seemed to show that we had taken the worse of the two channels; along the Saffah channel, which we took, there was only about 3 feet, or slightly less, of water, and on first entering the lake, there was a very awkward turn at the site of an old earthen bank used as a regulator, round which I do not think that any of the river steamers could have steered.

4. *Trade Possibilities.*—From the barrage to the end of the Shinafiyeh Lake, there is continuous cultivation on both banks, and the traveller is never out of sight of many date groves. Where the banks are high, wheat and barley are grown, and lower down there is an enormous area of rice cultivation, which is far more profitable than winter crops, which are ruined by floods every second or third year. In the direction of Diwania also there are large areas under cultivation, though these are not visible from the river. It is said that the lands on the Euphrates round about Hilla used to pay a revenue of about £ T. 57,000 a-year, whereas they now pay practically nothing. It seems that the cultivating population has migrated from the now dry Euphrates to the Hindiyeh. Between Shinafiyeh and Samawa there is not much cultivation. As the banks are high, canals are impossible, and cultivation by lift would be laborious. Further, it is said that during the last fifteen years this tract has been much disturbed by Arab raiders.

From Samawa to Nasiriyeh cultivation is scattered, but taken as a whole fairly extensive: it is done by water lift, except close to Nasiriyeh, where rice cultivation begins.

From Nasiriyeh to beyond Suk-es-Sheyukh is a long succession of gardens and cultivation, and the country appears to me incomparably richer than anything I have seen in Mesopotamia. In several places Sir William Willcocks said that he was reminded of the very best parts of Egypt.

From Suk-es-Sheyukh to Gurna there are extensive date plantations, and the area

can be almost indefinitely increased if the swamps are reclaimed, which will not be difficult to do if Sir William's schemes are carried out.

We were much struck not only with the number of the people, but with their industry. I think that, as far as the local market is concerned, the commerce on the Euphrates would exceed that on the Tigris.

A line of steamers running up the Euphrates and Hindiyeh would carry all pilgrims who come by sea to visit Karbala and Nedjef, and I think they would get a good deal of local passenger traffic.

As regards through traffic, I understand that many caravans come from Central Arabia to Suk-es-Sheyukh, Nasiriyeh, and Nedjef, and there ought to be a large trade in skins and wool, in addition to the local trade in dates, rice, and cereals. If the people could conveniently export their produce there would no doubt be a corresponding increase in the import trade.

5. *Security.*—From Hindiyeh to within about 10 miles of Nasiriyeh we found a cultivating population, and I do not think that we saw a dozen armed men.

From Nasiriyeh to Gurna, however, everyone seemed to be armed, and there appeared to be no real Turkish authority outside the towns. Everyone is armed, and from time to time one portion or other of this stretch of river is quite unsafe for sailing craft. I have no doubt that a decently honest and well-meaning governor could get over this difficulty provided he worked on intelligent lines. It is essential that he should be provided with two or three properly armed and protected gun-boats, which would very soon make the Government respected, provided the people were not goaded to desperation by dishonest officials. To attempt to pursue the Arabs into their marshes is to court disaster; but two or three gun-boats, such as are used on the Nile, backed by a couple of thousand soldiers, would soon reduce the country to order, provided they resolutely declined to leave the river in pursuit of the Arabs. The man who commands the river can at will, in the greater portion of this country, cause great damage by breaching banks or by closing canals, and he ought to be able to enforce his will. I believe that as soon as sufficient strength was shown, the country would settle down quietly, for everyone is tired of continual strife.

From Nasiriyeh Sir William went on the left bank of the river to see the Hai Canal (which he says is the orignal Tigris) and he was not allowed to leave the town without ten armed men as an escort. I crossed to the right bank and went to Ur of the Chaldees, with Mr. Van Ess, and we too were made to take an escort of ten mounted men. At the present time no revenue is collected from the crops, nor tax from the flocks within a mile of Nasiriyeh, and it is not long ago that Nasiriyeh itself was besieged by the Muntafik Arabs.

The son of Mijel Pasha's (Muntafik) chief retainer travelled with us, he seemed an intelligent man, and much interested to hear how the British Government administered tribal country on the Indian frontier. He said that if the Arabs could get something of the same sort they would settle down at once, and that they would not mind paying a fair revenue if it was spent on the people in providing security, justice, and public conveniences.

6. I have attempted to show that, even in existing circumstances, the Euphrates-Hindiyeh valleys offer a good opening for commerce, but the value of the commerce in these districts will enormously increase if Sir William's projects are accepted. One of them is to regulate the Tigris at Kut and to turn a large quantity of the water down the Hai, which will then become the chief route for navigation between Bagdad and Bussorah.

Another scheme is to practically drain the marshes on the left bank of the Shatt-ul-Arab between Zobeir, Suk-es-Sheyukh, and Medina, and to irrigate some 100,000 acres of very rich land between Bussorah and Zobeir.

A third scheme is to control the water at the Hindiyeh barrage, and so revive the former prosperity of the Hilla branch of the Euphrates and protect the Hindiyeh cultivation from damage by flood.

The first two schemes will vastly increase the commerce on the reaches of the Euphrates below Nasiriyeh, and the third will enormously increase the wealth of the people on the upper reaches of the Hindiyeh.

I have stated how, in my opinion, law and order can be maintained along the river banks, and Sir William informs me that there would be no difficulty in dredging a sufficiently good channel in the lakes. In the true swamp there is already a magnificent channel.

7. I think, therefore, that it would be much to the interest of British trade if we could get either a concession to run steamers on the Euphrates, or if we could

get permission to run steamers in competition with others. The Tigris shows how improvements in means of communication create wealth in this country, and I believe that steamers on the Euphrates would develop commerce in a surprisingly short time.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

Extract from the "Tanin" of May 31, 1909.

THE "Tanin" of the 31st May contains an article by Sassoon, deputy for Bagdad, on Tigris navigation. After a short account of the history of the Civil List steamers, the writer says:—

"An English company, Lynch, received permission to run two steamers, and three years ago was allowed to add a third, but this permission soon assumed the character of a concession. The three steamers, the 'Khalifeh,' the 'Mejidieh,' and the 'Bulout,' bear the name Lynch, and, with the exception of the 'Bulout,' carry the English flag on their voyages.

"In view of the infrequency of the service compared with the revenue and of the high freights charged, local capitalists made attempts at various times to get permission to bring out steamers and run them, but without success, so that the existing services must be regarded as having a practical monopoly.

"While it cannot be denied that the two administrations which enjoy a monopoly of the Tigris navigation suffered from the demand, and that the activity and scope of the local trade have gradually increased with the existing service, yet the profits of the Lynch Company reached a very considerable sum, as will be seen from the following statement:—

"Leaving out sailing-ships, the goods carried between Bussorah and Bagdad by steamer amount to about 70,000 or 80,000 tons a-year. To this must be added an average of about 100,000 passengers. Now steamer freight from Bussorah to Bagdad, a short journey of three or four days, is from 25*s.* to 38·5*s.*, whereas for the long voyage from London to Bussorah, which takes a month, the freight per ton, including the Suez Canal dues, comes to from 20*s.* to 37*s.*, and is sometimes reduced to 15*s.*

"When it is considered that the imports of Irak consist chiefly of natural products and raw material, which have great bulk, but a low price, and that the rates are excessive, when it is seen under how painful and intolerable a necessity the merchants groan while the steamer administration is acquiring greath wealth, it will become clear why local trade does not advance in proportion to civilised progress, and why the fruitful lands of Irak remain in their present state of desolation. While it is true that if the Government acts upon the investigations of Sir William Willcocks, and speedily proceeds to the clearing of the river and the opening of canals, the productivity of the land will increase several times over, yet, unless the import of goods is facilitated, or, to put it bluntly, unless the monopoly of navigation is destroyed and freights reduced, it is perfectly certain that the expected advantage will be fruitless.

"The Civil List, after taking charge of the boats above mentioned, and recently buying and adding other steamers, understood, as a result of their experiments for the last ten years, that they would be unable to 'turn the wheel of business,' and after the July revolution they had the idea of selling the service with buildings, fittings, and accessories to the Lynch Company on condition that the steamers should be run under the Ottoman flag. Fortunately the recent successes resulted in the service being handed over to the Exchequer, and the negotiations, which had almost been concluded, remained suspended, so that there is no fear that the trade of Irak will suffer such a blow as to be handed over from the monopoly of two companies to that of a single and above all a foreign company.

"Our object is not to enter into the question whether the Treasury will continue the service, or whether it would be successful if it engaged in maritime trade, but to suggest that the Ministry of Finance should work the administration itself, should lease it to somebody else, or should throw open the navigation of the Tigris to all Ottomans, as permission was given to the Lynch Company to this effect, both some time ago and recently.

"It is generally to be hoped that, should the Government decide not to work the enterprise but to lease it, preference should be given to Ottoman companies or individuals.

"With the increase in the number of boats and companies, the carrying trade would increase, while competition would bring down freights to a more equitable level; so we would beg the Government to consider the question of throwing open the navigation of the Tigris to all Ottoman subjects, and would add that, if the Government is thinking of selling the steamers, the fact should be advertised, as it is certain that bidders would be found in Bussorah and Bagdad.

"SASSOON, *Deputy for Bagdad.*"

[23055] No. 138.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 21.)

(No. 442.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 15, 1909.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 420 of the 8th instant I have received little additional information with regard to the condition of affairs at Adana. On the 2nd June His Majesty's vice-consul telegraphed that the town was quiet and that the bolder people among the inhabitants were going out to harvest. The deputies who arrived on the 3rd ultimo on the Parliamentary Commission seem to have created a good impression on the natives. They were horrified to see the ruin to which the town had been reduced. It is to be hoped that their presence may do some good, for, though the Commission have no direct powers, and do not attend the meetings of the court-martial, they hold a watching brief for Parliament, and receive and take note of all complaints made.

The attitude of the Vali has improved of late in his interviews with Major Doughty-Wylie, but the latter is still altogether unable to commend his activity or that of the Ferik of Konieh. Only the other day the two latter officials allowed a battalion of redifs to be mobilised by the Kaïmakam of Bozhir to withstand a purely imaginary attack of 1,500 Armenians; the kaïmakam was demanding further reinforcements from Konieh when it transpired that the whole story was an invention of some fifty tsiganes who were themselves intent on plundering. The deputies, who had heard the tale when passing through Konieh, expressed much disgust at the futile conduct of the Konieh authorities in allowing the matter to go so far unchallenged and uninvestigated. A day or two later a man rode in from Konieh and paraded the streets for half an hour shouting out that the Armenians had sacked all the villages and it was high time to rise and kill them. The Vali eventually had him arrested and imprisoned for the space of two hours, and he was hardly safely locked up when another rumour was spread abroad that English soldiers were on the point of entering the town. Altogether Major Doughty-Wylie's view of affairs was that, with such weak men as Nazim Pasha at Konieh, where some unrest evidently prevails, and the present Vali at Adana, general anarchy would be reigning in those two districts were it not for the iron hand held upon them by the system of martial law.

On the 8th, as a prelude to the executions that were soon to follow, a proclamation was issued by the general officer commanding stating that the inhabitants of the villages round Adana would be held responsible to the court-martial for the protection of life and property.

On the 10th six Armenians and nine Turks were publicly hung, and two days later I was informed that the numbers of persons in prison amounted to 150 Turks and seventy-four Armenians, but, though the country still remains quiet, Major Doughty-Wylie seems very doubtful as to the justice of the executions which have taken place; while most of the condemned persons were men of no importance, most of the notorious criminals are still going free, and have not been arrested.

From the district round Adana I have received one or two interesting accounts of events; among them the report enclosed herewith of the disturbances which took place at Payas and Alexandretta, drawn up by Mr. J. Catoni, who was acting as British vice-consul at the latter place at the time. Attached to this report is a copy of a memorandum by the Rev. S. H. Kennedy giving a description of the siege and relief of Durtyol.

Mr. Catoni's view that the disturbances described were the result of the work of the secret agents sent to inflame Moslems against the Armenians is supported by the

fact, which I believe is acknowledged by the Moslems and Christians alike, that the massacres at Antioch and Kessab and the slaughter of eighteen Armenians at Marash were the outcome of the machinations of certain *agents provocateurs* who were amply furnished with funds for the mission entrusted to them.

Mr. Fontana has presented to the governor-general a copy of the annexed list of persons who are alleged to have taken a prominent part in the massacres in the Alexandretta district. He informs me that he learns on all sides that the tact and courage displayed by Mr. Catoni during all that time was greatly appreciated by the Christian population.

You will notice that Mr. Catoni states that the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid has not produced a good impression amongst the civil authorities and the Moslem population of his district, who seem to be in the majority reactionaries.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 138.

Acting Vice-Consul Catoni to Consul Fontana.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Alexandretta, May 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to my various telegrams, I now have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of His Majesty's Ambassador, a report upon the massacres which have recently occurred in the districts of Payass and Alexandretta:—

District of Payas.—Payas is on the coast and, although in the Vilayet of Adana, is within 15 miles north-east of Alexandretta. I am mentioning first this district, as it is from there that, after Adana, massacres have started. The scenes of disturbance have been the three Armenian villages of Uzerli, Odjakli, and Chokmerzemen (or Durtyol). The two former villages were on the 16th April last attacked, plundered, and set on fire by bands of Turks, Circassians, and Kurds, and the villagers fled to Durtyol, where heavy fighting was reported on that very same day and the day after.

Durtyol.—To give an account as complete and correct as possible of the very sad events which occurred at Durtyol, I beg to enclose herewith in original a memorial drawn up by Rev. S. H. Kennedy, of the Alexandretta English Mission, who, at my request, has been kind enough to visit frequently the said village with a view to watch closely and report to me the movements of the conflicting parties.

Durtyol is at present under martial law, and the situation apparently is quiet, but the question of disarming the Armenians is causing yet a certain anxiety, owing to the fact that the gangs of Kurds, Circassians, and Turcomans who were surrounding and assaulting the village, although dispersed, are still armed, and at any moment may return and resume their interrupted work of destruction and extermination of Armenians and Armenian property. Moreover, as nothing has been done, thus far, on the part of the Turkish authorities to arrest and inflict condign punishment on the Mussulman authors of recent massacres, I consider the condition of the Armenians at Durtyol still critical. I must add that the Turkish authorities are now endeavouring, "as in 1895," to hold the Armenians responsible for the disturbances. As an evidence I may mention the fact that five prominent Armenians of Durtyol, who came to Alexandretta on business, have lately been arrested and put in prison without trial, on a charge of conspiracy, &c.

Village of Payas.—As reported in my telegram of the 19th April, the prisoners, about 400 in number, who were confined for life in the old fortress of Payas, have been released by the officials in charge of the fortress at the urgent request of the mob, on the understanding that all Mussulmans amongst them were to join their co-religionists in the extermination of the Armenians. This statement has been made secretly by two Bulgarians (Christians), who were themselves in the fortress at the time, and who fled away on the same occasion. The casualties amongst the Armenians in the district of Payas are as follows:—

	Killed.
At Durtyol	71
„ Odjakli	180
„ Uzerli	25
„ Nadjarli	10
„ Payas (Armenian prisoners killed in the fortress)	36
In all	272

At Ayass.—It is also reported that at Ayass Bay seventy-two Armenians have been massacred, and the widows and orphans have been rescued and brought over to Alexandretta by the Russian gun boat "Uraletz."

Alexandretta.—The excitement caused by the massacres at Adana, which were followed by the disturbance in the district of Payas, has spread rapidly through the Turkish villages surrounding Alexandretta, and it became even a very dangerous thing for a Christian to go out of the town. The prevailing anxiety among the Christians turned soon into a general panic, when on the night of the 16th April three Armenian farms within 2 miles of Alexandretta were looted and set on fire by bands of Turks. On the same day all Moslem villagers of this district rushed into the town and, under the pretence of defending themselves against an attack from the Armenians, they summoned arrogantly and repeatedly the local authorities to furnish them with Martini rifles and ammunition. The military acting commandant, Sadick Bey, having refused to comply with their demand, they declared that, unless satisfaction is given to their request, they would plunder the military stores. In front of such a threatening attitude on the part of the villagers, the military authorities ordered 200 troops to guard the stores. In the meanwhile, the said ruffians were walking in the streets of Alexandretta wearing white turbans on their head and armed with long knives ("yatagans") and revolvers, looking at the Christians with apparent hostility. Unhappily Sadick Bey's refusal to give them arms and ammunition did not last long, as under the pretext of arming the redifs they practically armed all the Moslem villagers, including even boys 16 years old.

On the 17th April a few Circassians were seen at Alexandretta having long meetings with the villagers in the mosque. On the afternoon of the very same day some more Circassians were marauding round Alexandretta with the result that through their presence two other farms in the vicinity of the town have been looted and set on fire.

In consequence of these facts, the Christian population of Alexandretta, having been seized by a feeling of terror and having lost all confidence in the Turkish authorities, they poured into the consulates, the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, and into the various warehouses near the consulates. A large number of families left Alexandretta on the same evening by the Austrian mail steamer for Cyprus; many others have passed the night in the lighters and boats.

On the following day, the 18th April, the panic increased on seeing new bands of Circassians passing on the main north-east road which from Payas leads to Alexandretta. The Prince Line steamer "Imperial Prince," which on that day was at anchor in this port, has therefore been crowded with refugees. I have not failed to draw repeatedly the attention of the kaimakam, Rifaat Bey, to the existing danger due to the presence of bands of Circassians, Kurds, and Turcoman villagers in the town and its neighbourhoods. He candidly confessed having no sufficient troops to compel them to retire.

On Monday evening, the 19th April, all the Mussulman population of Alexandretta, including boys 5 years old, appeared in town with white turbans on the head, walking insolently in the streets. On that very same night, at 9·30 P.M. (European time), I was informed that tins of petroleum have been transported secretly into the Armenian quarter by Turks, and that the *mot d'ordre* was passed to follow the example of the faithful Moslems of Adana and those of the district of Payas in massacring and plundering the Armenians.

Seeing that the position had become really very critical, I called at once, at 10 P.M., on the civil governor and on the military commandant of Alexandretta, to whom I made the necessary representations, urging them to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent disturbances. The former, Rifaat Bey, denied systematically the facts, declaring that everything was quiet in town; while the latter, Sadick Bey, confessed that in fact he was aware of the presence at Alexandretta of a few ringleaders who were trying to incite the Mussulman population of this district to cause troubles, but that he was doing his best to maintain order. At my urgent request he had reinforced the patrols on that night.

Early on the following morning, the 20th April, His Majesty's ship "Diana" arrived at this port, and her presence annihilated the infernal plans of the Mussulman populace. Sadick Bey, the military commander, fearing an invasion of Circassians and Kurds, asked Captain Kemp, of His Majesty's ship "Diana," to kindly assist him in the protection of the town by keeping a watchful eye over the main roads which convey to Alexandretta, and if absolutely necessary, at his (Sadick Bey's) request, to bombard the invaders on their way to Alexandretta, should they come in large numbers and

attempt to assault the town. With his consent the "Diana" landed on that evening fifty bluejackets and two Maxim-guns to protect British subjects and the consulate, which was crowded with refugees.

The Christian population, seeing that the local authorities could not dispose of any regular troops, except about 200 redifs, who were unable to protect the town, and on hearing that refugees were daily massacred on their way to Alexandretta, declined to return to their homes.

This critical situation lasted until the 24th April. Considering the apathy of the civil authorities, who disregarded all orders transmitted to them by the military commander, considering also that they were unable to control the town, we met together with my French and Italian colleagues in order to discuss whether it would be advisable to have again men landed from the men-of-war to assist the authorities in patrolling Alexandretta.

In the meanwhile 300 regular troops arrived from Beirout, and we therefore did not interfere in their internal arrangements, the military commander having declared himself to be now in a position to protect the town.

The casualties in this consular district may be summed up as follows :—

Name of Village.	Number of Armenians Killed.	Number of Houses Plundered and Set on Fire.	Number of Farms Plundered and Set on Fire.
In the neighbourhoods of Alexandretta	18	14	5
" " Beylan	42	30	..
At Kiriklian (a station on the Aleppo road) ..	110	All.	..

From the whole of my information and from my personal observations I am led to believe that the recent disturbance is the work of the reactionary party, whose secret agents, it is said, were travelling in the provinces distributing money and inciting the Mussulman population to cause troubles and massacres. One of these emissaries, named Ain Ullah Bey, who was travelling as governor of Kerkuk, on passing through Alexandretta, had a long and private interview with our kaimakam, Rihat Bey, after which he left at once for Antioch and Aleppo, where I heard he was arrested. The very fact that massacres occurred at the former place soon after his visit there tends to prove that this man was really a secret reactionary agent, and if Alexandretta escaped being assaulted and looted, this, as already stated, is due solely to the strong representations made by the consular body to the civil and military authorities, and more especially to the arrival at this port of His Majesty's ship "Diana," which came just in time to prevent an attack on the town. I must add that Captain Kemp acted in the occurrence with laudable tact and energy. I cannot say the same as regards the conduct of the local authorities, which in every respect is to be blamed.

The general situation may be considered quiet at present, but unluckily the late massacres at Adana have been the cause that the Christian population have no more confidence either in the civil authorities nor in the troops.

The deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid and the accession to the throne of Mohamed V has not produced a good impression amongst the civil authorities and the Mussulman population of this consular district, who seem to be in majority reactionaries.

I beg to forward herewith a list of persons who took an active part in the recent massacres which occurred in this vice-consular district, where now about 900 refugees are homeless and in urgent need of relief.

I have, &c.
JOSEPH CATONI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 138.

Memorandum by the Rev. S. H. Kennedy respecting the Siege and Relief of Durtyol.

FOR upwards of twelve days some 10,000 Christians were besieged at Durtyol on the plain of Issus by over 7,000 raging Moslem fanatics mad with lust and greed. To

my own certain knowledge more than 400 men of the besiegers were armed with Government rifles and kept supplied with Government stores and ammunition. On the third day of siege, Sunday, the 18th April, the water supply was cut off and a strong force of the besiegers were kept posted at the source of supply to prevent the Christians getting the water turned on again. On the 21st April the first attempt at relief was made, but it proved abortive. On that day the captain of His Majesty's ship "Triumph" which had arrived at Alexandretta that morning, took on his ship across the bay some fifty Turkish troops, officers, and men and the chief in command of the district, and a commission of notables from Alexandretta. Mr. Joseph Catoni, acting British vice-consul, and the writer also formed part of the party. A parley was proposed between the contending parties and it fell to the writer's lot to go to the village which was under siege to bring down representatives to the place of meeting. On the way up from the sea as we were passing the Moslem lines we were under fire for about fifteen minutes. After protracted negotiations the assailants swore to observe a truce for two days and to allow the water to be turned on again, the Christians on their part were to give up the Moslem prisoners they held. This latter item was the only part of the bargain kept. For, as we heard on Friday, the 23rd, no sooner had our backs been turned than the Moslem hordes renewed the attack with still greater violence than before, and disregarded their oath completely. The condition of the besieged was becoming more and more desperate. All day Saturday, the 24th, Mr. Catoni and the writer made all possible efforts to get the siege raised, but the way seemed blocked at every turn. When every other plan had failed pressure was brought to bear on the military commander by Mr. Catoni near midnight on Saturday night which succeeded. He (Mr. Catoni) had heard somehow that troops had left Mersine that evening for Alexandretta due here on Sunday morning. He therefore compelled the commander to promise to send these troops across the bay to Durtyol when they arrived, without delay. Mr. Catoni saw to it that he kept his word, and on Sabbath a little after noon we steamed across with 550 second army soldiers. Mr. Catoni had the writer appointed to watch the affair on behalf of the British consulate and report. When the mouth of the Durtyol River was reached we disembarked, and while the troops were being landed, the commander and the commission he had brought with him and I proceeded to the village of Chilie about 1½ mile to the north of Durtyol where the Mutessarif of Erzin was : the district forms part of his governorship. After a great deal of talk and waste of time it was proposed that someone should go up to the Christian village to acquaint them of the arrival of the troops for their deliverance and to arrange for the taking over of the barracks which they had occupied during the siege. The writer and the Armenian priest undertook this and as soon as we reached the village we wrote to the commander that the Christians were ready to vacate the barracks as soon as his men should come up to occupy them and that they, the writers, should remain in the village till he should come up in person to take over the barracks and the protection of the village and its people. No reply was sent to this note that night, but during the whole night a most determined attack was made on the place from four points and firing was kept up till morning, and the commander and his troops, though only about 1½ or 2 miles away, did nothing either for the protection of his envoys or for the relief of the beleagnered Christians. Indeed it seemed as if he wished to give his co-religionists a last chance to take the place if they could and do to it as had been done to other places. His inaction gave the advantage looked for and we made the best of it and in consequence were able to demand and get much better terms for the Christians than might otherwise have been possible. On Monday the 26th at about three in the afternoon after six or seven hours' negotiation the regular troops came up and occupied the barracks and the siege was raised and the water was turned on. On Tuesday afternoon the mill stream was turned on and the mills started and they were kept going till I left on Friday forenoon. On the morning of Friday the captain of the "Triumph" came across with Mr. Catoni to see the situation for themselves and I returned with them on the captain's steam-boat. The situation at Durtyol has continued to improve on the whole since then, and the main problem since has been the sending of assistance in food to the starving refugees numbering upwards of 3,500. These had fled to the central village from the smaller places round at the beginning of hostilities leaving all their goods and chattels in their houses. Before relief came all these houses to the number of about 746 had been looted and burned and many of the fruit trees had been cut down and the standing crops had been destroyed in surrounding fields, so that all these people are in absolute penury and starvation stares them in the face. Over 700 families have lost all they possessed and it seems to me that something ought to be done to compel the new government to give compen-

sation for the losses sustained. For many reasons it seems plain to me that all that happened during these terrible last days of April was part of a preconcerted plan. For the protection of upwards of 10,000 Christians surrounded by Moslem fanatics there were only some fifteen regular soldiers and these were stationed at a point about ten miles away from what might be called the storm centre in a time of revolution and political upheaval. Before the troubles began the soldiers who had occupied the barracks mentioned above had been withdrawn and the barracks were empty at the outbreak of hostilities. Further, when the troubles began the reserves were called in from the Moslem villages round Durtyol and armed and, of course, they immediately deserted and joined their friends who were besieging the Christians and the government arms and ammunition rendered them all the better able to give effective help in the siege. Also a number of reserves deserted from Alexandretta and joined in the siege. Without a doubt the Government officials are responsible for all that happened, and unless they are held responsible and punished there will be no security for Christians living in this part of Turkey.

S. E. KENNEDY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 138.

List of Persons who took an active part in the recent Massacres in the Alexandretta District.

Nurghislik.

(1½ hours south of Alexandretta.)

Müstük Baltadji Oglou.	Koussa Oglou Ahmed.
Emir Oglou Mehemed.	Emir Oglou Mustafa Mukhtar.
Emir Oglou Kurdus.	

It is reported that the following inhabitants of the village have provoked and started the massacres:—

Taher Oglou Mustafa.	Abdulla Oglou Ahmed.
Teholak Oglou Osman.	Alidjanin Oglou Mohamed.

Beylan.

(Neighbourhoods of Beylan, 2 hours south of Alexandretta.)

The same mob who massacred the Armenians at Kirikhan, have also massacred the twelve Armenians in the neighbourhoods of Beylan.

Kirikhan.

(A station on the Aleppo road, 5 hours south-east of Alexandretta.)

Nadjar Ali Begly.	Kul Oglou Mustik.
Ushakli Cura Dervish.	Bikash Oglou Basho.
Cheikh Omar Agha.	Kourtli Cara-Udjelli.
Toklou Oglou Mohamed.	Kurd Hamdo.
Adjem Oglou Mohamed.	Mahmoudly Hussein.

It is also reported that twenty-five Armenians have been massacred by order of Mursel Zadé Mustafa Pasha, a prominent Mussulman of Amuk. Four zaptiés, forming the guard of Kirikhan, were present at the massacre, namely:—

Bekir Chawish, of Antioch.	Hussein Effendi.
Khudur Chawish.	Shuk Melinguish.

[23144] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 449.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 15, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 379 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I learn that Djavid Pasha, commander of the 18th Division, in his tour through Albania is treating the Albanians of Yakova with considerable severity. In addition to collecting the sheep tax for the current year and arrears of other taxes, he is busy disarming the population and advising the possessors of "kules," or fortified towers, to replace their loop-holes by ordinary windows. It still remains to be seen whether this treatment will have the desired effect, or whether it will not rather produce a further element of danger and unrest for the Government to cope with.

The stern suppression of reactionaryism in all its forms continues in other parts of the country. At Uskub on the 28th May the authorities were still engaged in arresting persons suspected of such tendencies. Twenty-nine persons, mostly teachers of theology, were then under arrest awaiting trial there, while some twenty-four other suspects, including the mayor of Novi-Bazar, were a day or two before sent off for trial at Constantinople. The arrival of the new Vali was awaited before any fresh arrests were made.

While the Government would seem to have their hands full enough with the task of suppressing all signs of reactionaryism and revolt in the country, there are not wanting signs that they will soon be called upon to take active measures to eradicate the band activity in the three vilayets, which has begun to revive again latterly. On the 29th May the Vali of Monastir, accompanied by the inspector of the Financial Commission, left for Serfidjeh with the object of making a thorough inquiry into the movements of the Greek bands on the frontier and of endeavouring to prevent fresh incursions in that direction, and it is evident that he must have attached much importance to the news which he had received of recently renewed activity in smuggling arms and ammunition across the border, for under no other conditions would he probably have left Monastir at a time when things are still so unsettled in the district.

The condition of the Adrianople district, to judge from the enclosed report of a journey through that country by Major Samson, appears to be improving. Major Samson notes the general amelioration in means of communication, the building of solid bridges, and good roads in the district traversed; and, though the Turkish officials whom he met left much to be desired as regards capability and efficiency, he notes that there is a general feeling of security and a growing sense of responsibility for crimes committed which constitute a hopeful sign of better things to come.

On the 26th May Hussein Husni Pasha, who was formerly in command of the Serres district, arrived at Uskub to take up the position of Vali of Kossovo and commissioner of the 5th Division. On his arrival Hundy Pasha, who had been hitherto in command, withdrew himself from the conduct of affairs, without, however, having received any official communication of his removal. There is some question now apparently of sending him as Ottoman Minister to Bucharest.

In Asia Minor, as in European Turkey, the pursuit of reactionaries continues with unabated vigour, and, even where no practical results are obtained, the policy of the Government is not failing of a certain moral effect. Thus in Damascus the members of the Mahommedan Union have, since the deposition of Abdul Hamid, been retiring in large numbers from that reactionary society; have caused their names to be erased from the list of signatures kept by the heads of the association; and in fact most of the promoters of the union have applied to be admitted as members of the Committee of Union and Progress Association. The Mahommedan Union at Damascus is thus practically dissolved. Under strict orders from Constantinople the Vali did all he could to obtain the lists of the members of the association, but the member in whose possession they were refused to betray his friends and declared that the lists had been burnt. Three prominent members were nevertheless arrested on the 30th ultimo at Damascus and shipped to Constantinople for trial. This proceeding has produced a good impression and restored some confidence among the population as to the intentions of the authorities to do justice and keep order.

The arrest at Diarbekir of seventeen persons, mostly prominent and influential notables, who had been found guilty of treasonable acts during the period preceding the dethronement of Abdul Hamid, produced an equally favourable impression and

created a great sensation throughout the vilayet, especially among the various powerful beys and aghas, who had never expected that the Government would dare to take such strong measures. It is believed that these persons, a list of whose names is enclosed herewith, are to be exiled to Acre, where about 183 exiles are already assembled. Active proceedings are apparently being also taken against other reactionaries, and the army officers are as determined as the Government themselves to purge the country of its numerous undesirable characters. The ex-Vali of Diarbekir, Suleyman Pasha, has started for Constantinople, where he has been summoned to answer for his conduct for failing to arrest some reactionary leaders who dispatched a compromising telegram to the ex-Sultan.

Unfortunately, however, the restoration of order seems everywhere to be but an outward effect of the strong military measures that the Government have been compelled to resort to. On the 26th May Mr. Rawlins reported that trade at Diarbekir was at a standstill, all classes in the vilayet were mutually suspicious, Moslems standing in fear of the Government, and the Christians of the Moslems. The latter, and the Kurds in particular, expressed their lively disgust of the Government for their incomprehensible policy of "taking the part of the Christians," and there seems little doubt that the Kurds are ready to create a disturbance as soon as occasion offers and the military rule is relaxed. Nor are the authorities in any way to be relied on. The acting Vali, Moustapha Naim Pasha, has been ordering the release of all the beys and aghas who were recently put under arrest for trial, on the ground that it is "unseemly conduct to imprison leading Moslems," and that it is "foolish to lend too ready an ear to the exaggerated complaints of the Christians." The Christians are naturally alarmed by this attitude, and are longing for the arrival of the new Vali, Ghalib Bey, who comes from Benghazi with a not unfavourable reputation, though generally described, like most prominent Turks, as "lacking in energy." In the meanwhile the vilayet, having little communication with the outer world, is kept in a constant ferment and panic by the wild rumours of events which are spread about. The district of Van seems likewise to have been overrun with similar rumours, and, as you will see from the enclosed copy of a despatch from the acting British vice-consul, a panic occurred the middle of last month among the Armenians owing to the alleged preparations made by various Kurdish chiefs and notables for a general massacre of Christians there. No news has been received since to justify this panic, and as Mr. Saribajan himself reports, the acting governor-general, Javer Pasha, appears to be doing everything he can to punish the unruly Kurds and restore order in the district.

The condition of affairs in Erzerum seemed still somewhat doubtful on the 19th May last, when His Majesty's consul at that place reported that three battalions of the troops quartered there had been suddenly sent to Erzingan, ostensibly for service in the Dersim, but, as Mr. Shipley had reason to suspect, in reality because their loyalty was doubtful, and it was anticipated that their removal would have a beneficial effect on the rest of the garrison. This step greatly reassured the populace, who now felt relieved of the haunting fear of a reactionary movement among the garrison, and the situation was further improved by the entry of the mushir, Ibrahim Pasha, into the town on the 6th instant, accompanied by a large force and the fifty-two officers who had been removed by the ex-commandant; his arrival put an end to any further resistance on the part of the fortress artillery in the town, who had till then held out against being commanded by their former officers whom Youssouf Pasha had removed. The mushir caused about 150 of the ringleaders to be arrested outside the town, and having cowed the remainder of the garrison by this measure was received with acclamations by the townsmen.

To return for a moment to the events which succeeded the military mutiny of the 13th April, I have now received reports describing the reception of the news of Abdul Hamid's deposition in the Yemen. In that distant province the personal character of the Sovereign is held of little account, and the general feeling, particularly at Hodeidah and Sanaa among the military and official classes, was one of relief to be at last liberated from the autocratical rule under which most men had suffered at some time or other. The common soldiers also welcomed this change, which might, they hoped, conceivably lead to their receiving their pay more regularly and being sent back to their homes in Syria and Asia Minor when the regulation period of foreign service with the colours expired, which was hardly the case under the old régime. To the Arab and his highland kinsmen the new conditions made little difference; the Imam, on the other hand, foresaw great possibilities for the future. To Syyed Yahya and his followers the best chance of obtaining a form of autonomy in the highlands of the Yemen lies in the establishment of a constitutional Government in Turkey, and the

removal of the worst enemy to their aim must naturally be a cause for congratulation and hope to them.

For about three days, from the 3rd to the 6th ultimo, the position at Hodeidah looked somewhat menacing owing to the reports brought by a steamer from Massowa to the effect that the Europeans in Constantinople had been massacred by the Salonica army, that the foreign fleets were bombarding the capital, and that the Powers would probably reinstate the Sultan on the throne. The authorities were already fully occupied in coping with some armed mutinous soldiers who were threatening the town, and who were known to be hostile both to their officers and to the administrative officials. Mr. Richardson and his Italian colleague therefore thought it advisable to ask for the dispatch of a war-ship to Hodeidah in case of emergency. By the 6th, however, the reports had been proved to be untrue, and the situation had so far cleared that Mr. Richardson, writing to me two days later, stated that he did not propose to detain unnecessarily His Majesty's ship "Philomel," which was, he learnt, being sent at his request for the protection of British interests.

In other respects conditions in the Yemen have on the whole improved. The operations against the Zereneok tribe were brought to a successful conclusion at the end of April, when all the sheikhs and headmen surrendered, delivering up seventeen members of the tribe as sureties for their good behaviour, for the security of their trade routes, and for the fulfilment of the other conditions of surrender demanded by the Turkish authorities. These conditions included the payment of an indemnity of 62,000 Marie Thérèse dollars (6,200*l.*) on account of military expenditure incurred, restitution of the loot, and liquidation of arrears of taxes, tithes, &c., overdue by the tribe to the Government during the years 1322–4.

The greater part of the troops employed in the expedition have been withdrawn, except four or five battalions which still remain at Beir-el-Fakih to support Lieutenant-Colonel Riza Bey in collecting the taxes and indemnity due. On the 2nd May, however, about 100 time-expired soldiers from this force arrived at Hodeidah without permission and demanded to be sent home after receiving arrears of salary due. They were soon joined by other discontented soldiers and encamped outside the walls of the town, refusing to give up their arms. The garrison refused to fire on them, and it was not until the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Riza Bey with a considerable force that they were eventually compelled to surrender. At first even Colonel Riza's gunners were reluctant to fire their guns, and it was only by standing over the gunners with a loaded revolver that he at last got his orders carried out. The mutineers, among whom very few casualties occurred, were imprisoned and are to be tried by court-martial. Mr. Richardson attributes this incident, like a similar revolt of troops in the Hedjaz which has come to his notice, to purely local causes, and does not think that it was in any way connected with the military risings organised in other parts of the Empire. Tranquillity had been restored in the district when he last reported to me on the 8th May.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 139.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Adrianople, June 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, as stated in my telegram of the 7th instant, I returned on that day from a short tour in the districts of this vilayet.

I now beg to forward, for your information, the following details in connection with my journey:—

My route was as follows:—

May 31.—Adrianople to Orta Keui.
June 1.—Orta Keui to Drobischna.
" 2.—Drobischna to Demotika.
" 3.—Demotika and Armut Keui.
" 4.—Demotika to Dedeagach.
" 5 and 6.—Halted at Dedeagach.
" 7.—Returned to Adrianople.

I was everywhere received with the greatest civility by the local officials, and no difficulty was made in furnishing me with information for which I asked.

I propose to describe to your Excellency the condition of affairs in the principal places which I visited as typical of that existing in the districts as a whole.

Having traversed the main road leading from Adrianople to Orta Keui on my previous visit to the latter town in the year 1906, I proceeded on this occasion by the alternative route which lies on the left bank of the River Arda. The road in question is merely a country track, and is in places difficult for wheeled vehicles.

The villages through which it passes—Epeholi, Sederli, Deli Elias, and Kumarli—together with the village of Sari Hadir, on the right bank of the Arda, have a mixed Greek and Turkish population, who appear to be on good terms with one another. The surrounding country is chiefly used for grazing purposes, and large quantities of cheese are produced.

Orta Keui.—This is a very thriving town, which has considerably increased in prosperity during the past three years, chiefly owing to the efforts of the population in connection with the silkworm industry.

It is a centre of Greek influence, its inhabitants being almost exclusively of that nationality, as are those of the villages lying to the south of it. In the hilly districts towards the west, however, the population is mainly Turkish.

The kaïmakam, Djemal Bey, has recently been transferred to this town from Soufli, where I have on several previous occasions had an opportunity of meeting him. He is an exceedingly bad type of official, and I find that the reputation for incapacity which he earned at Soufli is maintained in his present post.

It should be observed, however, that the kaza over which he presides is better off under his rule than under that of his predecessor, whose methods of dealing with the Christian population of his district were highly reprehensible.

The chief representative of the Committee of Union and Progress in the town is an intelligent young officer of gendarmerie, with whom I had some conversation, and who, I think, may be trusted to prevent the kaïmakam from doing much harm in his district. I fear he can hardly be expected to do any good.

The methods of the local judicial court still apparently leave a good deal to be desired on the score of rapidity of procedure, but it is satisfactory to learn that on the whole its decisions are now admitted to be just and that its officials are no longer venal.

One of my objects in visiting this town was that of obtaining information as to the possibility of establishing a motor-omnibus service between Adrianople, Orta Keui, and Demotika. The scheme would appear feasible as regards the two first named, but there is comparatively little traffic between Orta Keui and Demotika. I have communicated with the Board of Trade on the subject.

The village of *Drebischna*, which lies some 3½ miles to the south-east of Orta Keui, consists of some forty Bulgarian families, of whom three-fourths are members of the Exarchate Church, the remainder being Patriarchists. Its proximity to such a centre of Greek activity as Orta Keui, coupled with the fact that the villages which surround it are mainly Greek, combine to make the lot of its inhabitants an exceedingly hard one. Except in the immediate neighbourhood of the village, they are unable either to pasture their cattle or to cut wood. The church has been closed by order of the Vali, who, as I have previously reported to your Excellency, offered the inhabitants the alternative of holding Greek and Bulgarian services in it in turn—an arrangement which they refused to accept.

The presence in the village of a Greek school inspector, who makes it his headquarters, is a source of constant annoyance to the Exarchist families, to whom, it may be noted, the restrictions as to pasturage and wood-cutting alone apply.

This condition of affairs would appear to be the direct result of pressure which is brought to bear on the neighbouring Greek villages by the ecclesiastics at Orta Keui.

I am assured that the Exarchists of Drebischna have been offered a renewal of all their pasturage rights, together with a considerable sum of money, on condition of their joining the Patriarchate.

I was able to satisfy myself that the rumours which have been recently circulated in Adrianople of an attack on this village by a Greek band are absolutely without foundation. The road from Orta Keui to Demotika, passing to the east of the village of Drebischna, has been completed within the past two years. Its importance, which is of a purely strategical nature, has been considerably enhanced within the past twelve months by the construction of the ferro-concrete bridge across the Maritza River south of Kuleli Burgas railway station, thus linking up the port of Rodosto with the frontier town of Kirjali by means of the road through Kossukavak.

It is at present in excellent order, metalled throughout. At various points along it have been constructed small stone buildings, which are at present used as gendarmerie posts, but which, I am informed, are intended for the ultimate accommodation of gangers in charge of sections of the road.

Crossing the Ataren Dere by a solidly constructed wooden bridge, it passes through the small villages of Buff Keui (Turkish), Shadnian (Turkish), and Emledin (Greek) over the hills separating the valley of the Arda River from that of the Kizil Deli stream, along the left bank of which it runs to Demotika, passing through the villages of Karajali (Turkish) and Bulgar Keui (Greek) *en route*.

I have ventured to describe to your Excellency the course of this road in comparative detail, since, so far as I am aware, it is not correctly shown on any existing map.

The mulberry-tree plantations in the Kizil Deli Chai valley have in recent years done much to improve the condition of the villages situated in it, by bringing in a considerable income from cocoons.

There is little of interest to note with regard to the villages in question, save for the fact that Bulgar Keui, whose inhabitants are unmistakably of Bulgarian nationality, is Patriarchist by religion. In view of the large Greek population of Demotika, it is strange that that town should have made so little progress during the past three years.

It has, however, suffered from a succession of kaïmakams who have opposed every effort in this direction.

The present official, Ahmed Bey, is no exception to this rule. He was transferred to his present post from Maigara, where he had made himself so unpopular that the population threatened to kill him.

In the course of two interviews which I had with him, I cannot say that I received a favourable impression of his capability, and this I find is borne out by his reputation amongst the townspeople.

In particular he seems inclined to place difficulties in the way of any enterprise, such as a cold storage and a steam flour-mill, both of which it is desired to establish in the town, and both, I hope, with British machinery. In the event of his continuing his opposition to these projects, I propose to bring the matter to the notice of the Vali here.

The complaints as to the proceedings of the judicial courts seem to be common both to Orta Keui and Demotika. A prominent lawyer of the latter town assured me that "it is necessary to drag justice out of the Turkish officials."

I gather from the inhabitants of both these two towns, and from those of the neighbouring villages, that the main advantage accruing to them from the new form of government is that of the increase in public safety. Until recently the Orta Keui–Demotika road was constantly the scene of robberies by bands who infested it, but these have now disappeared and the peasants travel with complete confidence.

A general feeling seems to exist that crime is no longer allowed to go unpunished and much satisfaction is expressed thereat in Christian and Turkish villages alike. Whilst at Demotika I took the opportunity of visiting the bridge over the Maritza to which I have referred above.

The road by which it is approached leads through the villages Prunghi and Arnaut Keui, and though easily passable for wheels as far as the former village, is difficult from that point to the river.

The weak point of the bridge appears to me to lie in the absence of any provision for approaching it, from the left bank when the Maritza is in flood, at which season the water approaches nearly to the foot of the hills on which the village of Eski Keui is situated. At Dedeguch I found that the Mutessarif had recently returned from a visit to Constantinople. Popular opinion attributes this visit to his impending removal from his post, but I have no information on that point.

The local Committee of Union and Progress seem by no means satisfied with him, accusing him of sympathy with the Greeks, with whom he is undoubtedly very popular.

I am inclined, however, to doubt whether the committee have any real grounds for their belief.

It seems natural that the Mutessarif, who until three years ago had spent the whole of his life in the capital, should find more in common with educated Greeks than with ignorant provincial officials. In any case, association with the former does not appear to have affected his method of work, which is as dilatory as ever.

He has, however, a capable assistant, who is an Armenian.

The local committee express great dissatisfaction with the Greek party, who they

declare are doing their utmost to create difficulties and to prevent the regeneration of the government of the district. They resent in particular the visiting of the Greek villages in the neighbourhood by the Greek vice-consul. These complaints, however, are of a general nature, and, so far as I was able to ascertain, unsupported by definite details, except as regards the activity of the Greek vice-consul.

The head-quarters of the 4th Infantry Division have recently been transferred to Dedeagach, and Zerik Ali Riza Pasha, the general officer commanding, informed me that it was intended to build increased barrack accommodation and large depôts. For the present a number of troops are lodged in the town.

I learned also from the Mutessarif that the construction of the fort at Dedeagach has been definitely decided upon.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major*.

Inclosure 2 in No. 139.

List of those sent under escort to Constantinople on the night of June 17, 1909.

(The first eight are important, the remainder are mostly partisans of the former.)

1.	Seviden Pasha	Of Hazro.
2.	Niazi Effendi	Of Diarbekir.
3.	Hadji Abdul Aziz Khalis Khoja	
4.	Hadji Ibrahim Effendi Mufti Zade	
5.	Bekr Effendi-Moharram Zade...	
6.	Aziz Effendi Chuzel Zade	
7.	Khusi Kaoja	
8.	Kunurji Khoja	
9.	Fikri Bey Tahsildar Zade	
10.	Sheikh Nouri	Of Haini.
11.	Khoja Reshid	
12.	Hadji Mohammad Zilfikar Oghlu	Of Diarbekir.
13.	Zilfo Kelkji Oghlu	
14.	Nucho Dravauli	
15.	Dalal Mohammad	
16.	Leblebji Feizi	
17.	Sallahu Mucho...	

Inclosure 3 in No. 139.

Qunik Hare Bey to Consul Shipley.

M. le Consul, *Van, le 17 mai*, 1909.

CONFORMÉMENT à votre ordre télégraphique, je m'empresse de vous remettre par le courrier d'aujourd'hui une copie de ma note du 3 courant.

Je saisis cette occasion pour porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit.

A l'heure qu'il est, une crainte règne dans la ville ; les bazars sont fermés. La cause de cette crainte la voici :

Au reçu des nouvelles du massacre d'Adana les notables fanatiques de la ville et les chefs kurdes et hamidiés se sont mis à l'œuvre. Ils se sont entendus pour organiser un massacre.

Hussein Pacha et Hussen Bey, de Takauri, ont adressé des lettres à tous les chefs de tribus leur donnant des instructions formelles pour prendre leurs dernières dispositions. Ils ne cessent de faire prêcher partout que la constitution ne profitera jamais qu'aux Arméniens, et qu'elle n'a été proclamée que pour la ruine des Turcs et des Kurdes. "Or, avant que cette ruine ne se produise, débarrassons-nous de cette race maudite, cause de nos malheurs d'à présent et à venir."

Tous les villages s'adressent au mourahass ("bishop") arménien et viennent lui exposer les faits et demander du secours. Le mourahass s'est adressé par dépêche télégraphique à Constantinople et a sollicité instamment une remise d'armes aux Arméniens—remise qui serait faite par le Gouvernement sous cautionnement. Mais la requête du mourahass a été purement et simplement rejetée.

D'autre part, la situation s'aggrave d'autant plus qu'on n'a pas la confiance d'autre

fois dans l'armée. Et l'on se demande avec anxiété quel parti prendront les soldats, si un massacre venait à éclater.

Le gérant Vali a lancé des télégrammes au Mutessarif de Hekkiari, à tous les caïmacans des kazas, et à tous les chefs kurdes de rester tranquilles.

Telle est, M. le Consul, la situation actuelle. Si par hasard un événement surgissait je vous le notifierais par télégramme en clair. Par ma note du 3 courant je portais à votre connaissance qu'une compagnie de soldats a été expédiée pour saisir Mir Mhé et sa suite, auteurs du petit massacre de Gangoumar. Quelques jours après deux autres compagnies, une troupe de vingt gendarmes et de quatorze cavaliers furent de nouveau envoyées à la poursuite de ces brigands.

Deux rencontres ont eu lieu. Dans la dernière rencontre, près du village de Sell, à sept heures de Bachkalé, quatre soldats et un Kurde ont été tués. Les autres Kurdes ont réussi à prendre la fuite.

Veuillez, &c.
QUNIK HARE BEY.

[23148] No. 140.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 21.*)

(No. 454.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 442 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Major Doughty-Wylie reporting further on the situation at Adana, and in particular on the unsatisfactory attitude of the court-martial and giving an account of a conversation with one of the deputies sent out on the commission of enquiry.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 140.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, June 4, 1909.*

IN continuation of my last despatch I have the honour to report as follows :—

I received yesterday a private visit from Babikian Effendi, deputy for Rodosto. He was very hopeless of a good result under present conditions, declares that the court-martial has already made up its mind to put all the blame on Armenians, and that out of eight men sentenced to death five were Armenians. He said that he had telegraphed to the Grand Vizier to ask to have all sentences suspended till the commission of deputies could examine papers. He was so hopeless that he said he was about to throw up his mission and return to Constantinople.

Among other things he begged me not to give up the refugees in my house, saying that if I did so they would be at once condemned to death ; that charges of murder were being prepared against them, so as to place the affair on a criminal rather than political basis.

In further conversation he said that all the officials here assured him that in Constantinople a most exaggerated view was taken of events in Adana. He said that after careful investigation he had replied that things here were four times blacker than they had been painted.

He did not know the names of the eight men condemned. He had been assured that the next batch of fifteen were to be all Turks from the villages. The general attitude of the officials is that in Adana the Armenians began the shooting and are really responsible, but in the villages there is no excuse for the horrible atrocities committed. Thus it seems that they do not object to the hanging of the villagers (who doubtless most thoroughly deserve it), as these lesser men cannot command such troops of friends as the chiefs in Adana. By whitewashing Adana city they whitewash some of their own number, noticeably such people as the Ferik and Abdul Keder Effendi, who ought to have been arrested long ago.

Babikian Effendi also told me that it was being freely said that the English had helped and encouraged the Armenians with promises of intervention. Mehemet Ali

Bey, the general, had assured him that there was absolute proof of this, and cited the discovery of certain so-called English artillery uniforms in Armenian houses. The general alleged that two of these uniforms had been found. Babikian Effendi begged me to treat this as entirely confidential, so that I cannot tax Mehemet Ali with it, unless I can get it from some other source. It strikes me as curious that so modern a person as Mehemet Ali should circulate such cock-and-bull stories. Babikian says it is a German intrigue. I should think it is more likely that it is a means of discrediting inconvenient foreign evidence.

I afterwards received private visits from the Mutessarif of Mersina and from Yusuf Kenal Bey. The Mutessarif told me that he was convinced that no Christian had been in fault in his government (Tarsus and Mersina), but he considered certain Armenians of Adana blamable, such as the bishop and Guerkderelian.

Yusuf Kenal who came to take about relief said that he had formed an entirely new Ottoman committee, composed of representatives of the Christian Churches, who in their turn had chosen two Ottomans. The Government would add a functionary. Kenal Bey himself would watch over the proceedings. He invited us to join. A meeting is to be held to-day.

Abdul Kadir Effendi is dismissed from this work by a special telegram from Constantinople, and Kenal Bey has reformed the others out of existence. He showed me the accounts up to date—a scandalous record of stealing. I know they have done very little, but their bill for medicine is over 1,000*l.* He has promised to investigate very closely.

Mr. Chambers brought me a telegram from the Armenian pastor at Dortyol that they had been under artillery and rifle fire last night and lost some lives and animals. I wrote to Mehmed Ali Bey about it, and he came to explain. A mutinous soldier had got drunk at night and fired on the officers' tents. The guard returned the fire, and the whole camp turned out and fired promiscuously. The artillery fired five rounds. In the panic a captain and six soldiers were wounded, as well as two women and children in the village from wild firing. The general has ordered the man to be tried by court-martial and shot.

June 4, 1909.—This afternoon we had a meeting of both committees in the konak. Our committee merely said that they would be happy to fall in with any plans that the other committee might outline. The Vali wishes to be president of the other committee, but luckily at present Kenal Bey is against it. Little resulted, except that Kenal Bey took the opportunity of thanking us in the name of the Ottoman nation.

Our last figures show a total fed of just under 15,000 people, including those in the vineyards. The numbers in hospital are also diminishing slowly.

Two of the main ideas of our committee have been to do what permanent good we could by leaving behind us an orphanage and a hospital. The orphanage would be run by the Germans, who have raised for this purpose about 1,000*l.*, and the hospital by the American Mission. The French priests and nuns have always had a hospital of their own, and we might assist that too if wanted, but I believe a separate fund is being raised in France for this purpose.

Our committee proposes to set aside the money given by the American Red Cross, 1,000*l.*, to establish on a permanent basis a hospital to be managed by the American Mission. Into this we hoped to empty our temporary hospitals which cannot go on much longer, as the houses are only lent for a short time. We are now refusing to take patients unless suffering from direct effects of the massacre.

It is possible that the Turks would prefer to a hospital under foreign management an extension of their municipal hospital. But this would not meet the views of subscribers in America nor, perhaps, those of the future patients. The committee think that, before encountering possible local opposition, the permission would be better obtained through the American Embassy by the channel of the American Consulate here.

I submit a copy of the last balance sheet of the relief fund and a list of subscribers.* Also a printed account of the Hassan Beyli massacre received from the American Mission in Beirout.

June 5.—The parliamentary deputies and the Mutessarif of Mersina are starting to-day for Dortyol to investigate the recent occurrences there. They complain of insufficient information and of obstruction on the part of the Vali.

Up to the time of posting this there has been no answer to my official letter to the Vali, stating what were your Excellency's and the Foreign Office's directions in the matter of the refugees in this house.

* Not enclosed.

The post from Hadjin brings news from Mr. Lawson Chambers that all is quiet there, but many complaints of unfair treatment of Armenian prisoners and news of a growing number on relief caused by refugees from the surrounding villages.

I have, &c.

C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[22987] No. 141.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 361.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 22, 1909.

EUPHRATES and Tigris navigation.

With reference to your telegram No. 211 of the 20th June, I consider that it would be an unfriendly act, and fatal to British trade in Mesopotamia, if the Turkish Government were to give a concession to a company, whether Turkish or foreign, for navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris financed by other than British capital. I leave it to your discretion to warn the Porte in this sense should you think fit, or should affairs become critical.

[23717] No. 142.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 25, 1909.

ARMENIAN refugees at Adana vice-consulate. Major Doughty Wylie telegraphs as follows:—

"I have received a private offer from court-martial, undertaking not to sentence refugees to death, leaving probable penalties of imprisonment or exile, if I could prevail upon them to give themselves up voluntarily. In consideration for Turkish pride the arrangement is to be kept a secret. Before speaking to Armenian refugees I await instructions. Other Armenians are being arrested, and I think this solution would be the best in their interests."

I propose, with your consent, to approve this solution, which seems to be satisfactory.

[23913] No. 143.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret letter from the Government of India, dated the 27th May, 1909, and enclosures, regarding the property at Fao of the sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, June 25, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 143.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)
My Lord, *Simla, May* 27, 1909.

WITH reference to our despatch in the Foreign Department (Secret-External), dated the 10th September, 1908, on the subject of the complaint of the sheikh of Koweit of Turkish encroachments of his properties at Fao, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence, from which it will

be seen that the embankment in dispute has been repaired with the consent of the Turkish military authorities at Bussorah.

2. In the circumstances, we agree with Major Cox that no further action in the matter is necessary at present.

We have, &c.
MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
G. F. WILSON.
S. P. SINHA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 143.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, April* 18, 1909.

IN continuation of this office letter, dated the 11th February, 1909, I have the honour to forward copies of further communications on the subject of the sheikh's Fao properties.

2. In any case, at the present juncture, in view of the disturbed state of affairs at and above Bussorah, nothing in the direction of a casual visit to Sheikh Mubarak's property by His Britannic Majesty's consul at that port, as recommended in Major Knox's letter of the 20th February, nor, indeed, any special action by His Majesty's Ambassador, is likely to be feasible for some time to come.

I am therefore forwarding a copy of Koweit agency letter, dated the 15th March, to His Britannic Majesty's consul, for information, and venture to think that nothing further is at present needed.

Inclosure 3 in No. 143.

Captain Trevor to Major Knox.

Bushire, February 11, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter, dated the 1st February, 1909, regarding rebuilding of Sheikh Mubarak's embankment at Fao, I have the honour to request that you will, if possible, ascertain how Sheikh Mubarak was enabled to rebuild the embankment under such auspicious circumstances, and that you will inform me if his dispute with the Turks on this subject can now be considered settled or merely in abeyance.

2. As you are aware, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been requested to urge the Turkish authorities, at a suitable moment, to settle this matter by arbitration. It is therefore of great importance that he should have early and accurate information as to any developments that may occur.

3. It would seem best for Sheikh Mubarak's interests that he should give us his complete confidence in the matter. Unless he does so, it is extremely difficult for us to act effectively for him. Perhaps you will be able to persuade him to see the matter in this light.

Inclosure 4 in No. 143.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, February 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential letter, dated the 11th February, 1909, requesting that I will ascertain how Sheikh Mubarak was enabled to rebuild his embankment at Fao, and (2) inform you whether his dispute with the Turks can now be considered settled or merely in abeyance.

2. Paragraph 3 of your letter would appear to me to suggest that I should approach Sheikh Mubarak himself on this matter, and encourage him to give us his full confidence. Sheikh Mubarak is at the present up river, and there appears to me

to be no immediate prospect of his return, and the inevitable delay in referring the matter to him induces me to request, with all deference, a reconsideration of this suggestion. If the present settlement is fair and above-board, there is not the slightest doubt that the matter will come to light either from the sheikh himself or from other sources, notably, Bussorah information.

3. If, on the other hand, as is far more probable, the present settlement has been effected by bribery, any questions put to Sheikh Mubarak will merely arouse his suspicions, and, if he should exactly realise the situation, he would regard, with some measure of contempt, my indiscretion in asking inconvenient questions, and would certainly not tell me the truth. That Sheikh Mubarak will give me, or anyone else, his complete confidence in this or any other matter, I am not sanguine enough to expect. He finds it extremely convenient to use his presumed influence with the British authorities to gain his private ends, and does so with considerable adroitness, if we may judge from the political agent, Bahrein's letter, dated the 30th January, 1909, on the question of Koweit pearl merchants' claims against Sheikh Jāsim-bin-Thani, chief of Katar.

4. With regard to the second question, as to whether his dispute with the Turks can now be considered as settled or is merely in abeyance, I fear that it is necessary to consider it merely in abeyance. What is certain is that Sheikh Mubarak does not now wish to reopen the question for the present at any rate, and would probably regret the appointment of a commission. The only action that would appear at all advisable would be perhaps a visit, unofficial, by His Britannic Majesty's consul, Bussorah, if he approves, and the visit could be arranged without alarming Turkish suspicion, so that the fact of the sudd having been actually reconstructed might rest on more substantial evidence than Sheikh Mubarak's statement and corroborative rumours from Fao. No doubt Sheikh Mubarak would be delighted to arrange for the visit in his steam launch, which is now up river. I have the honour to submit this suggestion for your consideration.

Inclosure 5 in No. 143.

Major Cox to Major Knox.

Bushire, March 9, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your reply, dated the 20th February, to Captain Trevor's letter of the 11th idem, in connection with the Fao embankment question.

2. I do not find myself quite sharing the apprehensions expressed in paragraph 3 of your letter.

Sheikh Mubarak specifically requested us to assist his interests by endeavouring to have a commission (to be attended by a British officer) appointed for the investigation and equitable settlement of the embankment question. I see no sufficient reason why we should hesitate to remind him of that fact in a friendly way, and add that he will no doubt realise the importance of keeping us accurately posted in regard to any developments that may be taking place, in order that His Majesty's Ambassador may be informed, and thus enabled to shape his representations accordingly.

I feel sure that Sheikh Mubarak has sufficient common sense to appreciate that aspect of the question.

In any case, we are entitled to presume that he has, without indiscretion. But I opine that, if adroitly approached, he will readily respond, and I request you, if one has not already concurred, to take an early opportunity of mentioning the matter.

If you need any opening, it might well be a message from me, sent on return to head-quarters, on learning with pleasure that the hund had somehow or other been reconstructed without objection from the local authorities at Fao.

Inclosure 6 in No. 143.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, March 15, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 9th March, 1909, on the subject of the Fao embankment question.

2. I enquired yesterday from Sheikh Mubarak how it was that the Fao authorities had withdrawn their opposition to the repair of the embankment in question and

reminded the sheikh that the matter was under reference to our Embassy at Constantinople and that it was important that his Excellency should be kept informed of all developments.

3. The sheikh replied that it was principally due to the changes among the military authorities at Bussorah. He had, through Kasim-al-Khudayree, approached the new Farik, Yusuf Basha, with a request to be allowed to put pipes into the plantation behind the enclosed ground that formed the subject of dispute, representing that, owing to the destruction of the embankment, the plantation behind it was endangered. Yusuf Basha did more than he was asked to. He suggested that Sheikh Mubarak should repair the old embankment and plant it, thereby ceding all that had ever been in dispute. He sent a yusbashi down to see that no one interfered with the execution of the work which was carried out, according to Sheikh Mubarak, unknown to the civil authorities of either Fao or Bussorah. Sheikh Mubarak explained to me that the predecessor of Yusuf Basha, Tahir Pasha, was not actively hostile to Mubarak's execution of the work, and even assisted Sheikh Mubarak by letters addressed to his Excellency the Vali of Bussorah. It will, however, be remembered that His Britannic Majesty's consul, Mr. Genry, at my visit to Bussorah in July last, came to a very different conclusion regarding the attitude of the military commandant at Bussorah towards the embankments in question (*vide* enclosure to my letter, dated the 1st August, 1908).

Inclosure 7 in No. 143.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, May 2*, 1909.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 18th April, 1909, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a despatch (dated the 23rd April, 1909), which I have received from His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, with regard to Sheikh Mubarak's Fao properties.

Inclosure 8 in No. 143.

Consul Crow to Major Cox.

(No. 6.) *Bussorah, April 23*, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th April, I have the honour to state that I informed His Majesty's Ambassador in my despatch of the 12th February, 1909 that, in the course of an interview with Sheikh Mubarak on the 31st January, the sheikh stated that the embankment dispute at Fao had been settled and the works repaired with the help of the Turks.

23717] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 26*, 1909.

ARMENIAN refugees at Adana.

I agree to solution suggested in your telegram No. 216 of the 25th June; and, provided that a written undertaking is insisted upon, you may approve it.

[23970] No. 145.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 28.*)

(No. 455. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 17*, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a confidential memorandum which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, which deals with various subjects with which he has lately been concerned.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 145.

Confidential Memorandum, No. 19.

1. *M. J. Pater.*—M. J. Pater is a Dutchman employed in the Persian Customs; and is now on his way from Tehran to Bushire. He told me that he was a relation of the Dutch chargé d'affaires (at Constantinople or Tehran (?)) and had gone out as secretary to the legation, but that as the diplomatic service of his country is ill-paid he has joined the Customs Department. He said that the Dutch Minister had for eighteen months been trying to get him an appointment in the Persian Customs, and that, though he was appointed to Bushire, he was equally willing to go to Ahwaz or Mohammerah. I mention this matter because, in view of the negotiations for a Dutch irrigation concession on the Karun, it may not suit us to have a Dutchman in charge of the Persian Customs at Ahwaz or Mohammerah. M. Pater speaks English well and says that he knows French and German.

2. *Interview with the French Consul.*—An Englishman named Barnett occupies a house which belongs to a French subject, and has not kept his promise to vacate it. I am trying to persuade him to vacate it, but some days ago M. Rouet called on me with his dragoman and said that the owner, with his approval, was going to send workmen to pull down the door of the house. As the French consul in Bagdad behaved disgracefully towards a British subject in 1887 (which I did not know at the time), it is perhaps as well that I took up a firm attitude. I told M. Rouet that if he did not give me his promise that no violence should be used I would at once telegraph to the British Ambassador and ask that suitable instructions might be sent to the French consulate from the French Embassy. M. Rouet gave the promise and we arrived at a temporary settlement. I hope that the matter may give the Embassy no trouble.

3. *Arif Bey Mardini, Vali of Bussorah.*—Arif Bey has passed through Bagdad on his way to Bussorah. He seems an intelligent man and anxious to do some good at Bussorah. His appointment will, I think, be advantageous to British interests, for he is a great admirer of our nation. His wife (my wife is my authority) speaks English almost like a native, and also French; she has come with her husband to Bussorah because Englishwomen go to all parts of the world with their husbands; she is having her children taught by an English governess, and generally the family shows a wish to be like the English, but at the same to be strictly Mahommendan. Arif Bey realises that he has a hard task before him, but he seemed more determined than boastful. Being a rich man, money is not a temptation to him, and knowing Arabic well he will be able to discuss matters personally with the sheikhs.

4. *Arab Disturbances on the Tigris.*—It is a curious coincidence that these began very suddenly at about the time that trouble was brewing in Constantinople, and that as soon as things were settled at the capital we heard that the Arabs were going to submit to the Government. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the troubles here may have been fomented by emissaries from Constantinople.

5. *Sir William Willcocks.*—Sir William had intended to return to Europe, but the Minister for Public Works has insisted on sending him a deputy, who in his absence would have been authorised to sign cheques, and who would have wanted to be the head of operations. Sir William thought this might lead to difficulties with his English engineers and also with his accounts. For these reasons he has decided to spend the summer at Bagdad.

6. *Abdullah Pasha rejected by Officers.*—Abdullah Pasha, the new commandant of the VIth Army Corps, arrived within two days of Bagdad when a number of officers went to the telegraph office and informed Constantinople that they did not want, and would not have, him as their chief. In consequence of this his appointment has been cancelled. The leader of the movement appears to be Zia Muharram Pasha, an Albanian, commandant of the artillery. He is said to be an ardent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress. Like so many of the Young Turks, he is not a total abstainer from alcoholic drinks, and when I dined with the Vali he was most distinctly noisy.

J. RAMSAY.

Bagdad, May 17, 1909.

[23971] No. 146.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 456.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 17, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo, containing an outline report on the disturbances in Aleppo and Adana vilayets, and of the present situation.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 146.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Aleppo, May 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following outline report upon events in this and the Adana vilayet, from the time of the outbreak of disturbances at Adana up to the present date.

For some days previous to my arrival at Aleppo on the 25th ultimo, there had been great tension between the Christians and Moslems in the town, created, it is alleged, by secret reactionary agents, and heightened by mutual fear and distrust owing to the fighting and massacres in the Adana vilayet, and the outbreaks at Antioch and elsewhere in this province. Fear of the Christians appears to have been unreasonably intense among the local Moslems, who greatly outnumber them, and fear among the Christians rose to such a pitch that hundreds of the well-to-do citizens left Aleppo for the Lebanon, 200 of the poorer took refuge at the Russian consulate, at the invitation of the consul, and on the 23rd April a crowd of panic-stricken men, women, and children rushed to the garden of the British consulate, crying out that a massacre had begun. Mr. Acting Consul Catoni did his best to reassure them, sent for a carriage, and went to ascertain for himself whether trouble had really broken out in the town. Finding all apparently tranquil, he drove back to the consulate, and succeeded in restoring some degree of calm among the refugees, who returned to their homes. During the days of panic and mutual fear, when both Christians and Moslems were armed and in a highly nervous condition, a trifling incident might have led to disastrous results. Mr. Catoni's activity and courageous example during that period, and the wide influence and esteem he enjoys in this town, were of great service to the Christians of Aleppo.

The Vali, also, seems to have used every effort to prevent an outbreak; and the vigilance of the colonel of gendarmes here was most laudable. But the handful of regular troops would hardly have sufficed, even if ably commanded and strongly held in hand, to quell a serious collision between Christians and Moslems in a town of over 200,000 inhabitants. An important factor on the side of peace, as far as the Moslem element was concerned, lay in the fact that the commercial and material interests of many of the wealthy Moslem notables are so closely knit together with those of the Christian merchants, that losses by pillage or fire suffered by the latter would have entailed equal loss upon the former. Moreover, Muslim land-owners in this neighbourhood have not always acquired their property by fair means, and the ousted and oppressed Arab peasants, in a position akin to that of the Egyptian fellaheen of the past, would probably have rejoiced to find an opportunity, in the general confusion of fire and bloodshed, for settling old scores. Nevertheless, the town was in peril, and it was only on the 28th ultimo, the day after the dethronement of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, news of which was received here on the evening of the 27th, that the tension relaxed and the atmosphere cleared. Late that evening the news of the accession of Sultan Muhammed V was published throughout the town by public criers. Firing broke out in the streets, squares, and outlying gardens, a deafening fusillade which at first led to the belief that fighting or massacre had commenced in earnest. Such was the impression among Moslems of neighbouring villages, 600 of whom collected and hurried on horseback towards the town, eager to join in the fray and the looting. They were stopped on the road and turned back by the colonel of gendarmes, who made known to them the accession of the present Sultan. The dethronement of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid seemed to meet with little approval among the majority of the local Moslem Arabs, who took

very little part in the rejoicing otherwise so general. From that time up to the present there has been no fresh outbreak in this vilayet, although the temper of a great part of the Moslems at Marash, Aintab, and in the Alexandretta region remains sullen and lowering, and the Armenians in those towns are still in some fear and uncertainty.

The disturbance at Adana on the 14th ultimo, in which 800 persons are computed to have perished, was followed on the 16th by an attack upon the Armenians at Tarsus. Their quarter was looted and burned, and 4,500 fugitives took refuge in the American college there. Thence the disorders spread to the surrounding country, more especially in the direction of Payas and Alexandretta. Odjakli and Uzerli were plundered and burned, many of the villagers were massacred, and the survivors fled to Deurtyol (Chokmerzemen). Bands of Kurds, Turcomans, Turks, and Circassians, estimated at from 10,000 to 15,000 in all, united to attack that town. The Armenians there took possession of such rifles and ammunition as were to be found in the Government armoury, and offered so stubborn a resistance that their assailants were repulsed with heavy loss. The attacking party drew off, and a large number of them hurried to Payas, where they killed some Armenians, and set free from the prison 418 condemned criminals, who promised to join them in a renewed attack upon Deurtyol (these criminals are still at large). Returning thither, with their numbers ever increasing by the arrival of other bands, they cut off the water supply by turning aside the stream outside the town, and waited for the Armenians to surrender. Meanwhile bands were descending towards Alexandretta, plundering, burning, and murdering as they went. Between the 17th and the 22nd April the village of Fortisli was destroyed, the small hamlet of Kirkhan, the half-way resting-place on the Aleppo–Alexandretta road, was burned, and the few Armenians there were massacred. Hassan Beyli, in the caza of Baghche, was sacked, the villages scattered over the Djebeli-Perekot were plundered and partially destroyed, and many Armenian villagers were slaughtered.

On the 19th April between 250 and 350 Armenians were massacred at Antioch and in the neighbouring villages, and on the 24th Kessab was attacked by marauding bands, who, uniting with the Kessab Moslems, burned the greater part of the town and murdered from 50 to 100 Armenians. The mass of the Armenian population had fled down to the sea-shore before the bands entered Kessab. The villages surrounding Kessab suffered considerably in destruction of life and property.

On the 27th April the following was telegraphed by the American mission at Hadjin: "Soldiers and plunderers raining bullets into the town. Killed and wounded innumerable. Situation awful and urgent." On the evening of the 29th April a detachment of troops reached Hadjin and restored order.

During the last days of April and the beginning of this month great anxiety was felt in Armenian circles here as to the fate of Deurtyol. After the arrival of reinforcements there, and thanks to the activity of the commanders of war-ships in the Alexandretta waters, the bands encompassing Deurtyol drew off, and the water supply was turned back into the town. The bands retired, however, swearing to return, sooner or later, and wipe out the Armenians to avenge the Moslems who fell in the assault. The Adana authorities telegraphed to the Vali of Aleppo that the Armenian Murakhass here should use his influence with the Armenians of Deurtyol, with a view to their delivering up their arms. To this the Murakhass replied that officially he held no clerical jurisdiction outside the vilayet of Aleppo, and that privately he was of the opinion that the disarming of the hordes who had besieged Deurtyol should precede that of its defenders. I spoke to the Vali upon the subject, offering my opinion that, although the authorities at Deurtyol might insist upon the rifles taken by the Armenians from the military store, for the defence of their own lives and of the ungarrisoned town being now given up, it would be a mistaken policy to insist upon the surrender of the personal weapons of the Armenians, as that might invite, and probably bring about, another attack upon the town by armed hordes. Such an attack might then lead to a landing of armed forces from the foreign war-ships, a clean sweep of Moslem bands whom the soldiery at Deurtyol would perhaps prove unable or unwilling to repulse, and the creation of a precedent for armed intervention which would be welcomed by every class of Christians throughout Turkey. The Vali agreed with me that the moment was unpropitious for insisting upon the disarming of the Deurtyol Armenians, and he called on the Murakhass the same evening and spoke to him in that sense. I at once telegraphed a few words, and wrote a careful letter to Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni upon the situation at Deurtyol, as far as it was known here, for communication to the commander of the British war-ship, in order that vigilance might not be relaxed in that locality. Subsequently I was informed, confidentially, through the Murakhass, that the Armenians at Deurtyol were determined not to surrender their weapons, or, if they

received a final summons to do so under threat of bombardment, that they would abandon the town *en masse*, fight their way down to the sea, and lay down their arms under the guns of the foreign war-ships. I was also informed that the Armenians, both here and at Deurtyol, fervently hoped that the European Powers would intervene, or would guarantee the immunity of the defenders of that town on condition of their delivering up their arms. And I telegraphed to your Excellency in that sense on the 9th instant. From letters received from Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni I gather that, although no pressure is now being exercised upon the Deurtyol Armenians in view of their disarming, their situation continues to inspire anxiety at Alexandretta.

Little more than a fortnight ago I received a visit from an English lady, who had just arrived from Aintab. She brought the gravest news, which she put before me so succinctly, and in so careful and virile a manner, that no doubt remained in my mind as to the truth of her statements. This was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. At 9 o'clock I called upon the governor-general, and told him what I had just learned —that seven agents from Constantinople had been inciting the Moslems to massacre, that three Moslem Notables of Aintab, Nouri Bey, Afri Bey, and Abdo Effendi, were bringing their whole weight to bear on the side of massacre, and that the temper of the Moslems in general there had been vitiated by evil communication, they were thirsting for massacre, were patrolling the streets bristling with arms, and cursing and insulting any shrinking Armenian who ventured to show his face in the street; that the garrison of Aintab consisted of 300 local redifs, relatives of the Moslem townspeople, and of only seventy soldiers from elsewhere; that the kaimakam, who had manfully combated the influence of the inciters to massacre, had been threatened and discouraged and was anxious to leave the town, and that the committee of Union and Progress there were too few, or too lacking in local influence to stem the tide of popular hatred of the Armenians. The Vali looked at me fixedly, and asked whether I was quite sure of the truth of the information I had given him. I replied that personally I was absolutely sure, and I begged him to accept my loyal assistance in any way he could suggest to stop impending disaster at Aintab. He sent for the commandant, who arrived after considerable delay. It was finally decided that troops from Alexandretta belonging to the IInd Army Corps should be telegraphed for to proceed of Aintab, and that the redifs there should be disbanded upon their arrival. Urgent telegrams were dispatched to the kaimakam and to the military commandant of Aintab, and I had hopes that Nouri Bey and Abdo Effendi would be removed from that town. An wattempt was made, with the connivance of these men, to bring about a massacre at Aintab at the beginning of this month. A Turk had brought word to the kaimakam that the market was to be fired, and the blame thrown upon the Christians. A day or two later the Turk's dismembered corpse was found in the Armenian quarter. Immense excitement prevailed among the Moslems, and the Armenian quarter would inevitably have been attacked had not the authorities discovered, through a Mussulman woman, evidence to prove that the murder had been committed by a certain Moslem named Sherif, and the corpse placed in the Christian quarter in order to incriminate the Armenians. Sherif was tried and sentenced to death, and the sentence has now been confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Four or five days after my interview with the governor-general, I received word from a European at Aintab that things were much quieter there, the Moslems much less aggressive, and that the kaimakam had abandoned his idea of quitting the town. According to my informant, both the kaimakam and Captain Yakia Effendi, of the Committee of Union and Progress, had been rendering excellent services on the side of peace. The Vali has since admitted to me that I was justified in my estimation of the peril overhanging Aintab. I hear, moreover, from a Franciscan monk and a Protestant missionary at Aintab, from Armenian sources, and from a well-informed Arab notable at Aleppo, that Nouri Bey, and more especially Abdo Effendi, are men of infamous character, whose removal from Aintab is almost indispensable to the safety of the Armenians there.

The situation at Marash, as I had the honour to report by telegram to your Excellency, has been precarious in the extreme, though now the arrival of 250 regular troops, belonging to the IInd Army Corps, to replace the local redifs, has wrought improvement there. These troops were received with great honours on passing through Aintab. A full battalion of Konia redifs—stated in the local newspaper to number 700 men—has also reached Marash. Colonel Riza Bey has been appointed commandant at Marash, and has already taken up his duties there.

Soon after the outbreak of disturbances in the Adana Province, the instigation of secret agents led to the slaughter of eighteen Armenians at Marash, many others being

severely wounded. A few Moslems were also killed before the authorities and troops intervened, and stopped the rioting. From that time forward the attitude of the Moslems towards the Armenians was menacing and hostile, and latterly the Armenians were afraid to go outside their house-doors, or to open their shops. Eighteen Moslems arrested in connection with the disturbance have now been brought to Aleppo. Shortly before their removal a crowd of Moslem women proceeded to the principal Mosque and to the Government House, and with shrill cries and clapping of hands, demanded their release. Twice they demonstrated in this way, the Mutessarif taking no steps to prevent a demonstration planned to excite Moslem fanaticism. Moslem excitement was such that the Armenians remained shut up in their houses awaiting attack. As soon as I heard of this state of things through telegrams received by Armenians here, I went to the Vali and laid the matter before him. He readily admitted that the Mutessarif was most supine, and should never have allowed the demonstrations, and he acknowledged that he himself was anxious about Marash, whence any outbreak of fanaticism against the Armenians would be likely to spread to Birejik, Ourfa, and even to Diarbekir. He sent urgent instructions to the Mutessarif, telling me at the same time that regular troops would shortly reach Marash, that the town would be placed under martial-law, and that there would be no reason to fear for the Christians then. But I could see that he was anxious, and himself almost at a loss to know how to work with an instrument so worthless as the Mutessarif. A commission of three officials, one of whom was the chief of police at Aleppo, was at once dispatched to Marash to draw up a report. The commission has now returned, and I hear are recommending the removal of the Mutessarif as inefficient and lacking in courage.

The Moslems of Marash have been drawing up a mazbata petitioning for the removal of Zeitoun, or its Armenian population, from their vicinity. The Zeitoun Armenians have, for some time past, hung as a cloud over the heads of the authorities and Musulmans of Marash. Had it not been for their proximity, the attempt at a general massacre of Armenians above referred to would hardly have been quelled so speedily. They have several times summoned, by telegraph, the Mutessarif to the Marash telegraph office, asked for and received tidings as to the welfare of the Marash Armenians, demanded that certain Armenians should be sent to them armed and on horseback, &c., and their demands have been complied with. And they have threatened that, in the event of a massacre at Marash, they will descend from the mountains and slaughter every Turk in that town. From Zeitoun on to Azizié there are numerous Circassian villages and settlements, and the Zeitoun people would be hopelessly outnumbered in a conflict against the Marash Turks aided by Circassian bands. But there seems to exist an agreement between the Zeitoun Armenians and the Circassians, whereby the latter undertake to remain neutral in the event of hostilities between Zeitoun and the Turks of Marash or elsewhere. Hence, perhaps, the Vali's anxiety about Marash, the arrest of eighteen Moslems after eighteen Armenians had been slain, and a mazbata praying that Zeitoun, or its Armenians, may be removed to a distant place.

The governor-general, Reshid Bey, and the authorities generally, are, I think, striving to prevent further outbreaks and to bring order out of disorder. Unfortunately, the Vali, who is an extremely able and intelligent man and very hard-working, is disliked by many of his subordinates, who are so inferior to him in ability and attainments, as well as by the military officers; and the members of the consular corps here, who are mostly either natives of Aleppo or foreigners of little experience in Turkey, are inclined to judge him from hearsay, or according to their dragomans' lights. He has been doing good and incisive work, and whatever his private political opinions may be, it is by his work, trammelled as it is at every step by inefficiency or lack of good-will, that he should be judged. I have tried to point out to Turkish acquaintances here that when a governor-general is striving hard to do his duty at a most difficult and delicate time, all patriotic Turks should second him as far as possible, and not obstruct, or stand aloof, or carp.

It is reported in the local newspaper that a Parliamentary Commission has started for Marash, and I hear that members of the court-martial from there are to be assisted by officers from Aleppo in forming the court-martial to be held in the Antioch and Alexandretta districts. The Vali of Adana, according to that paper, has telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior that, in the recent disturbances in various parts of the Adana vilayet 1,924 Moslems were killed and 533 wounded, and 1,455 Armenians killed and 383 wounded. This intelligence deceives but few, but it may serve to render Moslems more sullen than ever towards their Christian neighbours. Trade and credit both at Adana and at Aleppo are at a standstill, and quantities of merchandise remain in the Customs' store-house at Alexandretta, awaiting the return

of security on the Alexandretta–Aleppo road. 6,000 people are receiving doles of bread and other relief from the Government, and the Relief Committee in the Kessab district, and several thousands, I understand, in the Payas-Alexandretta region. Separate subscriptions have been raised at Aleppo by the Vali, the Committee of Union and Progress, and by the Christian notables, for the numberless homeless and indigent Armenians ruined by the disturbances. The authorities here state that relief of the value of £ T. 50 daily is being distributed by the Government in the Kessab neighbourhood, and the Antioch district.

The state of the Alexandretta district still inspires anxiety, and it is to be doubted whether the authorities there have as yet recovered any real hold over the Moslems. It would be well could the country thereabouts be swept by a few battalions of Salonica troops. The presence of foreign warships there seems most necessary at present, and will remain so until the Government regain adequate control. Their presence is beneficial far inland, even as far as Aleppo, whence their movements are eagerly followed. The governor-general, the better-disposed Moslem notables and all the Christians here declare that the only means of insuring against disturbance and massacre in the future, lie in the trial by court-martial and execution of the ringleaders in the massacres. If only a few of the foremost inculpated with inciting to, and promoting massacre, were thus dealt with in each district, it is felt that there would be no further outbreak or bloodshed for fifty years to come, provided no great revolution occur at Constantinople. Meanwhile public confidence is much shaken at Aleppo, the former friendly relations between Christians and Moslems will not be restored for a considerable time to come, and hundreds of Christian Arabs belonging to the working classes are emigrating to America. There appears, however, to be no noticeable emigration of Armenians from this town.

I have, &c.
RAPHAEL A. FONTANA.

[23977] No. 147.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 462.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 21, 1909.*

MY Russian, Austrian, and American collegues having put forward claims for losses suffered by their subjects and citizens at Adana during the recent disturbances, those have been informed by the Sublime Porte that they cannot be considered, and that they are questions that must be submitted to the tribunals.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23979] No. 148.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 464.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 21, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you on the subject of the claim against the Turkish Government in connection with the case of the steam-ship "Johara," in reference to your despatch No. 254 of the 16th June of last year.

The award of the commission appointed to investigate the matter assigned 1,025*l.* to the British and 240*l.* to the Italian parties interested. On the attempt by the Turkish Government to regularise their financial position, their claim was inscribed in the floating debt of the Empire, but I now have the satisfaction of informing you that it has been rescued from that repository of debt, and has been paid in full.

I am forwarding the money to His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, instructing him to divide it in accordance with the decision of the commission, handing over the 240*l.* to his Italian colleague for transmission to the Italian claimant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23989] No. 149.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 474.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 442 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the unsatisfactory character of the sentences pronounced by the court-martial at Adana and on the general situation there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 149.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, June 14, 1909.*

IN continuation of my last despatch I have the honour to report as follows:

With reference to the executions, one at least of the Armenians hanged was in Mr. Chambers' house all the time according to evidence of his fellows, and therefore could not have killed anybody. So far as I can find out the court-martial under Kenan Pasha took over the prisoners with a tremendous dossier made out by the sub-committee of enquiry referred to in one of my despatches. This committee was formed under the orders of Djevad Bey, late Vali. The president was a certain Shakir Effendi, president of the court of appeal, since, for some reason, transferred to Van. The members were the sous-procureur (about whom I know nothing), Abdurhman, son of Abdul Kader Baghdadi, Ali Riza, a staff officer accused of torturing prisoners (since transferred to Marash, where I hear that there have been difficulties since his arrival), and an attaché of the Vali's, Bourhaneddin Effendi. The three clerks of the court were the Mustantik Nazi Effendi, a certain Ismail Effendi, who arrived a few days before the massacre, and is now in prison under suspicion, and a certain Bekir Effendi.

This court has the worst reputation. They began by imprisoning 120 Armenians without touching a Turk. The court-martial under Kenan Pasha should not have accepted any dossier coming from them.

Of Kenan Pasha himself I have a good opinion. But it is naturally difficult to discover the truth if one starts on a totally wrong basis. The prisoners should also be allowed to be represented. Many are too frightened and hopeless to say a word for themselves.

I received yesterday a visit from General Mehemet Aly Bey. As we were alone he spoke perhaps more freely than usual, and gave me to understand that the chiefs (I had complained of their non-arrest) were not in the end likely to escape; that evidence against them was slow in forthcoming, but that the fear of death by hanging would slowly produce it. He instanced the hangings in Constantinople, where it seems they began with the lowest, and so arrived successfully at the more highly placed. I think there is something in the argument.

The Russian consul with the captain of the Russian war-ship came to Adana. They turned back from the Vali's room, because he was in slippers, and appear to have demanded that there should be no executions. The Russian consul afterwards visited me before I had seen the General, to persuade me to telegraph a similar request to your Excellency, or as an alternative that foreign dragomans be admitted to the trials. I replied that I could not take upon myself to do either of these things, as they were in my opinion matters which concerned the Ambassadors only.

Personally I am against the stopping of executions if the chiefs can be made to suffer, for without their punishment there will not be any security for better government.

The presence of foreign dragomans is a matter outside my province altogether, and has doubtless been considered long ago.

The Armenian Catholic bishop visited me to beg me to intervene to save innocent men.

I received last night from the embassy the detailed accusations against the refugees in my house.

All the witnesses named are men of no character now employed as professional witnesses against their coreligionists. They have in some cases liberty and in others money to gain by it.

The deputies are not yet returned from Erzin, and I think we lose nothing by waiting for them. In the meantime I have reminded the Vali that he has not answered my letter. It is possible that the accusations as received from him would not correspond with those given to your Excellency.

It appears that beyond the fact that these men belonged to the Hintchak and Tashnag societies it will be difficult to prove anything directly against them. The subterranean passage referred to turns out to be the chamber made to contain the water from the baptistery. It has been in existence since the church was built.

June 15, 1909.

The Vali paid me a long visit, apparently to tell me that he had sent out to arrest a Turk on a complaint by an Armenian, and to complain of a certain Armenian paper published in America, which he declared as long ago as October last to have incited the Armenians to kill the Moslems. I raised the question of the "Ittihad" here which has been suppressed. He acknowledged it was very blameable, but has not arrested the editor, although he is admitted to be partly responsible for the second massacre. I took opportunity to bring up again the question of the Saigetchid massacre, where I hear from an English correspondent that the Mudir who was the chief culprit is still in office. The Vali said he attached the greatest importance to this affair and had sent a commission to take evidence. I think and hope that this is not true, as such a commission would only interrogate the murderers themselves.

I asked for the accusations against the men in this house and he promised to send them.

Some Armenian prisoners were brought in from Tarsus, whom I am much entreated to help. There does not appear to be any evidence against them, but beyond advising their friends to collect witnesses in their favour and to send in petitions I can do little to help them. I also always advise an appeal to the deputies who unfortunately are not here at present, as also the Mutessarif of Mersina and Tarsus. He has himself told me that in his opinion no Christian in the Tarsus district was to blame. As far as I can find out the plea of self-defence is not admitted by the court-martial.

As the result of enquiries about the witnesses against the refugees in this house, it appears to me that no reliance can be placed upon them. Avedis Effendi I have already spoken of. He is a notorious spy, and was nearly killed at the time of the constitution.

Hagop gendarme is kept in a separate room in the prison, and is giving evidence in many cases which occurred all over the city. He cannot have seen them, as I saw him myself in the American girls' school, and the Americans can prove that he was too frightened to leave it.

Ohannes Semekian is a man of no character. He is, or was, a teacher in the Iladieh school. He was turned out of the local Committee of Union and Progress, because they discovered that he was selling their secrets to Abdul Kadir Baghdadi and his son. This Semekian is now principally employed in watching my house. He was in prison for an hour at the time of the first massacre, but was at once let out as soon as the committee of enquiry referred to in this despatch was formed.

The last man, Takis, is not a teacher, but a dealer in old clothes. He is unknown, but thought to be tortured.

June 16, 1909.

I have the honour to forward by the post the fourth instalment of the accounts of the relief committee.

The Ottoman Committee visited me this morning, and proposed, if we would help them, to build 500 houses at once. They are energetic, and an enormous change for the better from the committee under Abdul Kadir, which has somehow or other expended £,000*l.*, and has little or nothing to show for it. This expenditure will, I hope, be severely questioned by the deputies.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE,
Vice-Consul.

[23990]

No. 150.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 475.)
Sir, *Therapia, June* 22, 1909.

With reference to my telegram No. 206 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, forwarding a detailed account of the recent disturbances at Aivali. As the position of Mr. Eliopoulo, described in Mr. Gout's report as acting vice-consul, is somewhat ambiguous, for reasons explained in my Consular despatch No. 26 of the 18th May, I am waiting till that point is settled before taking up the question of his ill-treatment by Turkish soldiery.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 150.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Smyrna, June* 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Gout reporting a collision between the townspeople of Aivali and the troops on Monday, the 14th instant.

This report is a narrative of the course of events to which Mr. Gout alluded in his three telegrams of the 14th and 15th instant, of which he sent duplicates to your Excellency and myself.

The people of Aivali have always been truculent and disloyal, and this is not the first occasion upon which they have defied the authorities, who never maintain a larger force there than 100 men.

The young men of Aivali and the surrounding islands are all armed with revolvers and Gras rifles, which they smuggle into the country from Greece, and although this occurrence was the result of a drunken brawl and had no political significance, the people of Aivali are looking out for any safe opportunity which may present itself of asserting their Pan-Hellenistic aspirations.

Mr. Gout reports that Mr. Elias Eliopoulo was roughly handled by the soldiers.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 150.

Mr. Gout to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Aivali, June* 18, 1909.

ALTHOUGH my mission here is strictly confined to an enquiry into the affairs of Mr. Michael Sevastos, I felt it my duty, in the somewhat undetermined official status of Mr. Elias Eliopoulo, to inform at once his Excellency the Ambassador and yourself of the events of Monday last.

Owing to the pendency of the official enquiry into the origin of the troubles, the kaïmakam of Aivali is as yet unable to supply me with any official report, and the only information to hand at the present moment is derived from the testimony of some natives who were present at the occurrence, and which I now have the honour to lay before you.

It would appear that a military officer was in the habit of sitting at the door of a shop and treating the women of the neighbourhood with a gallantry that offended them. Three men friends of these women, to whom they had often complained of the officer's unwelcome addresses, happened in the evening of Monday last to go past the shop the worse for drink, and, in a fit of pot-valiant championship of female modesty, they smashed the windows of the shop and upbraided the shopman for encouraging a Moslem, whom they designated opprobriously, in philandering round Christian women. The shopman immediately sought out the officer, who soon appeared upon the scene with some four or five soldiers, whom he ordered to fire upon the drunkards.

These, however, managed to escape, and, as often happens, some fourteen innocent

bystanders had the ill-luck to serve as targets to the random volley that was discharged down the street. Some five pickets of ten each at once turned out of barracks, and, sweeping down the streets, ordered the closing of the shops and the dispersion of the people; not very ceremoniously, it is said. A panic that spread like wildfire at once ensued.

How wide of or near the truth this account is it is impossible, in the absence of other versions, to say; and I can only give it with all the diffidence of one who feels that there may be other circumstances behind it which, when known, might put a different complexion upon the matter.

As soon as news of the disturbance reached our vice-consulate, where I was, I expressed a wish to Mr. Elias Eliopoulo to see the kaïmakam; and on his assuring me that his Excellency would be pleased to come round, I sent him word to solicit his attendance. I would have called myself on the kaïmakam, but that the narrow and dimly-lit streets of Aivali in times of panic might have been dangerous to a total stranger; whereas his Excellency, I felt sure, had means to ensure his safety, which I, but newly arrived, could not possibly possess.

His Excellency courteously responded to my request soon after the Greek bishop with some of the higher clergy called, and the looks of deep anxiety and concern on the faces around and on those of the crowd that had taken temporary shelter in the entrance hall of the vice-consulate clearly showed the situation to be one of no small gravity. We all took counsel of each other as to the best means of warding off the danger that threatened the town, and both the Greek bishop and I were strongly of opinion that nothing short of the temporary isolation of the troops within barracks would attain the desired end. The kaïmakam expressed his concurrence, and at about 9·30 P.M. he and the bishop left the vice-consulate—the former to carry out our suggestion, the latter to exercise his pastoral authority over the natives in subduing their wild excitement. I then sent two telegrams to his Excellency the Ambassador and yourself within an hour of each other, followed by a third dispatched the next morning (copies inclosed).*

In pondering over the situation, I realised more than ever that the clash lay between the Greek population, on the one side, and the troops, on the other, with no admixture of other racial or religious element; and that in the holding in of the troops, who were few in number, as compared to the obstructive inhabitants, and accustomed to discipline, lay the key of the whole situation. Recalling to mind the general demeanour of the kaïmakam while at the vice-consulate, it occurred to me that his look was one of great perplexity, and lest he should change, or be led to change, the frame of mind in which he left the vice-consulate, I ventured, for the safety of the lives imperilled, to cause a letter to be sent to him at 1 A.M. urging once more the advisability of confining the troops, especially in view of the probability of some of the wounded dying.

Under ordinary circumstances I would not have made bold to throw out a suggestion to a Turkish official, but the situation had all the appearance of extreme gravity, and the moment was certainly one warranting, to my mind, a departure from the minutiæ of official etiquette.

The troops spent the night in barracks. This was certified to me by the kaïmakam next day, who added that he had telegraphed his intention to hold them in to the Grand Vizier, and that he was in receipt of the Grand Vizier's approval of the measure.

On Tuesday morning Mr. Elias Eliopoulo and I, together with the French, Greek, and Italian vice-consuls, called on the kaïmakam to suggest that the isolation of the troops should continue until after the funeral of the victims, two of the wounded having by now succumbed. We then proceeded to call on the Greek bishop. He appeared very anxious to quiet his flock, and undertook to see that the burial of the dead was conducted with as little ceremonial as possible. I was afterwards told that he wisely allowed none but the nearest relatives to attend, and forbade the tolling of bells.

By Tuesday noon some 200 soldiers arrived from Smyrna under Major Edib's command, and earlier in the day a gun-boat with some thirty gendarmes and fifty regulars and two officers arrived from Mitylene.

Things seemed to go fairly peaceably when an incident occurred on Tuesday afternoon which all but rekindled the popular outburst. Mr. Elias Eliopoulo, our acting vice-consul, was on his way to his sister's house when he saw a picket of soldiers coming up in the opposite direction.

* Not printed.

He had not passed the picket by a foot when one of the soldiers suddenly turned round upon him and, seizing him by the collar, proceeded to strike him with his rifle. Mr. Eliopoulo told his assailant he was the British vice-consul, but the soldier, nothing daunted, continued to beat and abuse him. A woman, who happened to be standing at her door and who knew Mr. Eliopoulo, rushed up to the soldier just as he was clapping his hand to his bayonet side, and, shoving him aside, said, "You are assaulting the British vice-consul." As this woman's interference diverted the soldier's attention to her, Mr. Eliopoulo managed to find his way to the vice-consulate without further molestation.

About fifty to sixty yards further off a clerk of the Greek vice-consulate, who was an eye-witness of the scene, tried to draw the attention of two military officers hard by; but Mr. Eliopoulo reports that they never moved.

By the time Mr. Eliopoulo reached the vice-consulate news of the assault had got abroad, and a thick crowd soon surged up to the door clamouring for reprisals. About ten minutes after Mr. Eliopoulo's return, the kaïmakam, some military officers, and his French, Italian, and Greek colleagues, who had evidently heard the story, turned up to make enquiries, the armed crowd outside the while increasing in numbers and getting out of hand.

Mr. Eliopoulo then came up to me and said that he thought his presence would quiet the mob, whereupon I of course pressed him to lose no time in appearing before them. He addressed them as follows:—

"If I, who have been assaulted, can keep my temper under control, surely you have the better reason to do so."

As the crowd was about to disperse a picket of marines in the charge of an officer suddenly turned into the street, and at sight of what seemed to be a riot the picket drew itself up for action. The crowd at once drew out their revolvers, and from the sitting-room window where we all stood, not a little anxious at the scene enacted before us, one of the military officers in the room put up his hand while Mr. Eliopoulo and the Greek vice-consul checked the excited crowd. This ended a *quart d'heure* of extreme anxiety which, but for the prompt discretion displayed by the afore-mentioned gentlemen, might have led to very serious consequences indeed.

Yesterday some 200 to 300 additional troops arrived, and more it is said are expected to-day.

The Vali of Broussa has also come to assume the temporary administration of the district. At 10·30 last night the authorities delivered at the vice-consulate an official proclamation for the guidance of the inhabitants, which they also caused to be placarded in the streets. The town is, if not wholly, certainly under quasi-martial law, and the query that arises is why are all those measures of sustained severity adopted in the face of a population already completely brought to a sense of obedience. The reply is to be sought in the peculiar local conditions that prevail here. Up to within the last month the garrison has always been inadequate, and the police force a mere impotent semblance of authority. The aspirations of the people have always been known to be Hellenic, and among them there are many whose means of livelihood have immemorially been exercised in defiance and violation of all authority. One cannot help concluding that the drastic action of the Government is due to the knowledge that Aivali has long been a depôt of contraband trade in arms and ammunition, whence these dangerous wares find their way into the interior of Asia Minor. Moreover, the easy toleration with which the Government has for many years treated these people has fostered a degree of self-assertion and lawlessness which had, sooner or later, to be suppressed, and the present opportunity was too good to neglect.

I have, &c.
EDGAR GOTT.

[23994] No. 151.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 170.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 25, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a note from the Sublime Porte, refuting the charges of excesses at Aivali which had been brought against the Ottoman troops there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 151.

Note communicated to Sir G. Lowther by Sublime Porte.

DANS un télégramme adressé au Ministère de l'Intérieur, Azmi Bey, gouverneur général du vilayet de Khudavendighiar, et Mouharrem Bey, envoyés en mission à Aivalik, font savoir que l'assertion d'après laquelle les troupes expédiées dans le village de Yenidjé auraient commis des actes d'agression contre les femmes, les enfants, et les prêtres est absolument fausse.

Seulement le curé de Yenidjé, interpellé par le commandant des troupes au sujet des armes se trouvant dans le village, ayant répondu d'une façon injurieuse et étant allé jusqu'à engager les habitants à ne pas livrer leurs armes, les autorités militaires ont dû opérer des perquisitions, qui ont amené la découverte d'une grande quantité de fusils Gras.

Azmi et Mouharrem Beys ajoutent que les dites autorités ne permettent aucun fait contraire à la loi, et que c'est dans le but de donner le change sur la vérité et de surexciter les esprits qu'on fabrique des nouvelles sensationnelles et tendancieuses sur les procédés des forces armées se trouvant à Aivalik.

A l'heure qu'il est, l'ordre et la tranquillité sont parfaits dans la dite localité, dont les habitants expriment toute leur satisfaction pour les mesures adoptées.

[24001] No. 152.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 28.)

(No. 486.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Surtees, military attaché to this embassy, reporting on a military mutiny at Hodeidah, for the information of the War Office.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 152.

Colonel Surtees to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 2nd May, 1909, 100 Turkish soldiers, who had been serving against the Zereneek tribe, suddenly and without permission proceeded with their arms from Beit-el-Fakih to Hodeidah, where they demanded to be sent to their homes and to be paid the amount of their army pay, which was in arrear. On being summoned to give up their arms they refused.

As soon as the commander-in-chief at Sana'a became aware of what was taking place at Hodeidah he telegraphed to the officer commanding there, ordering him to open fire from the fort upon the mutineers in the event of their still refusing to give up their arms.

The mutineers then took up a position in a mosque, situated in the middle of a number of mat huts, occupied by a section of the native population and outside the town walls.

The garrison of Hodeidah, including the gunners in the fort, declined to fire upon them when ordered, and 200 other armed soldiers joined the mutineers.

However, on the 6th May there arrived at Hodeidah towards midnight Colonel Riza Bey, who had distinguished himself in the operations against the Zereneek tribe, with four companies of infantry, four mountain guns, and two Maxims.

On the 7th May he called upon the mutineers to surrender. This they insolently refused to do. He then caused the locality to be cleared of civilian inhabitants and the position to be surrounded.

The freshly-arrived troops were at first reluctant to fire, but were compelled to do so by Colonel Riza Bey, who stood over the gunners with a loaded revolver. The mosque was then shelled, the Maxims being also brought into action.

The mutineers at first returned the fire, their object being to shoot the gunners

and then rush the guns; but this they were unable to do in the face of the steady fire directed by Colonel Riza Bey.

At 2·30 P.M. the minaret of the mosque was demolished, and, the fire becoming too hot, the mutineers surrendered after sustaining a loss of three killed and ten wounded.

Only two or three casualties are reported to have taken place amongst the loyal troops. The mutineers were then confined, and the ringleaders will be tried by court-martial.

A state of nervousness is said still to prevail in Hodeidah.

I have, &c.
H. CONYERS SURTEES,
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attaché.

[24002] No. 153.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 28.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 23, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 332 of the 11th May, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from consul-general Ramsey, of Bagdad, reporting on military operations against Arabs of the Lower Tigris.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 153.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 50/492.)

Sir, *Bagdad, May* 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the operations against the Arabs of the Lower Tigris undertaken by about 2,500 men of the VIth Army Corps during the spring of 1909. For my information I am indebted to Captain Denne, R.N.R., the captain of the river steamer "Baghdad," which has throughout the operations been used for military purposes; to Sir William Willcocks, who was on the "Baghdad" at the battle of Mejer Kabir, and to Captain Bowden, lately commanding the Royal Indian Maritime ship "Comet," who was a passenger on the "Baghdad," when she was under fire during the latter part of the operations. Sir William Willcocks has kindly drawn the map which is attached, and he also materially assisted me in preparing this report.

2. On the 4th April at 9 A.M. the steamer "Baghdad," with 350 men of the Nischanchi regiment, the steamer "Basrah" with 150 soldiers, and the gun-boat "Alus," left Amarah for Abu Sidra, where it was proposed to meet Sheikh Araibi on the left side of the Tigris. Sheikh Araibi belongs to the Albu Muhammad tribe, and he was the only Sheikh in this part of the country then on the side of the Turkish Government.

At 10 A.M. some 200 Albu Muhammad opened fire on the steamers from trenches made along the right bank of the Tigris at the Mejer Saghir canal, and the steamers steamed up and down for about an hour returning the fire (Y, Z on plan.) The Arabs never put their heads above the trenches and the soldiers fired in the air, as did the Arabs, and there were no casualties.

The "Alus" returned to Amarah, and I understand that she ran away.

At 11·15 the steamers halted for a short time to repair some defect in machinery of the "Basrah."

At 1·10 P.M. the ships reached (L) and met Sheikh Araibi. It had been stated that Araibi had at his disposal a force of 12,000 fighting men, but the number of men with him was not over 800.

At 6·30 P.M. the "Alus" returned in company of the steam-ship "Hamidiyeh" and 150 more soldiers, and the force anchored at (L) for the night, during which there was some sniping.

April 5.—At 6·15 Arabs were seen to be concentrating on both banks of the Mejer

Kabir canal (A, B, C, D, E), and at 7·15 the steamers put Araibi and his men on the right bank of the Tigris.

At 11·15 six mountain guns and one field gun began shelling (from P), a fort (F) on the Mejer Kabir canal situated 3,800 yards from the river. The practice was fairly good, and the Arabs were seen running out of the fort and the trenches towards the rear. The fire continued all day, and at 5 P.M. the guns were brought to bear on the Arabs' camp and on the bridge (H), which crosses the Mejer Kabir canal about 2½ miles from the Tigris.

At 6·30 P.M. firing ceased.

At 8 P.M. there was heavy sniping from the right bank, so the "Alus" was sent up the river to dislodge the Arabs.

April 6.—At 7·30 A.M. the Arabs opened fire from the woods near Abu Sidra. They were shelled from the "Basrah," and as they left the wood they were charged by some of Araibi's men, who took a few horses and sheep, and burnt two very large hut villages (K and K), which they said were full of dead and wounded.

At 8 A.M. troops were landed from the "Baghdad" (at P) to attack the Albu Muhammad trenches. They began firing at 2,500 yards, and kept firing for six hours at all distances between 2,500 and 500 yards. At about 500 yards they came in range of the Arabs (at D) and lay on the ground.

At 10 A.M. the "Basrah" returned from (N) below the Abu Sidra woods, and sent her soldiers to aid in the attack. The "Alus" went down the Mejer Kabir canal as far as (J). She refused to go to (C) the key of the situation.

At 12 noon the firing was very heavy, and an attack on the Turkish right flank (from E) was beaten off by about fifty soldiers, but the combatants were never nearer each other than 750 metres.

At 3·30 P.M. the "Basrah" went down from the Mejer canal stern first (to W), and all appeared to be going well with the Turks when suddenly about 800 men, most of them of the Bani Lam tribe from the trenches between (D) and (E), rushed on the right flank of the Turkish force (R, Q). The Arabs fight naked above the waist with a cloth round the loins and with bare legs and feet, carrying huge flags 2 yards by 2 yards: about one flag per twenty-five men in the case of the Albu Muhammad and fewer flags in the case of the Bani Lam. The rush was that of the whirlwind, and much more serious than that of cavalry, as the Arabs crept like cats for about 500 yards, and then with a wild shout, waving their flags and carrying their guns high above their heads, swept upon the Turks who fled without firing a shot. Some twenty-five soldiers threw away their guns, but a few brave men turned and fired while running. The soldiers fled towards the steamer, pursued by the Arabs. At this momentt he position of the "Baghdad" was very critical, for she was tied to the bank and had a guard of only twenty-five soldiers on board: fortunately the Arabs turned towards the "Basrah" (at W), which had a considerable force on board, and was consequently able to repel the rush. The Arabs were never within 1,000 yards of the "Baghdad," and still the crew, and especially the twenty-five soldiers on board, became panic stricken, and Captain Denne himself had to loosen the ropes so that he could push off into the stream in case the Arabs actually came close enough to board his ship. He might have been shot by the wild fire of the soldiers who could not be kept from firing and hitting the ground within fifty yards of the ship.

At 6·30 P.M. all were on board, and the ships returned to Amarah.

It appears that the Turkish losses were one killed, twenty wounded, and six missing. Five of the missing men were sent to Amarah the next day dressed in clean clothes.

3. No further action was taken until the 11th April, 1909, when the steamers "Baghdad" and "Basrah" started up-stream from Amarah with 500 soldiers on board.

Kumait was found to be deserted, and Fahad, of the Bani Lam, was landed there and put in possession. But he came back with his men to the "Baghdad," as he was afraid of Balassim's fort on the Dijail, which is a fortress rather than a fort, and dominates Kumait. At Sadiya the "Rasafa," with a force under Yusuf Pasha, was met; the "Basrah," with practically all the soldiers, remained there, and the "Baghdad," with the mails and passengers, came on to Bagdad.

4. These are the facts, as far as I can learn them from notes made while the action was taking place.

It is said that after the fight Araibi was attacked on the Chala by (1) Balassim, of the Bani Lam, brother of Ghadban, the principal chief of the Bani Lam, who keeps 800 trained soldiers, gets a revenue of £T. 50,000 per annum, and pays no revenue; (2) Abdul Kerim, of the Albu Muhammad tribe; that Osman and Zabun-ibn-Yusuf, on

behalf of Sheikh Araibi, crossed to the right bank of the river and attacked Faleh, of the Albu Muhammad, but that he was beaten, and that the river from Shatra to Ozeir remained in the hands of the Albu Muhammad under Faleh; that the people of Amarah are incensed against Muhammad Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of the VIth Army Corps, who, they say, betrayed them for bribes; and that the officer commanding the "Alus" has also been bribed, or is an abject coward, and that, in consequence, he behaved so badly that if he had landed at Amarah after the fight he would have been lynched. The men got waist deep into the water ready to drown him before he landed.

5. I am afraid that the friends of the Turkish Government can find nothing encouraging in these events. A force of four steamers, six mountain guns, one real Krupp gun, which fired from the shore, and fired splendidly, and 650 soldiers attacked the Arab position for two days; the infantry, armed with Mauser rifles, fired nearly all their ammunition at between 2,500 and 1,000 yards, while they were not within range of the enemy armed with Martinis, and then fled in panic on the steamers, and at the end of this the troops had only one killed, twenty wounded, and six missing. When the troops fled the men had at least five cartridges each left in their belts. The officers appear to have shown no want of courage, but they showed no intelligence, and the troops are absolutely undisciplined. The officers in charge ordered the "cease fire" to be sounded very many times, but the men paid no attention to it. Nearly all the ammunition appears to have been expended on an invisible enemy at long range, and when the Arabs made their rush across the open the soldiers had few cartridges left, and they fled. It is said that the Arabs had deserters in their camp who told them that the bugles were calling for ammunition to be brought up, and that this accounts for the opportune moment that they chose to make their rush. When the rush was made there was panic on the steamers, as well as among the soldiers. The "Basrah" cast off from the shore while some of the soldiers were trying to go on board, and they were left floundering in the water while the ship steamed away. On the "Baghdad" the crew also were panic-stricken, and Captain Denne was obliged to himself go ashore and loose the ropes. Having done this, he went to the bridge to take command of the ship, leaving one of his officers to tell him when all were on board. As the bridge was barricaded, the captain could not see what was going on. The officer, whose duty it was to report all on board, threw ashore the plank and reported that all were on board. Luckily Sir William Willcocks saw that some wounded men and many stragglers, principally of Araibi's following, were still making their way to the ship, so he informed Captain Denne, and the "Baghdad" picked up all the wounded and all the stragglers, as well as those who had been deserted by the "Basrah," and she left in an orderly manner. The escort on the "Baghdad" were quite mad with panic; they were firing rapidly on the ground in front of them, where there was no enemy, and so utterly had they lost their nerve that they mistook the dust raised by their bullets for the smoke of the enemy's rifles, and though they admitted their mistake when it was pointed out to them, they could not be kept from firing, because, they said, the noise frightened the enemy.

6. The "Baghdad" left Bagdad on the 17th April taking about 700 soldiers. Captain Bowden was a passenger and he remained on board until the 5th May. He has written to me that on one occasion when the steamer was fired at from across the river there was a panic on board, and he says that it was lucky that there was no fighting, for the men did not even understand the mechanism of the Mauser rifles which they had. One man was trying to go through the firing exercise with the bolt drawn out, and when he was asked what he thought he was doing he replied that he did not know, but that he was imitating a number of the others, which was the truth.

7. When I was coming up in the "Khalifah" at the beginning of the outbreak we only had about a dozen soldiers on board, and though we had twenty-three bullets in the ship there were no casualties; on that occasion the soldiers behaved well; they fired when they were told to and stopped when they were told to, and I did not see any man fire without taking aim. On subsequent occasions when the fighting was heavier the soldiers on the British vessels seem to have entirely lost their heads.

8. After discussing the matter with many persons who were on the steamers I have come to the following conclusions:—

(1.) There is neither discipline nor administrative ability in the highest ranks of the VIth Army Corps. The commander-in-chief told me that he had ordered up one of the steamers to take reinforcements, but the local commander had not sent one up; no proper provisions were made for medical attendance, and when the "Baghdad" left

Bagdad on the 17th April with about 700 men on board she carried no medical officer; the orders received by the officer commanding the troops on the "Baghdad" were to wait at Ali Sherghi till he saw the smoke of steamers coming to Kumait. One night he thought he was going to be attacked and he ordered the captain to steam up-stream, but the junior officers made him alter his orders. When the officer commanding gets written orders a number of officers look over his shoulders and, without his permission, read them.

(2.) The men are out of all control as soon as they get the least excited; they shoot at long ranges without putting up their backsights even when they are not within range themselves, as soon as they are within the enemy's range they cease to advance. They fire without orders and cannot be stopped.

(3.) The officers are either bribed, as is openly alleged in some cases, or they have no confidence in their men. At the latter part of the operations when the Arabs on the right bank wanted to cross to the left bank the steamers could easily have attacked them had they wished to do so, as the movements of the Arabs were known, but they did not move till the Arabs had crossed and got away.

(4.) The men have no confidence in their officers. If the "Baghdad" had not been commanded by an Englishman, and if he had not had the help of another Englishman a number of men on the Turkish side would have been deserted.

(5.) In fact the VIth Army Corps appears to be so deficient in discipline, organisation, drill and morale, that it is little better than an armed rabble, having decent rifles and ammunition, with a few good guns.

(6.) With the exception of about 800 men belonging to Ghadban, the rest of the Arabs are armed peasants who appear to have plenty of Martinis and ammunition, a good deal of which has probably been reloaded with second-rate powder.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[25489] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 171.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 28, 1909.

THE German Ambassador spoke to me to-day about Abu Musa. He urged that it was a very strong measure, while the question was still under discussion and after the German firm had been driven by force from the mines, for our consular agent to have the mines worked in the interest of someone else.

I told him that I had not lately gone into the matter. I had heard that the German Embassy had made a representation against the working of the mines, and I had been informed by the India Office that the working had been suspended. I did not see what more could be said until the German case had been put before us.

Count Metternich said that when the German Embassy made their representation they understood that 600 tons had been mined; but these had been shipped after the representation was made. In any case, the German Embassy had just heard that these 600 tons were not only mined, but also shipped and taken away.

I replied that my impression was that the shipping had taken place before any representation had reached us, but I would enquire as to the facts.

Count Metternich also said that he thought we ought to give an undertaking not to mine any more pending a settlement.

I told him I could not say anything more until I had consulted the India Office as to what the actual state of the case was.

I reminded Count Metternich that M. Wönckhaus had, by agreement, shipped some red oxide since the work had been stopped originally.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[24461] No. 155.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch, dated the 25th June, 1909, to the Government of India, regarding the salutes of certain chiefs in the Persian Gulf.

A copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, June 28, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 155.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, June* 25, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter of your Excellency's Government in the foreign department (Secret), dated the 18th March, 1909, recommending an alteration in the scale of salutes accorded to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein, and the grant of a salute to the eldest sons of those sheikhs on occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives, I forward herewith copy of correspondence with the Foreign Office and Admiralty, from which you will observe that His Majesty's Government approve your proposals.

2. I concur in the suggestions made in paragraph 7 of your letter under reply, that it should be left to the discretion of the political resident in the Persian Gulf to decide when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the sheikhs concerned. In this connection it seems desirable that Major Cox should consult Sir G. Barclay as to how far the proposal to increase the salute of the Sheikh of Mohammerah is affected by the sheikh's position as a Persian subject.

3. I request that I may be furnished with a report of your proceedings in due course. It will be seen that the Admiralty have requested to be officially informed of the date when the arrangements come into force.

I have, &c.

MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 155.

India Office to Foreign Office, dated April 28, 1909.

[Already printed.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 155.

Foreign Office to India Office, dated May 13, 1909.

[Already printed.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 155.

India Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *India Office, May* 25, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of correspondence* as to the proposed increase from five to twelve guns of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and from five to eleven of that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be

* Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3.

personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; also, as to the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and of three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives.

Subject to any observations which the Lords Commissioners may have to offer, Viscount Morley would propose to approve the introduction of these changes, and to leave it to the discretion of the political resident in the Persian Gulf to decide, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the sheikhs concerned.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 155.

Admiralty to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, June* 10, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 25th May, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for India in Council that they concur in the proposal of the Indian Government to increase from five to twelve guns the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and from five to eleven that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; and in the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives. The salutes will be fired, as are the existing salutes of these sheikhs, on the termination of an official visit.

2. My Lords will be glad to be informed officially of the date when the above arrangements should come into force, in order that the necessary instructions may be given to the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, and that record may be kept in office. They have, however, directed the commander-in-chief to instruct the commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf to act on the above scale of salutes when requested to do so by the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

[23287] No. 156.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that the Councillor of the German Embassy called at this office on the 21st instant to say that his Government desired to learn whether the statement in the communication to the Embassy of the 17th instant respecting the sample of Abu Musa oxide which was obtained for Messrs. Strick and Co., to the effect that "the operations had now ceased," meant that the oxide would not be shipped. M. de Kühlmann stated that otherwise his Government protested against the shipment, and asked that it might be stopped.

M. de Kühlmann was informed, in reply, that the communication to the embassy meant that the mining operations had ceased, and not that the shipments had been stopped. It was presumed that the shipment had already taken place.

I am to suggest, for Viscount Morley's consideration, that an enquiry should be made by telegraph of the local British authorities whether the shipment of the oxide has taken place yet.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that the German Government by their action are adopting the standpoint that His Majesty's Government have given an engagement to maintain the *status quo* at Abu Musa. This, however, as Viscount Morley is aware, is not the case, and they have only agreed to allow Messrs. Wönckhaus to take sufficient oxide to fulfil their contracts.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[23424] No. 157.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 276.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 30, 1909.

THE French Ambassador called on the 19th instant and was received by Sir Charles Hardinge. He had been instructed to state that M. Auboyneau had on the previous day informed M. Pichon that in 1903 an agreement had been made between the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank by which the latter institution was to participate to the extent of 30 per cent. or 40 per cent. in the Badgad Railway scheme. The Ottoman Bank had now received a warning from the Deutsche Bank that they must declare before the 23rd June, *i.e.*, within four days, whether they intend to take up this participation or not, and that if the reply was in the negative, the Deutsche Bank would proceed without the co-operation of the Ottoman Bank. M. Auboyneau wished to know what he should do.

M. Pichon had replied that if the Ottoman Bank went in with the Deutsche Bank in the Bagdad Railway, it was a banking concern, and must be regarded as such; but that the French Government would not allow the shares to be quoted on the Paris Bourse unless the scheme were one which they could approve and in which there was a British participation.

M. Auboyneau told M. Pichon that the Ottoman Bank were in the course of discussing British participation with a financial group in London.

The French Ambassador had been instructed to enquire whether this information was true, and what were the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the matter.

Sir Charles Hardinge replied that the views of His Majesty's Government were well known to M. Cambon, and that they had not been modified. He added that no information whatever as to any negotiations with a British financial group for participation in the Bagdad Railway had reached this Department, and that he could hardly believe that any serious negotiations could be in progress without the views of His Majesty's Government having been previously ascertained.

M. Cambon remarked that he was afraid that, owing to the recent exodus of capital from England and France to Belgium and Switzerland, the financial situation had been modified to the advantage of Germany, and that unless some agreement were come to before long we might have the unpleasant spectacle of the Bagdad Railway being completed with British and French capital.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.